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This thesis examines fraud as a basis for the voidabil ty of transfers in Scots law. In 
particular, it focuses on misrepresentation and fraud on creditors. In so doing, an 
attempt is made to provide a principled account of the effect of fraud on transfer 
which can explain the well-established rules in this area, show how these rules fit 
within the broader framework of private law and provide some guidance as to the 
appropriate result in cases where a rule is not clearly stablished.  
 
This account depends on examining the development of the law from a historical and 
comparative perspective, with particular emphasis on the periods during which the 
relevant rules and institutions were being developed or received in Scotland and on 
the links between this process and the wider us commune tradition. 
 
The central contention is that avoidance of a transfer on the basis of fraud is justified 
by a personal right held by the party at whose insta ce the avoidance takes place. In 
the core cases, this personal right is a right to repa ation for a wrong for which the 
transferee is liable. At the periphery, the personal right may arise from the law of 
unjustified enrichment rather than from the law of delict. This characterisation of the 
basis of avoidance explains the protection afforded to subsequent acquirers and the 
limited effect which avoidance has in certain circumstances. It shows the interaction 
between the law of property and the law of obligations in this area and enables 
principles developed in the context of one instance of fraud on creditors to be applied 
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This thesis is concerned with voidable transfers. It examines a number of instances of 
voidability (misrepresentation, challengeable transfers by insolvent debtors, 
litigiosity and the offside goals rule) and seeks to explain them by reference to fraud. 
Voidable transfers must be distinguished from transfers which are absolutely good 
and therefore unimpeachable on the one hand and those which are void on the other. 
The notion of voidness or nullity1 is relatively clear in modern Scots law: the legal 
relations remain as they were before the purported juri ical act. As far as the law is 
concerned, nothing happened. A void transaction is a legal nothing.2 
A voidable transaction is initially effective but liable to be set aside at the instance 
of a particular person or group of persons. An account f an instance of voidability 
should explain why the transfer is problematic but also why the problem does not 
lead to voidness. 
Chapter 2 traces the emergence of voidability as a category distinct from 
voidness. The picture which emerges from this examin tion is that rules which 
render transactions voidable rather than void exist for he purpose of protecting the 
interests of a particular person or group. 
The position is different when we consider the classic cases of voidness: 
incapacity, error, overwhelming force, forgery, vagueness and failure to conform to 
formal requirements. Rather than being vulnerable to being stripped of effect or set 
aside, the act of transfer simply does not come into existence because one of the 
positive requirements for its constitution is missing. 
In the case of the first four mentioned, intention that the transfer should take effect 
is missing. Since, in giving effect to any juridical act, “the law makes itself, in fact, 
                                                 
1 The two terms appear synonymous in modern usage and are used synonymously throughout, unless 
otherwise specified. 
2 Eg Stair I.x.13; Erskine III.i.16; Bell Comm I, 313–7; Bell Prin §§11–4 and Note on §§11–3; WM 
Gloag The Law of Contract in Scotland (2nd edn, 1929) 13–14; WW McBryde The Law of Contract in 
Scotland (3rd edn, 2007) paras 13-13–15. 
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the instrument of [the parties’] intentions”,3 absence of such intention essentially 
makes even partial success impossible: where there is no intention, there is nothing 
to which the law can give effect.4 The intrinsic nature of the requirement of intentio  
means that voidness seems to be an unavoidable consequence of its not being 
present. Similarly, with vagueness there is no clearly defined intention to which 
effect may be given. 
Formalities, on the other hand, are artificial rather than intrinsic requirements for 
constitution. That does not make them less necessary. The difference lies in their 
origin rather than their operation. They have been introduced because of policy 
concerns. In contrast to the rules which give rise to voidability, they are motivated by 
the general interest in certainty (and in some cases in publicity) in important 
transactions rather than for the protection of a particular person or group.5 
If voidability arises from rules designed for the protection of particular persons, it 
is understandable that the validity of the affected act should depend on the will of the 
protected party and thus why it should be voidable t that party’s instance rather than 
simply void. 
In the following chapters it is argued that voidability in the instances examined is 
a mechanism for giving effect to a personal right held by the party with the right to 
avoid. This explains why the protected party has a choice about whether the 
transaction in question should be upheld or not. It also explains why good faith 
purchasers are not affected by the voidability of their authors’ titles. 
It is further argued that in the core case of each of the instances described, the 
personal right held by the avoiding party is a right to reparation for fraud. This fraud 
may be straightforward deceit or it may be fraud on a creditor. The latter type of 
fraud is less prominent in the modern law but it underlies the rules on grants by 
insolvent debtors, litigiosity, and offside goals. The core of the concept is an action 
                                                 
3 F Pollock A First Book of Jurisprudence for Students of the Common Law (6th edn, 1929) 145. The 
phrase is used to describe the R chgeschäft in H Titze “Rechtsgeschäft” in F Schlegelberger (ed) 
Rechtsvergleichendes Handwörterbuch für das Zivil- und Handelsrecht des In- und Auslandes Vol V 
(1936) 789 at 790. 
4 Of course, in some cases, the law deems an intention where it is not there. Once such a fiction has 
been adopted, however, it operates as if there was true intention and thus does not unduly disrupt the 
analysis above. 
5 Public policy considerations clearly also motivate th  refusal to enforce illegal contracts. For a 
similar argument, see FS Wait A Treatise on Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors’ Bills: with a 
Discussion of Void and Voidable Acts (2nd edn, 1889) §411. 
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by the debtor which is calculated to frustrate the ability of one or more creditors to 
get satisfaction from the debtor’s patrimony. 
As well as concerning a type of fraud which is not widely known, fraud on 
creditors presents a further challenge: avoidance of the transfer in these cases does 
not affect the person who commits the fraud (the debtor) but the transferee. The 
latter’s vulnerability is explained on the basis of accessory liability. If a debtor is to 
frustrate his creditors by transferring property, he requires someone who will accept 
the transfer. Therefore, a bad faith transferee maybe regarded as a participant in the 
debtor’s fraud and liable to make reparation along with the debtor. This analysis is 
supported by the idea that third parties have a duty no  to induce or facilitate breach 
of obligations, an idea which is evidenced not only by fraud on creditors but also by 
the delict of inducing breach of contract. 
While fraud (and thus conscious wrongdoing) are central to the core case in each 
of the instances of voidability examined, voidability can also occur where the 
transferee is innocent: innocent misrepresentation, gratuitous alienations by insolvent 
debtors and the gratuitous variant of the offside goals rule. It is difficult to explain 
these rules in terms of a right to reparation. However, they can be explained on the 
basis of the law of enrichment, supported by the fact that, had the transferee known 
what he was doing, his actions would have been fraudulent. 
The common root which litigiosity, transfers by insolvent debtors and the offside 
goals rule have in fraud on creditors gives an insight nto the effect of avoidance in 
such cases. The idea that this might be restricted s well established in the context of 
one of the instances of inhibitions. And since fraud on creditors is the common basis 
of both inhibitions (being an instance of litigiosity) and the offside goals rule, ideas 
developed in the context of inhibition can be applied in the latter context in order to 
address certain problems in the offside goals rule.
A. METHODOLOGY 
(1) Contracts, conveyances and grants of subordinat e real rights 
An investigation into the Scots law of voidable transfers quickly encounters a 
problem: many sources dealing with voidability are concerned with voidable 
contracts rather than voidable conveyances. This rai es two questions: is an 
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investigation of the phenomenon of voidable transfer n cessary and can materials 
directed towards the law of contract legitimately be drawn on in the course of such 
an investigation? 
The answer to the second question lies in the fact th t contract and conveyance are 
both bilateral juridical acts. Both change the lega landscape. Both are underpinned 
by private autonomy and personal responsibility. Both require the co-operation of 
two parties in order to be effective.6  
The notion of the juridical act does not seem to have ppeared in a refined form 
until the Pandectist movement in nineteenth-century Germany.7 However, the ideas 
lying behind the notion have a long heritage in the ius commune8 and have been 
employed even in systems which do not adhere to the Pandectist scheme.9 While the 
concept is not much used in Scottish legal writing, the tendency in the early law to 
treat contracts and conveyances (as well as other acts such as wills and promises) as 
essentially similar might be regarded as hinting at inklings of such a notion in the 
minds of Scots lawyers.10 Detailed evidence for this position is presented in more 
detail in chapter 3.  
Therefore, materials discussing invalidity of contrac s are discussed alongside 
those concerned with transfer. The principles discus ed also apply to the grant or 
voluntary discharge of subordinate real rights. For the sake of brevity and simplicity, 
these transactions are only discussed explicitly in cases where their treatment differs 
from that afforded to a transfer. 
 
                                                 
6 The bilateral nature of contracts is obvious, but transfers are also bilateral because no benefit can be 
conferred upon one unwilling to accept it: D.50.17.69; Stein v Hutchison Nov 10, 1816, FC. 
7 A von Tuhr Allgemeiner Teil des deutschen bürgerlichen Rechts (1910 repr 1997) §50 fn 3. 
8 See MJ Schermaier “Das Rechtsgeschäft” in M Schmoeckel, J Rückert and R Zimmermann (eds) 
Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB Vol I (2003) vor §104 paras 2 and 3. 
9 See Titze “Rechtsgeschäft” 793–800; M Planiol with G Ripert Traité elementaire de droit civil (12th  
edn, 1935) Vol I para 265; L Badouin Les aspects généraux du droit privé dans law province de 
Québec (1967) 122ff; S Litvinoff and WT Tête Louisiana Legal Transactions: The Civil Law of 
Juridical Acts (1969); JC de Wet (revd AG du Plessis) “Agency and Representation” in The Law of 
South Africa, Vol 1 Reissue (1993) para 101; B van Heerden et al Boberg’s Law of Persons and the 
Family (2nd edn, 1999) 749–853; Pollock Jurisprudence 144–5 and 162–6; F Pollock Principles of 
Contract (10th ed, 1936) 2; TE Holland Elements of Jurisprudence (13th edn, 1924) 117–25. 
10 For instance, the terms of the first part of the Bankrupcy Act 1621 strike only gratuitous 
“alienations, dispositions, assignations and translations” but this was quickly extended to cover grants 
of personal rights such as bonds for payment (Bankton I.x.75). Similarly, when sales were reduced on 
the grounds of minority and lesion, the property and contract elements were not teased apart (Bankton 
I.vii.94; Erskine I.vii.44). 
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(2) Objects of transfer 
Throughout this thesis the term “property” is used to signify patrimonial assets and 
thus to include rights. Accordingly, ownership is used to designate the relationship of 
appurtenance between a person and a right as well as that between a person and a 
corporeal thing. This is the orthodox position in Scots law11 but is not 
uncontroversial.12 It was thought appropriate here because of the absnce of a word 
other than ownership to designate these relationships of appurtenance and because 
Scots law has, at least since Stair, taken an essentially unitary approach to transfer.13 
 
(3) A historical approach 
While the primary aim of this thesis is to provide an account of the modern law, 
examination of the process by which these rules becam  established in Scots law 
provides important insights into the nature of the rul s and the connections between 
them. For that reason, particular attention has been paid to the early development of 
the relevant rules. For most of the material covered, this involves concentrating on 
sources prior to the mid-nineteenth century since most of the relevant rules were 
clearly established by that point in time, although the crucial period was later in the 
case of the development of the law of misrepresentatio  and of offside goals. 
Constraints of space mean that it is not possible to examine the later authorities in the 
same degree of detail but these have fully examined by the major modern textbooks 
in this area and in each case the development of the rule is traced to the point where 
it reflects the principles of the modern rule.  
The fact that the rules in question developed at a time which Scots lawyers drew 
heavily on European materials means that it has also been necessary to examine the 
background of the rules in the Civilian tradition. Again, particular attention has been 
paid to materials which had a formative influence on Scots law so historical materials 
are treated in more detail than contemporary ones. 
                                                 
11 KGC Reid The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 16 
12 GL Gretton “Ownership and its Objects” (2007) 71 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und 
internationales Privatrecht 802. 
13 See PM Nienaber and GL Gretton “Assignation/Cession” in R Zimmermann, D Visser and KGC 
Reid (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland 






THE EMERGENCE OF VOIDABILITY 
 
 
The term “voidable” was a rather late arrival in Scots law. In his commentary on 
section 23 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, Richard Brown felt the need to explain it:  
 
‘Void’ and ‘voidable’ are not Scottish law terms but they are convenient, and are 
now freely used in Scotland. ‘Void’ corresponds to ‘null ab initio’; and ‘voidable’ 
to reducible.14  
 
In fact, the 1893 Act was not the first Scottish source to use the term ‘voidable’, 
although it was rather rare before the twentieth century. None of this means that the 
concept was previously.  
Voidability as a concept emerged in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The process was complex and rather opaque but it is possible to trace the 
emergence of several key insights necessary for the concept: 
 
• an understanding that not every problem with a juridical act instantly and 
inevitably deprives it of effect;  
• the idea that some of the rules which render a juridical act invalid do so to 
protect particular parties; 
• the idea that the validity of a problematic act might therefore depend on 
the decision of the protected party;  
• a move from a procedural to a substantive understanding of the 
consequences of different types of problem with juridical acts; and 
                                                 
14 R Brown Treatise on the Sale of Goods (2nd edn, 1911) 148. 
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• a move from a system of categorising problems with juridical acts which 
was based on procedural considerations to one which was based on 
substantive considerations. 
 
From an early stage, Scots law drew distinctions betwe n different types of problem 
with acts and attached different consequences to the problems in each class. The key 
to the emergence of voidability was the move from an essentially procedural 
distinction, concerned with how a problem might be raised in court, to a substantive 
one. 
 
A. NULLITY BY EXCEPTION AND NULLITY BY ACTION 
 
(1) Not all problems are instantly fatal 
In the early sources, most juridical acts which have something wrong with them are 
described as “null”. Thus the term null covers the situations which modern lawyers 
would categorise as either void or voidable. The word “void” is relatively rare before 
Stair.15 Sometimes “of nane avail, force nor effect”,16 “mak na faith”17 or some 
                                                 
15 The earliest example I have come across is King v Borthuik (1532): IH Shearer (ed) Selected Cases 
from Acta Dominii Concilii et Sessionis (St Soc 14, 1951) 2, but that seems to be an isolated incident.  
The term does not appear in Sinclair’s Practicks (G Dolezalek (ed) Sinclair’s Practicks 1540–9 
(http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~jurarom/scotland/dat/sinclair.htm) or Hope’s Major Practicks (JA Clyde 
(ed) Hope’s Major Practicks (St Soc 3–4, 1937–8)) the body of Hope’s Minor Practicks (Minor 
Practicks, or A Treatise of the Scottish Law (ed A Bayne, 1726)). (It does appear in the Index of Acts 
of Sederunt attached to Bayne’s edition. Balfour uses it four times but only in the non-technical sense 
of emptiness (The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendriech (1754 repr as St Soc 21–2, 1962–3) 
395 c XXXIX, 415 c XXIII, 484 c VII and 489 c I). An electronic search of Maitland’s Practicks (R 
Maitland The Practiques of Sir Richard Maitland of Lethington: from December 1550 to October 
1577 (Scottish Record Society (NS) 30, 2007)) was not possible but my research did not bring any 
instances to my attention.  It is used in a technical sense on a number of occasions by Robert 
Spotiswoode (eg Practicks of the Laws of Scotland (1706) 33, 72 and 237) and by Mackenzie (eg 
Institutions of the Law of Scotland in The Works of that Eminent and Learned Lawyer, Sir George 
Mackenzie of Rosehaugh (1716–22) Vol II, 278 at 287 and 325 and Jus Regium, in Works, Vol II, 439 
at 474). The term does not feature in Mackenzie’s Observations upon the 18th Act of the 23 
Parliament of King James the Sixth against Dispositi ns made in Defraud of Creditors (also in Works, 
Vol II, 1, henceforth Observations on the 1621 Act).  Stair himself makes relatively free use of the 
term (e.g. I.iii.7, I.iv.7, I.iv.16, I.vii.4, I.xvi.3). 
16 Eg Ruthven v Muncreifs (1496) KM Brown et al (eds) The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland 
to 1707 (http://www.rps.ac.uk, henceforth RPS) 1496/6/15; Balfour Practicks 170 c VII and VIII, 184 
c XXI,; Dumbar [sic] v Crichtoune (1575) Maitland Practicks Item 363; 1567 c 27, RPS 
A1567/12/33; 1581 c 102, RPS 1581/10/23. Where an act of the pre-1707 Scots parliament is cited, 
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variation thereon is used instead of, or in combinatio  with a reference to nullity. The 
language might be taken to suggest a uniform approach to problematic acts: they are 
null and null acts have no effect. That, however, would be misleading. 
There does appear to have been a period of uniformity, at least for written 
juridical acts but, rather than treating all null acts as ineffective from the start, the 
courts would treat any “evident” as valid until it was set aside by an action for 
reduction.18 The deed might be null, but it had effect anyway for a period of time. 
However, a more nuanced approach was soon evident. As early as the second half 
of the sixteenth century, cases turned on the distinction between nullities receivable 
by exception and those receivable by action.19 There seems to have been relative 
unanimity as to the principal consequence of the classification. As the names 
suggest, nullities in the former category could be raised as exceptions (defences) in 
response to an action brought by another as well as in ctions of reduction. Such a 
course of conduct was not available if the facts merely gave rise to nullity by 
action.20 A defect in that category would not assist a defender who had not 
previously raised the matter in an action of reduction.21 Whether a nullity was 
receivable by exception or action depended on the nature of the problem. For 
example, an allegation that a deed was forged was receivable by exception;22 a 
challenge on the basis of minority and lesion or breach of interdiction required an 
action of reduction.23  
The distinction was couched in procedural terms: it was about the proper way of 
raising the relevant issue. Despite that, it raised the possibility of a problem with a 
juridical act which did not deprive it of all effect: if the nullity was by action, the 
                                                                                                                                
the first reference is to the duodecimo edition (where the act is included in that edition), the second t  
the RPS. 
17 Eg Balfour Practicks 382 c V; Borthwick v Vassals (1627) Mor 25; Hope Minor Practicks §286; 
1555 c 29, RPS A1555/6/3; RPS 1599/7/6; 1605 c 4, RPS 1605/6/32; Registration Act 1617 c 16, RPS 
1617/5/30. 
18 Stirling v Stirling (1543) Sinclair Practicks No 312. 
19 Eg Bisset v Bisset, (1564) Mor 4655; Balfour v Grundistoune (1565) Maitland Practicks Item 230; 
Dumbar v Crichtoune (1575) Maitland Practicks Item 363; Countess of Crawfurde v Glasland (1576) 
Maitland Practicks, Item 396; Boyne v Boyne’s Tenants (1577) Maitland Practicks Item 414. 
20 See the cases in note 19 and Hope Minor Practicks §309 – substituting the terms nullitates juris and 
nullitates facti respectively; Mackenzie, Observations on the 1621 Act 23–4. 
21 Modern Scots lawyers still talk about reduction ope exceptionis where a challenge to a deed is 
raised in the course of litigation rather than as a freestanding action: e.g. Scotia Homes (South) Ltd v 
McLean 2013 SLT (Sh Ct) 68 at para 6; and Rafique v Ashraf [2012] CSOH 155. 
22 Balfour Practicks 384 c XIV. 
23 Stair I.vi.42 and 44. 
9 
 
court would ignore it and thus proceed as if the act was valid, at least until an action 
of reduction was raised. 
 
(2) The “protected party’s option” 
The nature of the early sources means that their discussion of the distinction between 
the types of nullity is relatively limited. However, it is addressed by the seventeenth 
century writers. The most sophisticated analysis is given by Mackenzie who turns to 
the ius commune for aid. When he does so, he is faced with a problem: the Scottish 
terminology does not match that used in the ius commune: 
 
[B]y the Common Law [i.e. ius commune], Nullities are either such as are 
received ipso jure, or ope exceptionis. That is said to be null ipso jure, where the 
Thing is declared null by any express Law, as this is by this Statute… That was 
nullum ope exceptionis, which was not receiveable, except the nullity hadbeen 
proponed, by him to whom it was competent: But in our Law nullum ipso jure, 
& nullum ope exceptionis, are the same, & termini convertibiles: And with us the 
Opposition is betwixt nullum ope exceptionis, & actionis; the Reason of which 
difference proceeds from the Favour designed by the Law, quoad the Form of 
Procedure[.]24 
 
This assumes a single ius commune position but other literature suggests a good deal
of variation.25 This variety may in turn be attributed to the fact that, in so far as there 
was a clear analysis in classical Roman law,26 it related to the formulary procedure.27 
Under the formulary procedure, each case had two stage :28 one before the Praetor 
(the Roman magistrate responsible for the administrat on of civil justice) and one 
before a iudex. In the first stage, the Praetor drew up a formula. This was an 
                                                 
24 Mackenzie, Observations on the 1621 Act 23. 
25 JMJ Chorus Handelen in strijd met de wet: de verboden rechtshandeling bij de romeinse juristen en 
de glossatoren (1976) 300–303; H Coing Europäisches Privatrecht, Band I: Älteres Gemeines Recht 
(1500 bis 1800) (1985) 414; R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the 
Civilian Tradition, (1990 repr 1996) 678–82. In Chorus Handelen in strijd met de wet, only the French 
summary has been consulted. 
26 Coing Europäisches Privatrecht 413 and RM Beckmann Nichtigkeit und Personenschutz: 
Parteibezogene Einschränkung der Nichtigkeit von Rechtsgeschäften (1998) 33–46. 
27 Van der Westhuizen v Engelbrecht and Spouse [1942] OPD 194. The relevant part of the decision is 
reproduced at (1943) 60 SALJ 331, see particularly 333. Zimmermann Obligations 681. 
28 The division of litigation into two parts was characteristic of Roman civil procedure in general, 
dating back to the more formal legis actiones procedure (M Kaser Das römische Zivilprozessrecht (2nd 
edn, revd by K Hackl, 1996) 44–48). Although the cognitio procedure (which later came to dominate) 
just involved a magistrate, the Romans still seem to have thought in terms of these two stages: Kaser 
Das römische Zivilprozeßrecht 169. 
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instruction to the iudex which essentially took the form of an if-then statement: if X 
is the case, condemn A to do Y for B; if X is not the case, absolve A.29 The core of 
the formula was the relevant actio which set out what the pursuer had to establish 
and which remedy was to be granted if he did so. However, the defender could have 
an exceptio inserted into the formula. This was a negative condition. If the defender 
could show that it was fulfilled, the defender would be absolved.30  
Some problems (ipso iure nullities) could be pled before the iudex even if they 
had not been raised before the Praetor. On the other hand, a nullity ope exceptionis 
required to be inserted as an exceptio, otherwise the facts could not be raised before 
the iudex and the party would be forced to rely on restitutio in integrum to reverse 
the result.31 
The classical distinction ceased to be relevant with the move to cognitio 
extraordinaria procedure. As a result, ius commune lawyers struggled to give 
meaning to texts originally written in reliance on classical procedure, which led to 
some confusion. This led Van den Heever J to dismiss the great wealth of ius 
commune scholarship on the types of nullity with the observation that, “Before the 
Gaius Palmipsest was rediscovered and deciphered [in 181632] commentators did not 
and could not understand this distinction between nullity ipso jure and nullity ope 
exceptionis”.33  
Mackenzie radically simplifies the ius commune position. Notably, he does not 
mention those Glossators who drew a tripartite division between ipso iure nullity, 
nullity ope exceptionis and nullity ope actionis, or those who assimilated ipso iure 
nullity with nullity ope exceptionis leaving an opposition between nullity ipso iure 
and nullity ope actionis.34 Of course, the latter looks very like the early Scottish 
distinction.  
In the passage quoted, Mackenzie suggests that nullity ipso iure and nullity ope 
exceptionis are equivalent terms in Scots law. He goes on to apply the ius commune 
                                                 
29 See F de Zulueta The Institutes of Gaius (1953) Vol II: Commentary 258–61; Kaser Das römisches 
Zivilprozeßrecht 310–22.  
30 De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius 280–1; Kaser Das römische Zivilprozeßrecht 260–1 and 363. 
31 F Schulz Classical Roman Law (1951) 51; M Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht (2nd edn, 1971–5) 
Vol I, 208 fn 28; Beckmann Nichtigkeit und Personenschutz 37. Kaser rejects the term ope exceptionis 
as “unrömisch”: Das römisches Privatrecht, Vol I, 635. 
32 Gaius The Institutes of Gaius (trans WM Gordon and OF Robinson, 1988) 11. 
33 Van der Westhuizen v Engelbrecht and Spouse (1943) 60 SALJ 331 at 333. 
34 Chorus Handelen in strijd met de wet 301–2 
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discussion to the characterisation of nullity under the Bankruptcy Act 1621,35 
observing that the ius commune rules and the words of the statute suggested that the 
nullity prescribed by the Act “was receivable ipso jure”.36 However, the practice of 
the Scottish courts had departed from this position:  
 
the Nullity arising from this Act, is oft-times recived only by Way of Reduction, 
whereby the Lords have receded from the express Words f the Law: And the 
only Reason I can give for it, is, That the Author or Disponer must be called to 
maintain his Right; which could not be if the Nullity were receiveable ope 
exceptionis.37 
 
The departure from the express words of the statute is discussed in chapter 6. For 
present purposes, the important thing is that Mackenzie’s approach suggests that he 
thought the ius commune distinction between ipso iure nullity and nullity ope 
exceptionis mapped onto the Scots distinction between nullity by exception and 
nullity by action.  He was not alone in this. 
This parallel usage can make reading the sources difficult. Ius commune nullity 
ope exceptionis corresponds to Scottish nullity by action. However, in the Scottish 
context, nullity by exception is sometimes Latinised as nullity ope exceptionis. In 
other cases, and particularly in Stair’s Institutions, nullity ipso iure is used as a 
synonym for nullity by exception in Scots law and nullity ope exceptionis as a 
synonym for nullity by action.38  
Despite these difficulties, the basic point is clear. While, the terminology had 
shifted, the underlying concepts were substantially the same.  This explains why 
Mackenzie spends time discussing the nature of relationship between ipso iure 
nullity and ope exceptionis nullity in the ius commune: it had implications for the 
action-exception distinction in Scots law. 
Mackenzie thought that only ipso iure nullities could be taken into account by the 
judge ex proprio motu. A nullity ope exceptionis was “not receivable, except the 
nullity had be proponed, by him to whom it was competent.”39  
                                                 
35 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 24. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Eg Stair I.xvii.14. 
39 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 23. 
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At first sight, this does not seem to take things much further than the sixteenth-
century case law: nullity by action/ope exceptionis required something to be done 
before account could be taken of the nullity. There is, however, a subtle difference in 
Mackenzie’s presentation of the rule. He draws attention to the person who had the 
power to invoke the nullity. That person had a choie about whether to invoke the 
nullity or not.40 
Once again, the issue is cast in procedural terms: the question is whether the judge 
is entitled to take account of the nullity. The result of this procedural question, 
however, has significant practical consequences. If the judge is not entitled to have 
regard to the nullity then the act will be treated as valid. If the “party to whom it is 
competent” decides not to invoke it, it is not open to the counterparty to found on the 
nullity. From that point, it is a short step to the id a that someone might have the 
right to set aside a juridical act which is valid for the time being.  
 
(3) Substantive consequences of a procedural distin ction 
A contrast between acts which are null by force of law from the start and those which 
persist but are vulnerable to being set aside at the instance of particular parties was 
also being drawn in Europe during this period.41    
In his Tractatus de nullitatibus contractuum, Biagio Aldimari42 distinguishes 
contracts which are ipso facto “nulli” from those which are “annullandi”.  Where a 
contract is in the latter class, the nullity requires to be determined judicially.43 In the 
interim, the contract remains completely valid. Grotius had earlier drawn a similar 
distinction in his discussion of promises made in error: “For in view of the diversity 
of these cases the [ius commune] writers declare some acts void and others binding, 
                                                 
40 To some extent, this is prefigured by Hope in his paraphrase of the 1621 Act: transactions 
vulnerable under the act were “null at the instance of true and just creditors”: Major Practicks 
II.13.18. However, Hope did not link this to any contrast with ipso iure nullity. 
41 Beckmann Nichtigkeit und Personenschutz 46–7. 
42 Also known as Blasius Altimarius. Very little has been published about Aldimari. His Tractatus de 
nullitatibus contractuum was widely published. The earliest edition that I have traced was published 
in 1678 (held by the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History in Frankfurt and published in 
Naples). According to the title page of the Tractatus, he was a lawyer in Naples. 
43 Tractatus de nullitatibus contractuum bound with and under the spine heading of Tractatus de 
nullitatibus sententiarum (1720) Rubr I Q 36, Nos 283–5.  
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but in such a way as they may be annulled or changed at the choice of the one 
injured.”44 
Mackenzie appears to move towards a similar position n his second comment on 
the ius commune distinction: 
 
By the common Law, either a Penalty was not adjected to the prohibitory Law, 
but the Thing was simpliciter prohibited, and these Things were ipso jure null. 
But if the Law proceeded further, and adjected a Penalty; then either the Penalty 
was adjected to the annulling of the Deed: And then t  Deed whereby the Law 
was contravened was null, and the Penalty was also due, or else the Deed was 
declared null; but so that it was some way allowed to subsist, but a Remedy was 
appointed, and then it was not null ipso jure, but was reducible by the Way 
appointed[.]45 
 
This passage seems to refer to the Civilian distinction between leges perfectae, leges 
minus quam perfectae and leges imperfectae46 but the interesting thing for present 
purposes is the way Mackenzie characterises the types of invalidity. Ipso iure nullity 
is contrasted with a deed which is “some way allowed to subsist” but subject to 
reduction. The context makes clear that Mackenzie regarded the latter category as 
equivalent to nullity by action. So where there is a nullity by action, there is 
temporary subsistence of the relevant act until it is set aside. 
Mackenzie was not the only writer to discuss nullity by action in terms which 
suggest temporary subsistence. Craig takes a similar approach in his discussion of 
inhibitions. Like breach of the 1621 Act, breach of inhibition gave rise to nullity by 
action.47 Craig gives the following account of breach of inhibition:  
 
                                                 
44 H Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres (1646, repr 1913) (trans FW Kelsey (1925)) 2.11.6.1. 
The Latin is “Nam pro harum rerum varietate alios actus irritos pronuntiant scriptores, alios validos 
quidem, sed ut arbitrio ejus qui læsus est, rescindi possint, aut reformari”. Similarly, for promise 
made under the influence of fear: 2.11.7.1. 
45 Mackenzie, Observations on the 1621 Act 24. 
46 See generally M Kaser Über Verbotsgesetze und verbotswidrige Geschäfte im römischen Recht 
(1977) and Chorus Handelen in strijd met de wet 281–3. For a similar discussion see Hope Minor 
Practicks §313–4. 
47 Murray v Mochtand (1564) Maitland Practicks Item 205; Rossie v Crichtoune (1565) Maitland 




[A]n alienation by an inhibited person is not “ipso jure” null so as to render it 
liable to be set aside by way of exception, but must always be reduced by a 
rescissory action “ex capite inhibitionis” as we phrase it.48  
 
Again, we see a link between ipso iure nullity and nullity by exception while the 
action of reduction for a nullity by action is a mechanism by which the alienation can 
be rescinded rather than being a way a recognising or declaring a pre-existing nullity. 
Aspects of Stair’s treatment of these issues also suggest that he considered acts 
which were null by exception as non-existent and those which were null by action as 
subsisting until set aside. An example of the first occurs in a discussion of attempts 
by superiors to grant feus over land which had already been feued, which is found in 
Stair’s oration for admission to the bar:49 
 
[I]f any lord superior qha granted to any man a few give to any man other 
infeftment therfor without infeftment changed without consent of his fewer, such 
an fact is voyde & null and sould be halden as vnmade, sall it then by Laufull to 
the king to give infeftment to any other of his vass l  few without his consent, 
truly the text [Lib Feu I.xxii] answers that such ane fact is not only prohibited by 
the Law and so invalide and by way of action may be annulled but it is even by 
the law itselffe null as if it had not bein made[.]50 
 
The opposition Stair sets up here is between deeds which are null, that is, to be 
treated as if they had not been made, and those which are annullable by action. This 
seems to suggest temporary subsistence of the right which was null by action.  
In the Institutions, Stair brings together the idea of temporary subsistence and the 
protected party’s option. In his discussion of whether an oath can render an otherwise 
null act effective he observes that, 
 
[s]ome deeds are declared null ipso iure, and other are only annullable ope 
exceptionis, or by way of restitution, or at least, where something in fact must be 
alleged or proven, which doth not appear by the right or deed itself; and so 
belongeth not to the judge to advert to, but must be proponed by the party.51 
                                                 
48 Craig (trans JA Clyde, 1934) I.xii.31. The Latin is “Sed nec in immobilius haec alienation est ipso 
jure nulla, ut ope exceptionis tollatur, sed tantum per actionem rescissoriam ex capite (ut solemus 
loqui) inhibitionis”. 
49 Recorded in G Neilson (ed) “Scotstarvet’s ‘Trew Relation’” (1916) 13 Scottish Historical Review 
380. His subject was Libri Feudorum I.xxii. 
50 “Scotstarvet’s ‘Trew Relation’” at 386. 




The context makes clear that Stair regards the class of nullities ipso iure as identical 
to the class of nullities by exception and the class of deeds annullable ope exceptionis 
as identical to nullities by action. 
In the latter case, the oath can fortify the act in question because it will bar the 
swearer from raising the relevant issue. This is not the case if the deed is null ipso 
jure. That can be considered by the judge ex proprio motu or raised by another party 
with an interest. An oath can only exclude points which “are not partes judicis, nor 
consisting in any intrinsic nullity or defect.”52 Stair’s primary focus is on the 
procedural question of what the judge can take account f but the contrast between 
that which is null and that which is annullable is striking. 
He uses similar language in his discussion of the shift away from the nullity by 
exception prescribed in the 1621 Act: 
 
Though the statute bears all alienations, without a cause onerous, in prejudice of 
prior creditors to be null ab initio, and without declarator by exception or reply; 
yet custom has found this inconsistent with the nature of infeftments, which 
cannot be reduced till they first be produced, and ll authors called, which cannot 
be by way of exception but by action[.]53 
 
Again the contrast is drawn between instant nullity, which can be pled by reply and 
something else, which does not give rise to instant nullity but requires a further 
process of reduction. 
That aspect of the passage seems to reflect a substantive distinction. However, 
Stair’s approach also suggests that the shift to a substantive understanding of the 
distinction between different types of problematic a t was not complete. For, 
although the fact that an action of reduction was required might lead to a different 
view of the substantive state of the relevant act prior to reduction, the reason for 
requiring reduction was procedural: the need to call the author of the deed to give 
him the chance to defend his deed. This reflects the general approach of both 
Mackenzie and Hope to classification of nullities,54 and also Stair’s comments 
                                                 
52 I.xvii.14. 
53 I.ix.15. 
54 Hope Minor Practicks §§309–17 and Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 24 
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elsewhere.55 Discussion focuses on procedural concerns such as pre umptions, 
burdens of proof and the availability of witnesses, albeit with some reference to ius 
commune rules on statutory interpretation which focus on the nature of the 
prohibition in question. 
This gives a somewhat awkward combination: whether an act was valid for the 
time being might depend not on substantive considerations but upon questions of 
procedural convenience. In this Stair cuts something of a transitional figure. His 
general statements about the action-exception distinction found the classification on 
procedural issues. However, in certain specific cases, this approach seems to break 
down and the consequences are explained on the basis of ubstantive rather than 
procedural reasons. To understand the context of these cases, it is necessary to 
examine another opposition: that between nullity in the self and restitutio in 
integrum. 
  
B. NULL IN ITSELF AND RESTITUTIO IN INTEGRUM 
As well as distinguishing between nullity by exception and nullity by action, early-
modern Scots lawyers drew a distinction between deed which were “null in 
themselves” and those which gave rise to a right to restitutio in integrum. The 
distinction was most important in the context of dee s granted by minors. 
Before the Age of Legal Capacity (Scotland) Act 199, Scotland followed the 
Civilian tradition of a two-stage approach to the legal capacity of the young.56 Until 
the age of 14 or 12, depending on whether the child was male or female, he or she 
was a pupil and lacked legal capacity. Juridical acts by the pupil were null.57 This is 
illustrated by cases such as Bruce.58 Bruce warned the person in occupation of his 
lands to vacate them. The occupier pointed to a renunciation which Bruce had given 
of his right to those lands when he was six. Bruce in turn pointed out that his tutors 
had not consented and that the deed was therefore “null in itself”. The Lords agreed, 
                                                 
55 I.vi.44; I.xvii.14. 
56 See generally Scottish Law Commission Legal Capacity and Responsibility of Minors and Pupils 
(SLC Consultative Memorandum No 65, June 1985) Part II. 
57 TD Fergus (ed) Quoniam Attachiamenta (St Soc 44, 1996) ch 50. There were some exceptions for 
transactions which were beneficial to the pupil but they do not change the analysis of the division 
between nullity in the self and restitutio in integrum. 
58 (1577) Mor 8979. See also Grundiston v Lawson (1561) Mor 8978. 
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finding that the deed was “null from the beginning without reduction” and so Bruce 
was entitled to invoke the nullity in the course of the litigation. Here it appears that a 
problem which renders a deed “null in itself” could be pled by exception. 
With minors (those beyond pupillage but below the ag of majority) the position 
was more complicated. A minor had legal capacity and could thus perform binding 
juridical acts without needing anyone to act for him. However, minors might have 
curators, in which case their consent was necessary for a valid juridical act. Without 
their consent, the act was “null in itself”.59 Whether the grant was by a pupil, or by a 
minor with curators who did not consent, the nullity was receivable by exception.60 
 Even a minor without curators had some protection: any minor who entered into a 
transaction which was prejudicial to his interests could challenge it on the basis of 
minority and lesion. Such prejudicial transactions were sometimes said to be null61 
but, as will be discussed below, the minor’s power to challenge was usually 
expressed in different terms.  
The period during which the minor could avail himself of the latter protection was 
limited. The challenge had to be brought within four years of attaining the age of 
majority.62 Therefore, it was very important to distinguish between challenges on the 
basis of the absence of consent from tutors or curators on the one hand and 
challenges on the basis of minority and lesion on the other. The former, but not the 
latter, could be challenged even after the four years h d expired.63 The difference in 
treatment was explained by saying that deeds in the former class were null in 
themselves and therefore did not need to be set aside, while deeds affected by 
minority and lesion were not null. Instead, they were open to challenge by the minor. 
This right to challenge could be lost if not exercised within the relevant time. 
However, if the “act” in question was null, it simply did not exist so this logic did not 
apply.  
                                                 
59 Bruce v Bruce (1569) Balfour Practicks 124 c XIII; Kincaid (1561) Mor 8979. This reflected the 
position in post-classical Roman law: C.2.21.3. Again, there were some exceptions for transactions 
which were beneficial to the minor but they do not affect the opposition being discussed here. 
60 Barnbougall v Hamiltoun (1567) Balfour Practicks 180 c V; Bruce (1577) Mor 8979; Ker v 
Hamilton (1613) Mor 8968; Maxwell v Nithsdale (1632) Mor 2115 and Stair I.vi.33. Cf Stirling v 
Stirling (1543) Sinclair Practicks No 312 and Douglas v Forman (1565) Balfour Practicks 179 c III. 
61 Glentoris v Kirkpatrick (1543) Mor 8978 (where the language of nullity is borrowed from 
Justinian’s Code). 
62 This rule, taken from Roman law (C.7.54.3) was established early: Glentoris v Kirkpatrick. 
63 See the cases in Morison from 8978–86. 
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Other rules surrounding minority and lesion also seem best explained in terms of 
temporary subsistence. To set the transaction aside, the minor was required to offer 
to return anything he had received under the transaction.64 Subjecting challenges to a 
condition like this makes sense if the transaction is valid for the time being but much 
less sense if it is not. 
Similarly, a minor’s challenge was refused where thproperty in question had 
been sold on to a good faith successor.65 Again, this suggests that the minor had a 
right against the initial transferee but that the transfer had nonetheless been valid, 
enabling a valid transfer to the third party. 
Often the terminology of restitutio in integrum was employed in discussions of 
minority and lesion. Thus, when reporting one such case, Kincaid, Balfour says that 
deeds by minors without curators are “not in the self null; bot the minor within 
lauchfull time may revoke the samin, and seik restitution in integrum.”66 
In Roman law restitutio in integrum was a remedy which allowed the reversal of 
some legal change such as a transfer, loss of status (capitus diminutio) or a 
contract.67 It was available for a number of reasons including minority and lesion, 
fraud and duress (ie metus).68 Reference to this concept helped link Scots law with 
European thinking in this area but it also supported he idea of temporary 
subsistence. Restitution assumes that the act was initially effective: the remedy was 
not purely declaratory.69 Were that not the case, there would be nothing to restore. 
While Scots lawyers used the term estitutio in integrum, they do not appear to 
have regarded it as a distinct remedy. Rather, restitution was achieved using an 
action of reduction.  
When reporting Kincaid, Maitland says the grant “sall not be null but theminor 
quhan he cums to perfyte age may reduce the samein”.70 Mackenzie suggests that a 
                                                 
64 Barnbougall v Hamiltoun (1567) Balfour Practicks 182 c XII; M’William v Shaw (1576) Mor 9022. 
65 Craick v Maxwell (1683) Mor 9029. 
66 (1567) Balfour Practicks 119 c XXIV. For other examples, see Bruce (1577) Mor 8979; Robertson 
v Oswald (1584) 8980; Edgar v Edgar’s Exrs (1614) Mor 8986; Houtson v Maxwell (1631) Mor 8986; 
Hume v Riddel (1635) Mor 8989. 
67 B Kupisch In integrum restitutio und vindicatio utilis bei Eigentumsübertragung im klässischen 
römischen Recht (1974); Kaser Das römische Zivilprozessrecht 421–6, 493–4 and 581–2. 
68 D.4.1.1. 
69 Prior to Kupisch’s work, the general view was that restitution was achieved by the Praetor’s decree: 
Schulz Classical Roman Law 68. Kupisch shows, however, that this was not always the case and that 
the term restitutio in integrum could refer to an order for reconveyance: In integrum restitutio 12  
70 Maitland Practicks Item 178. 
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minor who wants to challenge a grant should “execute a Summons of Reduction of 
that Act, ex capite minoritatis & laesionis”.71 In his discussion of reduction for 
minority and lesion, Stair seems to use restitution and reduction as equivalent 
terms.72 
Of course, reduction was also the appropriate remedy for nullity by action and we 
see the language of restitution being brought together with that of the nullity by 
action-exception distinction in Craig v Cockburn. Counsel for the minor’s 
counterparty argued that the minor could not plead the nullity by exception but only 
proceed “via restitutionis in integrum, et via actionis”.73 
Craig makes a similar point, observing that feus granted by minors  
 
cannot be set aside by way of exception, but only by decree of declarator and 
reduction on proper grounds. There is an exception to this in the case of a minor 
who, having a curator, grants the feu without that curator’s consent: not only is 
such a feu null and void–for the grant of a feu is a pecies of alienation–but so 
also is any let or assedation granted by him without the curator’s consent.74 
 
This reflects the link between restitutio in integrum and the action of reduction seen 
Craig v Cockburn but Craig does something else that is more interesting. He explains 
the distinction in the following terms: a minor with a curator has, in general, no 
power to contract without his curator’s consent;75 a minor without a curator does 
have such capacity but may be given restitution if he suffers by reason of his facility 
or of circumvention.76 In this explanation, Craig brings a substantive analysis to bear 
on deciding whether a challenge can be brought by exception or not. 
The reason for the difference in treatment of minors with and without curators is 
not one of procedural convenience; it is that a minor with a curator has no capacity 
and therefore his act is necessarily null ab initio. There can be no basis for treating it 
                                                 
71 Mackenzie Institutions 288. 
72 I.vi.44. Eg “There is no difference as to the restitution of minors, though the deed be done with the 
consent of curators. Nor did it exclude a minor reducing, because his curators had received the money 
in question.” 
73 (1583) Mor 8980. 
74 I.xii.30. The link with the action-exception distinction is perhaps a little clearer in the Latin: “A
minore … feuda data omnino non sunt per exceptionem irritata; sed opus est actione rescissoria, 
judicis sententia declaratoria, nisi minor ille curatorem habeat, & sine ejus consensu feudum 
concesserit: nam non solum hoc feudum (cum in feudum atio sit species alienationis) sed & omnis 
locatio, & assedatio a tali minore, sine curatoris consensu nulla est”  
75 “generaliter contrahere non potest … sine curatoris consensu” . 
76 “si ex sua facilitate aut circumventione laedatur, restitui possit”. 
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as valid for the moment. This is not the case where the challenge is based on 
minority and lesion. 
Stair follows Craig in recognising the basic distinc on. Acts done by minors 
without curators are “revocable and reducible upon enorm lesion”77 while “once they 
choose curators, all deeds, done by them without the consent of their curators, are eo
ipso null by exception, without the necessity to allege lesion.”78 However, unlike 
Craig, Stair gives a procedural justification for the distinction: “because they are 
facti, and abide probation, they are not receivable by exception.”79 
Stair returns to minors in his discussion of whether an oath can fortify an invalid 
deed.80 Here, however, the cracks are beginning to show in his analysis. He gives the 
general rules quoted above: where an external fact requires to be proved in order to 
establish a nullity, it is not ipso iure null and may therefore be excluded by an oath. 
Having done that, he moves on to consider specific examples, including deeds by 
minors.  
As might be expected, he argues that a plea of minority and lesion can be 
excluded by an oath. This fits nicely with Stair’s analysis. At this stage he does not 
mention the Oaths of Minors Act 1681,81 which prohibited the exacting of oaths from 
minors, and declared any contract purportedly fortified by such an oath “void and 
null”, a declarator of which could be obtained by “any person related to the minor … 
by way of action, exception or reply.” 
 Stair then comes to the position of a minor with curators and a problem presents 
itself. The age of the granter at the time of the de d and the fact that he had curators 
are external facts.  Therefore, according to Stair’s test the deed should be null by 
action and capable of exclusion by oath.  
However, such a result was unacceptable. It was well established by authority, 
and Stair had acknowledged elsewhere, that deeds by minors with curators who did 
not consent were null by exception. Therefore no oath should exclude the plea. Stair 
tries to reconcile the two positions by pointing to the 1681 Act. According to Stair, 
the exception of nullity cannot be brought by the minor on account of the oath but 





81 1681 c 19, RPS 1681/7/43. 
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this does not stop the curators from invoking the nullity: they did not swear the oath 
and, in any case, the 1681 Act preserves the right of any relation of the minor to raise 
the issue. 
Stair’s argument neglects the fact that the 1681 Act is expressly directed at the 
protection of minors’ right of “revocation, reduction and restitution in integrum” 
which suggests that it was concerned with minority and lesion rather than grants by 
minors with curators. Neither does he reflect on the fact that the problem regarding 
the effect of oaths only arose because he departed from the established rule that 
grants by minors with non-consenting curators were null by exception. 
The 1681 Act renders the issue practically irrelevant but Craig’s view of the 
difference between nullities by action and by exception provides a clearer basis for 
the pre-1681 law: the oath could bar a challenge on the basis of minority and lesion 
because there was a valid act there and the oath took away the minor’s right of 
challenge; where there were non-consenting curators, here was no capacity and 
therefore no deed, meaning that there was nothing to fortify with the oath. 
Later on in his discussion of oaths, Stair does employ an argument of this type but 
the problem he has in mind is not minority and lesion but the effect of force and fear 
and of fraud. They are considered in the next section. 
 
C. MOVING TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIVE BASIS FOR THE DISTI NCTION 
 
(1) Stair’s consideration of other rules 
As with minority and lesion, Stair considers that pleas of force and fear82 and of 
fraud can be excluded by oaths.83 The result makes sense on Stair’s analysis: in both
cases, an external fact requires to be proved for the challenge to be established. Stair 
notes, however, that these rules are potentially problematic: “if oaths be so effectual, 
great inconveniences will follow, a door being opened to force and fraud.” A 
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counterparty who can induce a deed by force and fraud is also likely to be able to get 
an oath from his victim.  
Stair’s first response is robust: “Incommodum non servit argumentum”: 
“inconvenience will not avail as an argument”.84 However, he also seeks to take the 
edge off the harshness of the rule: 
 
if the fear be such as stupifieth, and takes away the act of reason, there is nothing 
done, because there can no contract in its substantials consist without the 
knowledge and reason of the party; or if the deceit b  in substantialibus, as if a 
man should by mistake marry one woman for another, there is nothing done, 
except when an act of reason is exercised: but upon m tives by fear, error, or 
mistake, the deed is in itself valid, though annullable by fear or fraud, which are 
excluded by the oath[.]85 
 
A party asserting fear which “stupifieth” or a fraud inducing an error which meant 
that he intended to do something different from what e appeared to intend would 
need to prove an external circumstance. There would be nothing in the body of the 
deed in question which disclosed these problems. Therefore, they seem to fail Stair’s 
test for ipso iure nullity. However, he perceives a fundamental problem with such 
deeds: the basic conditions for the constitution of the juridical act have not been 
fulfilled. That being the case, there is nothing for the oath to fortify and, since oaths 
are accessory86 to the principal juridical act, this means that the oath will not prevent 
a challenge to the act. 
The distinction between those cases and situations where the challenge is based 
“upon motives by fear, error or mistake” is essentially the same as that drawn by 
Craig to distinguish deeds by minors with non-consenting curators from minority and 
lesion. In one case, the basic requirements for the constitution of the act have not 
been fulfilled so there is no act. This means instat nullity and the act cannot be 
propped up by the lapse of time or an oath. In the ot r case, the act has been validly 
constituted but the circumstances give the granter a right to have it set aside. Since 
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the act exists, conditions can meaningfully be attached to the exercise of this right 
and third party successors can be protected.  
This approach is also reflected in Stair’s classification of challenges based on 
fraud and force and fear under the heading of reparation for delinquences.87 The 
implications of such an approach are discussed more deeply in the following 
chapters. For the present, it suffices to note that, by basing the power to set 
transactions aside for fraud on the obligation to make reparation for a wrong done, 
Stair implies that the power is based on a personal right against the wrongdoer. 
The distinction is based on substantive criteria: the nature of the problem with the 
act. It has substantive consequences: nullity ab initio or temporary validity. In short, 
the logic here is that which underlies the distinction between voidness and 
voidability set out in chapter 1. 
Stair also casts the ipso iure–ope exceptionis distinction in substantive terms in his 
treatment of compensation: 
 
Compensation is a kind of liberation, as being equivalent to payment; for thereby 
two liquid obligations do extinguish each other ipso jure and not only ope 
exceptionis; for albeit Compensation cannot operate if it be not proponed, as 
neither can payment; yet both perimunt obligationem ipso jure, and therefore are 
not arbitrary, to either party to propone or not propone as they please; but any 
third party having interest may propone the same, which they cannot hinder[.]88 
 
Admittedly, the situation addressed here is not a juridical act created in problematic 
circumstances. Nonetheless, Stair’s approach is relevant to the present discussion. If 
an obligation has been extinguished, it will not be given effect by a court. In that 
respect an extinct obligation parallels the consequences of a null juridical act. Stair 
addresses who can raise this issue in litigation and does so by contrasting ipso iure 
effect with ope exceptionis effect. He explains that both payment and compensation 
take away or annihilate89 obligations ipso iure. For that reason there is no protected 
party’s option. Anyone who wants to can rely on their extinction. The implication is 
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that this contrasts with ope exceptionis effects which do not destroy the relevant act 
of obligation automatically and which may only be invoked by certain parties.  
The striking aspect of this analysis is that Stair derives the procedural 
consequence from a substantive effect: it is because the obligation has been 
destroyed that anyone can invoke payment. This is the case despite the fact that 
payment and the existence of another debt are external facts which would require to 
be proved. Thus here, as in the latter part of his discussion of the effect of oaths, a 
substantive approach to categorising types of nullity is beginning to displace a 
procedural one. 
 
D. ESTABLISHING THE SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS 
The basic concepts and distinctions which provide th basis for the modern 
understanding of voidability can be found in Craig nd Stair. However, in Stair these 
co-exist with a competing analysis which categorises problems with deeds according 
to procedural rather than substantive considerations. For the establishment of 
voidability, it was necessary that the substantive analysis should prevail. That it did 
so is evident from consideration of the discussion of these issues in Bankton and 
Erskine. 
 
(1) Minority and lesion 
Like earlier writers, Bankton bases his treatment of the relationship between minority 
and lesion on the one hand and of deeds by minors with non-consenting curators on 
whether the act is instantly null or not. 
Where there are non-consenting curators the deeds “are null, so that there is no 
occasion for reduction, or a proof of lesion”.90 Deeds affected by minority and lesion, 
on the other hand, “are not void, but only reducible upon minority and lesion”.91 So 
far, the analysis goes no further than Stair.  
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However, Bankton goes on to give a more detailed account of restitutio in 
integrum for minority and lesion. Here, there is a subtle difference between his 
analysis and Stair’s. It will be recalled that Stair identifies the need to establish 
lesion, an external fact, and reasons back from that to the temporary subsistence of 
the grant. Bankton approaches things the other way round, explaining the reason for 
an action of reduction in the following terms: “the d eds are not void, but only 
voidable, and subsist, unless reduced by sentence of the lords”.92 This appears to be 
the earliest use of the word “voidable” in a Scots law source describing Scots law.93 
Bankton probably borrowed it from English law. He drew heavily on Matthew 
Bacon’s New Abridgement of the Law94 for his observations on English law in this 
area and Bacon makes extensive use of the term.95 
More significant than the terminology is the logic of Bankton’s argument. The 
substantive point (temporary subsistence) leads to the procedural effect (the need for 
an action of reduction). This brings minority and lesion into line with Stair’s 
approach to fraud and force and fear. 
For Bankton, that temporary subsistence explains how the minor’s right to 
restitution can be restricted to the four years after a taining majority.96 The analysis is 
also evident in his discussion of the protection of a good faith purchaser. He explains 
that such a successor is safe “because the minor’s claim of restitution arises from the 
lesion in the contract committed by the author, which, being personal cannot affect 
his onerous singular successor”.97 
Bankton’s account also suggests that the initial procedural distinction was being 
watered down by the mid-eighteenth century. Having noted that minority and lesion 
cannot be received by exception, he continues “but if one is sued on such a deed 
within the four years, he may use his privilege by way of defence, which will 
sufficiently save the privilege [of restitutio in integrum], and repeat a reduction to 
satisfy the form, if insisted on.”98 On this view, nullity by action was losing much of 
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its significance as a procedural category. The fact that something was not receivable 
by way of exception did not prevent its being raised as a defence. It merely meant 
that, once this had been done, a separate action of reduction was needed to tick the 
formal box. This tendency to circumvent the procedural restriction was not novel. In 
Kennedy v Weir, a minor was charged to pay on a bond but was permitt d to suspend 
execution in order to give him time to raise an action of reduction.99 
One important aspect of the substantive analysis is ab ent from Bankton’s 
treatment. He gives little or no attention to why a grant by a minor with non-
consenting curators or by a pupil is void. This aspect is, however, addressed by 
Erskine. 
Erskine suggests that “a pupil has no person [sic] in the legal sense of the word” 
and as such is deprived of all active capacity.100 He uses a similar argument to 
explain why contracts by married women are “ipso iure void”: their personalities are 
“sunk” into that of their husbands.101 The position of a minor with curators is less 
extreme. He has legal personality and can therefore “act and be obliged.”102 
Nonetheless, deeds done by minors with non-consenting curators and by pupils are 
null against the minor or pupil. Like Bankton, Erskine takes the view that the 
counterparty may be compelled to perform but he views this as an anomalous result 
which is only explained by the law’s desire to penalise those who try to impose on 
the weakness of the young and by “the favour of minors, to whom the law has not 
denied the power of making their condition better, though they cannot make it 
worse.”103 
The key thing to note here is that this favour of minors applies both to minors in 
the narrow sense and to pupils. Erskine equates the position of minors with curators 
and pupils, suggesting that their acts are intrinsically null on the basis of fundamental 
lack of capacity.104 In the latter case, their power to act is contingent on the curators’ 
consent. This is the same argument which Craig usedwhen distinguishing grants by 
minors with non-consenting curators from minority and lesion. 
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(2) Other rules 
Bankton and Erskine also show evidence of a move towards a substantive approach 
to categorising problems with deeds in other contexts. 
 
(a) Bankton 
Like Stair, Bankton discusses the power to avoid deeds induced by force and fear or 
fraud under the heading of reparation for wrongs and, again like Stair, he 
distinguishes between absolute force and conditional force. In the latter case, the 
granter of the deed “chuses the least of two evils”. That means that the force “does 
not exclude all consent”.105  
Bankton thinks this explains the differing treatment of good faith purchasers of 
stolen and extorted goods.106 If goods have been stolen, the victim can recover th m 
from a good faith purchaser without paying compensation. If, on the other hand, the 
owner was compelled to sell, he can only recover from a good faith purchaser if he is 
willing to refund the price that the latter paid: “in rights extorted, a consent of the 
granter, tho’ forced, intervenes, which supports the indemnity of third parties.”107 
Bankton concedes that there are some cases where an extorted deed has no 
temporary subsistence. Even here, however, his language suggests a modern 
understanding of the void-voidable distinction: 
 
In some cases the deed extorted is intrinsically nul; because, if it did subsist, the 
law could hardly give a remedy: thus, a marriage, to which one is compelled, is 
void … the law prevented the right’s taking effect, since, if it did, the favour of 
the case would bar the reducing it: marriage being a divine contract, if it did once 
subsist, it could not be easily set aside.108 
 
Voidness and intrinsic nullity are clearly equiparated in this passage and the reason 
for the exceptional rule governing forced marriage is the difficulty which would be 
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caused by recognising the temporary subsistence of such an act. In the next 
paragraph, Bankton moves on to consider deeds extort d n behalf of third parties: 
“[T]hese [he observes] are likewise voidable in the same manner as if they had been 
granted to the offenders.”109  
Bankton’s views on the effect of fraud will be considered in detail in later 
chapters. At present it suffices to note that the reduction was based on a personal 
right to reparation against the fraudster and that e basic principle was that good 
faith purchasers were protected. 
 
(b) Erskine 
Erskine appears to have taken the view that both force and fear and fraud rendered 
contracts void on the basis that there is no consent.110 Thus, for Erskine, the fraud or 
the force and fear mean that there is no consent and it is the absence of consent that 
leads to the voidness. Since consent is a fundamentl requirement for a valid 
contract, this is consistent with a modern understanding of the relationship between 
voidness and voidability. 
Erskine’s comments on other topics support this view. Like Stair and Bankton, 
Erskine offers an extensive discussion of interdiction. This was a mechanism 
whereby the capacity of “prodigal persons” to deal with heritable property could be 
restricted. “Interdictors” were appointed either bythe court or by the prodigal 
himself and their approval was necessary for grants of heritable property by the 
prodigal.111 
Stair suggests that prejudicial grants made without the consent of the interdictors 
are “void”112 but that the nullity is not receivable by exception. Erskine takes a 
different approach. He agrees that reduction is necessary but the basis for this view is 
not the action-exception distinction. Rather, he argues that interdiction does not 
imply a defect of judgment on the part of a prodigal. The prodigal still has his reason.  
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Therefore, “all his deeds, though granted without the consent of his interdictors, are 
valid” albeit “subject to reduction” in cases of lesion.113  
The same point emerges from the contrast which Erskine draws between court-
imposed interdiction and the brieve of idiotry. The brieve of idiotry was retrospective 
“for an idiot, being destitute of reason, is incapable of obligation”. The prodigal, on 
the other hand, has his reason and is therefore capable of binding himself.114 
The contrast in approach is clear. For Stair, interdiction leads to nullity but the 
effect of that nullity is constrained by procedural ules. In Erskine’s treatment, the 
procedural result remains but its basis is a substantive consideration of the effect of 
interdiction on the prodigal’s capacity. 
 
E. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
The prevalence of the substantive approach to the classification of problems with 
deeds is more marked in late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century accounts. Thus, 
when discussing the effect of restitution for minorty and lesion, Hume explains that, 
where subjects sold to a minor at an excessive price are destroyed, the minor can 
reduce the transaction but only to the extent of recov ring the excess that he paid. 
This is because the sale “is not null and void. It is reducible only, on proof of lesion. 
In the meantime, and till reduced, it is a good sale and transfers the house to the 
minor. As proprietor he is subject therefore to the risk of the destruction of the thing 
by the ordinary rule of law.”115  
When discussing interdiction, Hume follows Erskine’s approach, noting that it 
does not “make [the interdictors’] consent essential, like that of a tutor, to all the 
prodigal’s deeds.”116 Rather, it simply “serves as a means of more easily setting aside 
the deeds granted without consent if they are to his prejudice and lesion.”117 The 
nature of the contrast becomes clearer in light of his earlier comment that “in all 
matters of active exertion [the pupil] is not acknowledged even as a person in law as 
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having a consent or will of his own.”118 In one case there is a protective right to 
recover, in the other the question concerns the basic requisites of the juridical act in 
question. 
A similar distinction is evident in Hume’s discussion of the effect of problems 
with transfer on singular successors. He contrasts the case of fraud with that of theft 
or violence. In the former case, there is consent to convey, albeit obtained by 
unjustifiable means. In the latter, there is no consent and therefore no transfer.119 
Bell’s approach is similar. He describes pupillarity as “a state of absolute 
incapacity” which means that the pupil’s purported acts have no effect.120 In Bell’s 
view, minority is not “total incapacity” and therefore minors are “held capable of 
consent.”121 Nonetheless, deeds by a minor with a non-consenting curator are “null” 
by reason of “presumed imperfectness of judgment”.122 The minor’s capacity means 
that, where curators consent or where there are no curators, deeds are valid but 
“liable to reduction on proof of lesion”.123 
Bell had doubts about the distinction drawn between th  effect of fraud on the one 
hand and of error and force and fear on the other. Nonetheless, he accepted the 
general view that error and force and fear could affect good faith third parties while 
fraud could not and that the basis of the distinction was that there was no consent in 
cases of error of force and fear while there was consent, albeit improperly obtained, 
in cases of fraud.124 
Perhaps the clearest proponent of the modern approach t  categorising problems 
with juridical acts prior to the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was Mungo Ponton Brown. In 
his discussion of the effect of force and fear and of fraud he notes that, in questions 
with bona fide purchasers, it is necessary to “distinguish the cases in which goods are 
purchased from a party who has acquired them, by a sale liable to reduction on the 
head of fraud, from certain other cases in which goods are purchased from a party 
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who does not hold them by a title of property at all” nd suggested that a similar 
distinction was relevant to reduction for force and fear.125  
Like Stair and Bankton, he takes the view that there can be cases where consent is 
obtained by threats of violence. Such action is clearly wrongful but the seller 
nonetheless consents and “although such a contract is clearly voidable, on the head 
of force and fear, it is not ipso jure void, and the property is, in the first instance, 
transferred so as to enable the wrong doer to give a good title to a bona fide 
purchaser.”126 To justify this view, Brown quotes extensively from Stair’s discussion 
on the use of oaths to fortify invalid deeds127 and but he does not discuss or take 
account of the elements in Stair which reflect the earlier procedural analysis. 
Summing up his discussion of fraud and force and fear, Brown returns to the 
distinction contrasting “a sale which is void ab initio, in consequence of the 
incapacity of the parties to the contract,– of some quality in the thing,–or of the 
existence of error” with one which is merely voidable.128 In the former case “there 
being no contract at all, the transaction is ipso jure null, and cannot have the effect 
of transferring the property of the thing sold”, while in the latter, the buyer acquires 
for the time being, albeit subject to a challenge by the seller.129 This distinction 
explains why a good faith purchaser is protected in one case and not the other. Where 
the transaction is void (ie non-existent), the purported transfer to such a purchaser is 
a non domino and therefore ineffective. In the latter case, the initial buyer is owner 
for the time being and therefore has the power to convey to the third party. 
Notable for its absence from accounts by Hume, Belland Brown is any attention 
to the action-exception distinction which had so dominated the earlier discussion. 
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By the end of the eighteenth century, the approach to t e classification of problems 
with juridical acts was one which would be familiar to a modern lawyer. The key 
distinction is between acts which are stillborn and those which are valid but liable to 
be set aside at the instance of some particular party. The latter are not null but 
reducible (and sometimes said to be voidable). Classification in one category or the 
other depends on the nature of the problem with the act. Broadly speaking, the 
absence of one of the essential requirements for the constitution of the relevant act 
will lead to nullity. Where, on the other hand, the basis of the challenge is a rule 
introduced to protect a particular individual (for instance, protection against the 
levity of youth or the consequences of fraud or force and fear) the act is voidable. 
The act is valid but the protected party has a right to have it set aside. Substantive as 
well as procedural consequences flow from this distinction. 
The process by which this end point was attained was a complex one. At the 
beginning of the early-modern period, it appears that a general concept of nullity was 
applied to all problematic deeds. However, from an early stage a procedural 
distinction was drawn between nullities which could be pled by exception or reply 
and those which required an action of reduction. Acts affected by either kind of 
problem were null but the opportunities to invoke th nullities in the latter category 
were more restricted. Scots lawyers appear to have regarded the distinction as 
equivalent to a distinction between ipso iure nullity and nullity ope exceptionis 
which was drawn in the ius commune. It dominated discussion of the classification of 
nullities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.  
In the course of this discussion, aspects of nullity by action emerged which 
prefigured key characteristics of voidability. The n ed to bring an action of reduction 
meant that the party with the right to reduce could choose whether the nullity was 
“given effect” or not. Further, the procedural restiction meant that, until an action of 
reduction was brought, the deed was treated as being valid. 
In light of these characteristics, it is perhaps no surprise that the language used by 
seventeenth-century writers to describe instances of nullity by action sometimes 
suggestd that juridical acts affected by such a nullity were valid until set aside. That 
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tendency was encouraged by use of the language of restitutio in integrum in 
discussion of minority and lesion. 
However, the procedural distinction continued to play an important role and there 
is a sense, particularly in some passages of Stair, th t a distinction is drawn on the 
basis of procedural considerations and that the result of that distinction is taken to 
have implications for the substantive validity of the act in question. So problematic 
acts were divided into those which were null from the outset and those which might 
be set aside, but classification in one category or the other did not depend on a 
substantive analysis of the nature of the problematic circumstance. 
The procedural distinction was, however, under pressure during this period. On 
the one hand, courts were sanctioning other procedural devices which prevented 
effect being given to juridical acts which were null by action even where the action 
of reduction had yet to be raised. On the other, it was becoming clear that a 
distinction based on procedural considerations was not an appropriate basis for 
determining the substantive validity of juridical acts. This is particularly evident in 
Stair’s discussion of the effect of oaths. 
Alongside the procedural criteria, another basis for classification can be traced 
back at least as far as Craig. This divided problems with acts according to the nature 
of the problem: so the substantive consequence (initial ullity or temporary validity) 
depended on substantive criteria (broadly, whether t  essential requirements for the 
constitution of a juridical act were fulfilled). In Stair, this analysis sits, rather 
uneasily, alongside the procedural analysis. 
In Bankton and Erskine, it is clear that the substantive analysis has prevailed. 
Very little attention is given to the action-exception distinction which dominated the 
early discussions. On the other hand, there is extensiv  discussion of whether acts are 
null from the outset or merely liable to be set aside. Where an explanation is offered 
of why a particular circumstance gives rise to one consequence or another, reference 
is made to substantive rather than procedural considerations. 
Brown’s discussion sums up the post-Stair development. The elements in Stair’s 
analysis which focus on the distinction between juridical acts where some essential 
element is missing and cases where the act has been done but was improperly 
obtained are emphasised and developed. The terms “void” and “voidable” are used to 
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denote this distinction and the distinction is used to explain the differing effect of 
invalidities in each class. All vestiges of the distinction between nullity by action and 








Voluntary transfer involves A deciding to transfer property to B and B deciding to 
accept that transfer. If there is some interference with the decision-making process of 
either party then the voluntary nature of the transfer, and thus the justification for 
upholding it, may be undermined. Misrepresentation about some matter relevant to 
the decision is one of the most obvious ways in which this can happen. It is therefore 
not surprising that misrepresentation can render a transfer voidable.  
The orthodox position in modern contract law is that misrepresentation can render 
a contract voidable even if the person making the representation was neither 
fraudulent nor negligent.130 All that is needed is a misrepresentation which induced 
the contract,131 made by or on behalf of the counterparty132 together with the 
possibility of restitutio in integrum.133 Fraud and negligence are only relevant to the 
question of damages. Authoritative statements explicitly endorsing avoidance of a 
transfer for misrepresentation in cases where there is no fraud are, on the other hand, 
rather thin on the ground.134 Should the rules regarding innocent misrepresentatio  in 
contract be considered applicable to transfer? 
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A. MISREPRESENTATION IN CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES 
It might be objected that there is no need to apply these contract rules to transfer. 
Authorities dealing with the effect of misrepresentation (fraudulent or otherwise) on 
the transfer of moveables have a tendency to treat th  problem as internal to contract 
law. MacLeod v Kerr135exemplifies this approach: a dispute between the defrauded 
party and the singular successor of the fraudster was discussed in terms of the effect 
of the misrepresentation on the contract rather than e transfer. 
This reflects Bell’s view of the relationship between contract and conveyance. For 
corporeal moveables Bell held what might be described as a “hard” iusta causa 
position. On this view, the prior contract is not merely necessary for a valid transfer, 
it also supplies the mental element for that transfer.136 Delivery is a purely formal 
act, with no mental element. This leads Bell to conclude that misrepresentation 
(fraudulent misrepresentation in the case he was con idering) could have no effect 
upon it. This is clearly some distance from the abstr ct analysis of transfer which 
dominates modern property scholarship in Scotland.137 It should be borne in mind, 
however, that a similar approach may have prevailed in Roman law.138  
This proclivity may have been exacerbated by the fact that, in a two-party case, 
reduction of a contract of sale will usually be a perfectly adequate remedy. It is well 
known that restitutio in integrum must be possible if a contract is to be reduced.139 
This is required because an order to restore performance tendered is part of the 
remedy given when a contract is reduced. In the case of sale, that will mean 
                                                 
135 1965 SC 253. See Smith Short Commentary 816 (criticising the earlier case Morrison v Roberston 
1908 SC 332) and “Error and Transfer of Title” (1967) 12 JLSS 206, criticising MacLeod. 
136 Bell Comm I, 262 and 268. MP Brown appears to have taken a similar view, although his 
expression of it is less explicit than Bell’s: Sale §§570 and 577. See also Erskine II.i.18 and II.vii.23 
and Hume Lectures Vol III, 245. 
137 Reid Property paras 606–13; DL Carey Miller “Systems of Property in Grotius and Stair” in DL 
Carey Miller and DW Meyers (eds) Comparative and Historical Essays in Scots Law (1992) 13 
especially at 19 and 28–30; DL Carey Miller with D Irvine Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law (2nd 
edn, 2005) paras 8-06–10; and LPW van Vliet “The Transfer of Moveables in Scotland and England” 
(2008) 12 EdinLR 173 at 192–9. 
138 See Zimmermann Obligations 240 and authorities cited. See also JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman 
Law (1976) 180, suggesting that traditio was “essentially factual”. Thomas, however, suggests that 
error in persona, in corpore and in dominium could affect the traditio directly, which seems to imply 
that it must have had some mental element: p 181. 
139 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & South-Western Railway 1915 SC (HL) 20. 
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retransfer of the object of the bargain. Therefore reduction of the contract will, in 
two-party cases, often lead to the same result as reduction of the transfer. Restitutio 
in integrum is more properly seen as part of the remedy sought when reducing a 
contract rather than as a prerequisite for its grant. The requirement that restitutio be 
possible is simply a requirement that the remedy sought be possible. 
Despite this, however, Scots law historically regarded fraud (and thus fraudulent 
misrepresentation) as being as much an issue for conveyances as for contracts. This 
is evident in Balfour’s record of one of the earliest Scottish statements about 
fraudulent misrepresentation: 
 
All contractis, infeftmentis, or obligatiounis quhatsumever, maid betwixt twa 
parties, quhairin the ane of thame is inducit to mak or give the same by deceipt or 
fraud usit be the uther partie; he that is deceivit and fraudfullie hurt, aucht and 
sould be restorit in integrum: And the samin contract, infeftment or obligatioun, as 
procedand fra fraud and deceipt, aucht and sould be ec rnit of nane avail, and 
reducit[.]140 
 
Similarly, Stair opens his discussion of fraud with a discussion of “circumvention” 
which “signifieth the act of fraud, whereby a person is induced to a deed or 
obligation by deceit”.141  
Balfour’s note is under the heading “Restitutioun”, Stair’s under reparation for 
wrongs. Mackenzie discusses fraud in his chapter on “Actions”.142 Bankton follows 
Stair.143 The first Scottish writer to consider fraud among the requirements for a valid 
contract is Erskine.144 Even he, however, does not explicitly reject consideration of 
fraud in relation to transfers. The pre-Erskine approach suggests two things: first, 
contrary to the “hard” iusta causa position, transfers are capable of being directly 
affected by fraud and therefore require to be analysed independently of the contract; 
second, the default position is that rules concerning fraud are general, applying on 
essentially the same terms to contracts and conveyac s of all types of asset. 
This approach is consistent with Stair’s tendency to draw parallels between the 
voluntary aspect of contracts and conveyances and his emphasis on the importance of 
                                                 
140 Hervie v Levingstoun (1516) Balfour Practicks 183 c XVIII.  
141 I.ix.9. 
142 Institutions 496–7. 
143 I.x.62. 
144 III.i.16. Bell follows Erskine’s approach: Prin §§13–4. 
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the will in transfer. Stair conceptualised voluntary obligations as alienations of 
freedom: 
 
[F]or it is the will of the owner, that naturally transferreth right from him to the 
acquirer: so in personal rights, that freedom we have of disposal of ourselves, our 
actions and things, which naturally is in us, is by our engagement placed in 
another[.]145 
 
Further, Stair suggests that, as a matter of principle, “[t]hat the dispositive will of the 
owner alone, without any further is sufficient to alienate his right”.146 Thus, he places 
the will at the heart of his analysis of transfer. He goes on to discuss the various 
formalities introduced by “custom” motivated by “expediency” or “utility” for 
assignation, transfer of moveables and transfer of heritable property.147 However, it 
is clear that these formalities supplement rather tan supplant the requirement for the 
will to transfer. While clear distinctions are drawn between the formal aspects, 
Stair’s treatment seems to suggest that the mental lement is the same for all three 
types of transfer.  
Note should also be taken of the line of cases concerning purchases by buyers 
who knew themselves to be insolvent. The nature of the insolvency which rendered 
such a purchase fraudulent changed over time. For present purposes, it is sufficient to 
note that a seller whose buyer knew himself to be rel vantly insolvent at the time of 
the transaction could reduce it and recover any goods delivered from the trustee in 
sequestration or attaching creditors.148 In many cases, the buyer had the requisite 
knowledge at the time when the contract was concluded so the contract was attacked 
and the transfer was swept up behind it.149 However, in a number of cases knowledge 
of insolvency at the time of the contract was not established and the courts focussed 
on fraudulent intent vitiating the act of transfer.150 As Bell well understood, a “hard” 




148 For discussion of the defrauded party’s preference over general creditors, see below. 
149 Eg Prince v Pallat (1690) Mor 4932; Main v Keeper of the Weigh House of Glasgow (1715) Mor 
4934; Forbes v Mains & Co (1752) Mor 4937; Dunlop v Crookshanks (1752) Mor 4879.  
150 Inglis v Royal Bank (1736) Mor 4936; Allan, Steuart & Co v Creditors of Stein (1788) Mor 4949 
(as Hume points out, this part of the decision was left untouched by the House of Lords on appeal: 
(1790) 3 Pat 191);  Stein v Hutchison 16 Nov 1810, FC; Carnegie & Co v Hutchison (1815) Hume 
704; Brown v Watson (1816) Hume 709; Schuurmans & Sons v Tweedie’s Trs(1826) 6 S 1110 (here 
the issue is treated as fraud deployed to prevent exercise of the right of stoppage in transitu); Watt v 
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iusta causa position which denied independent intention to transfer would have no 
room for this result. He therefore rejected the relevance of such supervening 
knowledge of insolvency.151 However, both the cases and his teacher David Hume 
appear to be against him on the point.152  
Although the detail of the test for fraud in this stuation changed over time, the 
same test was being applied whether the contract or he transfer was being 
challenged. In contrast, the rule in the straightforward case of direct fraudulent 
misrepresentation has remained remarkably stable over time. Balfour’s summary of 
Hervie v Levingstoun would only need to have its spelling revised to pass for a 
modern statement of the rule. The requirements that the representation is made by the 
counterparty153 and induces the deceived party to act154 are already there. Once 
Mackenzie had made it clear that the nullity did not occur ipso iure155 and Stair has 
shown that it was the injured party who was entitled o decide whether to avoid the 
transaction or not,156 the basic content of the rule on fraudulent misrepresentation 
was established. The rule was common to contract and co veyance. While Erskine 
and Bell treated fraud as a question for the formation of contract, a general approach 
continued to be applied by lecturers and textbook writers on conveyancing.157 
Menzies, for instance, discussed fraud as part of asection entitled “The general 
requisites of all deeds, whatever may be the nature of the rights to which they 
relate”.158 
                                                                                                                                
Findlay (1846) 8 D 529 and, somewhat uncertainly, Booker & Co v Milne (1870) 9 M 314; Young v 
DS Dalgleish & Son 1994 SCLR 696. In Watt, three of the judges are clearly uncomfortable with the 
conflict between the court authorities and Bell’s position. Analogous support can also be derived from 
the interlocutor on the plea of error in Dunlop v Crookshanks (1752) Mor 4879 at 4880. In that case, 
the seller thought he was selling to a partnership which did not exist, so both the contract and the 
transfer were void but the interlocutor clearly focuses on the act of transfer rather than on the contract. 
151 Comm I, 262 and 268. 
152 Lectures Vol II, 15–6. 
153 McBryde Contract para 14-38 
154 Ibid para 14-44. 
155 Institutions 496. 
156 I.ix.14. 
157 AM Bell Lectures on Conveyancing (3rd edn, 1882) Vol I, 170; J Hendry A Manual of 
Conveyancing in the Form of Question and Answer (4th edn by J P Wood, 1888) 74; HH Brown The 
Elements of Practical Conveyancing (1891) 35; A Menzies Conveyancing according to the Law of 
Scotland (4th edn by JS Sturrock, 1900) 73; J Burns Handbook of Conveyancing (5th edn, 1938) 41–2. 
158 Conveyancing 25. 
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While there might be some doubt about whether Scots law employs an abstract 
system of transfer,159 there can be little doubt that it recognises the principle of 
separation, under which contract and conveyance are separate juridical acts each 
requiring the will of the parties. Against this background, it appears clear that both 
contract and conveyance can be rendered voidable by fraudulent 
misrepresentation.160 Furthermore, the approach taken in the sources sugge ts that 
the same test for voidability should apply irrespective of whether the affected act is a 
contract or a conveyance. For this reason authorities on contracts rendered voidable 
by fraudulent misrepresentation are relevant to the voidability of transfers. 
 
B. FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND INNOCENCE 
Even if it is accepted that fraudulent misrepresentation can render a transfer voidable 
and that the same criteria are applicable to both contract and conveyance, the 
position might be different where the misrepresentation is innocent rather than 
fraudulent. Acceptance of non-fraudulent misrepresentation as a ground for 
avoidance of contracts was, after all, a nineteenth-century development. It emerged 
in a period when problems with the constitution of c ntracts tended to be considered 
without reference to other juridical acts.161 
Further, many of the early cases on innocent misrepres ntation seem to suggest 
that it has a closer connection with the vexed doctrine of error in substantialibus than 
with fraud.162 Recognition of innocent misrepresentation might be regarded as the 
                                                 
159 See eg McBryde Contract paras 13-01–11. 
160 This analysis is also taken by other systems which employ an abstract theory of transfer: Germany 
(BGB §§123 and 142) and South Africa (at least as seen in the most recent edition of Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s Law of Property (5th edn by PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert, 2006) paras 
5.2.2.2(g) and 5.2.2.5). It is not, however, restricted to such systems. See Arts II–7:101 and VIII–
2:101(1)(d) DCFR read with Comment H(d) on Art VIII 2:101. The law of unjustified enrichment 
could, in theory, be used to clean up after avoidance has removed the basis of the transfer, at least if 
reduction of contracts is retrospective in effect. I am not aware of any authority supporting this 
analysis. 
161 D Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” (PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2012) ch 4 and5; McBryde 
Contract paras 15-43–65. Even in 1899, Guthrie suggested that “an innocent misrepresentation (not 
leading to essential error and not being a warranty) does not invalidate a contract”: Bell Prin (10th  
edn) §14 n (e). 
162 Wardlaw v Mackenzie (1851) 21 D 940; Couston v Miller (1862) 24 D 607; Hogg v Campbell 
(1864) 2 M 848; Hare v Hopes (1870) 8 SLR 189; Stewart v Kennedy (1890) 17 R (HL) 25; Woods v 
Tulloch (1893) 20 R 477. In this line of cases, misrepresentation seems to operate to allow a plea of 
error in substantialibus which would otherwise be excluded by the rule against pleas and evidence 
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result of an English equitable doctrine being shoehorned into Scots law, distorting 
the meaning of essential error and causing further confusion in an already 
troublesome area.163 Innocent misrepresentation looks like an error issue rather than 
a fraud issue and a difficult one at that. Any attempt to tack it onto the established 
rule allowing reduction of transfers for fraud might t erefore be considered ill-
conceived. 
These objections are, however, less weighty than they appear at first sight. Lord 
Watson’s judgment in Menzies v Menzies164 was certainly an innovation which some 
Scots lawyers had difficulty taking on board.165 However, the analysis employed was 
not entirely novel. Reading the case in light of prior case law shows that, from the 
start, a distinction was drawn between Menzies-error and classical error in 
substantialibus. Further, murky as its origins may be, innocent misrepresentation has 
a form and rationale which are best understood as adevelopment of the concern 
implicit in the early unitary treatments of fraudulent misrepresentation and therefore 
as equally applicable to transfers. 
 
(1) The emergence of innocent misrepresentation 
The first point to note is that, despite definitional formulae like those quoted above 
which suggest that fraud was limited to intentional deceit, Scots law recognised 
challenges to juridical acts in cases of misrepresentation where there was no proof of 
intentional deceit well into the nineteenth-century. As Peter Stein and Dot Reid have 
shown, the scope of fraud was broadened by employment of the maxim culpa lata 
dolo aequiparatur, by a reconceptualization of aedilitian liability for latent defects as 
presumptive fraud and by a tendency to infer fraud in cases where a bargain was 
unequal and there was some other aggravating factor.166 Restrictions on methods of 
                                                                                                                                
which sought to qualify a written deed. As Lord Deas’ dissent in Hogg shows, even this was not 
uncontroversial. 
163 McBryde Contract paras 15-43–65, esp 15-60–5 and PG Stein Fault in the Formation of Contract 
in Roman Law and Scots Law (1958) 192–208. 
164 (1893) 20 R (HL) 108 esp at 142–3. (Discussed in more detail below.) 
165 Evidenced by Guthrie’s comments in Bell’s Principles. See fn 161 above. 
166 Stein Fault in the Formation of Contract 171–88; Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 65–91. Examples of 




proof which prevented parties from choosing to give e idence on their own behalf 
before 1853 rendered such presumptions difficult to rebut.167 
However, certain nineteenth-century developments undermined this approach: 
section 5 of the Mercantile Law (Scotland) Amendment Act 1856 abolished 
aedilitian liability for latent defects, facility and circumvention and undue influence 
began to break away from fraud as discrete doctrines,168 and there was growing 
insistence on specific proof of intentional deceit where fraud was alleged.169  
Reid suggests that the majority of cases of negligent and even of innocent 
misrepresentation might be accommodated within fraud, provided that the making of 
a statement in the absence of a belief on reasonable grounds that the statement is true 
is regarded as fraudulent.170 That was not, however, the route which the law took. 
First, a statement is now taken only to be fraudulent where there is knowledge that it 
is false or recklessness as to its truth.171 Secondly, in the modern law, a juridical act 
is open to challenge without any requirement of fault on the part of the 
misrepresenter. 
The starting point for innocent misrepresentation is Adamson v Glasgow 
Waterworks Commissioners.172 The pursuer tendered for the construction of a tunnel 
on the basis of a specification given by the defenders, which included incorrect 
statements about the composition of the ground to be tunnelled through. The work 
turned out to be considerably more expensive that it would have been had the 
specification been correct. The pursuer sought reduction. The question eventually put 
to the jury was “Whether, by the misrepresentation of the defenders, on a material 
point, the pursuer was induced to enter into the said contract under error as to the 
work to be performed.”173 The First Division insisted that misrepresentation and 
essential error be combined in a single plea. Lord President M’Neill’s explanation 
bears repetition: 
 
                                                 
167 Stair IV.lxiii.7; Evidence (Scotland) Act 1853 s 3. 
168 Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 90–1. 
169 Ibid ch 4 and 176–82. 
170 Ibid 182–3. 
171 Ibid 183. 
172 (1859) 21 D 1012. It was, to some extent, prefigured by British Guarantee Association v Western 
Bank of Scotland (1853) 15 D 834. 
173 (1859) 21 D 1012 at 1018. 
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Misrepresentation is the leading feature of the case. An issue on essential error is 
asked, apart from misrepresentation. Now we cannot grant that. 
Misrepresentation, which led to an erroneous opinion as to material or essential 
matters of the contract, is the subject of the issue. These two things are to be 
consolidated. It is the combined effect that produces the result. The element may 
be involved in the issue without using the technical expression of essential error, 
which is a ground of action apart from that of misrepresentation. The feature of 
the plea of essential error is the absence of that misrepresentation, which is the 
ground of this action.174 
 
In this passage, Lord M’Neill separates essential error in its “technical” sense 
(presumably classical error in substantialibus), which requires no supplementary plea 
of misrepresentation, from the looser sense of the term which applies when the 
“ground of the action” is not the error but the misrepresentation. This seems to 
prefigure Lord Watson’s approach in Menzies right down to the unfortunate decision 
to use the term “essential error” to refer to two different concepts. Crucially, 
Adamson indicates that a plea of misrepresentation plus error is quite distinct from 
“technical” essential error.  
Adamson was followed in Wilson v Caledonian Railway Co175 but it proved to be 
a false dawn for innocent misrepresentation. In Hare v Hopes,176 Adamson was 
interpreted as a decision in the line of cases where misrepresentation had been used 
to allow a plea of error in substantialibus which would otherwise have been excluded 
as an illegitimate attempt to qualify a written dee, and thus as part of “technical” 
error in substantialibus.177 
The breakthrough came with Menzies: Lord Watson famously opined that “Error 
becomes essential whenever it is shewn that but for i one of the parties would have 
declined to contract”. He went on to hold that, if such an error was induced by or on 
behalf of the counterparty, the good faith of the misrepresenter would not prevent 
“rescission”.178  Lord Watson cited Stewart v Kennedy179 along with the English case 
of Adam v Newbigging.180 Giving the leading opinion in Stewart only three years 
earlier, he had endorsed and applied Bell’s famous typology of essential error, which 
                                                 
174 Ibid. 
175 (1860) 22 D 1408. 
176 (1870) 8 SLR 189. 
177 See authorities at fn 167 above. 
178 (1893) 20 R (HL) 108 at 142–3. 
179 (1890) 17 R (HL) 25 
180 (1888) LR 13 App Cas 308. 
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bears little relation to the Menzies approach.181 As Lord President Clyde was to put it 
in Abram SS Co v Westville Shipping Co: 
 
It is obvious that Lord Watson's description of thequality of essential error (for 
the purposes of a plea of essential error induced by innocent misrepresentation) 
covers any error material to the entering into the contract, and the consequent 
acceptance of its rights and obligations. It involves no closer relation with the 
essentials of the contract itself (as defined, for instance, in Bell's Principles, 
section 11) than is required in the case of fraudulent misrepresentation when pled 
as a ground for reducing a contract.182 
 
It seems unlikely that Lord Watson would change his po ition so radically without at 
least adverting to the shift. The two judgments are more plausibly read as involving 
different kinds of essential error. In Stewart, essential error was of the “technical” 
kind and misrepresentation was needed, not to supplement the error but to 
circumvent the procedural restrictions on evidence which qualified written deeds.183 
In Menzies, on the other hand, misrepresentation was the “ground of the issue”, and 
the error was merely part of what was necessary to make the plea of 
misrepresentation stick. 
Whatever the circumstances of its introduction, innocent misrepresentation took 
hold and became firmly established as a ground of voidability and as a doctrine quite 
independent of the law of error in essentialibus.184 As McBryde puts it, “It should be 
recognised that what has happened is that Scots law has adopted the concept of 
innocent misrepresentation which is unrelated to the original law of error.”185 
Innocent misrepresentation is not, therefore, so closely tied up with error in 
substantialibus as to bar any logical connection with the existing rules recognising 
voidability of transfers for fraudulent misrepresentation. Neither is it all the work of 
Lord Watson and his equitable tendencies. Furthermore, prior to the rise of innocent 
misrepresentation, these issues had tended to be addr ssed using the broader fringes 
of fraud. Nonetheless, it must be recognised that te pre-Menzies authority is 
                                                 
181 (1890)17 R (HL) 25 at 28–9. 
182 1922 SC 571 at 579 affd 1923 SC (HL) 68. 
183 Note the emphasis on the fact that the contract was ritten: (1890) 17 R (HL) 25 at 29. See also 
Wardlaw v Mackenzie (1851) 21 D 940 at 947. 
184 Ferguson v Wilson (1904) 6 F 779 (compare with Hare v Hopes (1870) 8 SLR 189); Abram SS Co 
v Westville Shipping Co; Blaikston v London and Scottish Banking and Discount Corp Ltd (1894) 21 
R 417; Ritchie v Glass 1936 SLT 591. 
185 Contract para 15-65. 
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decidedly thin and it would be a hard task to trace the development from fraud to 
innocent misrepresentation in the Scottish case law. 
 
(2) The logical connection between fraudulent and i nnocent 
misrepresentation 
While a historical connection between fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation is 
difficult to establish, a logical one is not. When considering the modern law, 
coherence is a much more pressing concern than historical purity. A strong link is 
suggested by the fact that, as Lord Clyde observed, th  same type of error is relevant 
for innocent and fraudulent representation, and by the fact that (apart from the 
question of damages) the remedy is the same. 
This impression is fortified by the fact that the rationale of voidability for 
innocent misrepresentation can be seen as a developm nt of that for fraudulent 
misrepresentation. To see this, it is necessary to eturn to Stair, who remains a major 
authority on reduction of transfers on the latter ground.  
Stair was the first to give fraudulent misrepresentation a name which 
distinguished it from other forms of fraud, identifying “circumvention” as “the act of 
fraud, whereby a person is induced to a deed or obligation by deceit”.186 Later, the 
term took on a slightly different significance as part of the doctrine of “facility and 
circumvention”. According to that doctrine, if the actor suffered from some mental 
weakness short of insanity then conduct short of fraud would be sufficient to render 
the transfer voidable. This conduct was described as “circumvention” and contrasted 
with fraud.187 For that reason, “fraudulent misrepresentation” will be used to denote 
“circumvention” in Stair’s sense. Stair’s definition of “circumvention”, however, 
captures the essence of fraudulent misrepresentatio. 
As well as coining its first term of art, Stair was the first to anchor the concept 
within a wider system. Stair presents three instances of fraud: fraudulent 
misrepresentation; simulation; and collusion. The latter two are exemplified rather 
than defined.  
                                                 
186 I.ix.9. 
187 Clunie v Stirling (1854) 17 D 15; Gibson’s Exr v Anderson 1925 SC 774. 
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In the case of simulation the examples are gifts of ingle and liferent escheat and 
purported dispositions retenta possessione.188 Essentially simulation concerns a 
difference between form and substance. The parties were at one in their actions, but 
those actions were in fraud of the law, directed at efeating the forfeiture in the first 
case and (for instance) attempting to circumvent the requirement for delivery in 
pledge in the second.189 Collusion is exemplified by reference to a debtor who resists 
some creditors while allowing others to complete thir diligence.190 As with 
simulation, the parties to the act know what they are doing and intend to do it. In this 
case, however, it is not a general rule that is being c rcumvented but the interests of a 
defined group: the other creditors who are entitled o equal treatment.191 Fraudulent 
misrepresentation is the very opposite of collusion. Far from the parties co-operating, 
one of them is interfering with the other’s decision-making by deliberately supplying 
false information. 
Stair’s three cases of fraud reflect something of the breadth of dolus malus192 in 
Roman law, to which Stair makes extensive reference.193 As with Roman law, it is 
difficult to devise a formula for what the various actions have in common beyond 
                                                 
188 I.ix.9–13. The former example perhaps requires some explanation. Single and liferent escheat were 
general confiscations of property which could occur for a number of reasons. Very often, however, 
they were the result of horning (denunciation) for failure to fulfil an obligation. Under single escheat, 
the moveable assets of the party subject to the confis ation passed to the Crown. Heritable property 
was merely subject to liferent escheat so the property r verted to the heir of the party subject to 
confiscation on the latter’s death. Unless the confiscation was for treason, the liferent went to the 
superior rather than the Crown. See the entries on “Escheat” and “Forfeiture” in G Watson Bell’s 
Dictionary and Digest of the Law of Scotland (7th edn, 1890 repr 2012) for further details and 
Kennedy v McClellane (1535) RPS, 1535/50. The Crown often dealt with escheated property these by 
making “gifts of escheat”, whereby the whole confiscated estate was granted as a single unit.  
Friends of the forfeited person would sometimes take the gift of escheat and allow him to use the 
property, thus defeating the forfeiture. The act “Anent the eschaetis of rebellis” 1592 c 147, RPS 
1592/4/88 declared the gift of escheat null in such circumstances. Hope describes these gifts as 
“simulate for the Behoof of the Rebel” Hope Minor Prackticks No 183.  
189 See also the discussion of infeftments retenta possessione as fraudulent in Stair II.iii.27. 
190 Stair refers to Wardlaw v Dalziell (1620) Mor 2427, a very tersely reported example of this 
practice. Morison records it, alongside a number of other similar cases under the heading “Collusion”. 
191 This principle is discussed further in chapter 6. 
192 Dolus and dolus malus may both be broadly translated with fraud. Malus was sometimes added to 
distinguish from dolus bonus which was essentially acceptable sharp practice. 
193 Dolus malus appears to have been applied to an even wider range of situations than fraud in Scots 
law. See G MacCormack’s series of articles: “Juristic Use of the Term Dolus” (1983) 100 ZSS (RA) 
520;  “Dolus in the Law of Early Classical Period (Labeo–Celsus)” 1986 SDHI 236; “Aliud 
simulatum, aliud actum” (1987) 104 ZSS (RA) 639; “Dolus in Republican Law” 1985 BIDR 15, as 
well as A Wacke “Zum dolus-Begriff der actio de dolo” 1980 RIDA 349 and A Pernice Labeo Bd 2 
Abt 1 Dolus malus und bona fides (2nd edn, 1895 repr 1963) 134–261. 
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vague reference to unfairness or actions contrary to (objective) good faith.194 
Different interests are being protected: the rule against simulation protects the 
general public interest in legal rules being given effect rather than circumvented by 
resort to technicalities; that against collusion protects creditors’ right to satisfaction 
for their debts; and the rule against fraudulent misrepresentation protects the private 
autonomy of the parties. 
They do, however, have one thing in common which is very important.  The 
justification for the invalidity of the act (and indeed for any obligation to pay 
damages) is the wrongful nature of the conduct. That is why all three can be 
examples of fraud and thus be discussed in the context of the “obediential” 
obligation195 to make reparation for “delinquences”. For Stair, f audulent 
misrepresentation is a delict.  
Fraudulent misrepresentation is set apart from error, which Stair locates within his 
analysis of consensus.196 While error is discussed extensively in the course of his 
treatment of fraud,197 the motivation for this is expository rather than systematic. 
Fraud and error are set alongside one another to give the reader a clear picture of 
what distinguishes one from the other. For Stair, the ground for any remedy in the 
case of error was the absence of consensus and so no reference to wrongdoing was 
necessary. In fraud, on the other hand, there was con ensus. The remedy was granted 
because a wrong had been done.198  
While a fraudulent misrepresentation needs to cause n rror in order to induce a 
juridical act, the error is not the essence the problem; it is merely part of the chain of 
causation. The essence is the deceit, the deliberate incursion into the actor’s right of 
                                                 
194 For discussion of the pre-classical Roman conception of dolus as deliberate contravention of 
(objective) bona fides see G Grevesmühl Die Gläubigeranfechtung nach klassischem römischem 
Recht (2003) 33 fn 138 with further citations; Zimmermann Obligations 664–9; E Descheemaeker The 
Division of Wrongs: A Historical Comparative Study (2009) 71–2. In its objective sense, bona fides 
(or simply fides) was a central value in Roman society and implied fairness, honesty and constancy, a 
sort of morally reasonable man: F Schulz Principles of Roman Law (2nd edn, trans M Wolff, 1936) 
223–38 esp 227–8. For objective good faith in Scotland, see HL MacQueen “Good Faith in the Scots 
Law of Contract” in ADM Forte (ed) Good Faith in Contract and Property (1999) 5 at 7–8. 
195 Stair’s primary division of obligations is between the obediential (i.e. ex lege – encompassing what 
would now be classified as delict, unjustified enrichment, negotiorum gestio and family law) and 
conventional (voluntary): I.iii.2. 
196 I.x.13. 
197 I.ix.9 and IV.xl.24 




free decision-making.199 It is the wrongfulness of that incursion which justifies the 
avoidance. Avoidance of the transaction is a mechanism by which the wronged party 
is put in the position he would have been in were it not for the misrepresentation. 
This is what German lawyers call Naturalrestitution.200 It performs the same function 
as damages in delict but does so more effectively.201 
The focus on wrongfulness helps to explain why the representation must usually 
be made by or on behalf of the counterparty,202 for why should the counterparty 
make reparation for the wrong of a third party? It also explains why any wrongful 
statement which induces the act is relevant while a much narrower range of wrongs 
is relevant for error. If a lie was sufficient to draw the other into the act, why should 
it matter that it did not relate to one of the essentialia previously laid down by the 
law?  
Emphasising the wrongfulness of fraudulent misrepresentation seems to make an 
unpromising entry point for the acceptance of innocent misrepresentation as a ground 
for avoidance of transfers. Surely, the whole point f innocent misrepresentation is 
that it is not wrongful?  
It might, however, be better to say that innocent misrepresentation is distinguished 
by not being culpable. The innocent misrepresenter has still done something that he 
should not have done. If he had known what he was doing, he would be guilty of 
fraud. The position is clarified by consideration of an innocent misrepresenter who 
discovers that his statement was untrue before a transaction is concluded. He is 
clearly bound to correct the earlier statement. In Brownlie v Miller, Lord Blackburn 
went as far as to suggest (albeit obiter) that failure to do so would amount to fraud.203 
Why does failure to correct an innocently-made misrepresentation amount to 
fraud? It might be explained on the basis that the prejudice to the party misled is the 
same whether the misrepresentation is fraudulent or ot. The misrepresenter had an 
opportunity to prevent that harm from occurring and chose not to do so. Although the 
                                                 
199 For a similar analysis see FC von Savigny System des heutigen römischen Rechts (1840) Vol III, 
115–7 and B Häcker Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfers (2009) 165. 
200 §249 I BGB, H Oetker “§249” in K Rebmann et al Münchner Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuch Bd 2a (4th edn, 2003) RdNr 308–39. 
201 J Thomson Delictual Liability (4th edn, 2009) para 16.5. 
202 The point is evident, as noted above, in Hervie v Levingstoun and in Stair I.ix.9. It remains the 
basic position today: Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111 at 116–7 with further authorities.  
203 (1880) 7 R (HL) 66 at 79; see also Shankland & Co v John Robinson & Co 1920 SC (HL) 103 at 
111 per Lord Dunedin (also obiter). 
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“mens rea” and “actus reus” of the fraud did not occur in the order that would 
normally be expected, they were both present at the time that the harm was sustained: 
when the contract or transfer was concluded. 
From here, it is not a great leap to consider it fraudulent (at least in some broad 
sense) to try to uphold an act induced by an innocet misrepresentation. The small 
leap was made (again obiter) by Lord Shaw in Mair v Rio Grande:  
 
Fraud is not far away from–nay, indeed, it must be hat it accompanies–a case of 
any defendant holding a plaintiff to a bargain which has been induced by 
representations which were untrue; for it is contrary to good faith and it partakes 
of fraud to hold a person to a contract induced by an untruth for which you 
yourself stand responsible.204 
 
Lord Shaw did not refer to Roman law in his opinion but his thinking reflected an 
aspect of the exceptio doli.205 It was a procedural mechanism which allowed the 
defender to resist an action of the basis of the dolus of the pursuer. The defender had 
two options: either he could show some relevant dolus on the part of the pursuer in 
the past or he could show that because of previous c nduct (which might itself have 
been innocent) bringing the action amounted to olus.206 In such cases, the dolus was 
said to be incomplete until the action was brought, just as it is in cases of innocent 
misrepresentation. 
Fraudulent misrepresentation, of course, can give ris  to liability for damages 
while innocent misrepresentation will not. This, however, can be explained on the 
basis of the analysis proposed. Since discovery that an innocent misrepresentation 
has been made raises a duty of disclosure, it would s rely be fraudulent to wait 
knowingly until restitutio in integrum is impossible before disclosing. This appears 
to leave only two possible cases of innocent misrepresentation: the fact of the 
misrepresentation comes to the attention of both parties either before restitutio is 
impossible or after it has become impossible. In the former case, upholding the 
transaction would be a kind of fraud but it is a frud which the law prevents the 
misrepresenter from implementing by allowing avoidance. In the latter, no wrong has 
                                                 
204 1913 SC (HL) 74 at 82. 
205 Ie the defence based on dolus. 
206 See MacCormack “Dolus in the law of the early classical period” 250–263. 
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been committed. Knowledge was fixed only after it was too late to do anything about 
the situation and so it is reasonable to let the loss ie where it falls. 
While the recognition of innocent misrepresentation was certainly spurred by 
reference to English case law, it can legitimately be understood as a development of 
the voidability for fraud discussed by Balfour, Stair and Bankton. What is more, it is 
a development which echoes the position in Roman law. 
On that basis, despite the paucity of authority for the rule, there seems no reason 
to deny that voidability can occur when a transfer has been induced by an innocent 
misrepresentation. Therefore fraud, in the sense of a deliberately deceitful statement, 
should not be thought of as a requirement for reduction of a transfer on grounds of 
misrepresentation. However, the roots of the rule in Stair’s concept of circumvention 
must be borne in mind in order to understand why the rule works the way it does. 
 
C. REQUIREMENTS FOR VOIDABILITY FOR MISREPRESENTATI ON 
The requirement of fraud being discounted, four elem nts remain necessary for 
avoidance of a transfer on grounds of misrepresentatio : there must be a 
misrepresentation; the misrepresentation must induce the transaction; the 
misrepresentation must be made by or on behalf the counterparty; and reversal of the 
transfer must still be possible.  
 
(1) There must be a misrepresentation 
Most of the authorities on what counts as a misrepresentation concern contracts but 
they are equally applicable to transfer. It is difficult to see how a statement 
considered a misrepresentation in a contract case could be considered either true or 
not to be a representation if made to induce a transfer. Aside from the issue of verba 
jactantia or trade puffs,207 the main issue raised by the first element is what counts as 
a representation. 
                                                 
207  On which see McBryde Contract paras 14-11 and 15-67. 
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 It is self-evident that a statement – whether written or oral – will, if false,208 
constitute a misrepresentation. Such statements are clearly the most important cases 
of misrepresentation. The term “misrepresentation” can, however, obscure other 
significant cases. A transferor may be misled by actions as well as words.209 The 
most difficult cases, however, are those where the all ged misrepresentation 
consisted of doing nothing at all. 
 
(a) Misrepresentation by silence 
It is widely acknowledged that each party to a transaction is responsible for his own 
decision to act. The counterparty’s basic duty generally extends no further than non-
interference. However, there have been some cases wh re it has been considered 
fraudulent to allow a counterparty to act in ignorance of some relevant fact. There is 
a clear tension between the two principles,210 but the trend of development in Scots 
law has clearly been away from wide-ranging duties of disclosure. 
The earlier cases simply describe a “concealment” as fraudulent without giving 
much explanation as to why this is the case.211 In this context, “concealment” is 
failure to disclose rather than taking active steps to prevent the truth from being 
discovered. In these cases, fraud seems to be understood as breach of objective bona 
fides rather than deceit.212 The range of situations when it might be considere bad 
faith not to inform a counterparty of some relevant fact is obviously very wide. Bell 
stated the general principle thus:  
 
wherever the circumstances are of a secret nature, or such as a purchaser does not 
usually or naturally think of inquiring into, or whic  he can only learn from the 
seller’s information, the concealment is a fraud[.]213 
                                                 
208 The boundary between truth and falsehood can be less cl ar than appears at first sight.  Whether a 
representation is false must ultimately be a question of fact. See McBryde Contract para 15-67 with 
further authorities. 
209 Patterson v Landsberg & Co (1905) 7 F 675 at 681 per Lord Kyllachy; Gibson v National Cash 
Register Co Ltd 1925 SC 500. It is also worth noting that neither Stair’s definition of circumvention 
(I.ix.9), nor Erksine’s definition of fraud (“a machination or contrivance to deceive”, III.i.16 – cf 
D.4.3.1.2) requires an express statement. See the discussion in EC Reid and JWG Blackie P rsonal 
Bar (2006) para 2-10. 
210 One which has been evident since Cicero: De Officiis (trans W Miller, 1913) III.50–7. 
211 Eg Kincaid v Lauder (1629) Mor 4857; Wood v Baird (1696) Mor 4860. 
212 As Cicero puts it, “It is one thing to (actively) conceal, it is another to keep silent”: De officiis 
III.52. 




Bell, however, may have been somewhat out of touch wit  general sentiment. Hume 
had already stressed the general entitlement of a trader to take advantage of his better 
information and this approach was to prevail.214 The development of the law is 
illustrated by the changes in attitude to the buyer’s aedilitian remedies for latent vices 
not declared by the seller, and by an insured’s duty to disclose facts material to the 
risk to the insurer. 
Stair classified the former as a remedy for fraud.215 There was, however, a move 
away from that in the eighteenth century: Bankton discusses the remedy in the course 
of his treatment of sale rather than fraud,216 while Erskine and Hume explain the 
remedy as being the result of an implied term in the contract of sale.217 Erskine and 
Hume’s approach is reflected in the modern law, which covers much of the scope of 
the aedilitian remedies by terms implied by section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. 
Bell considered failure to disclose some matter materi lly relevant to the assessing 
risk when applying for insurance as a good illustration of his general principle.218 
Failure to disclose remains a ground for avoidance of insurance contracts.219 By the 
time M’Laren came to edit the seventh edition of Bell’s Commentaries in 1870, 
however, insurance was seen as a special case whichas “deceptive as to the general 
question of concealment.”220 Since the late nineteenth century, the rule has been 
regarded as the result of a specific duty of disclosure particular to insurance rather 
than a general principle. The details of the duty have been further refined in terms 
specific to the insurance contract, in particular clibrating the extent of the duty 
depending on the type of insurance.221 Further, despite being justified in terms of 
                                                 
214 Hume Lectures Vol II, 12, citing Morison v Boswall (1801) Mor App (Damages & Interest) No 1 
(affd (1812) 5 Pat App 649) and Paterson & Co v Allan (1801) Hume 681; Broatch v Jenkins (1866) 4 
M 1030. See McBryde Contract paras 14-13-8. 
215 I.ix.10.  
216 I.xix.2. 
217 Erskine I.iii.10; Hume Lectures Vol II, 40–5. 
218 Bell Comm I, 263 fn 2. 
219 Eg Cuthbertson v Friends Provident Life Office [2006] CSOH 74; 2006 SLT 567 at paras 42–52 
per Lord Eassie. 
220 Bell Comm I, 263 fn 2. 
221 Hooper v Royal London General Insurance Co Ltd 1993 SC 242.  
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insurance as a contract in uberrima fides, the duty to disclose can be breached despite 
the subjective good faith of the insured.222 
Thus, the idea of a general rule that failure to disclose was fraudulent came to be 
replaced by a number of specific duties of disclosure.223 The fraud was found, not in 
the non-disclosure tout court but in the fact that it constituted a breach of the duty of 
disclosure. 
 
(b) Failure to disclose insolvency 
The most important duty of disclosure for property law is that of a buyer who is 
verging on insolvency. Early authorities tended to cast conclusion of the contract, or 
the acceptance of delivery, by an insolvent buyer as fr udulent in itself.224 Bell, 
however, made clear that the basis for fraud in these cases was the buyer’s failure to 
disclose his circumstances to the seller.225 Over time, this duty of disclosure showed 
the same tendency to become narrower and more specific evident in the other duties 
of disclosure.   
The earliest case, Prince v Pallat,226 suggests that proof of absolute insolvency at 
the time of contracting or taking delivery was regarded as sufficient to establish 
fraud. This rule was rejected in I glis v Royal Bank.227 The (very brief) note of the 
Lords’ decision in Morison suggests some concern that t e buyer might be unaware 
of his insolvency at the relevant time. However, they followed the ius commune rule 
which directed that fraud was to be presumed when cessio bonorum228 followed the 
                                                 
222 Life Association of Scotland v Foster (1873) 11 M 351 at 359 per Lord President Inglis, approved 
by Lord Eassie in Cuthbertson at para 48. 
223 Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 165. For discussion of the cases where such a duty arises, see McBryde 
Contract para 14-17 and DM Walker The Law of Contracts and Related Obligations (3rd edn, 1995) 
paras 14.63–7. 
224 Eg Prince v Pallat (1690) Mor 4932; Creditors of Robertson v Udnies & Patullo (1757) Mor 4941; 
McKay v Forsyth (1758) Mor 4944; Hume Lectures Vol II, 12. 
225 Bell Comm 263–7. This analysis is clear even in the first edi ion of the Commentaries: (1804) Vol 
II, 169–70. 
226 (1690) Mor 4932. 
227 (1736) Mor 4936. 
228 Sequestration was introduced in Scotland by the Sequestration Act 1772. Cessio bonorum was 
procedure similar to the voluntary trust deed for behoof of creditors. Under it, the debtor surrendere 
his estate to his creditors and thus obtained protecti n from personal diligence (ie imprisonment for 
debt): see H Goudy A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy (4th edn by TA Fyfe, 1914) 2.  
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purchase within three days.229 Bankton appears to follow Inglis230 in treating 
knowledge of insolvency as the criterion for fraud.231  
Counsel for the creditors in I glis appears to have proposed a test for fraud which 
was narrower still. He suggested that, even if the buyer knew himself insolvent, 
failure to disclose insolvency would not be fraudulent provided that he still had some 
hope of trading out of his difficulties. In a number of late eighteenth-century cases, 
this argument was repeated by counsel and apparently dorsed by the courts,232 
although the terseness of the early reports makes firm conclusions based on these 
cases difficult. 
The position was made clear by Lord Chancellor Thurlow in Allan, Steuart & Co 
v Creditors of Stein.233 As well as rejecting the presumption of fraud adopted in 
Inglis, he endorsed the argument that a buyer was not fraudulent until he gave up 
hope of trading out of his difficulties.234 Whether or not Allan Steuart & Co was the 
spur or not,235 that test became firmly established.236 Hume and Bell note the 
narrowing of the criteria for fraud in these cases. Hume attributes the shift to “our 
more lax morality” and a greater faith in merchants’ ability to trade their way out of 
difficulty237 while Bell suggests that the earlier rule was “inco sistent with an 
advanced state of commerce.”238  
At this point in its development, the rule illustrates the general principle lying 
behind the duties of disclosure and explains why breach of such a duty can be 
regarded as a species of misrepresentation. Payment clearly goes to the root of sale. 
In the normal course of events, concluding a contract of sale implies an intention to 
                                                 
229 Successful counsel referred to “several foreign lawyers, particularly Simon van Leeuwen.” 
230 See also the earlier case, Main v Keeper of the Weigh-House of Glasgow (1715) Mor 4934.  
231 Bankton I.x.66 (the case cited Bruce 22 Dec 1680 does not appear to be reported). 
232 Creditors of Robertson v Udnies & Patullo (1757) Mor 4941; McKay v Forsyth (1758) Mor 4944;  
Gordon v Gardner (1758) Mor 6678; Crawfurd Newell v Mitchell (1765) Mor 4944; Sandieman & Co 
v Creditors of Kempt (1786) Mor 4947. 
233 (1790) 3 Pat 191. 
234 Ibid at 196. 
235 The third volume of Paton’s Appeals was not published until 1853. Some in Scotland were clearly 
aware of the decision before then: the reversal of the Court of Session’s decision is mentioned in the 
4th edition of Erskine’s Institute (1805, III.iii.8).  
236 Carnegie v Hutchison (1815) Hume 704; Brown v Watson  (1816) Hume 709; Hume Lectures Vol 
II, 14; Bell Comm I, 265–6. Bell explicitly disapproved of Bankton’s test in the text of the first edition 
of the Commentaries (Vol II, 1810, 171). Thereafter, the comment was relegated to a footnote: 2nd 
edn, 1810, 117 fn g; 7th edn II, 265 fn 2. 
237 Hume Lectures vol II, 13 
238 Bell Comm 264–5. 
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pay. The buyer is obliged to pay the price, the seller is induced to sell by the 
expectation of receiving payment.239  
Thus, the duty to disclose can be seen as a duty to correct a legitimate but 
mistaken assumption on the part of the seller which the buyer’s conduct invites. In 
entering into the contract, the buyer invited the seller to believe that he was able to 
pay. If he knew himself to be insolvent, the buyer misled the seller and interfered 
with the seller’s free decision-making in a manner v y similar to a fraudulent 
misrepresentation. If he discovers his inability to pay later, between contract and 
conveyance, his situation is similar to that where an innocent misrepresentation has 
been made: failure to correct it amounts to fraud. 
A similar analysis may be applied to other cases. The party subject to the duty is 
deemed to have acted in a manner which invited the counterparty to assume some 
fact which is not true. Taking on a fiduciary role implies that the fiduciary will put 
first the interests of the party to whom fiduciary duties are owed. That in turn entitles 
the latter party to assume that the normal rules which expect each party to look to his 
own interests and to find out the relevant facts do not apply. An insurer has a similar 
entitlement to assume that he will be provided with all the information necessary to 
assess the risk. It goes to the heart of insurance s a contract in uberrima fides. The 
duty to disclose, thus understood, is an aspect of the duty to correct a 
misrepresentation and thus a part of the protection against fraudulent 
misrepresentation discussed by Stair. 
The assumptions which a counterparty will be thought entitled to make on the 
basis of certain conduct may vary with time and this may explain why absolute 
insolvency was sufficient for fraud in Prince but not in the later cases. That does not, 
however, challenge the structural analysis of the way that the duty interacts with the 
wider law of misrepresentation. 
The test for the duty of disclosure in the case of a buyer’s insolvency was settled 
with Hume and Bell,240 although the courts’ tendency in the later nineteenth and 
early twentieth century was to apply the rule more and more restrictively. Watt v 
                                                 
239 AW Gamage Ltd v Charlesworth’s Tr1910 SC 257 at 264 per Lord Kinnear. 
240 All four editions of Goudy’s Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy say that an insolvent debtor is free 
to trade without disclosure of his circumstances until he has given up: 1st edn, 1886, 21 and 278–9; 2nd 
edn, 1895, 22 and 294; 3rd edn by WJ Cullen, 1903, 22 and 308–9; 4th edn, 20–1 and 281. 
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Findlay241 and Richmond v Railton242 suggest that mere failure to disclose inability to 
pay before delivery was not sufficient. In the latter case, Lord Justice Clerk Hope 
said that, if delivery was made voluntarily and there had been no further fraud, it 
might be effective despite the fact that it was pursuant to a contract which had been 
induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation regarding ability to pay, “the delivery not 
being within the shadow and blight as it were of the misrepresentation.”243  
A trio of early twentieth-century cases applied an extremely stringent test for 
proof of the debtor having given up hope of trading out of his difficulties, essentially 
suggesting that positive evidence of deliberate intntion not to pay was required.244 It 
is not surprising that Lord Kinnear suggested that failure to disclose insolvency was 
“a very difficult case to prove”245 or that sellers usually preferred to try and show 
some direct misrepresentation246 failing which they gave up on trying to recover 
from the trustee on account of fraud altogether.247 
The courts had good reason to take a very narrow vie  of the rule because it 
operated to give a preference in insolvency. The concern is evident in Richmond v 
Railton, where Lord Justice Clerk Hope seems to link his narrow reading of Watt v 
Findlay with concerns about the proper administration of asequestrated estate.248  It 
is easy to see why. Consider a shop-owner who knows he has no hope of paying his 
creditors. Despite this, he orders goods from a wholesaler and instructs work from a 
tradesman. After the work is done and the goods are supplied, the shop owner is 
sequestrated. The goods could well constitute the vast majority of the assets free of 
any security. Were it not for the rule, the wholesar nd the tradesman might each 
receive a substantial dividend. As a result of the rule, the wholesaler, having 
                                                 
241 (1846) 8 D 529. 
242 (1854) 16 D 402. See also Clarke & Co v Myles (1885) 12 R 1035. 
243 (1854) 16 D 402 at 406. 
244 Muir v Rankin (1905) 13 SLT 60 at 61 (the context makes clear tht t e insolvency Lord Dundas 
has in mind is irrecoverable); AW Gamage Ltd v Charlesworth’s Tr 1910 SC 257 at 264 per Lord 
Kinnear; Price & Pierce Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1910 SC 1095 especially at 1118–9 per Lord 
President Dunedin The last case was reversed on appeal (1912 SC (HL) 19) but the reversal concerned 
another aspect of the decision. 
245 1910 SC 257 at 264. 
246 As in AW Gamage. 
247 No twentieth or twenty-first century case has been found in which fraudulent concealment of 
insolvency was pled successfully. 
248 (1854) 16 D 402 at 406 and 408. 
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recovered the goods, merely loses his profit on the sal  while the tradesman receives 
either nothing or very little. 
It is difficult to see any justification for such a preference. The fact that a rule is 
potentially inequitable might be a good reason for restricting the ambit of its 
application and thus for a stringent test for when the relevant duty of disclosure 
arises. Yet this can never be a full answer to the problem. The inequity of 
differentiating between the wholesaler and the tradesman would be just the same if 
both had been induced by positive representations rathe  than a failure to disclose. 
This is really a problem concerning the interaction of fraud and insolvency. It is 
discussed further in chapter 8. 
 
(2) The misrepresentation must induce the transfer 
The second element is a simple causation requirement: if the misrepresentation does 
not induce the transfer, then the transferor’s freedom to decide can hardly be said to 
have been interfered with. That is the sense in which Scots authorities have 
traditionally understood the requirement of d lus dans causam contractui.249 It seems 
preferable to express the matter in terms of causation rather than to attempt to engage 
with the ius commune distinction between dolus dans causam contractui and dolus 
incidens.250   
Despite its importance in the ius commune tradition, the category of dolus 
incidens seems to be irrelevant in Scots law. A misrepresentatio  must cause a 
transaction before there can even be liability for damages, and any misrepresentation 
which does so renders the transaction voidable.251 Since dolus incidens could not 
give rise to liability in damages or be used to set th  transaction aside, it is rather 
difficult to see what value there is in recognising it as a category. 
                                                 
249 Erskine III.i.16; Bell Prin § 13; Brown Sale §582; Irvine v Kirkpatrick (1850) 7 Bell’s App 186 at 
237–8 per Lord Brougham LC. 
250 For which see Zimmermann Obligations 670–4. Dolus incidens covered cases where the defrauded 
party would have entered into the transaction withou  the fraud but would only have done so on 
different terms. The classic example was a defrauded buyer who would still have bought the subjects, 
had he known the truth but would not have paid the same price. 
251 Bell Comm I, 262–3 fn 2; Bell Prin §13 per Guthrie. Cf Hendry Conveyancing 75; Burns 
Conveyancing 41 and Walker Contracts and Related Obligations para 14.107. 
58 
 
 Bell suggested otherwise, writing that dolus incidens “will give relief in damages 
only,” but his editors M’Laren and Guthrie reject his position, primarily on the basis 
of Common Law sources.252 There is no suggestion in the institutional writers p ior 
to Bell that dolus incidens was recognised in Scots law.253 Bankton mentions the 
category but appears to regard the distinction betwe n dolus incidens and dolus dans 
causam contractui as tied to the Roman distinction between stricti iuris and bona 
fide contracts and therefore as irrelevant to Scots law.254 Further, as Zimmermann 
shows, the meaning attached to the distinction has not been entirely consistent in the 
European tradition. The trend of European development s ems to be against referring 
to it.255  
Analysing the requirement that the misrepresentation induce the transfer as a 
causation requirement means that it is largely a question of fact. Although not 
expressly adverted to in the case law, the standard “but-for” test for causation seems 
a reasonable starting point for analysis. 
 
(3) Misrepresentation by the counterparty 
If the right to avoid a transfer for misrepresentation is based on a personal right to 
reparation, the explanation for requiring misrepresentation to be made by or on 
behalf of the counterparty is obvious. Something, however, needs to be said about 
the exceptions to this rule. 
McBryde identifies three cases of misrepresentation by third parties: where the 
misrepresentation was made by someone for whom the counterparty has vicarious 
                                                 
252 Relying in particular on Lord Brougham’s speech in Attwood v Small (1835–40) 6 Cl & Fin 232 at 
447; 7 ER 684 at 765. Guthrie also refers to Lord Curriehill’s judgment in Gillespie v Russell (1856) 
18 D 677 at 686. It is not clear Lord Curriehill had claims for damages in mind when he made those 
remarks. Insofar as he did, the remarks are obiter. He also seems to rather confuse the distinction 
between dolus dans causam contractui and dolus incidens with that between dolus bonus (acceptable 
sharp practice such as trade puffs) and dolus malus (fraud). 
253 Stair I.ix.9; IV.xl 23–4; Erskine III.i.16. 
254 Bankton I.x.64. 
255 See Note I to Art II–7:205 DCFR. The DCFR applies a imple causation test for voidability on 
grounds of fraudulent misrepresentation (Art II–7:205(1)). Somewhat confusingly, the DCFR rule 
covering innocent misrepresentation appears to include Voet’s definition of dolus incidens 
(Commentarius ad Pandectas (6th edn, 1731) IV.iii.3): Art II–7:201(1)(a) and (b)(i). The comments, 
however, suggest that Art II-7:201(1)(a) should not be so understood: Comment C on Art II–7:201. 
59 
 
liability; where the counterparty is a participant i  a fraudulent scheme with the third 
party or where a misrepresentation leads to a gratuitous benefit.256 
The first exception can be easily explained. If thecounterparty had vicarious 
liability for the actions of the person who made the misrepresentation, then the 
counterparty has responsibility to make reparation for the wrong done. 
Where the counterparty is a participant in the scheme of the person who made the 
misrepresentation, he is liable for the wrong as an accessory. Accessory liability for 
fraud is discussed in more detail in chapters 4 to 7 in the context of fraud on 
creditors, where the authorities are more extensive. For the present, it suffices to say 
that each accessory to a fraud is liable to make reparation for it. 
It is difficult to imagine how a counterparty could be a participant in a fraudulent 
scheme when the misrepresentation was innocent, since it is difficult to see how 
parties might collude where one of them did not know what was going on. 
The last exception is sometimes explained on the basis of the so-called “no profit 
from another’s fraud” rule. The rule has a long history, having its roots in the maxim 
nemo debet locupletari ex aliena iactura257 and thus in principles of unjustified 
enrichment. However, the key authorities for the “no profit from fraud” rule itself 
were nineteenth-century cases on caution. 258 The development and detail of the rule 
are discussed by Reid and Whitty259 and in chapter 4 below but the basic application 
in a case like the present is straightforward: where a gratuitous transfer has been 
made under the influence of a third party’s fraudulent misrepresentation, the transfer 
can be set aside despite the fact that the transferee was unaware of the fraud. 
In this context, application of the basic principles of unjustified enrichment seems 
to make sense of the result. A gratuitous benefit has been conferred when the 
apparent basis for the transfer did not in fact obtain. The law of enrichment has 
shown itself ready to reverse transfers in analogous circumstances as evidenced by 
the condictio indebti and the condictio causa data causa non secuta. Furthermore, 
had the recipient known what was going on, he would have been a party to the 
                                                 
256 McBryde Contract para 14-44. See also, Smith v Bank of Scotland 1997 SC (HL) 111 at 116–7. 
257 “No one may be enriched at another’s expense.” Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 246–9; N Whitty “The 
‘No Profit From Another’s Fraud’ Rule and the ‘Knowing Receipt’ Muddle” (2013) 17 EdinLR 37 at 
49. 
258 Eg Wardlaw v Mackenzie (1859) 21 D 940 and Clydesdale Bank v Paul (1893) 4 R 626. 
259 Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 242–9; Whitty “The ‘No Profit From Another’s Fraud’ Rule” at 47–9. 
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fraudulent scheme so it can be seen as an instance of incomplete dolus of the kind 
discussed above. 
 
(4) Restitutio in integrum  must still be possible 
Reversal of the transfer (restitutio in integrum) must still be possible. The 
requirement is readily understandable if the voidability is seen as being founded on a 
duty to make reparation or to reverse an unjustified enrichment. The transferee 
cannot be required to do the impossible. In relation o transfers, this effectively boils 
down to a requirement that the asset transferred continues to exist and continues to 
form part of the transferee’s patrimony. The first of these requirements is fairly 
obvious: no-one can return what no longer exists.260 
The second requirement is the reverse side of the rule that good faith onerous 
successors are not liable for the fraud of their authors.261 The successor is protected 
because the fraudulent transferee had received a valid, albeit vulnerable, transfer and 
was thus able to transfer the asset to the successor. After the second transfer, the 
asset is no longer part of the misrepresenter’s patrimony. Therefore it is no longer 
available to satisfy his obligation to make reparation. There is no reason why the 
innocent transferee’s asset should be used to make reparation for his author’s wrong. 
Similarly, while the misrepresenter may be liable for damages if the 
misrepresentation was culpable, he or she cannot be ask d to do the impossible and 
effect the transfer of an asset which no longer forms part of his patrimony. 
This analysis assumes that the transfer induced by misrepresentation is initially 
valid (albeit subject to challenge) and that the transferor’s right is personal rather 
than real. As noted above, the idea that fraudulent misrepresentation does not lead 
ipso iure to nullity262 is already present in Mackenzie.263 It is repeated by Stair.264 
                                                 
260 It may also be regarded as a subset of the second requirement. 
261 Stair IV.xl.21; Bankton I.x.65; Bell Prin §13A and “Note relative to sections 11, 12 and 13”. The 
rule is well attested throughout Europe and often dsignated with the maxim dolus [or fraus] auctoris 
non nocet successori. 
262 Ie does not cause voidness. 
263 See text at fn 155. 
264 I.ix.14, IV.xl.21. 
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Likewise, the settled modern rule is that misrepresentation leads to voidability rather 
than voidness.265 This view has, however, not always been unchallenged.  
 
D. VOID OR VOIDABLE? 
 
(1) Heritable, corporeal moveable and incorporeal p roperty 
One preliminary issue requires to be addressed: is it legitimate to assume a general 
rule on the effect of fraud irrespective of the type of property at issue. The general 
nature of the early authorities on the effect of fraud suggests a positive answer. The 
question is whether there is anything which points i  the other direction. 
The only significant challenge to a uniform understanding of the effect of fraud 
arose in relation to the interpretation of the maxim assignatus utitur iure auctoris.266 
For a long time, many Scots lawyers held that even onerous good faith assignees 
were vulnerable to personal claims against the assignor which related to the right.267 
These were not restricted to “intrinsic” objections (for example, where A 
fraudulently induces B to enter into a contract and then assigns his rights to C). 
Claims which would now be regarded as “extrinsic” (as in the case where A and B 
enter into a valid contract but C fraudulently induces B to assign his rights and then 
assigns those rights on to D) were also included.268 This approach prevented the 
application of the maxim dolus auctoris non nocet successori269 to transfer of 
incorporeal moveables.  
                                                 
265 Price & Pierce Ltd v Bank of Scotland 1910 SC 1095; Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & South-West 
Railway Co 1915 SC (HL) 20; MacLeod v Kerr 1965 SC 253; Young v DS Dalgleish & Son 1994 
SCLR 696. Although MacLeod and Young are cast in terms of contract law, the decisions clearly 
concern the proprietary effect of the transaction.  
266 Anderson suggests that the first recorded use of the maxim in Scotland was in Irvine v Osterbye 
(1755) Mor 1715 at 1716: Assignation paras 8-02–3. 
267 See further Hume Lectures Vol III, 12–4; McBryde Contract paras 14-74–80; Anderson 
Assignation paras 9-20–5. 
268 On the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy, see Anderson Assignation paras 8-12–6. The other important 
extrinsic claim is that of a beneficiary under trus. As discussed in chapter 8 below breach of trust was
often considered an instance of fraud (in the broad sense). 
269 “The fraud of the author does not affect the successor”: Trayner Latin Maxims and Phrases.  
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Some considered this broad version assignatus utitur rule to express a general 
principle of the law of transfer.270 In that case, an explanation was needed for the 
good faith purchaser’s protection where corporeal moveables or heritable property 
were acquired. Special rules based on the freedom of commerce and “the faith of the 
records” were invoked to do this. 
The broad assignatus utitur rule offered one way of understanding the effect of 
trusts in insolvency.271 The beneficiary’s right was a “qualification” of the right in 
the hands of the trustee, and so prevailed against the trustee’s creditors in the case of 
his insolvency. The trustee’s capacity to give good title to purchasers of heritable or 
corporeal moveable property was explicable by the rul s designed for the protection 
of the freedom of commerce or faith of the records, sometimes allied with elements 
of personal bar.272 These considerations did not apply to creditors doing diligence. 
They could have no better right than their debtor and so were affected by the 
beneficiary’s right.  
Others took the rule applying to heritable property and corporeal moveables to be 
the basic position, explaining the rule in assignations either by reference to the fact 
that they are not proper objects of commerce,273 or by reference to the procuratorio 
in rem suam analysis of assignation. The term procuratio in rem suam derives from 
the Roman law device developed to circumvent the prohibition of assignations in that 
legal system. Formally, the de facto assignee sued or received payment as the 
                                                 
270 J Steuart Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in the Law of Scotland Resolved and Answered (2nd edn, 
1762) 332 (here Steuart invokes the maxim resoluto jure dantis, resolvitur jus accipientis); M’Donells 
v Carmichael (1772) Mor 4974; Hailes 513 per Lord Pitfour; Redfearn v Somervails (1813) 5 Pat App 
707 at 710 per Lord Bannatyne (in the Inner House); Gordon v Cheyne (1824) 2 S 566 at 569 per 
Lords Balgray and Succoth and at 571 per Lord President Hope. 
271 Dingwall v M’Combie (1822) 1 S 431 at 432 per Lord Hermand; Gordon v Cheyne (1824) 2 S 566 
at 569 per Lords Balgray and Succoth; Giles v Lindsay (1844) 6 D 771 at 796–801 per Lord Justice 
Clerk Hope, at 808 per Lord Medwyn and at 816 per Lord Moncrieff; Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd 
v Millar (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1174–5 per Lord M’Laren; Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar 
(1892) 19 R (HL) 43 at 43 per Lord Herschell, at 46–7 per Lord Watson and at 54 per Lord 
MacNaughton; H Goudy “Note on Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v M’Kay’s Trustee” (1891) 3 JR 
365 at 366. These cases are, of course, not limited to incorporeals. 
272 Eg Lord M’Laren’s argument in Heritable Reversionary Co v Millar at 1172: “it is the act of the 
truster that has enabled the trustee to commit the fraud, and it is therefore considered proper that te 
loss should fall on him rather than on the innocent purchaser or mortgagee” and Lord Watson in the 
House of Lords: “a true owner who chooses to conceal his right from the public, and to clothe his 
trustee with all the indicia of ownership, is thereby barred from challenging rights acquired by 
innocent third parties for onerous consideration” (1892) 19 R (HL) 43 at 47. Cf sub-section 21(1) of 
the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
273 Hume Lectures Vol III, 12. This position may have been influenced by Stair’s view that transfer of 
personal rights had originally been prohibited was only recognised rather grudgingly thereafter. 
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original creditor’s agent but the latter did not require the assignee to account for what 
he received.274 Since the assignee acted in the name of the assignor, it was obvious 
that he was vulnerable to all claims affecting the assignor. It is open to question 
whether the device ever played the same role in Scots law as it had in Roman law,275 
but it was central to Stair’s analysis of assignation,276 and so was influential in 
Scotland. Even some who did not accept it used it as a historical explanation and 
Hume uses it to supplement his policy justification f r assignees’ vulnerability.277  
The ambit of the assignatus utitur rule now appears to be restricted to intrinsic 
claims (although the debtor retains his right to plead compensation).278 Therefore, an 
assignee whose author had acquired the assigned right fraudulently would only be 
vulnerable if he was a bad faith or gratuitous successor. This brings the position for 
incorporeals into line with corporeal moveables and heritable property and implies 
that the broad assignatus utitur ule cannot be taken to have stated the basic prini le 
of the law of transfer.  
The turning point appears to have been the Redfearn v Sommervails,279 where the 
House of Lords decided that a latent trust could not be pled against an onerous 
assignee in good faith. If latent trusts were excluded, then so, by implication, were 
other extrinsic claims such as those relating to fraudulently induced assignations.280 
The principle in Redfearn was not readily accepted. For many years, it was regarded 
as a piece of judicial legislation by the House of L rds and one which had left the 
underlying principles of Scots law untouched.281  In the course of the nineteenth 
                                                 
274 Zimmerman Obligations 58–62. 
275 Anderson Assignation paras 5-13–23. Cf, however, the entry recording the view that an assignation 
not intimated before the death of the assignor fall “sic ane assignatioun comparatur mandato” in the 
anonymous “Practicks 1574/5/2–1577/5/4” in Adv.MS.24.1.11 reprinted in G Dolezalek Scotland 
Under Jus Commune (St Soc 55–7, 2010) Vol II, 186.  This shows that arguments were being made 
based on the parallel between mandate or pr curatio (both terms for agency) before Stair.  
276 Stair IV.xl.2. Some who did not accept the procuratio in rem suam analysis none the less used it as 
a historical explanation for the rule for assignations: M’Donells v Carmichael (1772) Mor 4974; 
Hailes 513 at 514 per Lord Kames.    
277 Hume Lectures Vol III, 12. 
278 Anderson Assignation paras 8-38–66. 
279 (1813) 5 Pat App 707. See Anderson Assignation para 9-25. 
280 There was a long-running tendency to treat breach of trust as a species of fraud.  
281 Hume doubted how widely the principle in the case would be applied and observed that “some of 
our Judges continue to entertain doubts about this judgement [sic] of the House of Lords in that case 
of Redfearn”: Lectures Vol III, 13. Further, Gairdners v Royal Bank of Scotland 22 June 1815, FC at 
463 per Lord President Hope; Gordon v Cheyne (1824) 2 S 566 at 569 per Lord Balgray and at 571 
per Lord President Hope and even North British Railway Co v Lindsay (1875) 3 R 168 at 176 per Lord 
Justice Clerk Moncrieff. 
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century, however, it became established282 and by 1892 Lord Watson felt able to use 
it as a general authority for the protection of all onerous singular successors from 
latent trusts.283 
Once the broad assignatus utitur rule had been rejected even in the context of 
assignation, it could hardly be regarded as expressing any general principle of the 
law of transfer. In the post-Redfearn world, the cases on corporeal moveables and 
heritable transfer are therefore a more reliable guide than early materials on 
assignation when considering the effect of fraud in the modern law. 
 
(2) Roman Law background 
The tendency in some sources to treat fraud as leading to nullity has its roots in the 
texts in the Corpus Iuris Civilis which deal with the effect of fraud on contracts of 
sale. To understand these properly, it is necessary to bear in mind two specialities of 
classical Roman law. 
First, as Flume has shown, the “two poles” of classical Roman legal thinking were 
the “legal act”284 and the actio (largely synonymous with remedy), without paying 
much attention to the legal relationship which modern thinking would see as 
mediating between them.285 As a result, the jurists’ discussion focussed on whether 
an actio would be granted in certain circumstances. They spoke of the act of sale and 
its circumstances, discussing whether the actio empti (the buyer’s action) and the 
actio venditi (the seller’s action) would be granted, but made little or no direct 
reference to the validity of the contract of sale.286 
                                                 
282 Burns v Lawrie’s Trs (1840) 2 D 1348; Littlejohn v Black (1855) 18 D 207; Scottish Widows v 
Buist (1876) 3 R 1078 at 1081 per Lord President Inglis. Even in the early cases, most judges accepted 
that, within its proper scope. Lord Gilles’s suggestion (in Gordon v Cheyne at 570) that the full court 
should be consulted on whether Redfearn should be followed or not was exceptional (and not 
followed). 
283 Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43 at 47. Lord President Inglis dd the 
same in the Inner House: (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1181. 
284 “Legal act” (Rechtsakt) is broader than juridical act (Rechtsgeschäft). It encompasses all actions 
which could give rise to an actio (ie a legal claim) in Roman law. Thus actions (such as delicts) which 
gave rise to involuntary obligations are also covered by the term. 
285 W Flume Rechtsakt und Rechtsverhältnis (1990) esp at 2. See also B Nicholas An Introduction to 
Roman Law (1962) 19–21.  
286 Flume Rechtsakt und Rechtsverhältnis 2. 
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Secondly, in the classical period, Roman litigation was conducted mainly on the 
formulary system.287 As discussed in chapter 2, formulary procedure involved two 
stages, one before the Praetor and one before a law iudex. Normally, a defence of 
fraud would need to be raised as an exceptio and thus inserted into the formula. 
In certain actions, known as the bona fidei iudicia, it was unnecessary to insert the 
exceptio doli into the formula.288 The reason for this was essentially procedural: the 
formula in such cases instructed the iudex to condemn the defender for what he ought 
to do or give ex fide bona.289 If the pursuer had obtained his right by dolus, ie breach 
of bona fides, he could hardly be said to be entitled to performance ex fide bona.290 
There was no need for insertion of the exceptio doli because its content was already 
implied by the terms of the formula.291 Among the bona fidei iudicia were the actio 
empti and the actio venditi. Contracts enforced through bona fidei iudicia came to be 
known as bona fide contracts, the others as stricti iuris contracts, but the terms are 
not classical.292 The Romans felt no need to decide whether fraud ren ered a contract 
null ab initio or whether it was valid until the matter was raised by the defender 
either through the xceptio doli or before the iudex in the bonae fidei iudicia. 
The post-classical period saw the abandonment of the formulary system.293 This in 
turn meant that Justinian’s compilers sought to excise references to it from the texts 
they included in the Digest. As a result, the procedural context of the Roman jurists’ 
comments on the interaction between fraud and the contract of sale was obscured and 
ius commune jurists were led to look for other interpretations of the texts. This led to 
a change in the understanding of the distinction betwe n stricti iuris and bona fide 
contracts.  
According to Voet’s view, which was one of the most influential, fraud rendered a 
bona fide contract and any transfer made in pursuance of it void, while a stricti iuris 
                                                 
287 On the formulary system in general, see Kaser Das römische Zivilprozeßrecht 149–432 and E 
Metzger  “Actions” in E Metzger (ed) A Companion to Justinian’s Institutes (1998) 208 at 212–4.   
288 Or indeed the xceptio pacti: Kaser Das römisches Zivilprozeßrecht 262. 
289 Kaser Das römische Privatrecht Vol I, 485. 
290 It has been suggested that the notion of bona fides was the spur for the recognition of informal 
contracts such as sale and hire in early Roman law: Schulz Principles 224–5; Classical Roman Law 
36. 
291 Kaser Das römisches Privatrecht 488; Das römisches Zivilprozeßrecht 262. 
292 Schulz Classical Roman Law 35–6. 
293 Das römisches Zivilprozeßrecht 517–9. 
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one could be set aside using the actio de dolo.294 This view is understandable because 
it offered some explanation for the texts in the Corpus Iuris which suggested that an 
attempt to enforce a contract induced by fraud would fail despite the absence of any 
plea of fraud on the part of by the defrauded party in the form of an exceptio doli. 
Scots writers recognised from a very early stage that t ere was no stricti iuris–bona 
fide distinction in their system of contract law.295 Stair had established an essentially 
unitary, will-based approach to contract law.296 
The Roman model, as they perceived it, could not be applied directly. 
Nonetheless, ius commune accounts of the division presented Scots lawyers 
considering the effect of fraud with a number of opti ns: all contracts could be 
treated as bona fide and thus rendered null by fraud; they could all be treated as 
stricti iuris and thus as voidable. Further, although the contract might be rendered 
null, a different rule might be applied to transfer.297 
Scots authorities flirted with all of these possibilities. The confusion which such 
variety implies is related to two apparently inconsistent rules which any theory 
regarding the effect of fraud had to account for. It is not altogether clear whether the 
lack of theoretical clarity allowed the inconsistent rules to develop or whether, 
conversely, these results caused the theoretical confusi n.  
 
(3) Two inconsistent rules 
The first of these rules is the well-known propositi n that a good faith buyer is not 
prejudiced by his author’s fraud: suppose A fraudulently induces B to sell X to him 
and that A then sells X on to C who is unaware of A’s fraud. In Scotland, as in the 
                                                 
294 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas IV.iii.3 and 6, trans P Gane in The Selective Voet (1955–8). For 
discussion of others, see LPW van Vliet “Iusta Causa Traditionis and its History in European Private 
Law” (2003) 11 ERPL 342 at 350–60. 
295 Mackenzie Institues 495–6; Bankton I.x.64. Somewhat surprisingly Bankto ’s account of Roman 
law differs significantly from Voet’s. In Bankton’s view, Roman law restricted the remedy for fraud 
to damages where the contract was stricti iuris. Stair uses the term stricti iuris a number of times 
(I.xi.6, I.xvii.17 and II.x.7) but he only once uses it in express contrast with bona fide (I.xvii.7). Even 
there, he is discussing the content of an obligation in Roman law rather than its validity in Scots law. 
296 G Lubbe “Formation of Contract” in KGC Reid and R Zimmermann A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (2000) Vol II, 1 and M Hogg “Perspectives on Contrac  Theory from a Mixed Legal System” 
(2009) 29 OJLS 643 esp at 648–53. 
297 Logically, the contract might be also have been rega ded as voidable but the subsequent transfer 
void. There seems to have been no support for this proposition. Had it been adopted, it would not have 
aided the rationalisation of the specific rules on the effect of fraud on onerous good faith successors 
and attaching creditors. 
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rest of Europe, B cannot claim X from C. The result is uncontroversial and has been 
well established for many years, often expressed by the maxim dolus [or fraus] 
auctoris non nocet successori.298 
The second rule is much less well-known and much more c ntroversial. If C is a 
creditor doing diligence rather than a buyer, the result is reversed: B can claim X 
from C.299  The result is most often relevant when A is insolvent. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the large number of cases attesting to this rule tend to concern the 
buyer’s fraudulent failure to disclose insolvency. The same rule allows a defrauded 
seller to claim the object of sale from the trustee in sequestration. Some authorities 
go even further, suggesting that if A fraudulently acquires X from B, sells to C who 
is in good faith and is then sequestrated, B will have a preferential claim for the 
price, the price being regarded as surrogatum for X.300 
The seller’s preference over general creditors301 is rather shocking to Scots 
lawyers in the post-Burnett’s Trustee age. It treats sellers better than other defrauded 
creditors, potentially at the direct expense of the latter. Further, the rule suggests a 
radical difference in treatment between two types of uccessor which Scots lawyers 
have tended to treat in the same way. 
Arguments concerning the security of purchasers were c ntral to the case made on 
behalf of Burnett’s trustee,302 and they have a long heritage in this context.303 
Further, from 1793 to 2008, vesting in the trustee was said to operate as an 
adjudication in implement of sale as well as an adjudication for debt. In the Inner 
House in Heritable Reversionary Co v Millar, Lord Kinnear argued, with some 
justification, that this meant that the trustee’s position is as good as that of a good 
                                                 
298 “The fraud of the author does not harm the successor.” The proposition was, however, doubted by 
some in Scotland: Steuart Dirleton’s Doubts 332 arguing that the protection for bona fide purchasers 
in the 1621 Act is exceptional and ought to be strictly construed. The maxim could be seen as 
conflicting with another, now less well known, maxim: resoluto iure dantis, resolvitur ius accipientis: 
“The right of the giver having ceased, or become void, the right of the receiver ceases also.” Trayner 
Latin Phrases and Maxims. 
299 See the authorities discussed in section C(1)(b). 
300 Chrysties v Fairholms (1748) Mor 4896; Creditors of Robertson v Udnies & Patullo (1757) Mor 
4941; Hume Lectures Vol II, 18; Brown Sale §597 but cf Dunlop v Jap (1752) Mor 741. 
301 “General creditors” is used here as a global term to describe the position of both the trustee in 
sequestration acting on behalf of all creditors and of creditors doing diligence. 
302 Admittedly, the House of Lords took a rather ambivalent view of this argument: Burnett’s Tr v 
Grainger 2004 SC (HL) 19, [2004] UKHL 8 at para 79 per Lord Rodger. 
303 See, eg Lord Braxfield’s views in Douglas v Adjudging Creditors of Kelhead (1765) 3 Ross LC 
169 at 171 (as counsel), Mitchells v Fergusson (1781) Mor 10296, 3 Ross LC 120 at 124–5 and Black 
v Gordon (1794) 3 Pat App 317. 
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faith purchaser.304 He went on to point to Bell’s view that adjudgers for debt had as 
much right to execute against an asset as adjudgers in implement.305 This, he argued, 
implied that adjudgers for debt were in as strong a position as a good faith 
purchaser.306 While this type of analysis sits very easily with modern thinking on the 
distinction between real and personal rights, it did not prevail in Heritable 
Reversionary and the sharp distinction between purchasers and both adjudgers and 
creditors doing diligence was maintained.  
It should be borne in mind, however, that the result is not unique to Scots law. 
Although, as Mackeurtan and Moyle point out, there ar  no texts in the Corpus Iuris 
supporting it,307  Bowen LJ suggested that it was generally prevalent in “ he Civil 
Law”.308 It also appears to have obtained in Roman-Dutch law and persisted for 
some time in South Africa.309 It remains the position in Germany.310 
It very difficult to produce a general principle whic  can account for both rules. If 
transfers induced by fraud are voidable rather than void, then A owns X at the time 
of the sale or attachment by C. As a matter of the general principles of property law, 
X is therefore available for voluntary transfer or attachment. On this analysis, which 
came to prevail, the good faith buyer is protected as a matter of course. Some 
explanation is required, however, for the vulnerability of the attaching creditor. The 
somewhat problematic attempts to construct the explanation for the exception are 
discussed in chapter 8.  
                                                 
304 (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1176 per Lord Kinnear. Lord Kinnear was concerned with the effect of a latent 
trust rather than of fraud but the argument applies to cases of fraud as much as to latent trusts becaus  
good faith purchasers enjoyed the same protection in each case. 
305 At least where their common debtor was insolvent: Bell Comm I, 784. 
306 (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1177. For a similar argument which runs the logic in the other direction, see 
RG Anderson “Fraud on Transfer and on Insolvency: ta … ta… tantum et tale?” (2007) 11 EdinLR 
187 at 201–3. 
307 JB Moyle The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law (1892 repr 1994) 155; HG Mackeurtan Sale of 
Goods in South Africa (5th edn, 1984 by GRJ Hackwill) 214 fn 4. 
308 Kendall v Marshall, Stevens & Co (1883) 11 QBD 356 at 358: “The doctrine [of stoppage in 
transitu] was at variance with the Civil Law, which laid down that although the goods had been sold 
on credit and were in the possession of the vendee, th re might be reception by the vendor if the 
vendee became insolvent.” Bowen LJ does not mention fraud but it seems likely that he had this rule 
in mind. Cf Moyle Contract of Sale 155.  
309 This is, of course, not surprising given Voet’s positi n. See Mackeurtan Sale of Goods in South 
Africa 213–216. In the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa held, in 1971, that 
the fact that a delivery was fraudulently induced was not sufficient to allow a seller to reclaim goods 
from an insolvent estate Cornelissen, NO v Universal Caravan Sales (Pty) Ltd (1971) 3 SA 158. The 
shift may be explained by the abandonment of Voet’s analysis of the effect of fraud. 
310 Häcker Consequences of Impaired Consent Transfers 78. The German rule, however, is the result 
of the wider German position regarding the retrospectiv  effect of avoidance: §142 BGB. 
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Some attention should first be given to those authorities which took the other 
route, assuming that fraud rendered a transfer voidan  thus had to explain the 
protection of good faith purchasers. 
 
(a) Fraud as a bar to consent 
These authorities suggested that fraud excluded consent and thus rendered a transfer 
void ab initio.311 Many of them quote a Latin tag along the lines of d lus dans 
causam contractui reddit contractum nullum.312 On this approach, the defrauded 
seller’s right to recover X from attaching creditors is relatively straightforward. The 
nullity of the transfer means that it never passed into the debtor’s patrimony and was 
therefore not available for attachment by his creditors. However, some explanation is 
then needed for the protection of the good faith purchaser. Since many of the 
authorities taking this approach involved cases where the seller was in dispute with 
attaching creditors or the trustee in sequestration, they rarely adverted to the rule 
protecting good faith purchasers. 
The court does appear to have felt the difficulty in Prince v Pallat, the earliest 
case attesting to the seller’s right against attaching creditors. Fountainhall reports 
that, while the judges in the Court of Session felt that fraudulent intent would prevent 
delivery effecting a transfer of ownership, good faith purchasers would be protected 
for the sake of the freedom of commerce.313  
Stair invoked the faith of the records and freedom of commerce in support of the 
good faith purchaser’s protection.314 However, he also treated avoidance for fraud as 
a means of reparation for a wrong done and suggested that the defrauded party had a 
                                                 
311 Prince v Pallat (1680) Mor 4932 (especially Fountainhall’s report); argument of counsel in I glis v 
Royal Bank (1736) Mor 4936; Crawfurd Newell v Mitchell (1765) Mor 4944; Sandieman & Co v 
Creditors of Kempt (1786) Mor 4947; Allan, Steuart & Co v Creditors of Stein: see the opinion of 
Lord Justice Clerk Braxfield recorded by Lord Hailes, (1788) Hailes 1059 (this point was also left 
untouched on appeal); Watt v Findlay (1846) 8 D 529 at 532 per Lord Mackenzie and Richmond v 
Railton at 406 per Lord Justice Clerk Hope. See also Erskine III.i.16 and III.iii.8 and Trayner Latin 
Phrases and Maxims “Dolus dans causam contractui”. 
312 This particular version comes from counsel’s submissions in Shepherd v Campbell, Robertson & 
Co 28 June 1775, FC and is also found in counsel’s argument before the Inner House in Allan, Steuart 
& Co v Creditors of Stein. Such expressions appear to have been common in the ius commune: see eg 
WA Lauterbach Compendium juris brevissimis verbis (New edn, JJ Schütz (ed), 1707) IV.iii.D. 
313 (1680) Mor 4932. It should be noted that Stair’s report of the case is much less conclusive and 




choice about whether to pursue avoidance of the transaction or damages.315 Taken 
together with his discussion of the effect of an oath on a plea of fraud,316 these 
factors suggest that he considered fraudulently-induce  transfers valid and that the 
victim’s right to avoid the transfer was based on a personal right to reparation. In that 
context, the freedom of commerce and “faith of the records” are merely 
supplementary to the validity of the fraudster’s right at the time of the sale to the 
good faith purchaser.317 
Bankton’s approach was essentially the same as Stair’s. He presents reduction on 
the basis of fraud as a remedy in delict.318 Discussing “civil obligations”, he observes 
that they “are such as may be made effectual by legal compulsion; some of these are 
only binding, till set aside by a sentence of the proper court, sustaining a just defence 
of force, fraud of the like against them.”319 He also, however, invokes freedom of 
commerce and “the faith of the records” as justifications for protecting the bona fide 
purchaser.320  
The first institutional writer to adopt the nullity analysis is Erskine. The issue first 
arises in his discussion of consent as a prerequisite for contract formation. Following 
the model commonly found in Europe, Erskine discusses a triumvirate of vices of 
consent: error, fraud and violence.321 All three are treated as excluding, rather than 
merely impairing, consent. In relation to fraud he says “he [the defrauded party] is 
justly said not to have contracted, but to be deceived.”322 
                                                 
315 I.ix.9 and 14. 
316 I.xvii.14, discussed in chapter 2. 
317 Bell (Comm I, 309 fn 1) reads Stair as taking singular successor vulnerability as a general rule, 
subject to policy exceptions for the sake of commerce regarding heritable property and corporeal 
moveables. This seems to be a misreading of Stair IV.xl.21. Stair does give a policy justification for 
the protection of purchasers, but his motivation for h lding assignees vulnerable on account of the 
fraud of their authors is that they are mere procurators in re suas. That is a justification specific to 
assignation so Stair’s rule in cases of assignation cannot be considered a general principle. 
318 I.x.62. 
319 I.iv.15. Bankton distinguishes between natural, civil and mixed obligations. Natural obligations are 
“founded in the law of nature alone, without legal remedy from the civil authority”. Performance of 
them is not gratuitous (I.iii.22) but neither is it compellable: (I.iv.12). Mixed obligations were both 
civil and natural and were therefore enforceable and not liable to be set aside.  
320 I.x.59 and 65. 
321 Erskine prefers “violence”, rather than the traditional Scottish terms extortion and force and fear: cf 




Given the context, Erskine’s argument might be thought limited to the law of 
contract but the same analysis (perhaps evidencing a iusta causa analysis) is applied 
to transfers of goods in his discussion of the contract of sale:  
 
Delivery in a sale, ubi dolus dedit causam contractui, ex gr. where the buyer knew 
himself insolvent, has not the effect to transfer the property to him; it remains 
with the seller, who was ensnared into the bargain––so that the contract becomes 
void; Dunlop [v Jap].323, 324 
 
When Erskine later comes to address the protection of bona fide purchasers, he 
justifies it with a combination of “the faith of the records” and freedom of 
commerce.325 In contrast to Stair and Bankton, these arguments are Erskine’s only 
basis for protecting the good faith purchaser. He holds that the prior transfer was 
null, and therefore he cannot fall back on technical arguments regarding personal 
rights or the fact that the bona fide purchaser acquired from someone who owned the 
property at the time of the transfer.  
It is perhaps rather surprising that the doctrine of the “faith of the records” was 
thought by some to be capable of curing at least some cases of nullity. There is now 
widespread consensus the General Register of Sasines operated a negative system: 
while recording of a conveyance was an essential conditi n for transfer, it was not a 
sufficient one.326 On such a view, the most that the “faith of the reco ds” could do is 
protect against the existence of rights not appearing in the register. It could not 
guarantee the validity of what is there. While this as probably always been the 
dominant view, it has not always been universally accepted. Hume held the 
conventional view but reports that: 
 
 It is true,––some have thought otherwise––have been disposed to think that a 
purchaser infeft, and who buys from an author infeft, does enjoy an absolute 
impregnable (unimpeachable) security against all mortals,––and is secure against 
challenge of every sort, though of the deepest, the most substantial and most 
fundamental nature. As they conceive, it was the obj ct and intendment of our 
                                                 
323 (1752) Mor 741. 
324 III.iii.8. 
325 III.v.10. 




Statutes establishing the Records to invest and array a purchaser with this 
invincible (impregnable) defence.327 
 
References to the “faith of the records” and freedom f commerce in moveables 
essentially come down to the same appeal to “dynamic security”: in this context, the 
idea that it should be possible to be certain that property has been acquired without 
unduly burdensome investigation of the transferor’s right to sell.328 However, 
dynamic security proves too much in these circumstances. It is now well established 
that a bona fide purchaser is not protected if the seller has stolen th  goods and (prior 
to the Land Registration Act 1979 coming into force) was not protected by the “faith 
of the records” if the seller only appeared on the register because of a forged deed. 
These risks pose just as much of a threat to dynamic security as the risk that the 
author’s title has been acquired by fraud. 
Attempts to moderate the dynamic security argument by suggesting that the 
victim of theft is more worthy of protection because he or she has not voluntarily 
ceded possession do not seem very convincing. It is doubtful that someone who has 
been duped is significantly less worthy of protection than the victim of theft.329 
Further, once one type of undetectable defect is allowed to affect good faith 
purchasers, dynamic security is undermined in a manner which is fatal to purchasers’ 
confidence. It would be an unusual purchaser who was illing to tolerate the risk that 
his author had stolen the subjects or forged the prior disposition, if and only if he was 
protected from the risk that the property had been acquired fraudulently.330  
 
(b) Fraud as a ground for avoidance of transfers 
Erskine proved to be something of a high point for the nullity analysis. The 
beginnings of a move away from that position can be discerned in a case cited by 
                                                 
327 Hume Lectures Vol IV, 319. More recently, see R Rennie “Land Registration and the Decline of 
Property Law” (2010) 14 EdinLR 62 at 64–5, arguing that the positive system applied by the Land 
Registration (Scotland) Act 1979 was the true application of the “faith of the records” principle. 
328 P O’Connor “Registration of Title in England and Australia” in E Cooke (ed) Modern Studies in 
Property Law Vol 2 (2003) 81 at 85–6. See also R Demogue “Security” in A Fouliée et al Modern 
French Legal Philosophy (trans FW Scott and JP Chamberlain, 1916 repr 1968) 41 , especially at 
427–8. 
329 Compare, for instance, the facts of Morrisson v Roberston 1908 SC 332 and MacLeod v Kerr 1965 
SC 253. 
330 This view lies behind protection against so-called “Register error” in modern registration of title 
systems. See Report on Land Registration paras 19.17–26. 
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Erskine: Dunlop v Jap.331 Although the nullity analysis was maintained in some later 
cases,332 the views of Lords Kilkerran and Elchies in the Dunlop cases were adopted 
by Bell, Hume and Brown. Their in turn approach forms the basis of the modern 
law.333 
Dunlop v Jap was the second action in litigation which can only be properly 
understood in light of the first. Dunlop v Crookshanks334 concerned the sale of spirits 
by Dunlop to Forbes, a bankrupt merchant. Forbes’ order was fraudulent on two 
grounds. Firstly, he was insolvent when he made it. Secondly, he placed the order on 
behalf of himself and Crookshanks “in Company”.335 Crookshanks and Forbes had 
previously ordered goods from Dunlop together but Crookshanks knew nothing of 
this order. Forbes also ordered a second set of goods n his own behalf. All of the 
goods were then sold on. The truth about Forbes’ circumstances emerged and an 
array of actions for payment, arrestments, multiplepoindings, and actions for 
reduction was unleashed. 
The court drew a distinction between the two orders. In the first, Dunlop had 
intended to transfer “not to William Forbes alone, but to William Forbes and William 
Crookshanks in Company”. Since the latter had refused to accept the goods, 
ownership remained with Dunlop. The offer to transfer had not been accepted by the 
person to whom it was made.336 In respect of the second order, on the other hand, 
there was general agreement that, despite the fraud, “the property would nevertheless 
be transferred” and that a bona fide purchaser was therefore protected.337 
                                                 
331 (1752) Mor 741. 
332 Crawfurd Newell v Mitchell (1765) Mor 4944; Sandieman & Co v Creditors of Kempt (1786) Mor 
4947; Allan, Steuart & Co v Creditors of Stein: see the opinion of Lord Justice Clerk Braxfield 
recorded by Lord Hailes, (1788) Hailes 1059 (this point was also left untouched on appeal); Watt v 
Findlay (1846) 8 D 529 at 532 per Lord Mackenzie and Richmond v Railton (1854) 16 D 402 at 406 
per Lord Justice Clerk Hope. 
333 M’Laren was content with the voidability analysis in 1870: Bell Comm I, 309. See also, Price & 
Pierce Ltd v Bank of Scotland at 1106-7 per Lord Kinnear and MacLeod v Kerr. 
334 (1752) Mor 4879 and Elchies, Fraud No 25 and 26. The case is also noteworthy for the court’s 
focus on intention to transfer rather than intention  contract. 
335 That is, as partners. 
336 This analysis is clear from the Lords’ interlocutor recorded by Kilkerran (Mor 4879 at 4880). Lord 
Elchies also held this view but he seems to have had t e impression that his judicial colleagues based 
their decision regarding the first sale on fraud rather than failure to agree to the transfer: see Elchies, 
Fraud No 25. The situation is complicated somewhat by the fact that Dunlop was content to seek the 
price from the buyer even in this case. This is unsurprising since he was a merchant. It does not seem 
to have affected the court’s analysis. 
337 Mor 4881. 
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The part of the litigation cited by Erskine338 was a contest between two 
arrestments which did not turn on the validity of the transfer in pursuance of the 
second sale.339 Stewart’s report does include the rather ambiguous phrase: “the Court 
seemed to be of opinion, that, had the goods been extant, there was sufficient 
evidence to have annulled the sale”. In light of the earlier case, this seems better 
understood as saying that the fraud entitled the sell r to have it set aside rather than 
that the fraud rendered the sale null ipso iure.340 
However the phrase should be read, Dunlop came to be the authority principally 
relied on by Hume, Bell and Brown as they revived Stair and Bankton’s voidability 
analysis of the effect of fraud on transfers.341 Hume was Professor of Scots law at 
Edinburgh from 1786 until 1822.342 Bell attended his first full course of lectures from 
1787–8343 and but Hume did not consider himself above reference to his student’s 
work. The Stair Society edition of Hume’s lectures is based on notes from the session 
1821–2. By this time Bell had already published three editions of his 
Commentaries.344 In these lectures, Hume refers to the Commentaries in his 
discussion of the effect of fraud on transfer.345 Unsurprisingly, Hume and Bell adopt 
very similar analyses. They mark a significant development from the brief statements 
of Lords Elchies and Kilkerran in relation to Dunlop, and a thoroughgoing revival of 
Stair’s view.  
Although Hume appears to follow Erskine in regarding the absence of fraud as a 
prerequisite for valid consent when concluding a contract,346 the difference in his 
approach is revealed by his treatment of the effect of fraud on transfer. Explaining 
                                                 
338 Dunlop v Jap (1752) Mor 741. 
339 The question was complicated by the fact that Forbes had employed a porter to collect the goods 
and sell them to the bona fide purchaser. The porter appears to have purported to sell in his own name 
and certainly took a bill payable to himself as payment. These are questions for the law of agency 
rather than the law of transfer. 
340 For a similar use of “annul” see Stair I.ix.14. 
341 Other authorise to similar effect were Christies & Co v Fairholms (1748) Elchies’ Notes Fraud No 
20 (also reported at Mor 4896 but without the detail of judicial reasoning); Forbes v Main & Co 
(1752) 4937 at 4939 Shepherd v Campbell, Robertson & Co (1775) Hailes 637 at 638 per Lord 
Kames; and Kames Elucidations Respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland (2nd edn, 1800) 
12–5. 
342 JW Cairns “Hume, David (bap 1757, d 1838)” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (online 
edn, 2007). 
343 DM Walker The Scottish Jurists (1985) 316 at 317 and 337. 
344 The 4th edition was published in 1821 but Hume does not refer to it in his lectures. 
345 Lectures Vol II, 236–7, referring to Bell Commentaries (3rd edn, 1816–19) Vol I, 188–9. The 
relevant passage is on p 189. 
346 Lectures Vol II, 7. 
75 
 
the protection of the bona fide purchaser, Hume stresses that fraudulently acquired 
consent is nonetheless consent and therefore, when combined with delivery, effective 
to transfer ownership.347 That being established, Hume directs his attention to the 
defrauded party’s remedy in the case when the fraudster has not transferred the 
goods. He suggests that, in strict form, the defrauded party may not bring the rei 
vindication.348 Rather he must first set the transfer aside and, util he does so, his 
claim is a mere right to reparation for a delict.349 Thus, the bona fide purchaser’s 
protection follows as a matter of course. Hume concedes that “you do find 
expressions in our Reports and Interlocutors, which at first sight seem as if the 
property in such cases never passed at all” and that Erskine takes this view. 
However, he dismisses this position as “a looseness only, or inaccuracy of 
expression”.350 Hume also suggests that the protection of good faith purchasers is “a 
rule which is essential to the daily traffic of moveables”351 but this argument merely 
supplements the more convincing technical argument. 
Bell and Brown adopt an analysis which is essentially the same.352 Both are 
somewhat clearer than Hume is that fraudulently acquired consent is nonetheless 
consent for the purposes of contract as well as transfer.353 Despite occasional dicta to 
the contrary, the settled position in both contract and property law is that fraudulent 
misrepresentation renders a juridical act voidable rather than void. 
Of course, this leaves open the question of how to account for the seller’s right 
against the fraudulent buyer’s general creditors. If the seller has a mere personal right 
against the buyer, it is difficult to see why it should prevail over the diligence of 
other creditors. Supporters of the voidable analysis did this by invoking the doctrine 
that creditors who acquired right by diligence or insolvency did so tantum et tale as 
the right stood in the hands of the debtor. This doctrine brings its own difficulties and 
they are sufficiently complex to require their own chapter. Therefore, further 
discussion of the tantum et tale doctrine is deferred until chapter 8. 
                                                 
347 Ibid 17 and Vol III, 235–6 (for moveables), Vol IV, 310 (for heritable property). 
348 Ie the action asserting the real right of ownership. 
349 Lecture Vol II, 236–7. 
350 Ibid 17. 
351 Ibid 237. 
352 Bell Comm I, 309; Brown Sale §§560 and 599. 
353 Brown Sale §§554–60; Bell Prin “Note relative to sections 11, 12 and 13”. It must be conceded 
that, by the time he came to write this note, Bell s ems to have come to doubt the validity of regarding 






In light of the above, the Scots law position on misrepresentation as a ground of 
voidability for transfers may be stated in the following terms: 
 
If a party to a transfer has been induced to consent to it by a misrepresentation 
made by or on behalf of the counterparty in the transfer, the party misled may 
have the transfer set aside, provided that the object of the transfer continues to 
form part of the transferee’s patrimony. Misrepresentation should be understood 
to include failure to comply with a legally recognised duty of disclosure. The 
basis for the right to set the transfer aside is a personal right based on either delict 
or unjustified enrichment. 
 
The success of the voidability analysis is to be welcomed. It reflects the basic 
principles which underlie the law’s response to misrepresentation and which can be 
traced back to Stair. It also provides a convincing explanation for the protection of 
bona fide purchasers from their author’s fraud but not their author’s theft, and of the 







TRANSFERS BY INSOLVENT DEBTORS 354 
 
The rule that transactions by insolvent debtors which diminish the assets available to 
their creditors may be subject to attack by or on behalf of the creditors (often referred 
to as the actio Pauliana) is very widely recognised in both Civil and Common Law 
systems.355 
The classic examples are well-known. A debtor recognises that he is irrecoverably 
insolvent. Knowing that his assets will be sold to pay his debts, he decides that he 
would rather see them go to his friends, so he gives th m away. In some cases the 
transfer might be intended to allow the debtor continued use of the property, as 
where a businessman in embarrassed circumstances transfers the family home to his 
wife. Whatever the purpose, the result is the same: a pool of assets which was 
already insufficient to meet the debtor’s obligations is further diminished. Creditors’ 
interests are thus prejudiced. It is uncontroversial th t the creditors, or an insolvency 
official acting on their behalf, can recover property so alienated and apply it to the 
satisfaction of creditors’ rights. 
Alternatively, an insolvent debtor might confer a right in security on a favoured 
but hitherto unsecured creditor. For instance, a tradesman provides services to the 
debtor and is content to give credit without any security. Once the debtor becomes 
aware of his circumstances, the debtor and tradesman decide that action must be 
taken to protect the latter. The debtor pledges some f his stock to the tradesman. 
The right in security is granted so that that the favoured creditor does not have to 
share the proceeds of the sale of the stock with the o er creditors. This makes it 
more likely that the favoured creditor will be paid in full but this is achieved by 
                                                 
354 An extract from this chapter has previously been published as “The Reception of the actio 
Pauliana in Scots Law” in TM Safley (ed) The History of Bankruptcy (2013) 200.  
355 BM Goodman “The Revocatory Action” (1934–5) 9 Tulane Law Review 422; A Boraine “Towards 
Codifying the actio Pauliana” (1996) South African Mercantile Law Journal 213; A Vaquer “Traces 
of Paulian Action in Community Law” in R Schulze (ed) New Features in Contract Law (2007) 421; 
JJ Forner Delaygua La protección del crédito en Europa: La acción pauli na (2000); PR Wood Law 
and Practice of International Finance (University edn, 2008) 79–85; Von Bar and Clive Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (Full edn) Vol 5 2634ff and RJ de Weijs “Towards an Objective Rule 




diminishing the pool of assets available to the other creditors. In certain 
circumstances, they or their representative may be abl to set the right in security 
aside, restoring equality of creditors in respect of the pledged assets.  
The range of transactions subject to challenge goesbeyond these core examples356 
but the focus of this chapter will be on grants made by the debtor because they are 
the most relevant to the wider aims of this thesis. 
 
A. WHAT DOES THE RULE PROTECT? 
The widespread acceptance of this principle is perhaps apt to mask how surprising it 
is. In contrast to the case of misrepresentation, the two parties to the transaction 
under attack consented freely to it without any interference to their private autonomy. 
The transaction is not set aside for the granter’s protection or at his instance, but at 
the instance of third parties, the creditors of thegranter, in order to protect their 
interests.357 These creditors have mere personal rights against the granter and no 
relationship at all with the grantee. It is not immediately clear why holders of 
personal rights against a granter should be entitled to challenge the transfer. Their 
rights are against the person of the debtor rather than against the relevant assets. The 
creditors’ right of challenge appears to grant them equality with or a preference over 
holders of real rights. Therefore, this rule present  a significant theoretical challenge 
to systems which draw a strict division between real and personal rights.  
In response to this, some scholars in the Germanic tradition have suggested that 
the rule exists to protect a right termed the Befriedigungsrecht358 or Zugriffsrecht.359 
On this view, such a right exists alongside every personal right to performance and is 
directed not against the debtor but his patrimonial assets.360 Similarly, francophone 
scholars have typically regarded the actio Pauliana as protective of the gage général 
                                                 
356 For instance, the debtor may co-operate with one creditor’s attempts to do diligence while resisting 
others or pay a debt before it is due. See further, WW McBryde Bankruptcy (2nd edn, 1995) para 12-
24. 
357 The challenge may be made by a liquidator or trustee in sequestration but, as Lord Hope observed 
in Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger [2004] UKHL 8 at para 11, an insolvency administrato  merely acts 
on behalf of the general body of creditors.  
358 Literally “satisfaction-right”. 
359 Literally “seizure-right”. 
360 As Koziol puts it, “auf die Vermögenswerte gerichtet”. H Koziol Grundlagen und Streitfragen der 
Gläubigeranfechtung (1991) 4–5. 
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des créanciers, a phrase which describes the creditors’ right to execute against the 
assets but whose wording implies that it lies against the assets themselves.361 These 
concepts may be attractive in systems with a strong c cept of patrimony, explaining 
why a right against a person can give rise to rights against assets in his patrimony.362 
Scotland, however, does not have such a strong concept of patrimony, and the 
stringency with which the distinction between real and personal rights has been 
maintained makes such approaches uncomfortable.363  
The closest that Scottish writers have come to thisapproach is Goudy’s 
suggestion that “so soon as a man becomes insolvent, his estate becomes the property 
of his creditors, and ought to be distributed among them according to their several 
rights and preferences.”364 A similar approach is perhaps evident in Bell’s suggestion  
that “From the moment of insolvency a debtor is bound to act as the mere trustee, or 
rather as the negotiorum gestor, of his creditors.”365  
Taken literally, these statements could be stronger than the Continental 
approaches because they suggest that the creditors are owners (or beneficiaries of a 
trust) rather than merely holding some right in theassets. However, that reading is 
implausible since it implies a transfer of all of the debtor’s assets at the moment of 
insolvency despite the fact that both the debtor and creditors are likely to be unaware 
of the fact. A reading which took Goudy’s statement literally would also sit 
uncomfortably with the rules on vesting of the estate in the trustee in sequestration in 
section 31 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985, which are drafted on the 
                                                 
361 Code civil art 2284, L Sautonie-Laguionie La fraude paulienne (2008) No 4; Goodman “The 
Revocatory Action” at 436. A minority of French writers have conceptualised the rule as offering 
natural reparation for delict: J-P Chazal “L’action paulienne en droit francais” in Forner Delaygua La 
protección del crédito en Europa 177 at 179. 
362 Ie the right to do diligence. 
363 It also seems to be implicitly rejected by the suggestion in WM Gloag and JM Irvine Law of Rights 
in Security (1897) 1–2 that the creditor has a single right of action and execution correlative to the 
debtor’s obligation.  
364 Goudy Bankruptcy 1. The text is the same in all four editions. Unless otherwise indicated, 
references are to the fourth edition.  
365 Bell, Comm II, 170, Goudy Bankruptcy 22. See also Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 197 and 
Hume’s comment that “A person who becomes bankrupt tho continuing in possession of his goods, is 
considered only a factor or trustee of his creditors.” D Hume Lectures on Scots Law, Session 1792–93 
Vol V, GUL Murray 322, 165. The chapter on bankruptcy was omitted from his lectures after 1800 
and are not included in the Stair Society edition: GCH Paton “Biography of Baron Hume” in Hume 
Lectures Vol VI, 404. This passage is not found in the equivalent part of the notes on the 1796–7 
lectures J Skene Notes taken from a course of lectures on Scotch law, delivered by Professor David 
Hume, 1796 and 1797 GUL MS Gen 1113 fol 409r. The relevant parts are missing from the pre-1800 
notes held by Edinburgh University library: EUL Dc.5.37–8 and Dc.6.122–4. 
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assumption that the transfer is from the debtor rather than from the various 
creditors.366 Similarly, if the debtor did, in fact, become a trustee from the moment of 
insolvency, section 33 (1)(b) of the 1985 Act would mean that none of his assets 
would vest in the trustee in sequestration. 
Even if these statements were understood in the strongest possible sense, 
however, they would not have the same explanatory pwer as the Befriedigungsrecht 
or the gage général. The Continental concepts may be considered as general 
concomitants of personal rights. The position suggested by Bell and Goudy, 
however, only arises on insolvency. It is not simply an aspect of every personal right. 
Therefore some explanation is needed of why it is triggered by insolvency. 
Even where every creditor is regarded as having a ri ht in his debtors’ assets, an 
explanation is needed of why this renders some transactions vulnerable and not 
others. In the Germanic tradition, it has been variously suggested that a grant is 
ineffective as a matter of property law because it is in breach of a statutory 
prohibition, that the creditors can attack the transaction on the basis of either the law 
of delict or unjustified enrichment, and that the transfer is haftungsrechtliches 
unwirksam.367 The last-mentioned is rather difficult to render in English but 
essentially involves a distinction between the debtor’s patrimony and the pool of 
assets liable to execution for his debts (the Haftungskreis). On this view, assets may 
pass in some circumstances from the debtor’s patrimony but nonetheless remain 
within the Haftungskreis and thus subject to the Befriedigungsrecht. Such transfers 
are said to be haftungsrechliches unwirksam. Of course, some reason must be found 
to explain why some transfers suffer from this defect while others do not.  
In light of these considerations, the B friedigungsrecht and the gage général seem 
redundant in analysis of the Scottish position. If a principle of property or obligations 
law must be employed to explain the protection of aright, which itself only exists to 
ensure the fulfilment of a personal right, why should the relevant principle not be 
regarded as explaining protection of the personal right directly? Further, they do not 
                                                 
366 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 ss 31(3) and (5). 
367 “Ineffective in terms of liability law”. For surveys of the conflicting theoretical approaches in the 
Germanic legal tradition, see Koziol Grundlagen und Streitfragen  ch 3 and W Gerhardt Die 
systematische Einordnung der Gläubigeranfechtung (1969) especially ch 1. 
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mesh well with the distinction between real and personal rights and there is very little 
precedent for them in the Scottish sources.  
It seems better to present the challenge in simple terms and to ask why the holders 
of personal rights can set aside proprietary grants made by the debtor. To answer this 
question, it is necessary to look at the manner in which Scots law received this rule. 
The latter process also sheds some light on a further peculiarity: why Scots law has 
two sets of statutory rules and one set of common law rules which all deal with the 
same problem. 
 
B. SCOTS LAW PRIOR TO THE 1621 ACT 
In light of the existence of common law rules which allow challenges to transactions 
in fraud of creditors, statutory intervention in 162  is rather surprising. Why was it 
thought necessary when fraudulent misrepresentation nd minority and lesion were 
left to judicial development on the basis of Roman law materials? Bell suggests that 
Scots law had received the Roman rule that gratuitous alienations were challengeable 
prior to the passage of 1621 Act368 and that the part of that Act which deals with 
gratuitous alienations was solely concerned with matters of proof.369  
The 1621 Act does make provision regarding proof and questions of probation 
generated a significant amount of litigation under the Act.370 There are also some 
hints of recognition of the Roman law rules prior t i s enactment. However, 
examination of the pre-1621 sources and of the Act itself suggests that it had a 
substantive as well as a procedural impact. The relationship between the 1621 Act 
and the common law is significant because the Act was repealed by the Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 1985371 on the assumption that it merely supplemented the common 
law.372 That has been the assumption on which the courts and legal profession have 
proceeded since the 1985 Act came into force.373 
                                                 
368 1621 c 18, RPS 1621/6/30. 
369 Bell Comm II, 171. See also Obers v Paton’s Trs (1897) 24 R 719 at 734 per Lord M’Laren. 
370 Eg Monteith v Anderson (1665) Mor 1044; Crawford v Ker (1680) Mor 1012; Spence v Creditors 
of Dick (1692) Mor 1014; Leslie v Creditors of Lauchlan Leslie (1710) Mor 1018; Guthrie v Gordon 
(1711) Mor 1020; Gibb v Livingstone (1766) Mor 909. 
371 s 75(2), Sch 8. 
372 Scottish Law Commission Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and 
Liquidation (SLC 68, February, 1982) paras 12.5 and 12.16 and s 46(4) and Sch 7 of the draft bill. 






(1) Quae in fraudem creditorum facta sunt ut resitutuan tur  
A case from 1492, Ramsay v Wardlaw, saw a transfer attacked on the basis that it 
was “in defraud and hurt of creditors”.374 The result in Ramsay would not be 
explained on that basis today since the creditors who challenged the transfer had 
already comprised375 the relevant property, which seems enough to give priority over 
the transferee without the need to establish fraud. The sphere of the fraud-on-
creditors rule is protection of creditors who have not obtained judicial security by 
diligence before the grant is made.376 If diligence has been done, there is no need to 
rely on the fraud-on-creditors rule: the completed diligence gives the creditor a right 
which is good against third parties irrespective of fraud. 
Ramsay is significant, however, because it is evidence of very early use of the 
formula “in defraud of creditors” to describe transctions which disappoint creditors’ 
attempts to seek satisfaction from the debtor’s patrimony. The phrase echoes the 
opening words of Digest 42.8 “quae in fraudem creditorum facta sunt ut 
restitutuantur”.377 This title is the major collection of texts discussing the Roman law 
rules on challengeable transactions by debtors.378 The phrase would have brought 
these rules to the mind of Scots lawyers educated in the Civilian tradition. 
The details of the classical Roman rules on this topic remain a matter of some 
controversy.379 However, there is more agreement about the position presented in the 
                                                 
374 (1492) Balfour Practicks 184 c XX. 
375 A form of diligence against heritable property which was the precursor of adjudication for debt. 
376 A point Stair makes at I.ix.16. Inhibition is, of course, an exception. For discussion of inhibition 
see chapter 5. 
377 Cf the title of Hope Major Practicks II.xiii: De creditoribus et his qui in fraudem creditorum. 
378 The other major texts are C.7.75 and J.4.6.6. 
379 The most recent contribution to the discussion is Grevesmühl Gläubigeranfechtung. Perhaps the 
most notable aspect of this work is the revival of the view that there was a remedy known as the actio 
Pauliana which allowed creditors to challenge fraudulent transactions. Since Otto Lenel’s Die 
Anfechtung von Rechtshandlung des Schuldners im klassischen römischen Recht in 1903 (reprinted in 
O Behrends and F d’Ippolito (eds) Gesammelte Schriften (1991)) the dominant view has been that the 
actio Pauliana was the product of interpolation, although there was some dissent (summarised by 
Grevesmühl at 12). The reception of Grevesmühl’s thesis has been mixed: see reviews: JD Harke 
(2004) 72 Tijdschrift voor Rechtgeschiedenis 383 and I Kroppenberg (2006) 123 ZSS (RA) 433. For a 
summary of the discussion, see C Willems Actio Pauliana und fraudulent conveyances: Zur Rezeption 
kontinentalen Gläubigeranfechtung in England (2012) 23–45. 
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Corpus Iuris and inherited by the ius commune. A transaction was challengeable if 
four requirements were fulfilled: diminution of the debtor’s estate, resulting loss to 
the creditors,380 intention to defraud on the part of debtor, and knowledge of that 
intention on the part of the counterparty to the transaction.381  
These requirements raise one major question: what was it that rendered a scheme 
fraudulent? Roman jurists were famously ambivalent about abstract concepts and 
particularly so regarding general definitions,382 so it is no surprise that the Corpus 
Iuris gives a multitude of examples of fraudulent conduct but no general definition. 
Radin suggests that fraus in the relevant sense means merely “prejudice” or 
“disadvantage”, pointing to the fact that dolus is the Latin word for fraud in the sense 
of deceit.383 It is certainly true that fraus involves prejudice to creditors but there is 
more to the concept. A careless act by the debtor which diminished the value of an 
asset could hardly be regarded as fraus in the sense in which the term is used in 
Digest 42.8. 
In order to qualify as fraud on creditors, the act of the debtor required to harm 
creditors in their role as creditors rather than in some other capacity. A debtor who 
stole from his creditor would certainly be acting intentionally to the creditor’s 
prejudice but, while he would be liable for theft, it would not be a case of fraud on 
creditors. Therefore, Kaser, Krüger and Ankum seem closer to the truth in suggesting 
that fraus had two elements: harm to the creditors qua creditors and intention to do 
                                                 
380 The term generally used for this is eventus damni. Eventus damni essentially turned on establishing 
absolute insolvency (the insufficiency of the debtor’s assets to meet his liabilities) although it is not 
entirely clear whether the relevant time for assessing olvency was the moment of transfer or at the 
time of the insolvency procedure: Grevemühl Gläubigeranfechtung 106–10. 
381 BT Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts (9th edn by T Kipp, 1906 repr 1963) Vol I, §463; H 
Dernburg System des römischen Rechts (8th edn by P Sokolowski, 1912) Vol II, §400; JA Ankum De 
Geschiedenis der “Actio Pauliana” (1962) 396; and Gerhardt Die systematische Einordnung 56. 
Ankum’s work is in Dutch with an extensive resumé in French. Only the latter has been consulted in 
detail. 
382 The most famous example of this is perhaps Javolenus’ suggestion in D.50.17.202 that “[e]very 
definition in civil law is dangerous; for it is rare for the possibility not to exist of its being 
overthrown.” 
383 M Radin “Fraudulent Conveyances at Roman Law” (1931-2) 18 Virginia Law Review 109 at 111. 
Radin’s view was anticipated in the German literature. See H Krüger and M Kaser “Fraus” (1943) 63 
ZSS (RA) 117 at 118–9 for a summary and Willems Actio Pauliana 24 fn 23. 
84 
 
so on the part of the debtor.384 A fraudulent transaction might be characterised as one 
which was calculated to frustrate satisfaction of the creditors’ rights.385 
It is perhaps surprising that the transaction did not require to be gratuitous or at 
least at undervalue. How can the patrimony be diminished unless the transaction is at 
least partly gratuitous? It is important to bear in mi d that what matters is the pool of 
assets available to creditors rather than the stateof the patrimony the instant after the 
transaction. Someone who buys assets from a debtor knowing that the proceeds of 
sale will be used to fund the debtor’s absconding can be understood as participating 
in a fraudulent scheme to disappoint creditors althoug  the transaction itself is 
onerous. One who takes a disposition of assets subject to a secret obligation to hold 
them for the benefit of the debtor might be regarded in similar terms.386 
The primary situation addressed by the Roman rule was fraudulent collusion 
between the parties. In the core case, the remedy might be characterised as one 
undoing the wrong done by the granter and transferee in their common plan to 
frustrate satisfaction of the creditors’ rights. Such a plan is obvious where the 
transferor has purchased assets from the debtor in order to furnish him with cash to 
fund an escape or where their intention is that the debtor will continue to have the 
use of the assets after the transfer.  
Less clear-cut cases are imaginable. Suppose, for instance, that the buyer has 
other, legitimate motives for making the purchase but is nonetheless aware that the 
debtor will use the funds to evade his creditors. It might be difficult to regard such a 
transaction as collusion in a narrow sense but it would still be caught by the rule in 
the Digest. First, while the Roman jurists appear to have require intention to defraud 
(consilium fraudis) on the part of the debtor,387 they speak of mere knowledge on the  
                                                 
384 Krüger and Kaser “Fraus”; Kaser Das römische Privatrecht Vol I 628 and Ankum Geschiedenis 
392. See eg D.42.8.1pr and D.42.8.6.8. 
385 Cf Forbes’ definition: “A fraudulent deed is that of a Debtor to deceive his Creditors, and defeat or 
disappoint the payment of what he owes to them” Institutes of the Law of Scotland Vol I (1722 repr 
2012) 222 and Lord Justice Clerk Hope’s definition of fraud as “any device on the eve of bankruptcy, 
in favour of one creditor to disappoint the legal rights of prior creditors”: M’Cowan v Wright (1853) 
15 D 229 at 232. In Forbes’ Institutes, the page numbers of the reprint have been followed because the 
original print had inconsistent page numbering. 
386 Cf Act 1592 c 147, RPS 1592/4/88 providing inter alia that proof that the rebel or his friends and 
family remain in possession of the property covered by a gift of escheat was a relevant objection to the 
title of the donee. 
387 Eg D.42.8.15 and 17. 
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part of the grantee.388 Secondly, even for the debtor, the line between intention and 
knowledge or foresight is a fine one. Julian records a case where a debtor transfers 
all of his assets to his children.389 There was no suggestion, Julian reports, that the 
debtor had fraudulent intent but because he knew that he had creditors and knew that 
he was transferring all of his assets, he was understood as having consilium fraudis. 
He must have known that the inevitable result of his actions would be the frustration 
of his creditors’ attempts to recover. Therefore, h is taken to have intended it 
whether that is his purpose or not. 
It is possible to take this analysis a step further. The basis of the recipient’s 
liability is wrongful conduct. At least on a modern view, a wrong must be a breach of 
some duty.390 The debtor’s duty in this case is fairly obvious. If he has a duty to 
perform, that may be taken to imply a duty not to render himself incapable of 
performing and not to take steps to evade claims for performance. The position of the 
grantee is more difficult. The duty owed by the debtor is a personal one. It might be 
thought that whether it is breached or not is a matter between the debtor and the 
creditors. The sources describe the transferee as being a participant in the debtor’s 
fraud.391 Since transfer is a bilateral act, it is certainly the case that that the grantee 
facilitates the debtor’s wrongful act. In and of itself, however, that does not seem 
quite sufficient to hold the grantee liable alongside the debtor.  
The grantee may have been a co-actor with the debtor bu  he was not bound by the 
same duty and it is the relationship between the act and the duty which renders the 
conduct wrongful. The challenge is to explain why te grantee’s conduct is wrongful. 
                                                 
388 Eg D.42.8.10.2. 
389 D.42.8.17.1. 
390 See Descheemaeker Division of Wrongs 13–28. Cf N Jansen “Duties and Rights in Negligence: A 
Comparative and Historical Perspective on the European Law of Extracontractual Liability” (2004) 24 
OJLS 443 especially at 446–7 arguing that liability in tort or delict may attach for infringment of a 
“fundamental right” which has no prior correlative duty. For present purposes, it is not necessary to 
take a view on whether Descheemaeker or Jansen is correct. The difference between them is at its 
sharpest in relation to strict liability which is not a concern here. (Even the good faith, gratuitous 
acquirer cannot be said to be strictly liable since his liability is limited to his enrichment.) Further, the 
analysis in the main text also holds on Jansen’s analysis. Holding the grantee liable implies that he has
infringed a fundamental right pertaining to the creditor, which is worthy of respect by third parties. 
The difference between that, and a universal passive obligation is a narrow one. Descheemaeker’s 
contention that not every wrong is a violation of a right is not relevant to the present discussion 
because breach of a duty with no correlative right would not per se give rise to any private law right.  
391 D.42.8.10.2–3. For use of the term in Scots law see, eg Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 
25 and 34; Bateman & Chaplane v Hamilton & Co (1686) Mor 1067; Spence v Creditors of Dick 
(1692) Mor 1014. 
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This end might be achieved by positing a duty not to induce or knowingly facilitate 
the breach of obligations to which you are a third party. This does not amount to 
binding third parties to the contract, because no positive performance can be exacted 
from them. Failure by the debtor to perform will not entitle the creditor to sue a third 
party for performance. Their obligation is merely a p ssive duty not to interfere, 
analogous to the general duty of non-interference which applies to corporeal property 
owned by another. The extent of the passive obligation is different but that is 
explicable because it is much more difficult for third parties to know about personal 
rights. Given the rule quod nullius est fit domini regis, all physical things are owned 
(except those narrowly defined classes which are considered res nullius and thus 
subject to appropriation by occupatio).392 Therefore, someone who knows an object 
is there also knows that it is subject to a right of ownership which means that he 
should not interfere with it. There is no such warning with personal rights because 
they are invisible.393 If either a traditional Gaian or a Ginossarian view394 of 
ownership is accepted then the passive obligation might be regarded as an incident of 
the creditor’s ownership of his personal right against the debtor.395   
It might still be objected that a private act between the creditor and the debtor is 
imposing an obligation on third parties who have no part in the transaction. However, 
the law already recognises the creation of servitudes and liferents, which impose 
passive obligations on third parties who have no say in the relevant transaction. 
Indeed, it recognises occupatio by unilateral act, which has the same effect. The 
difference between the situation at hand and occupatio or a grant of liferent or 
servitude is that the object of the passive obligation is a personal rather than a real 
right. Hitherto, that distinction has been thought to be crucial in the standard Scots 
law analysis.396 Therefore, a general passive obligation not to interfere with personal 
                                                 
392 Reid Property paras 540–6. 
393 S Ginossar Droit réel, propriété et créance: Élaboration d’un système rationnel des droits 
patrimoniaux (1960) No 32–3. 
394 For an English language summary of both the Gaian nd Ginossarian positions, see Gretton 
“Ownership and its Objects” especially at 809–10. 
395 See Ginossar Droit réel, propriété et créance No 4 and 22–34, especially No 25. The argument is 
perhaps easier to make in the context of French law because of its concept of pposabilité (see in 
general R Wintgen Étude critique de la notion d'opposabilité: les effets du contrat à l'égard des tiers 
en droit français et allemand (2004)) and its use of the gage général. 
396 See eg Stair I.xv.4 and Reid Property para 3. 
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rights is a controversial proposition. If it only served to explain the voidability of 
transfers to bad faith grantees by insolvent debtors, it might be thought unjustified. 
However, such a universal passive obligation would also explain the bad faith 
element of the so-called “offside goals rule” and the liability of bad faith successors 
to voidably acquired property. It also appears to be implied by the nominate delict of 
inducing breach of contract. These matters will be discussed further in chapter 7. For 
the present, it suffices to observe that, together with the present subject, they 
constitute a group of rules which would be conveniently explained by such a 
proposition.  
Therefore, it might be suggested that the vulnerability of a bad faith grantee from 
an insolvent debtor is based on his knowing facilitat on of the debtor’s attempt to 
frustrate measures which creditors might take to obtain satisfaction, and that this 
knowing facilitation amounts to breach of a duty which everyone owes in respect of 
all personal right-obligation relationships to which they are not parties. 
There is no evidence of any attempt to analyse the issues at this level of 
abstraction in the Corpus Iuris but the basic rule on participation in fraud was clear. 
This general rule was subject to two significant qualifications, which would have a 
major impact on Scots law and indeed on the development of the ius commune.397 
First, the requirement that the recipient knew of the debtor’s fraudulent scheme was 
waived where the transaction was a gift. However, in that case the donee’s liability 
was limited to his enrichment.398 Secondly, one who merely received what was due 
did not commit fraud even if he knew of the debtor’s insolvency.399 
 
(a) Gratuity as a substitute for fraud 
Since the basic rule was based on the grantee’s fault, some justification was needed 
for extending it to cases of gratuitous acquisition in good faith. The reason given by 
Ulpian is that stripping away an enrichment did not amount to imposing a loss on the 
donee.400 On a very short-term view, this is patently false: immediately prior to the 
                                                 






restoration of the gifted property, the donee had an item is his patrimony which is not 
there afterwards.  
The argument might be refined, suggesting that the loss which is imposed merely 
strips away an enrichment which was not justified an that such a stripping away is 
not a true loss.401 Since the enrichment was unjustified, an obligation t  return the 
item arose as soon as it was received. That duty might be regarded as forming either 
a negative part of the patrimony or as a liability of the patrimony. Reversing the 
transaction removes the asset received but it also extinguishes an obligation of equal 
value. Therefore, in some sense at least, the patrimony is undiminished by the 
reversal. That analysis has the advantage of reflecting the limitation placed on 
recovery in Roman law (ie to the donee’s enrichment). To hold good, however, it 
must be possible to establish that the donee was indeed liable in enrichment. At least 
from the perspective of Scots law, this presents some challenges. 
The transfer cannot be said to be without justification. The donative intention of 
the giver is generally accepted as a sufficient ground to support the transfer.402 The 
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam is of no assistance, since it does not justify 
a retransfer from an innocent transferee to a guilty transferor.403 Further, the creditor 
is a third party to the relevant transaction and so must overcome the general 
presumption against claims for reversal of indirect nrichment.404 Even within the 
category of indirect enrichment, the third party creditor’s case is a tenuous one. It is 
difficult to locate a transfer of wealth from the pursuer to the defender. This is not a 
case where the asset has passed into the defender’s patrimony from the pursuer’s 
through that of a third party.405 It is a case where the asset in question was never part 
of the pursuer’s patrimony at all. Neither is it necessarily the case that the debtor 
used funds obtained through his relationship with the creditor to acquire the asset 
transferred. 
                                                 
401 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts Vol I, §42.  
402 Eg Stair I.vii.1 and Bell Prin §533. 
403 See R Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment – Enrichment by deliberate conferral: condictio (2003) 
ch 5, esp para 5.50. 
404 Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment para 8.01. 
405 This might be regarded as “vanilla” indirect enrichment: see N Whitty “Indirect Enrichment in 
Scots Law” 1994 JR 200 at 205. 
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It is true that modern analysis of the English rules on fraudulent conveyances has 
suggested that they are based on unjust enrichment.406 However, the analysis which 
supports that is dependent on the unjust-factor model f enrichment, particularly 
recognition of “policy motivated unjust factors” including the general policy of 
insolvency legislation.407 
Scots law does not adopt an unjust-factor approach to enrichment claims408 so the 
English analysis would sit uncomfortably.409 There is perhaps also a question about 
whether saying that a transfer by the debtor gives rise to an unjust enrichment adds 
very much when the enrichment is only considered to be unjust because the policy of 
insolvency law says that it should be. An enrichment based account has also been 
proposed in Germany.410 The general approach to enrichment law in Germany is a 
little closer to Scotland’s so it might be thought a more promising model.411  It must 
be borne in mind, however, that the German analysis bases the claim to recovery not 
on the Leistungskondiktion412 but on the Eingriffskondiktion413.414 The former covers 
those cases which Scots lawyers would regard as instances of enrichment by 
deliberate conferral; the latter typically covers cases where the enrichment arises 
through unlawful interference with the disenriched party’s property.415 At first sight, 
the Leistungskondiktion might seem the more appropriate basis because therhas 
been a direct transfer to the enriched party. The problem is that the expense which is 
being relied on is not that of the transferor but that of the creditors, who have had no 
part in the performance. Therefore, it is necessary to fall back on the 
Eingriffkondiktion. That option is plausible in German law, because the actions of the 
insolvent debtor and his grantee can be seen as instances of unlawful interference 
                                                 
406 S Degeling “Restitution for Vulnerable Transactions” in J Armour and H Bennett (eds) Vulnerable 
Transactions in Corporate Insolvency (2003) 385; R Goode “The Avoidance of Transactions in 
Insolvency Proceedings and Restitutionary Defences” in A Burrows and A Rodger (eds) Mapping the 
Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (2006) 299. Goode relies (at p 300) on Degeling’s analysis to 
justify the enrichment analysis. 
407 Degeling “Restitution for Vulnerable Transactions” paras 9.49–59. 
408 See Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment paras 1.63–1.84. 
409 In passing, it may be noted that some have suggested that English law no longer follows an unjust 
factor approach either: P Birks Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn, 2005) 101–128. 
410 Summarised in Koziol Grundlagen und Streitfragen 55–65. 
411 Evans-Jones Unjustified Enrichment paras 1.67–1.78. 
412 “Performance condictio”. 
413 “Interference condictio”. 
414 Koziol Grundlagen und Streitfragen 55. 
415 H Sprau “§812” in O Palandt Kommentar zum Bürgerlichesgesetzbuch (67th edn by P Bassenge et 
al, 2008) Rn 2 and 12–5. 
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with the Haftungkreis contrary to the creditors’ Befriedigungsrecht. That option is 
not available in Scots law (and presumably was not available in Roman law) because 
there is no right analogous to the B friedigungsrecht whose object can be regarded as 
having been interfered with. 
The most promising Scottish basis for the exception is the “no profit from fraud 
rule”. This rule takes its name from a dictum of Lord Chancellor Campbell, which 
was adopted by Lord Shand in Clydesdale Bank v Paul:  
 
I consider it to be an established principle that a person cannot avail himself of 
what has been obtained by the fraud of another, unless he is not only innocent of 
the fraud, but has given some valuable consideration.416 
 
The principle was later adopted in New Mining and Exploring Syndicate v Chalmers 
& Hunter417 and then by Menzies and Gloag.418 Menzies used it to justify imposing a 
constructive trust on gratuitous or bad faith acquirers of property transferred in 
breach of trust. For present purposes, Gloag’s chara terisation of the rules as giving 
rise to “a liability closely resembling that resulting from recompense” is more 
relevant. It suggests a rule which exists at the edge of the law of unjustified 
enrichment.419 
In New Mining, the Lord Ordinary, Lord Skerrington (whose judgment was 
approved in the Inner House) suggested, that the stat ment was equivalent to Stair’s 
invocation of “that common ground of equity, Nemo debet ex aliena damno 
lucrari.”420 The maxim and its cognates421 may be traced back to two fragments from 
the Digest,422 one from the title on the condictio indebiti, the other from the 
collection of regulae iuris, expressing the general rule against unjustified 
enrichment. They became particularly associated with attempts to develop a general 
                                                 
416 (1877) 4 R 626 at 628. The English case from which the passage is take is Scholefield v Templer 
(1859) 45 ER 166. 
417 1912 SC 126. 
418 AJP Menzies The Law of Scotland Affecting Trustees (2nd edn, 1913) No 1271 and Gloag Contract 
332. 
419 Gloag discusses the rule in his chapter on “Quasi-contract and implied obligations”. 
420 1912 SC 126 at 133 and 137 per Lord Mackenzie, quoting Stair I.vi.33. Trayner translates the 
maxim: “No one should be enriched out of the loss or damage sustained by another.” 
421 Nemo debet locupletari aliena jactura, Nemo debet ex aliena jactura lucrari and Nemo debet 
locupletari ex alterius incommodo are all given by Trayner. 
422 D.12.6.14; D.50.17.206. 
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enrichment action which went so far as to encompass negotiorum gestio.423 The 
particular example discussed by Stair is that of a minor who transacted without the 
consent of his curators. Such transactions were void, but the counterparty could 
recover if the money lent had been spent on necessities. Stair bases this exception on 
the “common ground of equity” expressed by the maxi. Of course, this situation is 
far removed from one who has benefited from the fraud of another. 
Lord Skerrington’s approach may be seen as an attemp  to tie the no profit from 
fraud rule into a broad conception of unjustified enrichment. In the modern law, 
however, this is somewhat problematic. Scots enrichment law may be broad and 
unitary but it is rarely suggested that it is broad enough to capture the law of 
negotiorum gestio, and some explanation would still be needed of whyrecovery is 
permitted despite this being an instance of indirect enrichment. 
This concern about fit may be part of what led Gloag to describe the rule as one 
“closely resembling” recompense rather than an instance of recompense itself. 
Similarly, Dot Reid has suggested that the rule owes more to the broad Scholastic 
conception of restitution, which cuts across the classical categories of obligation.424 
However, such accounts have the potential to leave the rule adrift from the broader 
framework of private law. 
This problem may be mitigated by seeing the “no profit” rule as relating to the 
rule in cases of fraud in a similar manner to the way voidability for innocent 
misrepresentation relates to fraudulent misrepresentatio . Had the recipient been 
aware of the circumstances of the gift at the time t was made, he would have been 
bound to refuse it. Failure to do so would have amounted to participation in the 
fraud. As with innocent misrepresentation, it might be considered fraudulent to 
attempt to hold on to an enrichment when the donee would have been bound to 
refuse it had he known at the time of the transfer what he knows now. 
It should be borne in mind that, while voidability for innocent misrepresentation 
was explained by reference to its connection with fraudulent misrepresentation, this 
does not imply liability in damages (at least for the period until the misrepresenter 
                                                 
423 See DH van Zyl “The General Enrichment Action is Alive and Well” 1992 Acta Juridica 115 at 
117–28. 
424 Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 238–42. Further on this opic see G Dolezalek “The Moral 
Theologians’ Doctrine of Restitution and Its Justification in the Sixteenth and Seventeen Centuries” 
1992 Acta Juridica 104. 
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becomes aware of the true facts). By setting aside the transaction, the court 
effectively prevents a delict from being done. Similarly, understanding the 
vulnerability of a gratuitous alienee as related to fraud need not imply an obligation 
to pay damages on the grantee. This line of reasoning does not, therefore, imply that 
the gratuitous acquirer is liable in delict. Rather, it explains why an exception might 
be made to the technical objections to recovery in enrichment.425 
In Scotland, due to the terms of the 1621 Act, the gratuity exception has tended to 
overwhelm the rule,426 with non-gratuitous cases existing on the analytical periphery. 
When the focus is on gratuitous alienations, it canseem rather difficult to see why 
early-modern Scots lawyers linked the rule so closely to fraud. This approach makes 
a lot more sense, however, if they saw the Scottish rules as merely the local version 
of a European rule which was firmly grounded in fraud. 
The terms of the 1621 Act also meant that it was not initially necessary to engage 
with arguments of this type. The first part of the Act was directed against gratuitous 
transactions, so there was no need to derive their vulnerability from fraud. As will be 
shown below, Scots law eventually developed a distinct common law challenge to 
fraudulent transactions which existed alongside the 1621 Act. When this ground was 
used to challenge gratuitous grants, and the grantee was in good faith, Scots lawyers 
deployed a line of reasoning which contains the germ of the argument set out above. 
 
(b) Creditors who received what they were due  
The second qualification was that one who merely received his due could not be 
regarded as acting fraudulently.427 This meant that a creditor who had been paid, or 
received a conveyance or real right which the debtor was specifically obliged to 
grant, was safe from challenge. Even if a passive obligation to respect other people’s 
personal rights is recognised, it is balanced by an entitlement to look to one’s own 
                                                 
425 On indirect enrichment see Whitty “Indirect Enrichment in Scots Law”. 
426 Goudy’s discussed the subject under the headings “Gratuitous Alienations at Common Law”, 
“Fraudulent Preferences at Common Law”, “Act 1621, c 8––Gratuitous Alienations” and “Act 1621, 
c 18––Alienations in Defraud of Diligence”. McBryde Bankruptcy appears to take a similar approach, 
as the chapter dealing with challengeable transactions is entitled “Gratuitous Alienations and Unfair 
Preferences”. The substance of McBryde’s treatment does not privilege the gratuitous alienation to the 




interests first and to seek satisfaction from the debtor. This principle would be a 
significant controlling factor in the development of the law of fraudulent preferences. 
 
  
(2) The common law prior to the 1621 Act  
The description of a transfer of property against which diligence was being done as 
being “in defraud of creditors” was not unique to Ramsay v Wardlaw. A statute of 
1592 described purported transfers of moveables by de tors at an unrelaxed horn as 
“maid in defraud of the creditour”.428 Similarly, the old form of letters of 
inhibition429 narrated that the inhibited party “does therefore int nd, in defraud and 
prejudice of the complainer (as he is informed) to sell, annailzie, wadset, dispone, 
resign, burden or otherwise dilapidate” all of his property, heritable as well as 
moveable. Although, by Craig’s day, the inhibition was no longer thought to affect 
moveables,430 the form of words used suggests that inhibition was regarded as Scots 
law’s response to attempts to defraud creditors. This impression is supported by 
Stair’s comment that inhibitions were introduced because debtors were “dilapidating 
their estates” and that they “are much more ancient and extensive than the remedy by 
reduction ex fraude creditorum, which is determined by that excellent statute of 
Session, ratified in Parliament, anno 1621.”431 For Balfour, alienations in breach of 
inhibition “ar of nane avail, as done in fraudem creditoris”.432 
Craig’s position is even stronger. He uses the Roman law rule as a comparative 
counterpoint in his discussion of inhibitions.433 He suggests that inhibitions, which 
are publicised and thus a matter of constructive notice, are preferable to the Roman 
law remedy because of the difficulty of proving the recipient’s knowledge. Craig 
                                                 
428 Act 1592 c 147, RPS 1592/4/88. As discussed in chapter 5, horning was a form of diligence which 
gave rise to single escheat by which his moveable ass ts were confiscated by the Crown inter alia for 
the benefit of the creditor who had used the horning. Therefore grants by a debtor on whom horning 
was used diminished the pool of assets available to the creditor. 
429 Recorded by Stair at IV.xl.3. A short form was introduced by the Titles to Land Consolidation 
(Scotland) Act 1868 s 156, Sch QQ. These were repeal d by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure 
(Scotland) Act 2000 s 76(2) and Sch 13 para 1. Under s 146 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence 
(Scotland) Act 2007, letters of inhibition are no longer a competent method of inhibiting. 
430 Craig I.xii.31. 
431 IV.xl.3. 




took the idea that inhibition was a remedy against fraud by creditors sufficiently 
seriously to consider whether a transfer in breach of inhibition by a solvent debtor 
was nonetheless valid. Craig thought that there was “much to commend” this view 
but recalled that the court had decided to the contrary in a case between the Dowager 
Countess of Crawford and the Laird of Garthland.434 
The widespread view that inhibition was Scots law’s response to fraud on 
creditors might be expected to discourage reliance on the ius commune rules in this 
area. There were, however, some cases in the sixteenth c ntury in which transfers 
were held null on the basis that they were “in defraud of creditors” despite the 
absence of any diligence. 
The most striking is Kennedie v Somervill. It concerned a debtor who, prior to 
summons, had alienated so many of his assets that he was incapable of complying 
with the decree when it was obtained. Balfour explains that the court held that the 
transfer “aucht and sould be reducit, as done and mai efter the dait of the decrete, in 
defraud and hurt of the creditour obtenar thairof.”435 This indicates that a rule was 
already established which rendered null any alienato  made after decree which 
rendered the debtor unable to comply with it.436 It also illustrates the court’s 
willingness to employ a legal fiction (deeming the transfer to have been made after 
the decree rather than before it) to expand the ambit of this rule. The extended rule 
also seems to have been applied in In es v Oliphant437 but that case indicates some 
reticence: Balfour’s account emphasises the fact that t e alienation was made after 
the date of summons. 
Balfour stresses that there is no requirement of a close relationship between the 
debtor and the recipient, although the disponee in Innes was the debtor’s “tendir 
kinsman”.438 He gives no indication of whether either bad faith or gratuity was 
requisite. However, some other sources suggest that they were being taken into 
account. This first appears in the manuscript record of the Acts of the Lords of 
                                                 
434 This case has not been found. 
435 (1504) Balfour Practicks 184 c XXI. 
436 A number of subsequent cases attest to this rule: Fleming v Drummelzear (1525); Mouat v 
Kynnaird (1531) (also summarised on the basis of the manuscript records of the Acts and Decreets of 
the Lords of Council and Session in A M Godfrey Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland (2009) 350); 
Waterstoun v Laird of Teiling (1553) and Spens v Chalmer (undated) (all listed in Balfour Practicks 
185 c XXIII). 
437 (1530) Balfour Practicks 184–5 c XXII, Godfrey Civil Justice 349–50. 
438 See Godfrey’s paraphrase. 
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Council and Session. In 1512, John Inglis sold lands to his brother Gilbert. At the 
time, he was liable in warrandice to Margaret Allan d did not have other lands 
which were sufficient to meet the obligation. Twenty years later439 she challenged 
this, alleging that Gilbert knew of both the liability and the absence of other lands. 
There was also a suggestion that the sale was a sham because Gilbert had not paid 
the agreed price. Gratuity was also alleged to support a plea for nullity in Spens v 
Anstruder.440 Strikingly, the pursuer in Spens sought to cast an assignation as 
“simulat” on the basis that it was made “to ane conjunct person without any 
reasonable caus [sic]”. 
These cases seem to suggest that Scots law was on the way to developing a 
common law rule along the lines which the 1621 Act would eventually establish. 
Key elements such as the insufficiency of assets to meet obligations, the link with 
simulation, and the relevance of gratuity and bad faith, were beginning to emerge. 
Unfortunately, the laconic nature of the records from this period mean that there is no 
indication of the sources which were relied on. 
One contrast with later law is worthy of note, however. The majority of these 
decisions turn on the sufficiency of the debtor’s as ets to meet a particular decree 
rather than on absolute insolvency (ie ability to meet all debts).441 The approach is 
not surprising. In the absence of a collective insolvency procedure (which was not 
introduced into Scots law until 1772),442 absolute insolvency would be very difficult 
to establish.443 This did mean, however, that many transfers caught by the later law 
would not have been captured by the rules in these early cases. A debtor may well 
have sufficient assets to pay any one of his creditors without having enough to pay 
all of them. This focus also makes it much more difficult to see the rules as being 
primarily directed at ensuring equal treatment of creditors. Rather the policy behind 
the rule is clearly to prevent frustration of particular creditors’ attempts to obtain 
satisfaction. 
 
                                                 
439 Godfrey Civil Justice 350. Godfrey gives no date for the case but the manuscript in which it is 
recorded (NAS CS 6/2) covers the period 12 November 1532 to 5 July 1533). 
440 (1570) Maitland Practicks Item 312. 
441 Spens is an exception. 
442 Goudy Bankruptcy 1–3. 
443 See Ankum Geschiedenis 392 and Grevesmühl Gläubigeranfechtung 110 making the same point in 





C. THE 1621 ACT 
The matter was not left for the courts to develop. One of the areas of law reform 
which the 1567 Commission was instructed to consider was “ane artickle for thame 
that puttis thair sonnis or freindis in thair landis or makis assignatiounis of thair gudis 
in defraude of the executioun of decreitis”.444 The desire for legislation in this area 
reflects a preference for statute over other sources of law in this period,445 a general 
concern with the state of the statute book during the reign of James VI,446 and 
legislation on this topic elsewhere in Europe.447 The reference does, however, frame 
the issue in distinctly Scottish terms, following the sixteenth-century cases in 
focussing on defraud of decrees. 
Neither the 1567 Commission nor the 1581 Commission produced the general 
statute envisaged. In 1582, however, the Lords made an Act of Sederunt concerning 
the execution of decrees. Its narrative discloses that i  was motivated by concern that 
delays in execution opened the way for “simulatt and fals assignationis of [the 
debtors’] movable guidis, fraudfull and private alienationis of thair possessionis, 
landis and heretageis”. The remedy, however, was not a challenge to the grants but 
expedited execution.   The Act of Sederunt was ratified by Parliament in 1584.448 
Eventually the judges took the matter up with a furthe  Act of Sederunt in 1620, 
ratified by parliament the following year. It is reproduced in the Appendix to this 
thesis with added section markers. The Act falls into five parts: [a] the ratification by 
Parliament, [b] the preamble to the Act of Sederunt, [c] the provision regarding 
                                                 
444 RPS A1567/12/24. The Commission was renewed in 1581: RPS 1581/10/28. 
445 Eg Craig I.viii.12–17. On Skene’s view see JD Ford Law and Opinion in Scotland During the 
Seventeenth Century (2007) 57–58 and 129–30. 
446 Two commissions were instructed to collect and revise the statutes in the 1570s (1575 (RPS 
A1575/3/7) and 1578 (RPS 1578/7/18)) and there were further attempts in the seventeen century (RPS 
1633/6/47). These produced no effect but the period saw a battery of particular statutes, the best 
known are probably the Compensation Act 1592 c 143, RPS 1592/4/83; the Prescription Act 1617 c 
12, RPS 1617/5/26; and the Registration Act 1617 c 16, RPS 1617/5/20. 
447 Gerhardt summarises provisions in municipal laws in Germany and Italy: Die systematische 
Einordnung 62–79. For Italian and French legislation of the period, see Ankum Geschiedenis 417. For 
discussion of English law, see Willems Actio Pauliana.  
448 1584 c 139, RPS 1584/5/21. 
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transfer to conjunct or confident persons, [d] the provision protecting partially 
completed diligence and [e] a provision imposing a Scots law version of infamia. 
 
(1) An Act of Sederunt 449 
To modern eyes, the first surprising thing is that t e legislation was initially an Act 
of Sederunt rather than a statute. The statute ratifying the institution of the College of 
Justice had expressly conferred on the judges a power to make “sic actis, statutis and 
ordinancis as thai sall think expedient for ordouring of processes and haisty 
expeditioune of justice”450 but, on its face, this legislation seemed to concern 
substantive rights rather than procedure.451 
Discomfort about competence may explain why the Lords felt it necessary to 
make explicit reference to the basis in Roman law.452 Mackenzie adopts this line of 
thinking, arguing that, had the court been faced with a case in which a disposition 
had been made in fraud of creditors, it would have be n justified in adopting the 
Roman law rule (and indeed expected to do so). Instead it had decided the case “in 
Hypothesi [rather] than in Thesi.”453  
Any deficiency of competence was, of course, quickly ured by the parliamentary 
ratification but the origins of the Act might go some way to explaining the judges’ 
later willingness to adopt a very flexible interpretation. If the Act had been simply 
concerned with proof, it would have been easier to present as within the court’s 
procedural jurisdiction but this argument did not occur to Mackenzie. This is not 
                                                 
449 The statutory text is the most reliable record of the Act of Sederunt because the Book of Sederunt 
for the period 1608 to November 1626 was lost in 1674. See I Campbell (ed) The Acts of Sederunt of 
the Lords of Council and Session from the Institution of the College of Justice in May 1532, to 
January 1553 (1811) 64. However, Campbell’s collection does reproduce an abstract of the Act of 
Sederunt as preserved in Fountainhall’s manuscripts in the Harleian collection (now held at the British 
Library) and in Pitmedden’s Abridgment of the Books of Sederunt (Adv MS 25.2.2). The abstract 
gives the date as the 13th rather than 12th July (as does Hope Major Practicks II.13.18) includes no 
preamble or summary of parts [c3] or [e]. The summary of part [d] mentions payment but not the 
grant of any other right. 
450 1540 c 93, RPS 1540/12/64. 
451 There are other examples of essentially substantive Acts of Sederunt which were later ratified by 
parliament: eg 1579 c 75, RPS 1579/10/28; 1584 c 139, RPS 1584/5/21. See also the apparently 
substantive Act of Sederunt “Anent executors creditors” of 28 February 1662, but cf Campbell’s view 
that the statute merely articulated a principle of c mmon law: Campbell Acts of Sederunt xii. For a 
discussion of changing attitudes to the proper scope of Acts of Sederunt see ibid xv–xvii. 
452 None of the Scottish materials (and indeed none of the European materials consulted) make 
reference to Canon law texts on this point. It seems likely that the phrase “lawis, civill and cannone” is 
simply a catch all term for the ius commune. 
453 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 5–6. See Erskine making a similar argument and 
identifying other instances at I.i.40. 
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surprising because the terms seem to make express povi ion regarding the validity 
of juridical acts. Similarly, if Mackenzie had taken the view that the Roman law rule 
had already been received into Scots law, he might have been expected to make 
reference to this as well as to the Roman law preced nt. He did not do so. 
It may, however, be that nineteenth-century perceptions about the proper sphere 
of Acts of Sederunt contributed to Bell and M’Laren’s view that the Act was 
essentially concerned with proof. In fact, the Act has substantive provisions and they 
give an insight into the way Scots lawyers thought about the issue in the first part of 
the seventeenth century. 
 
(2) Narrow scope 
The Act focuses on two relatively narrow cases: a transfer to a conjunct454 or 
confident person for which there was no “trew, just and necessarie” cause; and 
voluntary payment or transfer in prejudice of prior diligence. In contrast to the 
approach in the Corpus Iuris and in the English statutes455 there is no general 
provision striking down deeds made with the intentio  of defrauding creditors.456  
This narrow scope was to prove a major defect. A great number of the cases 
which came before the courts did not fit into either of the two categories. As 
discussed below, this led to pressure for flexible nt rpretation457 and to recognition 
of common law rules alongside the statutory provisin . 
  
                                                 
454 Ie related. 
455 34 & 35 Henry VIII c 4; 13 Eliz c 5 s 2. Bell suggests that it the latter provision was clarified by 
later legislation (1 James I c 15, s 5), which provided that grants by the commissioners of bankruptcy 
would prevail over voluntary deeds given without onerous consideration. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that the latter statute (in contrast with the Stature of Elizabeth) only applies to deeds by one 
who has committed an act of bankruptcy (similar to the requirements for notour bankruptcy) as 
defined in s 2 of the statute. 
456 This approach was also that adopted in France in a 1609 Edict of Henry IV and in the Code 
marchand promulgated by Louis XIV in 1673 (for which see Gerhardt Die systematische Einordnung 
83). 




(3) Fraud or gratuity? 
There is a tension within the provision on transfer to conjunct or confident persons. 
The latter part458 provides that fraudulent intent is presumed where it is proved either 
(i) that the transfer was made without a just price eally paid or (ii) that the receiver 
sold the assets on and the debtor got the benefit of the price obtained. This suggests 
that the drafters still regarded fraudulent intent as essential for liability. This is rather 
surprising because the condition for nullity expressed at the beginning of the 
provision is not fraud but the absence of a “trew, just and necessarie” cause. One 
might reasonably ask why it was necessary to establi h fraud in these circumstances.  
The tensions within the Act might be explained in the following way. The Civilian 
background of Scots lawyers from the period made it almost inevitable that they 
would conceive of actions by debtors which defeated their creditors in terms of 
fraud. They would have been aware of the praesumptiones fraudis which were 
recognised in the ius commune. One of these arose when a gift was made to a close 
relation.459 It is clear from the preamble to the Act of Sederunt that the drafters 
considered fraud by the debtor as the relevant mischief. This is also reflected in part 
[e], which is an attempt to reflect Roman law infamia.460  
As Craig makes clear, they were also aware of the challenges regarding proof of 
intention to defraud. One possible response would be to introduce a presumption of 
fraudulent intent triggered by proof of certain objectively discernible facts. The other 
would be to craft a rule which turns on such criteria tout court rather than using them 
to establish fraud. These objective conditions could, nonetheless, refer to 
circumstances where fraud is likely to be present. 
At a conceptual level, there is a substantial difference between the two 
approaches: one operates at the level of proof and ensures that the relevant boxes are 
ticked; the other operates at the substantive level, controlling which boxes require to 
be ticked. In practical terms, however, they feel very similar. In both cases, the grant 
can be challenged by establishing certain objective facts (since it will typically be 
                                                 
458 Marked [c3] in the appendix. 
459 Willems Actio Pauliana 178–181. 
460 In Roman law, condemnation under a number of actiones where the relevant conduct reflected 
badly on the character of the person liable resulted in infamia. Infamous persons were subject to 
various legal disabilities and regarded as disgraced: s e WW Buckland A Textbook of Roman Law 
from Augustus to Justinian (3rd edn by P Stein, 1963) 91–2. 
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very difficult for the debtor to rebut any presumption once it has been raised). Given 
this, and the fact that both techniques can be regard d as responses to the problem of 
proof, it is not surprising that the distinction is not always strictly maintained. 461  
If the starting point for development is a rule based on fraud, a system might 
initially deal with problems of proof by means of presumptive fraud and develop 
from there to objective conditions for challengeability.462 It may be that the tensions 
in the 1621 Act reflect a lack of clarity about where Scots law was in this process. 
The ambiguity persisted for some time. Bankton describes the effect of part [c] as 
“Statutory Presumptive fraud”,463 despite having earlier observed that this part of the 
act “concerns Gratuitous rights granted by a bankrupt in prejudice of prior 
creditors”.464 
 
(4) Prejudice to creditors 
Part [c] makes no reference to the condition of the granter at the time of the act 
which was impugned. Instead it merely requires that a lawful debt had been 
contracted prior to the act which was impugned and that the act was prejudicial to 
creditors’ interests. This marks a departure from the earlier Scottish approach 
because it focuses on prejudice to creditors in general rather than to a particular 
decree.  
The formulation left two questions open for later litigation to settle. Did the 
creditor bringing the challenge require to have been a creditor at the time of the grant 
or did it suffice that there were other creditors? And did it suffice that the debtor was 
                                                 
461 See eg Gerhardt Die sytematische Einordnung 78 suggesting that the presumption of fraud in the 
period running up to bankruptcy laid the foundation f r the objectivisation of the requirements for 
challengeability in the Italian city states. See also N Hoffmann “Die Actio Pauliana im deutschen 
Recht: Gläubigeranfechtung nach dem Anfechtungsgesetz und der Insolvenzordnung” in Forner 
Delaygua La protección del crédito en Europa 153 at 155 and 161. For a Scottish example see JS 
More Lectures on the Law of Scotland (1864) Vol II, 339–40. 
462 This pattern of development is evident in a number of systems, although the fraud based rule often 
remains as a fall back: Gerhardt Die systematische Einordnung 75, 77-8, 82-8, 108 and De Weijs 
“Towards an Objective Rule on Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies”. There was also resistance to 
this approach, however. In Germany, the gemeines Recht rejected the objective rules found in the 
municipal laws of many of the Hanseatic cities in favour of the traditional Roman law approach: 





bankrupt at the time of challenge or did the creditor require to show something about 
his condition at the time of grant?  
(5) Conflation of simulation and fraudulent grants 
Fourthly, parts [b] and [c3] follow Spens v Anstruder465 as well as the English 
statutes in conflating simulation and fraud on creditors. The former provision 
describes the acts of debtors as “simulate and fraudfull”; the latter gives a clear 
example of simulation: where the disponee sells the assets and applies the proceeds 
for the benefit of the debtor. The transfer is effectively a sham to protect the proceeds 
of the sale from the creditors. In this way, the statute rejects the distinction, first 
observed by Bartolus but generally accepted thereafter, between simulated acts 
(which were null ipso iure) and acts in fraud of creditors (which were valid until 
challenged by creditors).466 
Part [c3] also casts some light on the nature of the creditors’ right against the 
disponee. The disponee is liable to pay over the proceeds to the creditors, subject to a 
deduction for any part of the price already paid to creditors. If part [c] was simply 
concerned with the validity of the act such a provision would be difficult to 
explain.467 The fact that the transfer was challengeable when t  asset was in the 
disponee’s hands would not, in and of itself, explain why the price should be paid to 
the creditors. If, however, the basis of the challenge is the fraudulent grantee’s 
liability to make reparation for his role in diminishing the pool of assets available to 
the creditors, then it makes sense that (as with misrepresentation) either natural or 
pecuniary reparation would be possible.  
Such an analysis would also explain why there was a deduction for funds paid out 
to creditors. To the extent that the funds had been paid to lawful creditors, no wrong 
was done and therefore the right to reparation could n y cover the residue. While a 
right to reparation in delict is frequently subject to such modification, it is more 
difficult to marry such thinking with the “on-off” analysis which would apply if the 
question was simply whether the act was valid or not. An analysis in terms of 
                                                 
465 (1570) Maitland Practicks Item 312. 
466 Ankum Geschiedenis 399–400 and Willems 158–9. 
467 Unless resort was had to an argument based on traci g or real subrogation. 
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personal rights against the grantee would also explain why it was possible to limit the 
donee’s liability to his enrichment.468  
 
(6) Protection for good faith purchasers 
Finally, the rules on protection for good faith purchasers are evidence of the relative 
immaturity of thinking about voidness and voidability in this period. It was clear that 
good faith purchasers were to be protected. In modern law this result can be 
explained very simply. The transfer is valid until the creditors choose to attack it, 
meaning that the acquirer has the power to make someone else the owner up to that 
point.  
The protection for such buyers in part [c2] might be thought closer to that in 
sections 24 and 25 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 than to a voidability rule, 
particularly since part [c1], provides that the relevant deeds are null by exception. 
However, at least in relation to heritable grants, ullity by exception was quickly 
replaced by nullity by action.469 Further, as has been noted, other aspects of the Act 
suggest the creditor’s right is a personal one. When Scottish writers sought to present 
the protection of good faith purchasers in a conceptual framework, they characterised 
the challenge as being based on a personal right rat er than a question of the 
fundamental nullity of the impugned transaction. That meant that the protection of 
good faith third parties followed as a natural consequence. 
When Mackenzie discussed [c2], his first resort wasto the characterisation of the 
actio Pauliana by “the Doctors”. He noted that the Gloss and certain other 
interpreters considered the actio Pauliana to be a personal rather than a real action 
because the receiver’s liability depended on his conduct rather than the mere fact of 
possession, and observed that “Our Law agrees in this with the Civil Law”.470 
Mackenzie’s position, however, was not altogether consistent.  
In an earlier passage, Mackenzie cast doubt on the s andard justification for 
allowing challenges under the 1621 Act or the actio Pauliana to be brought by 
                                                 
468 D.42.8.6.11. 
469 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 24; Stair I.ix.15; Forbes Institutes Vol I, 223; Bankton 
I.x.108 and Bell Comm II, 181–2. 
470 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 24-5. The European position was not quite as clear cut as 
Mackenzie suggests. On the debates on the characteris tion of the actio Pauliana, see Ankum 
Geschiedenis 402–5.  
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creditors with “incomplete” rights: those whose right is either not yet due or subject 
to an as yet unfulfilled condition.471 The common view, he suggested, was that such 
creditors needed to be protected from the risk of the transferee’s insolvency. This 
analysis flows naturally from the personal right analysis. Mackenzie, however, 
objected that “Reductions are in rem” and so are not affected by supervening 
insolvency. He conceded that a transfer to a good faith purchaser would defeat the 
reduction but pointed out that it was open to creditors to protect themselves against 
that risk with an inhibition.  
The other interesting thing about this passage is the absence of any reference to 
the so-called tantum et tale rule.472 The precise scope of this rule has always been 
rather uncertain but, at its narrowest, it suggested that attaching creditors took their 
debtor’s property subject to any rights of recovery arising from fraud by the debtor in 
its acquisition. Given that the transfer was thought to be a species of fraud, tantum et 
tale might have provided an explanation for the results which Mackenzie suggests: 
the right to challenge survives the transferee’s inolvency but not subsequent 
transfer. Conversely, if tantum et tale was accepted here, the necessity on which 
proponents of the standard justification relied for recognising 1621 Act challenges by 
holders of incomplete rights would not obtain. The absence of reference to tantum et 
tale is evidence of its lack of purchase as a general princi le in this period. 
Whatever its cause, the absence of tantum et tale left Mackenzie with an analysis 
which implies that the right to avoid is a real right but that there is overriding 
protection for the good faith purchaser of the type found in the Sale of Goods Act 
1979. As such it is inconsistent with the personal right analysis which he gives in his 
treatment of part [c2]. It seems, however, that the personal right analysis enjoyed 
more support. It is certainly the one which is reflected in discussion by other Scottish 
writers. 
Stair explains the protection by observing that “Fraud is no vitium reale affecting 
the subject, but only the committer of the fraud an these who are partakers of the 
fraud”.473 Furthermore, Stair presents the Act within his title on the obligation to 
                                                 
471 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 11. 
472 On which see chapter 8. 
473 I.ix.15. A similar approach is taken by Bankton: I.x.85. 
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make reparation for wrongs done.474 This aspect of Stair’s structure is followed by 
Forbes475 and Bankton.476  
Erskine treats the statute in the context of actions f reduction,477 Bell in the 
context of bankruptcy.478 These classifications, however, are contextual rathe  han 
analytical and do not imply that the reparation analysis is incorrect. This analysis is 
reflected in Hope’s description of part [c] as rendring acts in defraud of creditors as 
“null at the instance of true and just creditors”.479 If the nullity operated ipso iure, 
there would be no question of it operating at anyone’s instance. The phrase implies 
an innocent party’s option of the type described by Stair in his general discussion of 
the remedies for fraud.480  
The reparation analysis is also supported by the fact that a grantee could defeat a 
challenge by offering to pay the debt owed by the creditor. By doing so, he makes 
reparation for any wrong done, thus removing the creditor’s interest in challenging 
the grant.481 
As with misrepresentation, this analysis implies that avoidance of the gratuitous 
transfer is simply a direct way of placing the creditors in the position in which they 
would have been were it not for the debtor’s wrongful conduct. 
 
 
                                                 
474 I.ix.15. There appears to be a slight confusion in the wording of the opening sentence of this 
section which seems to suggest that the debtor was a victim of the fraud but the general point is clear. 
475 Institutes Vol I, 222. 
476 I.x.73. 
477 IV.i.28. 
478 Comm II, 171; Prin §2324. Hume also treated the 1621 Act as part of his discussion of bankruptcy, 
which was treated after succession and before actions: Hume Lectures on Scots Law, 1792–3 165; 
Skene Notes fol 409r. In the latter, he explained his placement o  the basis that bankruptcy, like 
succession was “one of the modes of transferring property.” 
479 Hope Major Practicks II.13.18. It is also used in the abstract of the Act of Sederunt preserved by 
Fountainhall and Pittmedden. The phrase was picked up by Bell in the Commentaries on the 
Municipal & Mercantile Law of Scotland: Considered in relation to the subject of Bankruptcy (1804) 
Vol I, 65. This work would, in later editions, become the Commentaries on the Law of Scotland. In the 
later editions, the phrase used is “null, when challenged” (2nd edn, 1810 Vol I, 159; 7th edn Vol II, 
172) but the sense is the same. 
480 I.ix.14. 
481 Steuart Dirleton’s Doubts 331 and W Forbes Great Body of the Laws of Scotland 
(http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/) Vol I, 987. 
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D. APPLICATION OF THE 1621 ACT AND DEVELOPMENT OF T HE 
COMMON LAW 
 
As observed above, the scope of the two bases of challenge in the 1621 Act was, on 
its face, very narrow. This is illustrated by Bankton’s summary: 
 
it consists of two principal parts: the first concerns Gratuitous rights granted 
by a bankrupt in prejudice of prior creditors who had done no diligence; the 
second, Rights granted by a bankrupt to one creditor, in prejudice of another’s 
lawful diligence.482 
 
Many of the transactions by fraudulent debtors were either not purely gratuitous 
or not made with conjunct or confident persons, and the creditors prejudiced had 
often not commenced their diligence. These pressure led the court to adopt a 
flexible approach to the conditions in the Act.  Where this was felt to be 
impossible, the common law of fraud was allowed to resurface and fill the gap. 
The end point of this process was an independent common law challenge to 
transactions in fraud of creditors, which sat alongside the 1621 Act. 
 
(1) Gratuitous grants 
 
(a) The debtor’s condition at the time of the grant 
The most immediate challenge in applying the 1621 Act was establishing which 
transferors were caught by part [c]. As noted above, it made no mention of the 
condition of the granter beyond the fact that he was a debtor. However, the rubric of 
the Act indicated that it was concerned with deeds by “dyvoures and banckruptis”. 
There was considerable uncertainty as to whether these words should be read as 
limiting part [c]’s sphere of application. Even in those cases where it was presumed 
to do so, there was some uncertainty as to who could be considered a bankrupt or 
dyvour. A number of early cases on the Act seem to focus not on the sufficiency of 
the debtor’s assets to meet his debts, but on events such as flight or its contemplation 




or charges to pay which would later be considered conditions of notour 
bankruptcy.483 
At the same time many argued that, provided the debtor was unable to pay his 
creditors at the time of challenge, his solvency at the time of the grant was irrelevant. 
This view rested on the fact that part [c] was limited to gratuitous transfers to 
conjunct or confident persons. The argument was that donees bore the loss more 
equitably than creditors and that those close to the debtor were in a better position to 
locate assets which were not well-known and to do diligence against them.484 
The requirement that the debtor be absolutely insolvent at the time of the grant 
first established itself as a defence.485 If the donee could demonstrate that the debtor 
had sufficient assets to pay his debts after making the gift then (absent any fraudulent 
scheme) he could establish that the creditors had not been prejudiced. The debtor had 
assets sufficient to meet his obligations. What he did with the rest of his assets was 
none of their business.486 
The focus was on absence of prejudice rather than solvency per se, as is 
evidenced by the suggestion that certain assets which would be difficult for creditors 
to find out about or get access to could not be reli d on for establishing solvency.487 
This objection lost some of its potency once a formal process of sequestration was 
introduced in 1772 because individual creditors no longer needed to find the assets. 
Over time, absolute insolvency began to mature into a p sitive requirement. Steps 
in this direction are evident in cases where there was a significant lapse of time 
                                                 
483 Flight: Finlaw v Park (1621) Mor 895; Richardson v Eltone (1621) Mor 1047; Scougal v Binnie 
(1627) Mor 879. Charge to pay: Craw v Persone (1623) Mor 1047. 
484 Kilgour v Thomson (1628) Mor 910; Lady Greenhead v Lord Lourie (1665) Mor 931 (in the end 
the creditor failed for lack of prejudice in this case because the transferee was content to allow the 
access to the lands on the basis of his diligence against the transferor); Dewars’ Creditors Competing 
(1710) Mor 923; Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 4–5. 
485 Pringle v Ker (1624) Mor 931; Lady Borthwick v Goldilands (1629) Mor 914; Garthland v Ker 
(1632) Mor 915; Clerk v Stewart (1675) Mor 917; Creditors of Mouswell v Children of Mouswell 
(1679) Mor 934; M’Kell v Jamieson & Wilson (1680) Mor 920; Guthrie v Gordon (1711) Mor 1020; 
M’Kenzie v Fletcher (1712) Mor 924; Executor Creditors of Meldrum v Kinnier (1717) Mor 928 
Creditors of Hay, Competing (1742) Mor 929; Stair I.ix.15. 
486 Formally, Mackenzie appears to support this positin but his exceptions seem to swallow his rule 
and place him effectively among those who did not require insolvency at the time of the grant: 
Observations on the 1621 Act 3–5 
487 As in Kerse’s report of Garthland v Ker (1632) Mor 915 (suggesting that lands were the only 
assets suitable for establishing solvency). See also Callander v M’Kell (1680) Mor 932; Lord 
Queensberry and Creditors of Mouswell v Children of Mouswell (1682) Mor 936; Children of 
Mousewell v Duke of Queensberry (1688) Mor 932; Deas v Fullerton (1710) Mor 921. 
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between the disputed grant and the challenge. Those relying on the transfer were 
discharged of any burden in establishing the grante’s solvency.488  
Bankton’s analysis reflects a further shift,489 suggesting that granter required to be 
a “bankrupt” in the sense of having insufficient asset  to which “creditors might have 
had free access”.490 He went on to argue that, while solvency was generally 
presumed, the opposite was the case under the Act. Thus, while in theory those 
challenging the deed required to establish insolvency, the presumption operated 
immediately to throw the burden of proof onto the grantee. 
As discussed below, by the time Bell came to address the issue, grants to persons 
who were neither conjunct nor confident were being brought on the basis of the 
common law rather than the 1621 Act. Bell suggested that it was the fact that a grant 
was made to a conjunct or confident person (and presumably the subsequent failure) 
that raised the presumption of insolvency.491 With Goudy, he further suggested that, 
while each case required to be considered on its merits, the presumption should apply 
as readily to common law challenges to grants to conjunct persons as to challenges 
under the 1621 Act.492 The point does not appear to have been raised in modern case 
law.493 
The shift from Bankton’s analysis to Goudy’s is significant because the former 
depends on the 1621 Act (and would not therefore survive its repeal)494 while 
                                                 
488 Spence v Creditors of Dick (1692) Mor 1014; Brown v Creditors of Kennet (1696) Mor 1055. See 
also the common law case Street v Mason (1672) Mor 4911, where a full proof of the debtor’s 
solvency at the time of the grant was ordered. 
489 Forbes position is not entirely clear. In his In titutes, he suggests that the terms debtors in part [c1] 
means “Bankrupts, or Dyvours, or Persons actually insolvent, whose Estates are, by the Alienation, 
rendered insufficient to satisfy their Debts.” (Vol I, 223) That might suggest a positive burden on the 
challenge to establish absolute insolvency. However, when he discusses the matter in the Gr at Body 
he seems to tend in the other direction. Having considered, at some length, the debate about whether 
the debtor’s solvency at the time of grant was relevant at all, he concludes that the defender is safe “if 
he should either prove that the Disponer had a sufficient Estate aliunde to pay the Reducer, or should 
offer to pay the Reducer upon an Assignation to his Debt.” (Great Body Vol I, 987.) 
490 Bankton I.x.73, he relies on Lourie v Dundee (1663) Mor 911 (Bankton gives the case as L urie 
but the dates tally exactly) and M’Kenzie v Fletcher (1712) Mor 924. In both cases, solvency was 
proposed as a defence and the even acceptance on that basis was vigorously contested. Forbes report 
of the latter case does disclose reference to commentators on the Corpus Iuris who suggested that the 
requirement of consilium fraudis referred to knowledge of insolvency. 
491 Bell Comm II, 174. 
492 Bell Comm II, 184 and Goudy Bankruptcy 32. 
493 McBryde does not discuss any presumption in his discussion of the requirement for insolvency in 
common law challenges: Bankruptcy para 12-32–3. 
494 Incidentally, Bankton’s view that gratuitous grants to strangers were challengeable on the basis of 
an extended reading of the statute rather than on common law (I.x.75) meant that he would have 
applied it to cases which both Bell and Goudy would have regarded as excluded. 
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Goudy’s does not. The matter is perhaps not of great practical importance because of 
section 34 of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 sufficiently addresses most cases 
of fraudulent transfer by an insolvent debtor. Goudy’s position might be justified 
with an argument parallel to that used by earlier writers to justify the requirement 
that a conjunct donee prove that his grant was onerous without reliance on the 
narrative of the deed. The conjunct person was thoug t to be in a better position to 
find evidence of the consideration for the grant than another grantee because of his 
close connection with the granter. Similarly, he might be thought to have more 
chance of establishing the solvency of the granter at the time. Whether either 
argument would stand up to empirical examination is perhaps open to question. 
 
(b) Posterior creditors 
The court took a narrow view of the other major question raised by the wording of 
part [c], restricting the right to challenge to creditors whose rights were constituted 
prior to fraudulent act.495 However, where it felt that an arrangement was fraudulent 
in respect of posterior creditors (typically because of simulation or latency) it was 
willing to entertain a challenge on the basis of fraud at common law.496 This 
approach persists, without much further analysis, into modern treatments.497 
The Scottish approach reflects the continued conflation of simulation and fraud, 
contrary to the Bartolist tradition,498 and a conflation between simulation and 
latency.499 This is problematic on two levels. First, simulation and latency are mirror 
images of each other: in the former, the parties ar effectively holding themselves out 
to have done something which they did not do; in the latter, they have done 
something but are pretending to have done nothing. Furthermore, neither analysis 
should lead to voidability for fraud on creditors in the sense relevant to this chapter.  
                                                 
495 Pollock’s Creditors v Pollock and Son (1669) Mor 1002; Street and Jackson v Mason (1673) Mor 
4911 (cf Street v Masson (1669) Mor 1003); Reid v Reid (1673) Mor 4923, summarised and endorsed 
in Stair I.ix.15; Watson v Malloch (1681) Mor 883. See also Forbes Great Body Vol I, 982–3, with 
references to further cases. 
496 Pollock’s Creditors v Pollock and Son (1669) Mor 1002; Kolston v Weir (1682) Mor 902 Bankton 
I.x.89 and Erskine IV.i.44. 
497 Eg Goudy Bankruptcy 33, relying on Wink v Speirs (1867) 6 M 77, and McBryde Bankruptcy para 
12-49, adopting Goudy’s analysis. 
498 Ankum Geschiedenis 399–400 and Willems 158–9. 
499 Sometimes collusion was thrown in as well. There is no necessary conflict here since collusion 
refers to the process by which a scheme is executed while simulation or latency refer to what is done. 
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For simulated transactions, Bartolus’ analysis is persuasive. In holding a transfer 
to be simulated, the law concludes that the parties did not intend ownership to pass. 
They just wanted to take advantage of the insolvency consequences of transfer 
without accepting any of its other incidents. That being the case, the requisite 
intention is missing so the grant is void rather than voidable. Thus, where a debtor 
has made a simulated transfer, the asset remains in hi patrimony and subject to the 
diligence of his creditors.  
Alternatively, the simulated transaction may be a transfer to rather than from the 
debtor which creates apparent wealth on the basis of which credit is given by a third 
party. In that case, there is still no intention to transfer. The simulation is not 
fraudulent in the sense of being designed to defeat creditors’ rights. Rather, it is 
fraudulent because it is a misrepresentation by an act. That misrepresentation may 
have induced a creditor to transact with the debtor. If so, the transaction is voidable 
on the basis of misrepresentation.500 If the counterparty to the simulated transaction 
understood that its purpose was to mislead potential creditors, then he may be liable 
in delict for the creditor’s losses as an accessory t  the fraud. This might lead to 
diligence being done against the asset which was the subject of the simulated 
transaction (but which is still in his patrimony), just as it might lead to diligence 
against any of his other assets. 
Similarly, a latent transaction will prejudice creditors where the debtor has 
transferred assets while appearing to retain them. The publicity principle means that, 
in many circumstances, a latent transfer is simply ineffective meaning that the assets 
remain liable to creditor’s diligence. Even when the ransfer is effective, the latency 
only matters where the creditors cannot challenge the act on the basis that it is 
gratuitous or an unfair preference. Typically, this is because the creditor making the 
challenge was not a creditor at the time of the transfer. Once again, the real issue in 
that situation is that the latency was an attempt to deceive. That being the case, the 
transaction under which the posterior creditor gave credit will be voidable and the 
counterparty to the latent transfer might be liable in delict as an accessory to the 
fraud, but it is difficult to see why either of these things should render the latent 
transfer voidable. 
                                                 
500 And, if the tantum et tale rule remains good law, sellers induced to give credit by the apparent 
wealth might be able to recover what they sold from the insolvent estate. 
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In each of these cases, the nature of the fraud is different from the classic case of 
gratuitous alienation. The object of the simulate or latent transaction is to deceive 
potential creditors rather than to frustrate their rights. The transactions make them 
think that they will be able to have recourse against assets rather than take away 
assets against which they would have had recourse. Therefore, Scots law would do 
better to consider such cases as instances of misrepre entation rather the fraud on 
creditors. 
 
(c) Sale at undervalue 
Seventeenth-century case law also established that a sale at undervalue could be 
challenged on the basis of the 1621 Act, although the transfer was not entirely 
gratuitous.501 Mackenzie justified this position by arguing that there was no true 
cause for the transfer, making reference to the equivalent rule in the ius commune.502 
Without such a rule, the protection offered by part [c] would have been very easily 
evaded. Indeed, the rule is best thought of as an anti-avoidance measure. Both 
Mackenzie and Stair stress that the price need not be the highest that could have been 
obtained, and the former suggested that the challenger must show either that the low 
price was intended as a device to cheat creditors or that it was “extraordinary [sic] 
low in itself”.503 
 
(d) Gratuitous grants to strangers 
By the time Mackenzie was writing his commentary on the 1621 Act,504 it was clear 
that gratuitous deeds could be attacked on the basis of part [c] even where the grantee 
was a stranger.505 Faced with the requirement in the text of the Act that the grant be to 
a “conjunct or confident person”, counsel sought to bolster their arguments with 
reference to other factors indicating fraudulent intent, such as the fact that the grant 
                                                 
501 Glencairn v Brisbane (1677) Mor 1011 and 911. 
502 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 21–2. 
503 Ibid 22; Stair I.ix.15. See also Murray v Drummond (1677) Mor 1048. 
504 Published in 1675. 
505 A distinction continued to be drawn between conjunct and confident persons and others: the latter, 
but not the former, were entitled to rely on the narrative in a deed to establish that the grant was 




was of all of the debtor’s goods and gear.506 Mackenzie and Stair saw this move as a 
change in the interpretation of the statute based on judicial practice,507 although 
Mackenzie, in particular, appears to have found the position troubling.508 In his later 
writings, he rationalised the extension to strangers as an actio utilis, justified by 
parity of reason with the rule explicitly set out in the Act.509 
This line of reasoning held sway for a long time.510 However, other circumstances 
were making it more and more vulnerable. First, the developing case law regarding 
challenges by posterior creditors and challenges to transactions with existing creditors 
meant that, by the end of the eighteenth century, it was well established that actions 
by insolvent debtors in fraud of their creditors were challengeable at common law. 
This meant that challenges to gratuitous grants to strangers had an alternative 
justification which did not require the words of the statute to be stretched. Further, 
attitudes to statutory interpretation were becoming less flexible. 
The shift emerged dramatically in the first edition of Bell’s Commentaries in 1804. 
After his treatment of part [c] of the 1621 Act, Bell devotes a separate section to 
“Fraudulent Embezzlement of Funds, as reducible at Common Law”.511 Here he deals 
with gratuitous grants to strangers. He begins by suggesting that “it was held by some 
of our lawyers, that, if the grantee was not a conjunct or confident person, under the 
statute, the deed was not liable to challenge as grtuitous.”512 He supports this by 
quoting the passage from Mackenzie’s Observations on the 1621 Act where the 
                                                 
506 Henderson v Anderson (1669) Mor 888. Such an action is deemed fraudulent in D.42.8.17.1. This 
was a presumption of fraud in the ius commune: Willems Actio Pauliana 179–80. 
507 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 18; Stair I.ix.15: “This excellent statute hath been cleared 
by many limitations and extensions, in multitudes of decisions occurring since … Thirdly the statutory 
part declares all alienations to any conjunct or confident person without a just price, being in prejudice 
of anterior creditors, to be annulled, which hath always been extended, not only to dispositions of 
bankrupts made to confident persons, but to any person.” 
508 He concludes his discussion of the point by observing that “This shews how mysteriously our 
Statutes are conceived.”  
509 Mackenzie Treatise of Actions in Works Vol II, 492 at 495. This treatise was published for the first 
time in the second volume of the collected works in 1722. See Works Vol I, x.  
510 Forbes does not really discuss the point, but the placement of his comment suggests that he 
followed Mackenzie’s approach: Institutes Vol I, 223, Great Body Vol I, 988. Mackenzie’s 
justification is repeated by Bankton, without refernce to actio utilis as a characteristic: I.x.75 and by 
Erskine Principles (3rd edn, 1769) IV.i.13, Institute IV.i.35. In his 1792–3 lectures, Hume simply 
comments that “This part of the Stat: was laid aside as far back as the time of Mackenzie” and cites 
Mackenzie’s Observations on the 1621 Act and Stair: Hume Lectures on Scots Law, 1792–3, 169. By 
1796–7, even this explanation had been removed and Hume simply comments that the statute 
“likewise extends” to grants to conjunct and confident persons: Skene Notes fol 411r. 
511 Bell Commentaries (1st edn, 1804) Vol I, 98 
512 Bell Commentaries (1st edn, 1804) Vol I, 99. 
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narrow terms of the Act and the broader practice are discussed. He does not address 
the other authorities considered above which make it very clear that the broader 
practice was seen as being based on an extended reading of the statute. Instead, he 
moves on to attack Erskine’s suggestion that, in a grant to a stranger, an assertion in 
the narrative that the deed is onerous can only be re utted by writ or oath.513 Part of 
Bell’s argument is the simple point that, if this was truly the case, fraud would be 
very easy indeed. A few extra words in the deed would secure it from challenge.514 
This is true, and Erskine’s statement of the distinction between grants to conjunct 
persons and to strangers probably went too far. What is more interesting, however, is 
Bell’s other argument. 
Erskine had relied on Trotter v Hume515 to support his position. In Trotter, a grant 
to a stranger had been challenged on the basis of the 1621 Act, but the challenge was 
unsuccessful because the narrative of the grant disclosed that it was in consideration 
of “money paid and undertaken, conform to an inventory”. Bell rightly points out that 
the court merely held that the narrative threw the burden of proof onto the pursuer 
rather than necessarily limiting his options for discharging it.516 He also argues, 
however, that the reason for the citation of the statute in Trotter and cases like it was 
that the ambit of the Act was not clear and that pursuers were invoking it in cases 
where it was not appropriate “with the view of throwing the burden of proving the 
onerous cause on the holder.”517 The assumption behind this argument is that the 
challenges could have been brought on the basis of the underlying common law and 
that part [c] of the 1621 Act was concerned with proof rather than the substantive 
law.518 The argument also provided some sort of explanatio for the multitude of 
cases in which the 1621 Act had been invoked althoug  the grantee was not a 
conjunct or confident person. There can be little doubt, however, that Bell’s approach 
was a departure from the previous analysis. 
                                                 
513 Erskine IV.i.35. 
514 Bell Commentaries (1st edn, 1804) Vol I, 100 
515 (1680) Mor 12561. 
516 Bell Commentaries (1st edn, 1804) Vol I, 101. 
517 Ibid. 
518 A contention Bell would later make explicitly: Comm II, 171. 
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Novel as it was, Bell’s approach found support in the nineteenth-century case law. 
Mackenzie’s analysis was rejected by the Lord Ordinary in Wilson v Drummond,519 a 
decision which was upheld by the Inner House and Bell’s approach received explicit 
support in the Inner House in Obers v Paton’s Trustees.520 
Bell’s treatment provided the bedrock for common law challenges to gratuitous 
alienations in the modern era.521 The finishing touch may, however, be said to have 
been applied by Goudy. The order of Bell’s treatment betrayed something of the 
history which his account concealed. Even in the lat r editions of the Commentaries, 
the 1621 Act was discussed first and received much more extensive discussion than 
the common law. 522 Yet, if the common law provides the general rule, it should have 
been treated first with consideration of the alterations made to the general rules by a 
special statute discussed thereafter. Goudy reversed the order,523 and his approach 
persists into the modern law, which, as noted at the s art of the chapter, proceeds on 
the assumption that a common law ground of challenge exists alongside the statutory 
ground. 
 
(2) Transactions with existing creditors 
In their treatment of transactions in defraud of creditors, both Bell and Goudy draw a 
fundamental distinction between transactions undertak n with existing creditors and 
those undertaken with others.524 This distinction and Goudy’s terminology (which 
contrasts “gratuitous alienations” and “fraudulent preferences”), mirrors the 
traditional approach in English law525 marks the structure of the modern statutory 
provisions in this area.526  
                                                 
519 (1853) 16 D 275. 
520 (1897) 24 R 719 at 734 per Lord M’Laren. 
521 McBryde challenges aspects of Bell’s treatment and notes criticism of his approach in M’Cowan v 
Wright (Bankruptcy para 12-19) but the challenges do not bear on the idea that gratuitous alienations 
are challengeable at common law. 
522 Bell Commentaries (2nd edn, 1810) 169; 7th edn, Vol II, 184. 
523 Chapters III and V respectively. 
524 Bell deals with both in Book VI of the Commentaries, devoting chapter II to the latter and chapter 
III to the former. Goudy deals with the latter in chapters III and V and the former in chapters IV and 
VI. 
525 Which distinguished between “fraudulent preferences” (dealings with creditors) and “fraudulent 
conveyances” (grants to third parties): R Stevens and L Smith “Actio Pauliana in English Law” in  
Forner Delaygua La protección del crédito en Europa 195 at 195. 
526 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 ss 34 and 36; Insolvency Act 1986 ss 242 and 243. 
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However, in respect of the common law, the value of this distinction has been 
doubted. McBryde prefers a general category of “fraudulent transactions” of which 
gratuitous alienations and unfair preferences are merely particular instances.527 He 
proposes a uniform analysis applicable to all common law challenges to fraudulent 
transactions by debtors.528 McBryde’s analysis is preferable because the law did not 
develop in two hermetically sealed categories. Many of the existing creditors who 
received preferential treatment did so because theyw re relatives (ie conjunct 
persons). Further, one the most important types of fraudulent preference (the grant of 
a security for an existing debt without additional consideration) can be understood as 
a gratuitous grant. However, transactions with existing creditors do pose extra 
analytical challenges because such creditors have a legitimate claim on the debtor’s 
assets while third parties do not.  
The only provision in the 1621 Act devoted to transactions between the debtor and 
existing creditors was part [d], but it had a very narrow scope. Creditors did not 
qualify for its protection until they had commenced diligence; and, as soon as the 
diligence was complete, they no longer needed its protection because they could rely 
on their priority of diligence. This restrictive approach is understandable. The 
development of this area in the ius commune exposed certain fundamental tensions 
which certainly had not been resolved by 1621. 
 
(a) The ius commune context 
As mentioned above, a text in the Corpus Iuris suggested that payment of a debt 
which was due was not fraudulent.529 This principle had strong support in the 
European tradition, bolstered by the consideration hat payment of a debt has a 
neutral effect on the patrimony since it operates to discharge a liability equal to its 
value.530 
Such an approach rather neglects the fact that the creditor who is paid will receive 
complete satisfaction while the other creditors must typically be content with a 
                                                 
527 McBryde Bankruptcy para 12–24. 
528 Ibid para 12–29. 
529 D.42.8.6.6. Early payment was considered fraudulent: D.42.8.10.12. 
530 See Ankum Geschiedenis 409–10. 
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proportion of their entitlement.531 If the payment to the favoured creditor is reversed, 
he will rank alongside them for a proportion of his debt, while the pool of assets 
available to all will be increased by its full value. Thus, its reversal is clearly 
beneficial to the other creditors. It is very difficult to say that a transaction whose 
reversal would be beneficial to creditors was not prejudicial to them in the first place. 
Similar concerns are expressed in the Digest,532 although Scaevola’s concluded 
views on the matter are not entirely clear from the fragment. He does seem to hint 
that those who have diligently enforced their rights are entitled to retain their 
advantage in a question with those who neglected to o so. This implies that the 
problem is where the debtor decides of his own accord t  favour one creditor over 
others. This line of thinking was developed by certain glossators who took the view 
that a payment to one of many creditors was vulnerabl  to challenge under the actio 
Pauliana.533 However, in the Civilian tradition, this view was largely overwhelmed 
by the view that creditors were entitled to look to their own interests and accept 
payment debts owed to them.534 
Creditors’ freedom to take what they can get was generally more limited if what 
they get is not cash payment but a transfer in lieu of payment or a right in security, 
granted after the constitution of the debt.535 This approach was, however, rejected by 
Voet, Wissenbach and some of the usus modernus writers on the basis that it made no 
sense to allow a creditor to accept total satisfaction in the form of payment but not a 
right in security, which was something less than total satisfaction.536 
 
(b) Hostility to preferential conduct 
While these considerations may have led to a narrow approach in the drafting of part 
[d], the general attitude of Scottish judges was hotile to preferential conduct by 
insolvent debtors. Even prior to the 1621 Act, courts were willing to set aside 
diligence where the debtor had assisted the creditor using it while not offering the 
                                                 
531 Although formal sequestration was not introduced until 1772, cessio bonorum and the rules on 
equalisation of diligence meant that creditors often acted collectively. 
532 D.42.8.24. 
533 See Ankum Geschiedenis 409. 
534 Ankum Geschiedenis 409–10. 
535 D.42.8.10.13. D.42.8.13 was explained in the ius commune as concerning a right in security 
granted or promised before the debt was constituted: Ankum Geschiedenis 410. 
536 Ankum Gescheidenis 410–1. 
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same help to others. This was considered to be collusi n (a species of fraud) and 
continued to be recognised after the Act was passed.537 It reflects an attempt to strike 
a balance between the creditors’ right to look to their own interests and the debtor’s 
duty to be neutral in respect of them. 
The court’s desire to prevent preferences by the debtor was also evident in a 
liberal attitude to the requirement in part [d] that the creditor had commenced 
diligence against the debtor, accepting horning as sufficient although it did not, in 
itself, attach any assets538 and by recognising a horning as sufficient even when it 
was open to a technical objection in its execution.539 
Another technique employed in extending the capacity of the 1621 Act to catch 
fraudulent preferences was to read the reference in part [c] to a true, just and 
necessary cause cumulatively. On this basis it could be argued that a transfer made in 
discharge of a debt which was not under the pressur of diligence was without 
necessary cause. However, the reception of this line of argument was, at best, 
mixed.540 
Beyond the 1621 Act, however, the cases are somewhat inconsistent, suggesting 
some uncertainty about the right balance between protecting equality of creditors and 
recognising their right to look to their own interests. Thus, in Scougal v Binnie541 the 
Lords suggested that even a payment would have been struck down had the creditor 
                                                 
537 See the cases reported under Collusion in Morison’s dictionary, starting at page 2427. The earliest 
is Kinloch v Haliburton (1618) Mor 2427. See also Creditors of Hunter, Competing (1695) Mor 1023; 
Stair I.ix.13; Bankton I.x.72. However, the court did take a pragmatic attitude so a payment which 
merely anticipated the inevitable result of diligenc  and thus saved further expense was safe from 
challenge in respect of either collusion, part [d] of the 1621 Act or challenge as a common law 
fraudulent preference: Bishop of Glasgow v Nicolas (1677) Mor 1060; Gellaty v Stewart (1688) Mor 
1053; Dalgleish v Gibson (1709) Mor 1035; Gordon v Bogle (1724) Mor 1041; Grant v Smith (1758) 
Mor 1043. 
538 Richardson v Eltone (1621) Mor 1047; Veitch v Pallat (1675) Mor 1029; Murray v Drummond 
(1677) Mor 1048; Bathgate v Bowdoun (1681) Mor 1049; Bateman & Chaplane v Hamilton & Co 
(1686) Mor 1067; Hamilton v Campbell (1709) Mor 1059; Chaplain v Drummond (1686) Mor 1067; 
Wordrop, Fairhom and Arbuthnot & Co Competing (1744) Mor 1025. However, hornings not 
proclaimed at the relevant head burgh were not sufficient: Cockburn v Creditors of Hamilton of 
Grange (1686) Mor 1046; Gordon or Davach v Duff (1707) Mor 1078. Similarly, a creditor who 
delayed in prosecuting his diligence lost the protection of part [d]: Drummond v Kennedy (1709) Mor 
1079. See also Dalrymple v Lyell (1687) Mor 1052, where an inhibition was found enough to ground a 
1621 part [d] challenge to an alienation of moveabls.  
539 Kilkerran v Couper (1737) Mor 1091. 
540 Birkinbog v Grahame (1671) Mor 881; Creditors of Tarpersie v Laird of Kinfawns (1673) Mor 900 
541 (1627) Mor 879. The case is also noteworthy for the willingness to treat an assignation in 
satisfaction of a debt as equivalent to payment. On this point see also Dempster (1622) Mor 895 and 
Newman v Preston (1669) Mor 880 and 897. 
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been a participant in the debtor’s fraud (ie aware of his intention to abscond), 
although no other creditor had done diligence prior to the payment. Five years later, 
however, in Jack v Gray542 the court held that, in the absence of prior diligence, a 
creditor could accept either payment or security even from a debtor known to be 
contemplating absconding.  
A further nuance is evident in Creditors of Tarpersie v Kinfawns.543 Some but not 
all of the creditors who were challenging a dispositi n had done diligence. The 
reports are inconsistent: Stair suggests that the diligence was enough to render the 
debtor a notour bankrupt and therefore incapable of pre erring one creditor over 
another, while Gosford’s report seems to suggest that the protection was limited to 
those creditors who had done diligence.544 The difference is significant because 
Gosford’s account can be explained as a mere appliction of part [d] of the 1621 Act 
while Stair’s cannot. 
 
(c) Notour bankruptcy 
The concept of notour bankruptcy (ie notorious bankruptcy) was deployed in later 
cases. In some, the requirement in part [d] that the debtor be a “dyvour” at the time 
of the grant was taken to require notour bankruptcy.545 In others, notour bankruptcy 
was used to establish fraudulent intent and thus a common law challenge. A number 
of these cases involved dispositions omnium bonorum. Where a disposition was, on 
its face, one which covered all of the debtor’s assets, it was taken to establish 
participation in the fraud on the part of the prefee since he must have been aware 
that the debtor was left with nothing to meet other creditors’ claims.546 As noted 
above, a disposition of all or most of a debtor’s as ets also gave rise to a presumption 
of fraud in the ius commune. Taken together, these cases established that a notour 
                                                 
542 (1632) Mor 897. 
543 (1673) Mor 900. 
544 See also Cunninghame v Hamilton (1682) Mor 902, where the Lords appear rather ambivalent 
towards the idea that a debtor who is a notour bankrupt is barred from preferring one creditor over 
another. In later proceedings, they limited the protection to those creditors who could bring 
themselves within 1621d: (1682) Mor 1064. See further Bateman & Chaplane v Hamilton (1686) Mor 
1076, where the bench was split as to whether personal creditors could be protected where a 
disposition was de facto of all goods and geir but not so on its face. 
545 Veitch v Executors of Ker and Pallat (1675) Mor 1073 
546 Kinloch v Blair (1678) Mor 889; Cranston v Wilkie (1678) Mor 889; Pollock v Kirk Session of 




bankrupt (presumptively known to be bankrupt by the cr ditor taking any grant and 
also aware of his own condition547) could not prefer one creditor over another even 
where there was no prior diligence.548 The justification for the recipient’s liability is 
close to that noted above in relation to fraudulent transfers: the preferee who accepts 
the security in the knowledge of the bankrupt’s condition is also presumed to know 
the law and thus that preferential conduct by the debtor is wrongful. By accepting the 
transfer anyway, he knowingly facilitates the fraudulent scheme. 
There was, however, considerable dispute about the precise criteria for notour 
bankruptcy and whether something less, such as “material bankrupt[cy]”, was 
sufficient for a challenge.549 The issue would be settled by statute in 1696,550 which 
established clear criteria for notour bankruptcy and declared that all acts in favour of 
creditors were “voyd and null” if undertaken within the 60 days prior to notour 
bankruptcy or at any time thereafter.551 
Following the 1696 Act, some doubted whether it was necessary to satisfy its 
requirements in order to bring a challenge under part [d] of the 1621 Act.552 The 
majority of cases suggested that this was not so but that the preferee did require to be 
a participant in the debtor’s fraud.553  
Whatever its effect on the 1621 Act, the 1696 Act’s express provision might have 
been expected to bring common law challenges to an end. However, as the with 1621 
Act, the conditions for challenge under the 1696 Act were quite restrictive. Creditors 
continued to bring common law challenges to preferences in situations falling short 
of the Act’s requirements and the court was receptiv  to them. Some of these were 
                                                 
547 Campbell’s Creds v Lord Newbyth (1696) Mor 883. Although the case was decided after th  1696 
Act, the statute did not have retrospective effect: Creditors of Hunter, Competing (1695–7) Mor 1023. 
548 Shaw v M’Millans (1685) Mor 105; Moncrief v Creditors of Cockburn of Lanton (1694) Mor 1054; 
Scrymzeor v Lyon (1694) Mor 903. Moncrief would become the key authority on the point. 
549 Spence v Creditors of Dick (1692) Mor 1014; Moncrief v Creditors of Cockburn of Lanton (1694) 
Mor 1054; Moncrieff v Lockhart (1696) Mor 884. 
550 1696 c 5, RPS 1696/9/57. 
551 As with the 1621 Act, the statute reflects foreign influence. Suspect periods prior to the moment of 
bankruptcy during which acts by the debtor are presumed to be fraudulent were known in both Italy 
and France in this period: Gerhardt Die systematische Einordnung 77–8 and 82–3. The idea of 
establishing bankruptcy on the basis of particular events which strongly suggest that debtor’s inability 
to pay his creditors closely resembles the English concept of an “act of bankruptcy”. On “acts of 
bankruptcy”, see WJ Jones The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commission in the 
Early Modern Period (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society Vol 69, Part 3, 1979) 24–
5. On the English approach generally, see Willems Actio Pauliana 89–150. 
552 Miln v Nicolson’s Creditors (1697) Mor 1046; Deans v Hamilton (1703) Mor 1062; Bank of 
Scotland v Kennedy (1708) Mor 1057; Hamilton v Campbell (1709) Mor 1059. 
553 Eg Tweddie v Din (1715) Mor 1037. The exception was Deans v Hamilton (1703) Mor 1062. 
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dispositions omnium bonorum554 but others simply involved intention to prefer.555 In 
one case, a sale at full price by an insolvent debtor was set aside because certain 
favoured creditors were informed of the sale and thus put in a position to arrest the 
price in the buyer’s hands.556 
The picture that emerges from these cases is that a b nkrupt debtor had a duty of 
neutrality in respect of his creditors. This duty might be explained by reference to the 
distinction between a solvent and an insolvent debtor. A solvent debtor may pay 
some creditors early or grant them extra rights in ecurity just as he may make gifts. 
He does not prejudice the remaining creditors by so doing. Each is still in line to get 
what they are due. That being the case, the debtor’s dealings with others are none of 
their business. The insolvent debtor,557 however, is in a different position. His case is 
one of insufficient assets. This means that he cannot be generous to friends but it also 
means that he cannot prefer one creditor over another. By favouring one creditor he 
renders himself even less able to meet his obligations to others, just as surely (if not 
always to the same extent) as he would by giving a gift. He cannot justify his action 
by saying that it was necessary to satisfy the prefer d creditor because he has no 
justification for sacrificing the rights of some for the sake of others. He is equally 
bound to all his creditors, as is reflected by their ranking pari passu in his insolvency 
and their equal right to use diligence against his assets.558 
 
(d) The creditor’s knowledge 
In the vast majority of the cases, the creditors receiving the preference knew what 
was going on: either there was express collusion, or the transfer was of all of the 
debtor’s assets, or the debtor was notour bankrupt. In such circumstances, it is easy 
to see why the preferee would be liable to other creditors. The preferential 
transaction is impossible without the preferee’s willing participation. Therefore, he 
facilitates the debtor’s wrongful conduct just as much as someone who buys goods 
                                                 
554 Weems v Murray (1706) Mor 912; Crammond v Bruce (1737) Mor 893. 
555 Cochrans v Couts (1747) Mor 947; Grant v Grant (1748) Mor 949. 
556 Brown v Murray (1754) Mor 886. 
557 It is generally conceded that, for a common law challenge, the debtor must either be insolvent or 
act in contemplation of his failure: M’Cowan v Wright (1853) 16 D 494 at 498 per Lord Justice Clerk 
Hope, at 510 per Lord Cockburn and at 513 per Lord Wood; MacDougall’s Trustee v Ironside 1914 
SC 186 
558 See Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 197–8. 
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from the debtor knowing that the funds will be used to abscond.559 That being the 
case, a knowing preferee is liable as an accessory to the debtor’s wrongful conduct 
and has a duty to make reparation. Since the wrongful conduct is typically a juridical 
act such as a payment, transfer or grant, the status quo ante can be restored by 
reversal of the transaction. The vulnerability of the transaction can be understood in 
terms of that party’s duty of reparation to the other creditors. 
However, in Grant v Grant,560 a successful challenge was brought against 
heritable bonds granted to certain favoured creditors, with the design on the part of 
the debtor that they should be preferred to his major creditor, the pursuer in the case. 
The Lords proceeded on the basis that the preferees w re innocent of the debtor’s 
scheme but nonetheless reduced the bonds to allow the pursuer to come in alongside 
the bondholders. The case would become particularly influential in the later 
development of the common law relating to fraudulent preferences.561 McBryde 
suggests that, together with the nineteenth-century case, M’Cowan v Wright,562 
which relied on it, it established that a preference could be challenged as fraudulent 
despite the good faith of the preferee.563 They remain the key authorities. 
On this basis, fraudulent preferences seem to raise a rious challenge to the 
analysis presented so far. The preferee can hardly be liable as an accessory to a 
fraudulent scheme if he does not know what is going , while Goudy suggests that a 
transaction with a creditor is not gratuitous because the creditor “in getting 
satisfaction or security for his debt, is only getting some equivalent for what the 
debtor is under a legal obligation to give him.”564 This line of reasoning led Goudy to 
doubt the soundness of the decisions which dispensed with the need for knowledge 
on the part of the preferee.565 However, examination of Grant and M’Cowan 
suggests that the decisions are not inconsistent with the principles examined so far. 
The apparent difficulty is created by analysis of fraudulent preferences as a uniform 
category set in opposition to gratuitous alienations. 
                                                 
559 Ibid, 201–2. 
560 Grant v Grant (1748) Mor 949. 
561 See M’Cowan v Wright (1853) 15 D 494 at 500–1 per Lord Justice Clerk Hope. 
562 (1853) 15 D 494. 
563 McBryde Bankruptcy paras 12–16 and 12–34. 
564 Goudy Bankruptcy 36. 
565 Ibid 37–9. 
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In his (very brief) report of Grant, Lord Kilkerran suggested that acceptance of 
the bonds rendered the preferred creditors participants in the debtor’s fraud, despite 
their ignorance of it. In M’Cowan, Lord Justice Clerk Hope explained how this could 
be:  
 [I]f a party for his own benefit uses a deed fraudulently granted by his 
debtor as a preference to him, he really becomes a party to the fraud, and is 
so dealt with just as if he had assisted in the preparation of the security.566 
 
The rationale is a familiar: it would be fraudulent to seek to retain a benefit which 
could not have been acquired in full knowledge of the circumstances once those 
circumstances are disclosed. However, it is only persuasive if the preferee is seeking 
to hold on to a benefit acquired gratuitously. Otherwise the preferee would have a 
legitimate basis for insisting on his right. To setthe transaction aside would simply 
be to shift the loss caused by the debtor’s fraud from one innocent party to another. 
Here the effect of Goudy’s mischaracterisation is evid nt. Although the 
transactions in Grant and M’Cowan were between a debtor and one of his existing 
creditors they were, in substance, gratuitous transactions.567 Unlike other transactions 
attacked as fraudulent preferences, the grant of a security does not discharge the debt. 
After the grant, the preferee still has the personal right to repayment which he had 
before but he also has something extra: a right in security. It is an extra right for 
which he has given no value.568 Since the transaction is gratuitous, well-established 
principles explain why bad faith on the part of thepr feree is unnecessary.569 It also 
answers Voet and Wissenbach’s objection that it is strange to allow payment of the 
debt but not the grant of a right in security which is something less than full 
satisfaction. Payment discharges the debt. Where a right in security is granted, the 
creditor retains a right to full satisfaction but has a new right as well. 
 
 
                                                 
566 M’Cowan v Wright (1853) 15 D 494 at 500. 
567 Similarly, in the cases cited by Goudy as following M’Cowan in this respect, the transaction was 
gratuitous. 
568 Had he done so, the transaction would not be a fraudulent preference thanks to the nova debita 
rule: Renton & Gray’s Trustee v Dickison [sic] (1880) 7 R 951 and Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 
36(2)(c). 
569 It is noteworthy that, in M’Cowan, Lord Justice Clerk Hope expressly reserved his opni n on the 
situation where the security was granted in consideration for the creditor’s forbearance from claiming 
payment (at 498). 
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(e) Preferences resulting in discharge 
The other types of fraudulent preference cannot be explained as gratuitous 
transactions. When an insolvent debtor makes payment b fore the debt is due or 
transfers property in its satisfaction the transaction cannot be said to be gratuitous, 
since the debtor’s obligation is discharged. 
Nonetheless, the transaction is prejudicial to other cr ditors and, as observed 
above, in fact beneficial to the preferee. Some of the dicta in M’Cowan, where the 
judges observe that the bad faith or otherwise of the preferee makes no difference to 
the prejudice to the other creditors, appear to suggest that such prejudice is sufficient 
to justify the vulnerability of a preferential transaction.570 On this reasoning, it might 
be argued that, although such preferences are not formally gratuitous, because the 
debtor gets a discharge, in substance they represent an enrichment of the preferee at 
the expense of the other creditors since he gets full atisfaction when otherwise he 
would not have done so. 
Tempting as such a line of argument may be, it should be resisted for a number of 
reasons. First, the argument that the mental state of the preferee has no relevance to 
the prejudice to the other creditors would apply with equal force to the mental state 
of the debtor. The prejudice arises from the fact tha his affairs are beyond recovery, 
not from the fact that he knows them to be so. However, all of the judges in 
M’Cowan accepted that the debtor’s mental state was relevant to the vulnerability of 
the transaction. 
Secondly, not all transactions which operate to prefer a particular creditor are 
challengeable. The distinction between acts which the debtor would undertake in the 
normal course of his business and extraordinary acts was drawn by Kames in his 
report of Grant and it continues to be relevant.571 Ordinary transactions are safe 
while extraordinary ones are vulnerable. The class of “ready money” transactions, 
when a debtor satisfies a debt which is due in cash have sometimes been given 
special attention572 but such transactions are essentially payments made in the course 
of business. 
                                                 
570 Eg Lord Justice Clerk Hope at 498, per Lord Cockburn at 509 and per Lord Wood at 512. 
571 See generally McBryde Bankruptcy paras 12-40–6. 




As McBryde suggests, the range of potentially fraudulent circumstances is 
wide.573 Nonetheless, the protection for transactions in the ordinary course of 
business, when taken together with the protection for ova debita, where fresh value 
is given, means that preferences which give rise to discharge are challengeable in 
only two circumstances: where there is active collusion between debtor and creditor, 
and where an insolvent debtor discharged a debt by an unusual method. 
If the insolvent debtor’s duty of neutrality is accepted, rationalisation of these 
cases becomes easier. In the former, there is conscious participation in the debtor’s 
wrongful conduct. In the latter, the creditor may be regarded as having been “put on 
notice” that something strange is happening. This might be regarded as the 
insolvency equivalent of circumstances which would raise a duty of enquiry in 
offside goals cases. 
 
(f) Justified transactions 
Even this line of reasoning might be thought to prove too much because there is clear 
authority that even a creditor who knows that his debtor is insolvent may accept 
payment of a debt which is due574 and may even accept grants of real rights if the 
debtor was contractually obliged to grant them.575 Some of these decisions might be 
explained on the basis that an insolvent debtor is entitled to try to trade his way out 
of insolvency and, if that is the case, his creditors must be entitled to continue to 
transact with him in the normal fashion. However, certain passages in the case law 
go a step further and suggest that even a creditor wh  was aware of the debtor’s 
irretrievable insolvency might be entitled to accept payment or transfer.576 That being 
the case, the ground of protection cannot be the grantee’s or payee’s good faith but 
rather the legitimacy of accepting such performance. 
The first point to make is that a creditor is not generally entitled to refuse 
performance which is due and offered. Should he do so, the debtor can consign the 
                                                 
573 McBryde Bankruptcy para 12-25. 
574 The authorities are traced in detail by Lord Presid nt Emslie in his opinion in Nordic Travel Ltd v 
Scotprint Ltd 1980 SC 1.  
575 Horne v Hay (1847) 9 D 651. See also Taylor v Farrie (1855) 17 D 639 at 649, discussing the 1696 
Act. 
576 Eg Nordic Travel Ltd v Scotprint Ltd at 18–9 per Lord President Emslie, at 27 per Lord Cameron 
and at 32–3 per Lord Stott. 
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goods or funds discharging the debt.577 This would not, however, be the case if the 
“performance” that was offered was not in strict compliance with the contract. 
Secondly, it must be borne in mind that, up to sequestration (and subject to 
retrospective suspect periods), each creditor is entitled to pursue satisfaction by 
diligence without regard to the interests of other creditors. Similarly, there is no 
liability for inducing breach of contract, if the purpose of the interference is “to 
protect and equal or superior right” of your own.578 
Thirdly, there is the well-established principle that it is no fraud to get what is 
due. Taken together, these principles form a plausible justification for allowing 
creditors to accept performance which is due to them, particularly since this right is 
very narrowly constrained being limited to performance which accords precisely 
with the creditor’s right. 
 
(3) The effect of reduction 
One of the most striking features about the case law in this area is the court’s regular 
specification of the persons against whom reductions were to be effective and the 
extent of that effect. Thus, in Lourie v Dundee,579 the pursuer sought reduction of a 
disposition on the basis of part [c] of the 1621 Act. The Lords allowed reduction to 
the effect that the land should be subject to Lourie’s diligence. Similarly, in Kinloch 
v Blair, a disposition of all the debtor’s assets was reduc  but only to the extent 
necessary to bring in the other creditors pari passu with the preferee.580 In other 
cases, a decree of reduction was granted but its effect was limited to protecting 
certain classes of creditor.581 Similarly, when the transfer made as part of a 
fraudulent scheme to favour creditors who would arrest the price was reduced in 
                                                 
577 Stair I.xviii.4. 
578 OBG v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 at para 193 per Lord Nicholls. 
579 (1663) Mor 911. 
580 (1678) Mor 889. See also Cranston v Wilkie (1678) Mor 889: Gordon v Ferguson (1679) Mor 
1012; Cunninghame v Hamilton (1682) Mor 902 and 1064; Brown v Drummond (1685) Mor 891; 
Crammond v Bruce (1737) Mor 893. A similar approach was taken to reductions under the 1696 Act: 
Mitchell v Rodger (1834) 12 S 302. 
581 Cunninghame v Hamilton (1682) Mor 1064; Bateman & Chaplane v Hamilton (1686) Mor 1076; 
Deas v Fullerton (1710) Mor 921. 
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Brown v Murray, the Lords reduced it “not as to the purchaser, but only as to the 
creditors, to the effect of ranking them all pari passu upon the price.”582 
The court’s willingness to limit the effect of reductions under part [d] of the 1621 
Act marked a rejection of Mackenzie’s suggestion that, in contrast to part [c], the 
basis for the challenge was that the act was contrary o lawful diligence rather than 
that it was fraudulent. From this he inferred that, “the Ground of Nullity being real, it 
ought to be extended to all” excluding protection even for bona fide purchasers.583 
The approach taken by the court also reflects the fact that part [d] of the 1621 Act 
is aimed at addressing fraudulent avoidance of diligence rather than at giving effect 
to that diligence. The conditions for the general third-party effect of diligence were 
as established part of the law regarding diligence, rather than the result of the 1621 
Act. This distinction supports the view that the basis for a challenge under part [d] 
was a personal right held by the pursuer.584 
On the whole, the court’s approach was endorsed and reflected by legal writers. 
Mackenzie himself seems to analyse reductions under part [c] in these terms. 
Bankton comments that under part [d] “the right reduced still subsists, burthened 
with the reducing right.”585 In his 1796–7 lectures, Hume observes that “The eff cts 
and benefits of a Reduction extends [sic] to all creditors, and not to the pursuer 
only.”586 It seems unlikely that Hume would have made specific reference to 
creditors if he had considered that reduction operated to revest the property with 
respect to all parties. A similar approach is taken by Bell.587 
The limitation on the effect of the reduction can be explained by reference to the 
limit of the personal right. The fraudulent preferenc  was a wrong done to the 
creditors. Reduction of the grant is a mechanism for making good that wrong. If the 
wrong had not been done, the preference (typically a right in security) would not 
have been granted and so the wronged creditors would have ranked alongside the 
preferee in respect of that asset. To go further, and strip the transfer of all effect 
                                                 
582 Brown v Murray (1754) Mor 886. 
583 Observations on the 1621 Act 38. Bell notes but doubts Mackenzie’s position: Comm II, 190–1. 
584 As suggested by the successful party’s argument in Henry v Glassels & Coning (1709) Mor 1062. 
See also Elliot v Elliot (1749) Mor 905. 
585 I.x.108, relying on Street and Jackson v Mason (1673) Mor 4911. 
586 Skene Notes fol 411r. The passage does not appear in the printed edition of Hume’s lectures (which 
are based on notes taken in 1821–2). 
587 Comm II, 183 and 190. 
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would be to add a penal element to the rule. If the c allenge was on the basis of part 
[d] of the 1621 Act, then the effect of this would be to confer a windfall on creditors 
who had not done diligence. 
Since the basis of both the challenges under both the 1621 Act and the common 
law is reparation for wrongful conduct, there seems no reason to believe that 
different principles would apply to common law challenges. The fact that common 
law challenges to fraudulent preferences are based on personal rights to reparation is 
illustrated by Munro v Rothfield.588 The court held that, while an agreement between 
a debtor and certain of his creditors that he would set aside a portion of his income to 
the satisfaction of their debts was challengeable by the other creditors, it was not a 
pactum illictum and therefore it was effective between the parties. If the result of a 
fraudulent preference at common law was nullity rather than voidability, such a 
result would be impossible. The personal right analysis has also recently been 
endorsed for common law challenges to fraudulent preferences in Liquidator of 
Letham Grange v Foxworth Investments.589 
As has already been noted, the personal right analysis of voidability for fraud on 
creditors provides a natural explanation for the protection of good faith successors. In 
doing so, however, it raises another challenge: explaining the vulnerability of 
gratuitous or bad faith successors. These, however, fall within the broader category 
of “successor voidability”. The same challenges arie in relation to misrepresentation 
and the offside goals rule and they will be addressed together in chapter 7. 
 
(4) Summary of the common law position 
The net result of this analysis is that modern Scots law has ended up very close to the 
position described in the Digest. There is a common law ground of voidability for all 
types of transaction in fraud of creditors. However, most of the development which 
undergirds this position arose from the interaction between common law and statute 
rather than from independent common law development. The final step of 
                                                 
588 1920 SC (HL) 165. Indeed, that case, the courts employed the language of voidness and voidability 
to express the contrast. 
589 [2011] CSOH 66, 2011 SLT 1152 at para 12 per Lord Glennie. The decision was reversed on 
appeal ([2013] CSIH 13) but the basis of the appeal was Lord Glennie’s treatment of the evidence 
rather than his fundamental analysis of the nature of the challenge. 
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recognising a common law challenge in circumstances which overlap directly with 
the 1621 Act was the work of Bell, with very little basis in the earlier sources. 
The basic proposition is that it is wrongful for a debtor to render himself unable, 
or even less able, to fulfil his obligations to hiscreditors. The insolvent debtor’s duty 
of neutrality between creditors is really a special instance of this general duty 
because, by favouring one creditor, he aggravates his inability to meet his obligations 
to the others. 
It is not enough to establish that the debtor has acted wrongfully. Any challenge to 
the transaction will typically damage the counterparty to the prejudicial transaction 
rather than the debtor. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the counterparty’s 
liability. 
The basic explanation is that the counterparty is a participant in the debtor’s 
wrongful conduct. The actions by the debtor are bilateral transactions: transfers, 
payments and grant of rights in security. If the debtor did not have a willing 
recipient, the wrongful conduct would be impossible. Therefore a knowing 
counterparty can be regarded as an accessory to thewrongful conduct. It is wrongful 
knowingly to participate in acts by a debtor which render him incapable of fulfilling 
his obligations to his creditors. Since an insolvent debtor has a duty of neutrality 
between his various creditors, a creditor who knows and accepts such preferential 
treatment is just as guilty of wrongful conduct as someone who accepts a gift from 
the debtor or buys goods from him knowing that he will use the funds to abscond. 
The conduct is prejudicial to creditors and a wrong against them. In short, it is a 
delict. Therefore, creditors are entitled to reparation of that wrong from both the 
debtor and the accessory. Since the wrongful conduct took the form of a transaction 
between the debtor and the accessory, it is amenabl to natural restitution. Reversal 
of the transaction puts the wronged parties in the position they would have been in 
had the wrong not been done. Therefore, the basis for avoidance of a grant to a 
recipient who is aware of what the debtor is doing is a right in delict. 
As in the case of innocent misrepresentation, an attempt (once apprised of the 
relevant facts) to retain a benefit which it would have been wrongful to acquire in 
full knowledge of those facts would itself be wrongful. In this context, that concern 
is expressed through the “no profit from fraud” rule. If, however, reversal of the 
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transaction would go beyond stripping away a benefit and impose a loss on the 
recipient, it is not justified because the recipient did not have the relevant “mens rea” 
at the time it was concluded. Therefore, where the grantee was innocent at the time 
of the grant, the basis for the liability is best placed in enrichment rather than in 
delict. 
 
E. TWENTIETH CENTURY STATUTORY INTERVENTIONS 
Today, the first port of call for those looking to challenge a transaction done in fraud 
of creditors is not the common law but certain provisions in the Bankruptcy 
(Scotland) Act 1985590 and the Insolvency Act 1986.591 They replaced the 1621 and 
1696 Acts, implementing of recommendations by the Scottish Law Commission.592 
Detailed discussion can be found in the major modern t xtbooks. For present 
purposes, the key question is the extent to which these statutory interventions can be 
considered as continuing along the lines established in the pre-1985 law. 
 
(1) Essential elements 
The provisions in the 1986 Act take those from the 1985 Act and apply them to 
corporate insolvency. Therefore, there is effectively a single statutory regime 
irrespective of the nature of the debtor. 
Gratuitous alienations and unfair preferences are dealt with separately but in each 
case the legislative technique is the same. There is a suspect period running up to the 
date of sequestration, liquidation or administration. Transactions entered into in that 
                                                 
590 Sections 34 and 36. Detailed commentary can be found in McBryde Bankruptcy paras 12-58–148. 
591 Sections 242 and 243. Detailed commentary can be found in Drummond Young and St Clair 
Corporate Insolvency paras 10-06–10-12 and 10-15–10-21. Section 245 of the 1986 Act contains a 
similar provision which is directed specifically at floating charges. The policy concerns and general 
shape of this provision is similar to that of the provisions discussed in the main text. However, the 
match with the other rules discussed in this chapter is not complete: the provision limits the effective 
scope of the relevant grant directly rather than givin  the court power to set it aside: s 245(2). As such, 
it fits less well with a reparation based model. This is perhaps unsurprising given that the provision 
applies in both Scotland and England so it is not a direct development of the Scottish rules in the way 
that the provisions discussed in the main text are. 
592 See Scottish Law Commission Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and 
Liquidation ch 12. 
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period are vulnerable unless the counterparty can bring himself within one of the 
stated defences.593 
An alienation made at the relevant time will be setaside at the instance of 
creditors or the insolvency administrator unless the recipient can show that the 
transferor was solvent at some point between the grant and the sequestration594 (thus 
demonstrating that the gift did not contribute to or worsen the insolvency which led 
to the ultimate failure), or that the transaction was for adequate consideration (and 
therefore, absent some fraudulent scheme, not prejudicial to creditors’ interests),595 
or that the transfer was a permitted gift.596 
Similarly, a preference over other creditors granted within the relevant period will 
be set aside unless the transaction was in the ordinary course of business,597 cash 
payment of a debt which was due,598 a novum debitum,599 or anticipating the 
inevitable effect of arrestment.600 
The basic structure is familiar and replicates much of the common law position. 
The difference is that solvency is cast as a defenc rather than a positive requirement. 
This is a return to the position developed in the early cases on the 1621 Act. While 
the requirements are cast in substantive terms, there ar  indications that the mischief 
aimed at remains fraud by the debtor in which the other party participates. The rules 
are designed to catch cases where it is likely that the debtor has behaved fraudulently 
with the recipient’s collusion but the creditors are relieved of the difficult task of 
proving the debtor’s state of mind at the relevant time. 
The Scottish Law Commission took such deliberate frustration of creditors as the 
starting point for their discussion.601 Further, the Commission’s discussion of the 
effect, particularly of the new rules on gratuitous alienations presents them in terms 
of placing an “onus of proof” on the recipient.602  
                                                 
593 1985 Act ss 34(2)(b), (3) and 36(1); 1986 ss 242(2)(b), (3) and 243(1). The periods vary depending 
on whether the transaction is a gratuitous alienatio  or an unfair preference and, in the former case, on 
whether the alienation is to a closely connected person. 
594 1985 Act s 34(4)(a); 1986 Act s 242(4)(a). 
595 1985 Act s 34(4)(b); 1986 Act s 242(4)(b). 
596 1985 Act s 34(4)(c); 1986 Act s 242(4)(c). 
597 1985 Act s 36(2)(a); 1986 Act s 243(2)(a). 
598 1985 Act s 36(2)(b); 1986 Act s 243(2)(b). 
599 1985 Act s 36(2)(c); 1986 Act s 243(2)(c). 
600 1985 Act s 36(2)(d); 1986 Act s 243(2)(d). 
601 Report on Bankruptcy paras 12.3 and paras 12.33–5. 
602 Report on Bankruptcy para 12.18. 
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This attitude is also reflected by the fact that the suspect period for gratuitous 
alienations is longer where the recipient is an associate of the debtor.603 The 
justification for this can hardly be that close associates are less worthy of protection 
than strangers. It is however plausible that the debtor is thought more likely to 
engage in fraudulent schemes with his close associates.604 Thus, these rules can be 
seen as an instance of the general tendency to take rules which are motivated by 
concerns about fraudulent conduct by the debtor and those he deals with and to cast 
them in objective terms to avoid problems of proof. 
 
(2) The nature of the challenge 
None of the statutory provisions use the term “voidable”. Instead, they provide that 
“the court shall grant decree of reduction or for such restoration of property to the 
debtor’s estate or other redress as may be appropriate” together with a proviso 
protecting good faith purchasers.605 This led the Lord Ordinary in Liquidator of 
Letham Grange to treat the statutory regime as independent and distinct from the 
voidability which arises at common law.606 In response to this, it may be observed 
that the term “voidable” was not used in the 1621 Act either and that the recognition 
of voidability in this context arose from A rationalis tion of a proviso for the 
protection of good faith purchasers very much like th one in the modern statutes. 
Further, as a matter of general principle, it is not desirable to multiply concepts, 
particularly when they are so close in content. Doing so renders the law 
unnecessarily complex and makes consistent and coherent application more difficult. 
Finally, the wording of the statute fits well with the picture of voidability 
presented hitherto. The alienation or preference is a wrong done against the creditors, 
requiring reparation to be made. There is no particular reason to impose narrow 
constraints on the range of remedies which might be applied to this.  
This analysis also meshes well with the Inner House’s d cision in Short’s Trustee 
v Chung (No 2),607 where a gratuitous alienation was reversed by an order to deliver 
                                                 
603 1985 Act s 34(3); 1986 Act s 242(3). 
604 Report on Bankruptcy para 12.20. 
605 1985 Act ss 34(4), 36(5); 1986 Act ss 242(4), 243(5).  
606 [2011] CSOH 66 at para 16. 
607 1999 SC 471. 
131 
 
a disposition rather than by reduction, because the wording of the Land Registration 
(Scotland) Act 1979 meant that a decree of reduction could neither be registered nor 
used as a basis for rectification.608 
Therefore, the provisions in the 1985 and 1986 Acts are best understood as 
instances of voidability and their underlying rationale can be understood as a 
development of that which underlay the 1621 Act and the common law which 
developed out of and alongside it. Since the common law challenges had come to be 
regarded as independent of the 1621 Act by the time i  was repealed by the 1985 Act, 
these challenges also survive. 
                                                 








RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER ARISING FROM COURT 
ACTION: ADJUDICATION AND INHIBITION 
 
 
Litigation is often a time-consuming process.609 Even after decree has been obtained, 
it may be some time before the pursuer obtains satifac on. In the meantime property 
can be delivered, transferred or burdened by the def n r. This may give rise to both 
procedural and substantive problems. Where the pursuer founded on a real right, 
transfer of property by the defender might force thpursuer to raise a fresh action 
since the transferee will not have been called as a defender in the first one. A 
vindicatory action brought against Alfred may of little use if Barbara has possession 
by the time the decree becomes enforceable. At the substantive level, a pursuer 
seeking to enforce a personal right which entitles him to grant of a real right may be 
frustrated by transfer of the relevant property. Suppose the pursuer is suing Alfred on 
a contract of sale and the latter transfers the subjects to Barbara. The pursuer has no 
contractual right against Barbara. 
The latter risk is more serious than the former. If the pursuer had a real right, he 
could raise a fresh action against any transferee o possessor. The problem where the 
right is personal is more fundamental: the debtor is no longer in a position to 
perform. It is in this circumstance that the pursue has an interest in setting the 
transfer aside. Where he has a real right, it would be simpler just to assert that right 
against the transferee. 
 
                                                 
609 See generally CH van Rhee Within a Reasonable Time: The History of Due and Unue Delay in 
Civil Litigation (2010). 
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A. LITIGIOSITY IN THE IUS COMMUNE 
Rules which seek to prevent dealings with property in the course of litigation have a 
long history. The Twelve Tables prohibited the dedication of property which was the 
subject of litigation as a res sacra610 and enforced this with a penalty of twice the 
item’s value.611 The validity of the dedication was not impugned an o ly a narrow 
class of evasive action was affected, but later developments rendered the transfer of a 
res litigiosa ineffective.612 
This rule was preserved in the Corpus Iuris and continued in the ius commune.613 
However, there was some doubt as to its scope. Thisis understandable. The 
prohibition is imposed in circumstances when the pursuer’s rights are not clearly 
established. Yet it can take assets out of commerce fo  a long time, while annulling 
the transfer has consequences for third parties. At a more abstract level, it might be 
argued that litigation about a personal right is not a dispute about a “thing” since the 
object of a personal right is an act by the debtor. These considerations might be taken 
to point to a narrow application: confining the prohibition to litigation concerning 
real rights and delaying its application until litis contestatio614 so as to give the 
defender the opportunity to point out an irrelevant claim, and to ensure some sort of 
public procedure which puts third parties on notice. 
Other considerations pull in the opposite direction. Restricting the prohibition to 
litigation concerning real rights means that the rul  only protects against procedural 
problems. This is the lesser of the two risks to which the pursuer is exposed. 
Delaying its application leaves the defender with a period in which to transfer or 
burden the property. 
                                                 
610 This would have the effect of taking the property extra commercium. 
611 D.44.6.3. 
612 G 4.117a; CT 4.5; C 8.36; Nov 112; Kaser Das römische Privatrecht Vol I  406, Vol II, 267; and H 
Kiefner “Ut lite pendent nil innovetur: Zum Verbot der Verfügung über res und actiones litigiosae im 
römischen Recht und im gemeinem Recht des 19 Jahrhunderts” in D Nörr and D Simon (eds) 
Gedächtnisschrift für Wolfgang Kunkel (1984) 119.  Kiefner suggests that the Augustinian legislation 
was directed not against the defender but against the pursuer in the vindicatio and that its purpose was 
to protect those in possession from speculative claims: 120–2. This was discovered too late to 
influence the modern law. 
613 D Zeffert “The Sale of a res litigiosa” (1971) 88 SALJ 405; Kiefner “Ut lite pendente nil 
innovetur” 147–8, noting the role of Canon law in bringing the rule under the rubric of the maxim ut 
lite pendente nil innovetur; S Schlinker Litis Contestatio (2008) 66, 152, 193, 308 and 492.  
614 Litis constestatio can be traced back to Roman civil procedure and had a long influence throughout 
the ius commune. For present purposes, it suffices to note that it was an element of litigation in which 
the two parties clarified the issues in dispute before a judge or magistrate. 
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In light of these conflicting pressures, it is not surprising to find variation within 
the ius commune. Some considered property to be rendered litigious by ervice of the 
summons on the defender, others required l tis contestatio.615 The Gloss restricted the 
prohibition to cases where ownership was in dispute.616 Others excluded litigiosity 
where the matter at issue was an actio in personam.617 However, it was suggested 
elsewhere that personal rights were in just as much need of protection.618 Another 
view was that some, but not all, actions on personal rights relating to property 
rendered the property litigious.619 The ius commune also saw the prohibition on 
alienation being gathered together with other rules intended to prevent the conduct of 
litigation being frustrated or impeded under the Canon law maxim ut lite pendente 
nihil innovetur.620 
One aspect of the rule’s scope is yet to be mentioned. This prohibition is not made 
in the general interest but for the protection of the pursuer. Suppose Peter seeks to 
enforce a personal right to property against David an  this litigation renders the 
property litigious. The prohibition on transfer is there to protect Peter’s attempt to 
enforce his personal right. There might be others who have an interest in challenging 
the transfer (perhaps creditors of David who wish to do diligence). However, the 
prohibition does not exist for their benefit, and allowing them to challenge the 
transfer by relying on it could subvert the rules on transactions by insolvent debtors.   
In light of this, simple voidness of the transfer might be thought to go too far.621 
The pursuer’s interest is sufficiently protected by allowing the decree obtained 
                                                 
615 Schlinker Litis Contestatio 152, 193, 308; I Menocchio De praesumptionibus, coniecturis signis et 
indiciis, commentaria (1608) II.97.7–10. On Menocchio in general, see M Stolleis (ed) Juristen: Ein 
biographisches Lexikon von der Antike bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (2001) 436. 
616 Glossa ad X.2.16.3, verb. litigiosi, col 672.  
617 A Favre Codex Fabrianus definitionum forensium et rerum in sacro sabaudiae senatu tractatarum 
(1610) VII.xxiv. 8. On Favre in general, see Stolleis Juristen 207. This attitude persists in Germany: 
Kiefner “Ut penedente lite nil innovetur”  146–8; K Reichold “§265” in H Thomas 
Zivilprozessordnung (25th edn by H Putzo, K Reichold and R Hüßtege, 2003) para 4; K Becker-
Eberhard “§265” in T Rauscher et al (eds) Münchner-Kommentar zum Zivilprozessordnung, Band 1: 
§§ 1–510c (2008) paras 17, 18 and 23. 
618 Craig I.xv.25.  Ius commune sources refer to actiones in personam rather than personal rights. For 
present purposes, it is sufficient to understand the former as an action asserting a personal right and to 
draw its distinctive characteristics from the nature of that right. 
619 Menocchio De praesumptionibus II.97.14–26; Zeffert “The Sale of a res litigiosa” at 406–7. The 
approach which persisted in Roman-Dutch and South African law. 
620 Decr Grat II.xvi ; Kiefner “Ut penedente lite nil innovetur” 148. 
621 Of course, where the action is vindicatory, the purported transfer will be void but the reason for the
voidness is that the grant is a non domino rather than because it is in breach of any prohibition on the 
transfer of litigious property. 
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against the transferor to be enforced against the transferee. Such a restriction has the 
potential to ameliorate the unwanted effects of the prohibition, while retaining the 
benefit which it is designed to secure. The defender remains free to deal with the 
property in question. He just has to find a counterparty who is content to take the risk 
of the ongoing litigation. The pursuer cannot complain because he has no legitimate 
interest in controlling the property beyond the enforceability of his decree. Third 
parties cannot free ride on a rule which is not intended for their benefit. 
Of course, this model cannot be regarded as a prohibiti n in the strong sense of 
the term. Neither the defender nor the transferee is necessarily doing anything wrong, 
provided that the transferee complies with any decre  against the transferor.  
Certain discussions of Roman-Dutch and French law which talk about the 
abandonment of the prohibition on alienation of a res litigiosa in fact concern a move 
to such a weak prohibition.622 The transfer is permitted but this is done saving the 
interest of the pursuer, which implies that his decre  will continue to be 
enforceable.623 In Germany, where the prohibition on transfer was abolished in 1879 
when the Civilprozessordnung came into force,624 alienation of a res litigiosa is 
expressly permitted.625 However, it is also provided that such transfer “shall not 
affect the proceedings”,626 which implies inter alia that any decree is enforceable 
against the successor.627 While it is clear that transfer of litigious property is not 
prohibited in these systems, transferability is nonetheless restricted. The result of the 
rules protecting the pursuer is that the defender cannot transfer the asset free of 
vulnerabilities which would not otherwise concern the ransferee. 
In Scotland, litigiosity has been understood as a prohibition on grants which 
would frustrate the relevant court action. The prohibition is not absolute in the sense 
                                                 
622 H Grotius Introduction to Roman-Dutch Law (trans RW Lee, 1931) III.xiv.10; S à Groenewegen 
van der Made Tractatus de legibus abrogatis et inusitatis in Hollandia vincinisque regionibus (trans B 
Beinart and ML Hewett, 1987) 60; Voet Commentaries on the Pandects 44.6.3; Kiefner “Ut lite 
pendente nil innovetur” 148. 
623 Groenewegen Tractatus de legibus abrogatis 60; Voet 44.6.3; Coronel v Gordon Estate & GM Co 
(1902) TS 95. 
624 Kiefner suggests, however, that the tendency of in legal practice had been to move away from the 
Roman law restrictions but that this position was not recognised by the Pandectists and the 
Processualists: “Ut lite pendente nil innovetur” 149. 
625 §265 I ZPO.  
626 §265 II ZPO, trans by C von Schöning for the Bundesministerium der Justiz: http://www.gesetze-
im-internet.de/englisch_zpo/. The original German is perhaps slightly clearer: “Die Veräusßerung 
oder Abtretung hat auf den Prozess keinen Einfluss.” 
627 § 325, 727 ZPO. See Becker-Eberhard “§265” paras 6–7.  
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of denying the grant all effect; but then not all prohibitions have that strong sense. 
For example, if Alfred contracts with Bertie, bindig himself not to transfer a plot of 
land, transfer by Alfred is prohibited in the sense that Alfred owes Bertie a duty not 
to make the transfer and this duty is recognised by law. That does not mean, 
however, that a disposition by Alfred would necessarily be ineffective. The idea that 
a party to litigation is obliged to hold on to property which is the subject of litigation 
is central to the way in which litigiosity has been rationalised and it is in this weak 
sense that the term “prohibition” is used in this chapter. 
Craig appears to be the first Scots lawyer to mention litigiosity.628 He does so in 
discussing “what kinds of property may be the subject of infeudation”,629 giving a 
sketch of the Roman law rule and mentioning the debate about whether litigation 
concerning personal rights gives rise to litigiosity. However, he ends by suggesting 
that there is no restriction on alienation of feudal property arising from litigiosity in 
Scotland.630 This attitude did not persist. Part of Craig’s discu sion was included in 
Hope’s Major Practicks but Hope omitted Craig’s observation that the rule did not 
apply to the transfer of feus in Scotland.631  
Reflecting the trend noted above, the restriction on transfer of litigious property 
was set alongside a number of other rules under the pendente lite maxim, and the 
term “litigiosity” would come to be applied to all such situations. However, the early 
development of the concept in Scotland focussed on tw  areas. The first, which is not 
relevant to the present discussion, concerned the rules that the oath of an assignor 
could not be invoked against an onerous assignee and th t a wife could not be put on 
oath to her husband’s prejudice. There was an exception to these rules when the 
matter had become litigious prior to the assignatio.632 The other concerned 
diligence.  
                                                 
628 Craig I.xv.25–6. 
629 Clyde’s translation of the title of I.xv. The Latin is “Quae res in feudum dare possint”. 
630 Craig I.xv.26. 
631 Hope Major Practicks III.iii.3. 






(1) Relationship with apprising 
By the time litigiosity began to be recognised in Scotland, the early debt-recovery 
procedures633 had begun to be replaced by rules which are recognisable to the 
modern lawyer. The old forms were remodelled by the Diligence Act 1469,634 which 
provided first of all for sale of the debtor’s moveables in satisfaction of the debt.635 If 
that proved insufficient, a process known as apprising (or sometimes comprising)636 
was used.  
Apprising was effectively a judicial wadset of the lands.637 Under the supervision 
of a sheriff or (more usually) a messenger at arms, a jury of “apprisers” estimated the 
value of the lands which were transferred to the creditor in (part) satisfaction of the 
debt. The income from the lands replaced the right to interest, and the debtor had a 
reversionary right to redeem the lands by paying the principal sum within seven 
years. Notice of an impending apprising was given by “denunciation” on the lands 
and at the market cross of the relevant head burgh fifteen days prior to the 
apprising.638 Copies of the denunciation were to be left at the market cross and on the 
lands. The creditor’s real right was completed by infeftment. 
The Adjudication Act 1672 replaced apprisings with adjudications for debt.639 
Adjudication was known to Scots law prior to 1672 but was restricted to special 
cases such as diligence against a hereditas jacens (which allowed creditors to recover 
when the heir declined to enter) and adjudication in implement of obligations to 
                                                 
633 The brieve of distraint for moveables (including those of the debtor’s tenants) (Quoniam 
Attachiamenta c 36) and the Statute of Alexander which provided for the sale of the debtor’s lands if 
moveables proved insufficient to pay the debt.  
634 1469 c 36, RPS 1469/15.  
635 Relieving tenants of their former exposure to diligence for their landlord’s debt. 
636 The terms are synonymous in this context. 
637 For styles disclosing the detail of procedure for apprising see G Dallas A System of Stiles [sic] as 
now practiced within the Kingdom of Scotland (2nd edn, 1773–4) Vol I,  27–48. On wadset, see W 
Ross Lectures on the History and Practice of the Law of Scotland: Relative to Diligence and 
Conveyancing (2nd edn, 1822) Vol II, 330–91; Hume Lectures Vol IV, ch VII; Bell’s Dictionary 
“wadset”; AJM Steven Pledge and Lien (2008) paras 2-12–3 and 3-62–5 and “Accessoriness and 
Security over Land” (2009) 13 EdinLR 387 at 395–6. 
638 Balfour Practicks 401; Spotiswoode Practicks 44, recording an Act of Sederunt of 27 Jun 1623. 
639 1672 c 19, RPS 1672/6/55. 
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dispone.640 The 1672 Act sought to remedy some of the abuses asociated with 
apprisings. The most significant change was replacing procedure before a messenger 
at arms and a jury of apprisers with an action in the Court of Session. Allied to this 
was a change in the method of initiating the procedur . Instead of denunciation on 
the lands and at the head burgh, the procedure commenced with citation of the 
debtor. This, as Mackenzie pointed out, was a very inadequate mechanism for public 
notice.641 The 1672 Act carried most of the rules which applied to apprisings forward 
and applied them to adjudications.642 
At the heart of both procedures was a judicial process at the end of which the 
creditor had a real right transferred to him by the court. In both cases, the creditor did 
not obtain his real right until infeftment.643 This meant that the basic rule gave 
preference to the appriser or adjudger who was first infeft and that infeftment 
regulated competition with other real rights. Superiors were entitled to payment of a 
year’s rent by the appriser or adjudger, which gave them an incentive to co-operate, 
although if necessary, they could be charged to give entry on pain of horning.644 
 
(2) Protecting the gap 
The first stage of the diligence (denunciation in the case of apprising and citation in 
the case of adjudication) conferred no real right. This left a significant gap during 
which the creditor was at risk of his diligence being frustrated. However, case law 
established that rights granted by the debtor after denunciation or citation would 
prevail over the the apprising or adjudication only if (a) completed prior to 
infeftment on the diligence and (b) based on a specific obligation to grant which pre-
                                                 
640 Craig III.ii.23–4; Mackenzie Institutions 312; Stair III.ii.45 and 54; Bankton III.ii.79; Erskine 
II.xii.47 and Adjudications Act 1669 c 18, RPS 1669/10/55. 
641 Mackenzie Observations on the Acts in Works Vol I, 311. 
642 Strictly speaking, it applied them to “general adjudications” but the alternative procedure, “special 
adjudication” proved so unpopular that it was very rarely used: Erskine II.xii.40; Hume Lectures Vol 
IV, 481. It was abolished by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 s 1. 
643 Mackenzie Institutions 311; Stair III.ii.23; Bankton III.ii.49 and 52; Erskine II.xii.23; Bell Comm I, 
754; Comptroller v Lord Sempill (1555) Balfour Practicks 403 c XI; M’Adam v Henderson (1612) 
Mor 8374; M’Culloch v Hamilton (1627) Mor 8383; Neilson v Ross (1681) Mor 8387; Buckie v Bell 
(1731) Mor 8388. 
644 Stair II.iii.30; III.ii.24. 
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dated the denunciation or citation.645 Diligence for pre-citation or denuncation debts 
continued to be competent.646 The first requirement is easily explained on the basis 
of the rule prior tempore potior iure but the latter is not. The reason for the second 
requirement was that denunciation or citation rendere  the property litigious, and 
once property was litigious the debtor was not freeto do any “voluntary” acts which 
affected it.647 
 Stair appears to have been the first to deploy the word “litigious” in this 
context.648 The earliest printed instance is his report of Johnston v Johnston649 and he 
also uses it in his Institutions.650 The term was picked up by the writers and became 
part of the standard account of inchoate adjudication.651  
Stair’s description of the effect of litigiosity istypical: it is because the object of 
the apprising becomes litigious from the moment of denunciation that “no voluntary 
deed of the debtor, after the denunciation, can prejudg  the appriser.”652 
 
(3) Protection by prohibition 
In the context of adjudications, four aspects of the development of litigiosity are 
striking. First, Scots law comes down firmly against restricting litigiosity to cases 
where a real right is being asserted. The function of litigiosity in this context is to 
ensure that the adjuger or appriser is able to obtain a real right.   
The second point is related to this. Litigiosity was merely a temporary state, 
intended to prevent the frustration of appriser or adjudger’s right. Therefore, the 
                                                 
645 M’Adam v Henderson (1612) Mor 8374; Gardin (1627) Mor 8375; A v B (1629) Mor 8375; 
Blackburn v Gibson (1629) Mor 8378. 
646 Massey v Smith (1785) Mor 8377. 
647 A v B (1629) Mor 8375; Cardross v Somerdycke (1684) Mor 8376. 
648 I have found no instances prior to Stair. Mackenzi does not use the term litigious in his 
discussions of adjudication and apprising (Observations on the Acts in Works Vol I, 431–2; 
Institutions 310–11) although his observations on the 1672 Act show he was aware of the rule which it 
describes. 
649 Johnston v Johnston (1674) Mor 8386. 
650 III.ii.21. The term was also used in the 1681 edition (II.xxiv.20). 
651 Forbes Institutes Vol I, 292; Bankton II.ii.47; Erskine II.xii.16; Kames Elucidations Art 19; Hume 
Lectures Vol IV, 453 and Bell Comm II, 145.  
652 Stair III.ii.21. 
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creditor who was unduly dilatory in completing that right lost its protection on 
account of his mora.653 
Thirdly, the subordinate function of litigiosity, and the way its effect was 
expressed suggest that it only had effect with respect to the creditor doing diligence. 
The deed was not struck out erga omnes. This does not stop Stair from describing 
tacks deprived of their 1449 Act effect on the basis of litigiosity as “null”,654 but the 
nullity is relative rather than absolute. 
Bell classified litigiosity, alongside consent to a preference, inhibition and rules 
on grants by insolvent debtors, as a “preference by exclusion”.655 He treats these 
preferences within the broader class of “securities”656 and notes that preferences by 
exclusion are not real rights but that they “operat merely in the way of Prohibition 
of Exclusion against claims which would otherwise b entitled to a preference.” 
However, not all prohibitions are securities because “[w]hen such a prohibition is 
general, it can scarcely be said to operate as a security”. Therefore, Bell only 
discusses those cases “where the exclusive diligence or ontract belongs to individual 
creditors, allowing full effect to their securities, and excluding others”.657  
Even in respect of the relevant creditor, litigiosity’  effect is limited to protecting 
his interest in doing the diligence, which is why it ceases to be competent when he 
appears to have abandoned any attempt to complete the diligence. 
Fourthly, litigiosity developed to maturity remarkably quickly. There seems to be 
no evidence of the term being used in the sense which is relevant to this chapter prior 
to 1674, but the form of the rule stated in Stair’s report of Johnston v Johnston658 
closely resembles the view of Roman-Dutch lawyers who considered that they had 
abandoned the rule: the transfer was effective, saving the right of the creditor doing 
                                                 
653 M’Culloch v Hamilton (1627) Mor 8383; Earl of Gallow v Gordon (1636) March 29 Mor 8384; 
Johnston v Johnston (1674) Mor 8386; Earls of Southesk and Northesk v Lord Powerie (1680) Mor 
8387; Buckie v Bell (1731) Mor 8388; Stair III.ii.21. 
654 III.ii.21. 
655 Bell Comm II, 132–3. 
656 Bell Comm I, 711. Book V (of which the discussion of preferenc s by exclusion forms the fifth 
chapter)  is entitled “Of Real Securities over the Moveable Estate” but the introduction to Book IV (I, 
711) and the inclusion of inhibitions and adjudications makes it clear that Bell intended to cover 
aspects of heritable property in Book V. 
657 Bell Comm II, 133. 
658 (1674) Mor 8386: “Denunciation of apprising makes the subject litigious, after which the debtor 
cannot make any voluntary alienation in prejudice of the apprising, provided that the appriser proceed 




diligence. Subject to some refinement regarding what a creditor must do to avoid 
mora659 the account recorded by Stair is a serviceable stat ment of the relationship 
between litigiosity and adjudication in the modern law. 
The only major statutory intervention was the addition of the obligation to register 
a notice of litigiosity.660 As noted above, the major disadvantage of adjudication as 
compared with apprising what the inadequacy of the means of publicity. This was 
addressed by section 159 of the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) At 1868, 
which suspended litigiosity until a notice was registered the Personal Register. 
Part of the reason for the rapid achievement of a mature position may have been 
that Scots law had already developed this pattern of results (vulnerability of 
voluntary deeds concluded after the initiation of the diligence but before the 
creditor’s right was completed) in the context of the escheat which fell as a result of 
horning by a creditor.661 Horning for civil debts was abolished by the Tenures 
Abolition Act 1746662 and the first Scots lawyer to rationalise its effect by reference 
to litigiosity was Kames, writing after 1746.663 The materials on horning had one 
other characteristic which is important to the later law: grants made by the debtor 
between the commencement of the process of horning and the escheat were said to 
be made “in defraud of the creditor”664 or of the Crown (which acquired escheated 
property in the first instance).665 
 
                                                 
659 The subject of Art 19 of Kames Elucidations. 
660 Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 159. Although the 1868 Act was a 
consolidating act, this provision appears to have be n novel: J Marshall An Analysis of the Titles to 
Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 (1868) 16; JG Stewart A Treatise on the Law of Diligence 
(1898) 608 fn 5. The current rules are contained in s 159 as amended by s 44 of the Conveyancing 
(Scotland) Act 1924, The form is prescribed by Schedul  RR of the 1868 Act.  
661 Hamilton v Ramsay (1623) Mor 7832; Dundas v Strang (1626) Mor 8354; Lindsay v Porteous 
(1627) Mor 8354; Inglis v Wood (1627) Mor 8356; Raith v Lord Buckie (1628) Mor 8356; Lord 
Lochinvar v Lindsay (1632) Mor 8358; Lindsay v Nisbet (1632) Mor 8357; Mossman v Lockhart  
(1635) Mor 8365; Cochran v Dawling (1638) Mor 8358; Lumsden v Summers (1667) Mor 8359; 
Veitch v Pallat (1673) Mor 8367; Jackson v Simpson (1676) Mor 8362; Nicholas v Archbishop of 
Glasgow (1677) Mor 8369; Hope Major Practicks VI.xxvii.15; Stair III.iii.16, III.iv.65, IV.x.3 and 
IV.ix.6; Forbes Institutes Vol I, 145–6 and Great Body Vol I, 651–5. 
662 1746 c 50 s 11. 
663 In the first edition of the Principles of Equity (1st edn, 1760) 214–5. 
664 1592 c 147, RPS 1592/4/88. 
665 Hope Major Practicks VI.xxvii.6. 
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(4) Third-party effect 
It is relatively easy to see why the debtor should be obliged not to frustrate creditors’ 
efforts at satisfaction. The diligence is a way to get him to fulfil his obligations. 
Those obligations might reasonably be said to include or imply a duty to undergo 
diligence if he does not perform. Erskine observes that the rule “was without doubt 
introduced, that the debtor might not have it in his power to defeat or evacuate his 
creditor’s diligence.”666 Similarly, Bell defines litigiosity as “an implied prohibition 
on alienation to the disappointment of an action, or of diligence, the direct object of 
which is to attain the possession or to acquire the property of a particular subject.”667 
This analysis echoes the background of litigiosity in the Civilian tradition. To say a 
thing was a res litigiosa was to say that its alienation was prohibited. By sa ing the 
property was litigious, Scots lawyers were saying that he debtor was prohibited from 
dealing with it in a way which prejudiced the diligence (which was, of course, a form 
of judicial process). However, it is the third-party grantee rather than the debtor who 
will suffer if a grant is set aside. Some justificat on is needed for this result. 
While the institutional writers say little on the point, the problem was addressed 
by Kames. He suggests that the third party who knows f the inchoate diligence is 
accessory to the debtor’s wrong by accepting the grant.668 This is a plausible 
explanation. By the denunciation, or citation and registration, the creditor doing 
diligence gives notice that he is pursuing the relevant asset in satisfaction of his right. 
Third parties are also presumed to know the law and thus the implied prohibition on 
alienation which the inchoate diligence triggers. A third party who accepted a grant 
would thus be colluding with the debtor’s attempt to evade his obligation to undergo 
the diligence. The duty not to do this might be regarded as flowing from a duty not to 
facilitate or induce breaches of obligations owed to other people. In other words, the 
debtor is defrauding the creditor by frustrating satisf ction of his right, and the 
grantee is an accessory to that fraud. The reasoning echoes the fraud on creditors 
analysis deployed in relation to grants by insolvent debtors. 
Elsewhere in the Principles of Equity, Kames argues that, once diligence has 
commenced, the debtor has an obligation to convey th  subject to the creditor 
                                                 
666 Erskine II.xii.16. 
667 Bell Comm II, 144. 
668 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 43–4. 
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voluntarily to save the latter the expense of further execution, and  he grounds the 
implied prohibition on that obligation.669 
Some aspects of Kames’ analysis are less than persuasive. He suggests that the 
third party is “postponed to the creditor in a court of equity, as a punishment.”670 If 
the purpose of the rule was punitive, it might be expected that the grant would be 
struck down altogether. Merely rendering the grant subject to the inchoate diligence 
seems a rather half-hearted punishment. However, it does make sense if the rule 
seeks to make reparation rather than to punish. The creditor doing diligence is put in 
the position in which he would have been had the wrongful grant not been made. 
Secondly, Kames argues that the logic which renders voluntary transfers 
vulnerable is equally applicable to the diligence of other creditors “for it is unjust to 
demand from a debtor a subject he is bound to convey to another.”671 This neglects 
the important difference between existing creditors and post-citation purchasers. An 
existing creditor who does diligence or accepts satisfaction of an existing right has as 
much right to seek satisfaction from the debtor as the first adjudger. Unlike a third 
party with no prior right, he cannot avoid a conflict by standing aside and not getting 
involved with the debtor. Therefore, the duty of non-interference which is owed in 
respect of obligatory relationships to which they are strangers is not so extensive as 
to prevent them from taking normal steps to seek satisfaction of their own rights. 
Kames’ approach would also imply that buyers who had yet to complete title would 
be protected from the diligence of their seller’s creditors. Since a seller is obliged to 
transfer that item which is sold to the buyer. This is clearly not the law.672 
 
C. INHIBITION 
In addition to adjudications, which allow creditors to realise the value of the debtor’s 
heritable property, the law provides inhibitions. These serve a very different 
function: prohibiting the voluntary grant of any dee  in respect of that property 
which would prejudice the inhibiting creditor. Inhibitions prepare the way for 
adjudication by preserving the debtor’s heritable property until it can be adjudged. 
                                                 
669 Ibid Vol II, 179–80. 
670 Ibid Vol II, 43. 
671 Ibid Vol II, 180. 




(1) Comparative and historical context 
While interim measures intended to secure a debtor’s property for execution at some 
point in the future are widely recognised, the form of the inhibition is somewhat 
unusual. The interim measures in Germany (Arrest and einstweilige Verfügung) and 
France (saisie conservatoire and sûreté judiciaire) can cover both moveable and 
immoveable property,673 and relate to particular assets rather than to a class of 
property as a whole.674 The various types of Arrest in German law are modelled on 
means of execution directed at realisation of the assets’ value.675 Similarly, a saisie 
conservatoire can be used to realise the value of the attached asset once a titre 
exécutoire is obtained.676 A sûreté judiciaire gives the creditor a right in security 
rather than prohibiting transfer.677 The einstweilige Verfügung is closer to an interim 
interdict than an inhibition. 
Under English law, it is possible to obtain a “freezing injunction” which restrains 
the defendant from dealing with his assets.678 However, this is a relatively recent 
development stemming from a Court of Appeal decision fr m 1975.679 As the name 
suggests, it derives from the general power of the Courts of Equity to grant 
injunctions. 
Scots lawyers have long considered inhibition an unus al institution. Craig, 
Forbes, Bankton and Kames all point out that there was nothing like inhibition in 
England.680 Craig appears to have felt that the closest comparator in Roman law was 
the actio Pauliana.681 Mackenzie also pointed to the absence of an inhibition in 
Roman law but draws a different Civilian parallel. Citing David Mevius’ Tractatus 
                                                 
673 §§916 I, 938 ZPO; arts L521-1 and L531-1 Code des procedures civiles d’exécution. 
674 §§930 I, 932 I, 938 II ZPO.  
675 §§928, 930 (with 804), 932 (with 866–8) ZPO. 
676 Arts L522-1, L523-2 Code des procedures civiles d’exécution. 
677 Arts L531-1 and 2 Code des procedures civiles d’exécution. 
678 Civil Procedure Rules 1998/3132 r 25.1(f). 
679 Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulk Carriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213; [1975] 2 
Lloyd's Rep 509. 
680 Craig I.xii.31; Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1245; Bankton I.vii.39 (England) and Kames Elucidations 
Art 18. 
681 Craig I.xii.31. 
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iuridicus de arrestis,682 he suggest that “the Doctors” recognised a prohibition on the 
alienation of immoveable property which was analogous to arrestment. In the 
passage to which Mackenzie refers, Mevius suggests that arrestment would be 
superfluous for immoveables since they cannot be remov d.683 In relation to them, a 
prohibitio alienationis can be obtained from the court. Mevius observes that t is 
prohibition on alienation is similar to arrestment but notes that it leaves the owner or 
possessor with ownership or possession and the right to the fruits of the property. 
Mevius also applied the term inhibitio to the prohibition. However, he does not seem 
to have regarded it as a technical term since he also refers to it as a praeceptum and 
an interdictio.  
Mackenzie concludes that inhibition is a “Resemblance, if not a Species of 
Arrestments.”684 But, while he feels that arrestment provides a parallel and thus an 
analytical model, Mackenzie looks elsewhere for the origin of inhibition, pointing to 
Canon law, in particular to the device used by ecclesiastical judges to prevent secular 
courts from impinging on their jurisdiction.685 He notes that inhibition’s first 
application in Scotland was in respect of teinds. This impression is fortified by the 
chapter “Anent inhibitioun” in Balfour’s Practicks, which is dominated by discussion 
of inhibition of teinds.686 This suggests that Balfour regarded teinds as the primary 
focus for inhibitions.  
Since teinds were originally a pecuniary burden on land due to the church, this 
fortifies the Canon law hypothesis.687 To modern eyes, inhibition of teinds looks very 
                                                 
682 Mackenzie Observations on the Acts 287, referring to D Mevius Tractatus iuridicus de arrestis: Ex 
Iurisconsultorum scriptis et Germaniae legibus moribusque ch 9 paras 25, 29 and 32. A number of 
editions were printed but none predated Mevius’ death in 1670: see the entries for Mevius at 
http://www.worldcat.org and http://gso.gbv.de. Mevius’ foreword is dated 2 August 1645. The edition 
consulted was that printed by JA Plener in 1686, whose foreword indicates that he had not altered 
Mevius’ work. On Mevius in general, see Stolleis Juristen 437. 
683 For Mevius, as for others in the ius commune, arrestment was as much about ensuring that the 
defender remained within the jurisdiction of the court as it was about preservation of his assets. The 
primary concern was with things or people moving beyond the jurisdiction of the relevant court: 
Tractatus iuridicus de arrestis ch 1 para 12. 
684 Mackenzie Observations on the Acts 287. 
685 Ibid. Mention is made of this type of inhibition in the s t rules of the Commissary Court made in 
1610 and preserved in Balfour’s Practicks 664–665. Similarly, Sinclair records a case where the Lords 
of Council “put inhibitioun to the official of Sanctandrois that he suld nocht cognose upone the 
reductioun of xix yeiris takis”, on the basis that they had juridiction over these matters whoever the 
parties were: Prior of St Andrews v Bishop of Dunkeld (1542) Sinclair Practicks No 284. Similarly, 
No 290, 430. 
686 Balfour Practicks 476. 
687 On teinds in general, see Bell’s Dictionary “Teinds or tithes”. 
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different to standard inhibition. It was used by those entitled to teinds to prevent 
collection by others. The remedy for breach was not reduction but spuilzie of 
teinds.688 
The process by which inhibition in the modern sense emerged is rather hazy.689 
Although Balfour focussed on inhibition of teinds, he did discuss standard inhibition 
elsewhere.690 That fragment and some cases noted by Sinclair provide clear evidence 
of inhibition in the 1540s.691 
No attempt was made to offer an account of how inhibition of teinds might have 
developed into a standard inhibition until Walter Ross’s Lectures.692 Ross claims that 
Scots law had at one time recognised conventional hypot ec693 and that most bonds 
included both a hypothec and an oath. The oath brought the whole matter within 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Inhibitions initially supported the enforcement of the 
conventional hypothec just as the inhibition of teinds supported enforcement of the 
right to the teinds. As with teinds, inhibition became essential in order to give third 
party effect to the hypothec since there was no other publicity for the security. The 
conventional hypothec was undermined by the rising gnificance of feudal sasine in 
relation to heritable property. This, coupled with the fact that the hypothec was 
useless without the inhibition, led the basic right to wither and the inhibition, which 
was originally part of the mechanism of enforcement to be left standing alone. Thus 
inhibition came to be granted for all debts without the need for any hypothec in the 
original bond. 
Ross suggests that the allegations of intention to defraud creditors found in the 
style for letters of inhibition were an attempt to find a fresh basis for inhibitions once 
the hypothec had fallen away. The format of Ross’s Lectures did not lend itself to 
extensive referencing and there is no trace of this course of development in the 
standard sources. It should also be noted, however, that the sources do not provide 
evidence which contradicts Ross’s account. 
                                                 
688 Stair II.viii.23. 
689 See eg Stair IV.l.3; Ross Lectures Vol I, 459 and Stewart Diligence 525. 
690 Balfour Practicks 185 c XXIV (under Restitutio in integrum). 
691 Hering v Dowhill (1541) No 89; Maxwell v Maxwell (1543) No 347 (Mor 7013); Queen’s Advocate 
v Earl of Crawford (1543) No 349 and 494 (Mor 7013). 
692 Ross Lectures Vol I, 460–7. 
693 Ie non-possessory security. 
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For the later law, its truth or falsehood is of little significance. The majority of 
Scots lawyers who considered inhibition make no mention of the Canon law 
connection. The exceptions are Bell694 and Stewart695 but even they did not lay any 
emphasis on this aspect in their analyses.696 In its developed form, inhibition had 
nothing to do with competing jurisdictions and inhibition of teinds was considered a 
distinct remedy.697 
Further, there is no reference to any European literature on the topic in other 
Scottish discussions. This is perhaps a little surprising since the term “inhibition” 
was used in the ius commune and there is a tract of works devoted to the subject.698 
In some cases, it was applied in a broad sense for any kind of prohibition.699 In 
others, however, it had a meaning and force very close to arrestment.700 Of course, 
arrestment was recognised by Scots lawyers as a parallel diligence to inhibition.701 
Part of the reason for this may have been that, once the view that inhibition was 
unique to Scots law had established itself, Scots lawyers saw no reason to look 
abroad for assistance in understanding it. As noted above, the basic approach in 
modern French and German law differs considerably from that seen in Scottish 
inhibiton. 
 
(2) Letters of inhibition 
Until the Rules of the Court of Session were revised in 1994, creditors obtained a 
warrant to inhibit by applying to the Court of Session for letters of inhibition.702 In 
                                                 
694 Comm II, 134 
695 Stewart Diligence 525–6. 
696 Although Bell’s rather confusing suggestion that, while conventional hypothecs are not recognised 
in Scots law, “inhibition is a device which has been borrowed from the canon law, to supply that 
want” perhaps makes a little more sense in light of R ss’s account. 
697 Bankton I.vii.148. 
698 Eg Q Mandosi De inhibitionibus (2nd edn, 1581); B Carpzov De inhibitionibus curiarum 
provincialium Saxonicis, earumque processu in momentaneo possessorio (1649); J de Sessé De 
inhibitionibus et executa privilegiata (1661); BL Schwendendörffer De inhibitione in vim arresti 
(1691); J Klein De inhibitione iudiciali in causis appellationum (1705); Carpzov Responsa juris 
electoralia (1709) I.iii; JG Lotich De inhibitionibus et processu inhibitivo (1754). On Carpzov see 
Stoellis Juristen 119. 
699 Mandosi De inhibitionibus 1; Klein De inhibitione 623; Carpzov Responsa I.iii.21.1–2. 
700 Schwendendörffer De inhibitione in vim arresti esp 4–5. 
701 On the parallel between inhibition and arrestment, see Mackenzie Observations on the Acts 287; 
Stair IV.l.pr and 24.  
702 Stair IV.l.4. The 1994 reforms are discussed below in section (6) Formalities. 
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the absence of a statutory framework or a ius commune background, the style of 
these letters,703 and the analogy with interdiction of prodigals, formed the bases of 
analysis.704 Stair felt the form of the letters was sufficiently important to warrant 
reproducing it.705 
The letters were issued in the king’s name and instructed messengers at arms to 
make two prohibitions. First, they were to “inhibit and discharge” the debtor, 
prohibiting any dealing with his property whether hritable or moveable and any act 
pursuant to which diligence might be done against hi  assets. Secondly, “all our 
lieges of this realm, and all others whom it effeirs” were to be inhibited and 
discharged from concluding any of the prohibited transactions with the debtor. The 
former prohibition required to be by personal service on the debtor, the latter by 
proclamation at the market cross. The reason for this drastic action was also narrated 
in the letters: namely that the king is informed that the debtor intends to diminish his 
estate “in defraud and prejudice of the complainer”. This justification echoes some of 
the criteria for a prohibition on alienation applied in the ius commune.706  
In light of this, it is not surprising that Scots lawyers characterized inhibition as a 
“personal prohibition”707 against transactions “in fraud” of the inhibitor. F aud in this 
context refers to transactions undertaken with a view to frustration of the inhibiting 
creditor’s hopes of recovery. This conception was to have profound consequences for 
the way in which inhibition was understood, the most bvious being that inhibition 
conferred no real right, but merely cleared the wayfor a later adjudication.708  
                                                 
703 Craig I.xii.31; Stair IV.l.3–4; Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1245–6; Erskine II.xi.2; Kames Principles 
of Equity Vol II, 186; Syme v Laird of Coldingknows (1614) Mor 6943; and Crichton v Earl of 
Tulllibardine (No date) Mor 6941. 
704 Bankton I.vii.133. 
705 Stair IV.l.4 
706 Mevius Tractatus ch 9 para 28, himself referring to P Rebuffi Tractatus de literis obligatoriis regio 
sigillo vel alio authentico signatis art 6 gloss 3 num 28. This can be found in Commentarii in 
constitutiones seu ordinationes regias (1554) Vol I, 14. Mevius also refers to Rebuffi’s “Roman. 
Consil. 241” This is probably a reference to Consiliorum sive Responsorum iuris D Petri Rebuffi 
published in Venice in 1588. This volume is rare. Internet searches disclosed one copy in the Library 
of Congress and a number in Itailian libraries. It has therefore not been possible to check this 
reference. The reference does not match Rebuffi’s Responsa et consilia (1587). On Rebuffi in general, 
see Stolleis Juristen 528. Mevius also mentions apparent insufficiency of assets as a ground for 
prohibition. 
707 The phrase recurs through the Scottish sources: eg Mackenze Institutions II.xi at 310; Forbes 
Institutes Vol I, 281; Erskine II.xi.2; Hume Lectures Vol VI, 69. See, similarly Bell Comm II 134. 
708 Stair IV.l.25; Bankton I.vii.139; Erskine II.xi.13; Bell Prin §2309; Stewart Diligence 551. 
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Read literally, the letters prohibit the debtor from dealing with his property or 
from concluding any contract until the creditor is paid. Such a prohibition comes 
close to a total deprivation of active capacity. Given that any attempt to verify the 
alleged risk to the creditor’s prospects of recovery was soon abandoned,709 and that 
inhibition was available on the dependence,710 a strict application of the terms of the 
letters would have amounted to an intolerable restriction on the inhibited party. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that they were not interpreted with this degree of 
rigour. 
 
(3) Extent of the restriction 
By Stair’s day, the idea that inhibitions restricted alienation of moveables had been 
abandoned on ground of freedom of commerce and the need for debtors to be able to 
purchase food.711 The shift led Dallas to remove the reference to “gods and gear” 
from his version of the style in the only major change in the formalities surrounding 
inhibitions between Stair and the nineteenth-century reforms.712 
Other aspects of the effect of inhibitions required to be clarified. These 
clarifications can be seen as applications of the idea that inhibition was a personal 
prohibition of transactions which would defraud the inhibiting creditor. This is 
evident in discussion of the rule that inhibition against a debtor required to be 
reconstituted if he died. If this was not done, theinhibition did not affect dealings 
with the defunct debtor’s property by the heir.713 The rationale given for this was that 
the prohibition was personal to the defunct, and the heir had not been prohibited from 
dealing with the property.714  
                                                 
709 Balfour Practicks 185 c XXIV, 476 c I; Craig I.xii.31; Stair IV.l.5 and 21. Particular grounds to 
fear frustration of eventual enforcement did require to be averred where the inhibition was sought to 
secure a conditional obligation: Stair IV.xx.29; Stewart Diligence 528–9. Such grounds now require to 
be demonstrated in order to inhibit on the dependence: Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 ss 15E(2)(b) and 
15F (3)(b). 
710 Kae v Stewart (1664) Mor 6952; Fraser v Keith (1668) Mor 6953; Bankton I.vii.194; Ross 
Lectures Vol I, 485. 
711 Craig I.xii.31; Aitken v Anderson (1620) Mor 7016; Lord Braco v Ogilvy (1623) Mor 7016; Stair 
IV.xx.33 and IV.l.5.  
712 Dallas System of Stiles 26; Ross Lectures Vol I, 478.  
713 Pyrie (1612) Mor 6943; Hamilton v Kirkpatrick (1625) Mor 6945. 
714 Stair IV.l.6; Bankton I.vii.140; Erskine II.xi.2; Bell Comm II, 141; Stewart Diligence 554. 
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Similarly, it was soon established that grants made in satisfaction of prior 
obligations,715 and diligence done for satisfaction of prior rights, were safe.716 As 
with horning and apprising or adjudication, the distinction between vulnerable and 
invulnerable grants was explained on the basis that the protected grants were not 
voluntary.717 An explanation for why involuntary grants should not be vulnerable has 
already been attempted in relation to adjudications, but the well-known fragment 
from the Digest718 which says that one who merely receives what is due to him does 
not commit fraud should also be borne in mind. Performance of a prior obligation is 
not a breach of the prohibition because the debtor is merely giving the grantee his 
due rather than defrauding the inhibitor. 
Conversely, an inhibiting creditor who received payment of his debt could not be 
said to be defrauded even if the debtor made grants in respect of his heritable 
property. The grants may have been made despite the prohibition in the letters but 
they did not operate to defeat the inhibitor’s hopes of satisfaction. Therefore, the 
inhibitor’s right to reduce was said to persist “ay nd while he were paid of his 
debt.”719 Once it was paid the inhibition fell away.  
The concept of fraud did not provide as wide-ranging a restriction on the scope of 
inhibition as it might have done. Craig toyed with the idea that a grantee who could 
show that the inhibiting creditor’s hopes of satisfction were unprejudiced because of 
a sufficiency of assets even after the relevant grant was safe.720 However, the court 
had rejected such arguments.721 Further, in Douglas v Johnston the court allowed an 
inhibitor to reduce an apprising in toto despite the appriser’s protestations that the 
land was sufficient to satisfy both their claims.722 
Craig provides a hint at the reason for this narrower approach in his argument that 
inhibitions are preferable to the actio Pauliana because of the difficulty in proving 
                                                 
715 Laird of Tullibardine v Laird of Cluny (1615) Mor 6944; Ross v Dick (1635) Mor 6949; Lord 
Scotstarbet v Boswell (1639) Mor 7029; Gordon v Seatoun (1675) Mor 7034; Balfour Practicks 185 c 
XXIV; Hope Major Practicks II.xv.3 and 5; Mackenzie Institutions II.xi at 310; Stair IV.xx.29 and 
IV.l.18; Stewart Diligence 562–3. 
716 Mackenzie Institutions II.xi at 310; Stair IV.l.19; Bell Comm II, 139; Stewart Diligence 560–1. 
717 Elleis v Keith (1667) Mor 7020; Hope Major Practicks II.xv.5; Mackenzie Institutions II.xi at 310; 
Stair IV.xxxv.21 and IV.l.20 and 22; Bankton I.vii.138; Erskine II.xi.11; Hume Lectures Vol VI, 72. 
718 D.42.8.6.6. 
719 Douglas v Johnston (1630) Mor 6947. See similarly Forbes Institutes Vol I, 283–4. 
720 I.xii.31 and I.xv.24.  
721 I.xii.31. 
722 (1630) Mor 6947. 
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knowledge of the debtor’s insolvency.723 By the same token, depriving inhibitions of 
effect where the debtor was solvent may have been thought to introduce an 
unacceptible level of uncertainty.724 
 
(4) Consequences of breach 
Even where a grant was covered by inhibition, the prohibition did not render it void 
ab initio. Rather, the inhibitor has a “rescissory” action, which allows him to set 
aside the grant.725 The act is thus valid until challenged by the inhibitor.726 If the 
inhibitor chooses not to exercise that option, then the transfer stands. Thus, the 
inhibitor seems to enjoy a “protected party’s option” f the kind discussed in relation 
to misrepresentation. This suggests that his right might be characterised as a personal 
right to have the transfer reversed. Reduction on the basis of this personal right might 
be seen as natural restitution, reversing a grant in breach of a prohibition which was 
imposed for his benefit. 
The interim validity meant that the grantee, rather t an the debtor or the inhibiting 
creditor, was entitled to fruits generated by the property.727 It also suggests that, as in 
the case of misrepresentation, a further transfer made by the grantee would be safe. 
Kames made this point explicitly, deriving his conclusion from the personal nature of 
the prohibition.728 The inhibited debtor had been prohibited from dealing with the 
property and the lieges had been prohibited from dealing with him. However, no 
such prohibition had been made in respect of his singular successor and the inhibitor 
had no real right. He suggested, however, that the position would be different if the 
inhibitor had raised an action of reduction on the basis of the inhibition, for this 
would render the property litigious. 
                                                 
723 I.xii.31. 
724 Cf Erskine’s suggestion that inhibition established a praesumptio juris et de jure that any deed in 
breach of the inhibition was fraudulent: II.xi.2. 
725 Craig I.xii.31; Stair IV.l.22.  
726 Stewart Diligence 552. 
727 Crichton v Anderson (1684) Mor 7050. 
728 Elucidations 17 and 21: placing inhibition alongside fraud, minor ty and lesion, and reduction of a 
sale for failure to pay the price in the context of a discussion of which challenges also affect the rights 
of singular successors. 
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Hume doubts Kames’ position, arguing that (while inhibition gives no real right), 
the inhibition is known to all the world by reason f being registered.729 Therefore, 
he suggests, the third party buyer must have known that his author had taken the 
property in breach of the inhibition. Hume pointed out that there was no judicial 
authority to support Kames’ view. Hume’s approach is not inconsistent with the view 
that the right to reduce is personal. Since it is ba ed on constructive notice of the 
content of the register, it would simply bring all purchasers within the rule that bad 
faith successors are vulnerable where their authors ave acquired by means of a 
voidable grant.730  
The position is somewhat modified by section 32 of the Land Registration 
(Scotland) Act 2012, which requires that, if the Keep r accepts a deed whose validity 
“might be affected by an entry in the Register of Inhibitions”, a note disclosing that 
fact must be included in the title sheet. There is no equivalent provision in the 
Scottish Law Commission’s draft bill and it seems to run counter to the 
Commission’s view that “voidability does not make the register inaccurate”.731 It is 
difficult to see what the purpose of such a provision could be other than to put 
potential grantees on notice that the current owner’s title was subject to challenge 
and thus to put them in bad faith.  
An inhibition could only be exercised with a view to securing satisfaction of the 
relevant debt. Although the contention that no reduction could be brought unless the 
inhibiting creditor had some real right was rejected,732 a grantee could “purge” the 
inhibition by payment of the debt with interest.733 Further, reduction was excluded if 
it would be of no benefit to the inhibiting creditor. Bankton posits the following case 
(paraphrased for reasons of clarity):734  
 
Angela has borrowed £100 each from Brenda, Carmen and Daisy in that order. 
Her heritable property is worth £100. Carmen had inhibited Angela prior to the 
loan from Daisy. Brenda adjudges first and Daisy follows within a year and a day, 
entitling her to rank pari passu with Brenda under the 1661 Act. After the year 
and day have passed Carmen tries to reduce Daisy’s adjudication on the basis of 
                                                 
729 Hume Lectures Vol VI, 75 
730 Discussed further in chapter 7. 
731 Report on Land Registration para 20.2 
732 Monteith v Haliburton (1632) Mor 6947; Bankton I.vii.139. 
733 Trotter v Lundie (1683) Mor 7048; Hope Minor Practicks (1726) No 259; Bankton I.vii.141. 
734 I.vii.142. See also Stewart Diligence 553. 
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her inhibition. She cannot do so because, even if she were otherwise allowed, she 
could get no benefit: it is too late to come in pari passu with Brenda. 
 
(5) Effect of reduction 
Where the right to reduce is exercised, the effect of the reduction is limited. It only 
operates for the benefit of the inhibiting creditor. This can be seen as a consequence 
of the nature of inhibition. The grant was a wrong done against the inhibitor, not 
against anyone else, so there is no need for consequences which go beyond what is 
necessary to protect the inhibitor’s interest. 
Thus, in Lady Borthwick v Ker, the Lords held that an infeftment which had been 
reduced ex capite inhibitionis could nonetheless be relied on in disputes with others 
“who could pretend no interest in the inhibition.”735 Debts contracted in breach of the 
inhibition and diligence done in enforcement of them remain exigible against the 
debtor despite reduction ex capite inhibitionis. 
Stair gives an example of the application of this limited or ad hunc effectum 
reduction in his title on Competition.736 To make sense of it, it is necessary to say a 
little about competitions as a class of procedure. Stair makes it clear that 
competitions are different from normal actions because they involve a number of 
putative rightholders coming together with competing claims. “[T]he competition of 
rights ... implies as many different actions as there are competing rights.”737 In this 
melting pot, any objection which one creditor could raise against another’s right may 
be raised, without regard for the normal restrictions which meant (in Stair’s day) that 
some challenges had to be raised in separate actions. This explains why inhibition 
sometimes appears to confer a preference without the need for an action of 
reduction.738 
Stair is considering the case where a debtor’s estate is to be subject to a judicial 
sale for creditors.739 In the interim, rents are being collected from the estate and Stair 
                                                 
735 (1636) Mor 6952. 
736 IV.xxxv. 
737 IV.xxxv.1. 





considers how they should be divided between annualrenters740 who were infeft 
before the first adjudication and adjudgers (all of whom were infeft within a year and 
a day of each other). Having stated the basic rule that the annualrenters were to take 
their rights according to the order of their constitution by infeftment and the 
adjudgers were to share any surplus proportionately,741 he continues: 
 
This is the rule of division; but all the former grounds of reduction are exceptions 
from the rule; so that if any of the competitors could reduce the right of another in 
the process of reduction, they may make use of the same reason in a 
competition.742 
 
Stair takes inhibition as his example and works through a number of hypothetical 
situations. The process described is that which would later become known as Bell’s 
canons:743 the position is analysed as if there were no inhibition and then again as if 
the grant done in breach of inhibition had not been made. Those creditors who 
neither inhibited nor breached the inhibition are paid according to the first analysis. 
The inhibiting creditor is paid according to the second analysis. This is made 
possible by taking what is necessary to make up the difference between the inhibiting 
creditor’s share on the first and second analysis from the creditor whose right was in 
breach of inhibition. Stair’s last hypothetical case illustrates the process relatively 
simply but a paraphrase of it may clarify matters further: 
 
There are three adjudging creditors (Andrew, Basil nd Colin) all ranking pari 
passu under the 1661 Act. Each is entitled to annual interest of £400. However, 
Basil had inhibited the debtor before Colin lent the money and the property 
adjudged only has annual rents of £600. How is the rent to be shared? 
 
Step 1 is to share the rent as if there was no inhibition. That would mean each 
getting £200, since they rank pari passu. That fixes Andrew’s entitlement.  
 
Step 2 is to share the rent as if Colin had complied with the inhibition and not 
dealt with the debtor. If that had been the case, th  £600 would have been split 
two ways so Andrew and Basil would have received £300 each. That fixes Basil’s 
entitlement. 
                                                 
740 An annualrent was a real right in land which entitled the holder to annual payment from the land: 
Steven “Accessoriness and Security over Land” at 396.
741 IV.xxxv.28. 
742 IV.xxxv.29. 




It remains to establish Colin’s entitlement. Basil i  entitled to £100 more than the 
pari passu division would yield. That is achieved by taking £100 from Colin and 
giving it to Basil. Thus Andrew ends up with £200, Basil with £300 and Colin 
with £100. 
 
It is clear from this example that Andrew cannot rely on the nullity of Colin’s right in 
relation to Basil. If he could plead the inhibition then both Andrew and Basil would 
have to £300 and Colin would have got nothing. Stair does not seem to have felt that 
this required any explanation beyond the observation hat the inhibition “should 
neither profit nor prejudge him”. 
On the other hand, Stair is careful to explain why the party whose right is reduced 
cannot claim any compensation from others, even if they rank below him. The 
situation is illustrated by his second example: 
 
In this case, Basil inhibited the debtor. The debtor then granted an annualrent to 
Colin in breach of the inhibition. The annualrent is a subordinate real right which 
entitled him to £400 a year from the debtor’s propety. Thereafter, Basil and 
Andrew (a pre-inhibition creditor) both adjudged the same property. These 
adjudications also entitled them to a rent of £400 to cover their interest.744  
 
Colin’s annualrent was constituted before either of them had adjudged but after 
Basil had inhibited the debtor. Basil adjudged within a year and a day of 
Andrew’s adjudication. The rent from the property is £600. 
 
Step 1, as before is to divide the rent ignoring the inhibition. As noted above, the 
basic rule is that the annualrent ranks ahead of the adjudications because it was 
constituted first (and the 1661 Act is no help to the adjudgers when competing 
with an annualrent). Therefore, Colin would get thefull £400 and Andrew and 
Basil would share the remaining £200, giving them £100 each. That fixes 
Andrew’s share because he did not inhibit but neither was his adjudication 
vulnerable to challenge on the basis of the inhibition. 
 
Step 2 is ranking as if no annualrent had been granted i  breach of the inhibition. 
On that hypothesis, Andrew and Basil would have shared £600 between them so 
Basil would receive £300. That fixes his share. 
 
Step 3 involves making up the difference between Basil as per Step 1 and Basil as 
per Step 2 by taking something from Colin because Colin’s right was constituted 
                                                 
744 In Stair’s day, the idea was that the rents from adjudged property would cover the interest due and 
the capital would be repaid by the debtor exercising his reversionary right.  
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in breach of the inhibition. Basil needs an extra £200, so Colin loses £200, leaving 
him with £200. 
 
Therefore Andrew gets £100, Basil gets £300 and Colin gets £200. 
 
Colin might object that he ranks ahead of Andrew and that Andrew is therefore only 
entitled to be paid once Colin is fully satisfied. On that basis, he might argue that he 
should get Andrew’s £100, making his share up to £300. Stair, however, rejects such 
an argument. Colin’s right “is faulty and defective, as proceeding against the King’s 
authority, prohibiting to take any such right; and therefore it cannot claim to be made 
up out of any other right which is not faulty, whic holds in the other grounds of 
reduction”.745 
This comment stresses the centrality of the idea of inhibition as a prohibition. 
Breach of the prohibition is effectively a private matter between the person for whose 
benefit the prohibition was imposed (Basil) and the p rson who breached the 
prohibition (Colin). Basil is put in the position he would have been in had the wrong 
not been done but Andrew, a third party to all this, is not affected. This fits very well 
with a model which conceptualises reduction as a mechanism for reparation of a 
wrong which had been done to the reducing party by the party whose right is being 
reduced. 
One other aspect of this passage requires to be emphasised: Stair’s reference to 
other grounds of reduction. Here, as at the beginning of the section, Stair makes clear 
that inhibition is just one example and that any of the grounds of reduction which he 
has outlined in this title would give rise to a similar analysis.746 These cover the full 
gamut from lack of some necessary formality747 and prescription on the 1617 Act748 
to litigiosity arising from incomplete diligence,749 the effect of the 1621 Act,750 
fraud,751 and force and fear,752 and others besides.753 









753 The others are primarily concerned with statutes of less contemporary interest such as those 
regulating priority between base infeftments one of which is clad with possession or restricting the 
apparent heir from doing deeds to the prejudice of his ather’s creditors. 
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In principle, Stair seems to have regarded his relativ -reduction analysis as 
applicable to any of these grounds. However, the nature of some of the grounds 
means that it would play out differently. Stair’s analysis only operates to give results 
of the kind just described where the ground of challenge affects the relationship 
between some of the competing rights but leaves others untouched. A defect which 
could be raised by every claimant would move the aff cted right to the bottom of the 
pile and a ground which operated against all other rights would move the relevant 
right to the top. 
If Colin’s problem was lack of some necessary formality rather than breach of 
inhibition, Andrew would be just as entitled to rely on it as Basil because the lack of 
formality would render the grant void. Any creditor in the competition could table 
the objection against Colin’s right and all other creditors would rank as if Colin had 
no right. 
However, a number of the grounds of reduction which Stair mentions share 
inhibition’s limited scope. Fraud, litigiosity, and challenges on the 1621 Act can only 
be raised by certain parties against certain other parties. In light of this, it seems 
reasonable to assume that Stair regarded reduction on these bases as having the same 
relative effect as reduction ex capite inhibitionis.  
The idea that a transfer can be set aside in relation to some parties and not others 
might be thought a troubling one, particularly in a system which has a unitary 
conception of ownership. Although ad hunc effectum reduction was generally 
accepted in relation to inhibitions,754 substantial effort was expended on trying to 
work out how its implications, particularly in relation to the maxim qui vincit 
vincentem me, vincit me.755 However, Stair’s model eventually prevailed in theform 
in which it was stated by Bell.756 
Bell did not to limit his analysis of ad hunc effectum reduction to inhibitions. 
Rather, he discusses the canons of ranking in a section entitled “Of ranking of 
                                                 
754 Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1253; Bankton I.vii.147; Erskine II.xi.14; Stewart Diligence 552. 
755 Mackenzie Observations on the 1621 Act 39; Kames Essays upon Several Subjects in Law (1732) 
61– 99. 
756 The developments in the case law are set out by Bell in his Commentaries (II, 409–13). His 
summary of the effect of these rules was endorsed by the Inner House in Baird & Brown v Stirrat’s 
Trustee (1872) 10 M 414. 
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creditors entitled to preferences by exclusion”.757 At its narrowest, that includes the 
four categories which he mentioned earlier: consent to a preference, inhibition, 
litigiosity, and breach of the bankruptcy statutes.758 However, a case could also be 
made for including the offside goals rule in this category too. It also gives one party a 
right to challenge a grant which is not available to general creditors. 
 
(6) Formalities 
Ross suggests that the mode of execution of inhibition was borrowed from France.759 
Initially, the form was twofold (as is also evidencd by the terms of the letters of 
inhibition): personal execution against the inhibited party and general execution at 
the market cross of the relevant head burgh, which involved crying the three oyesses 
and affixing a copy of the inhibition to the cross.760 From 1581, this was augmented 
by registration.761 In 1868, the requirement for public execution at the market cross 
was removed and registration replaced it as the time at which inhibition took 
effect.762  
1868 also saw the introduction of a statutory short f rm for letters of inhibition 
and introduced the option of having the warrant to inhibit included in the summons 
rather than in separate letters.763 This short form removed the narration of grounds 
for the inhibition as well as any reference to a prohibition directed at the general 
public. On this model, inhibition is a prohibition imposed on the debtor, of which the 
public have notice. As with inchoate adjudication, the public has an implied duty not 
to participate in the debtor’s breach of that prohibition. 
This can be seen as the culmination of a tendency which had been embedded 
within the common law for some time. The primacy of the prohibition on the debtor 
                                                 
757 Bell Comm II, 407. 
758 Ibid 133. 
759 Ross Lectures Vol I, 469. 
760 Stewart Diligence 583. 
761 1581 c 119, RPS 1581/10/42. 
762 Land Registers (Scotland) Act 1868 s 16. See further J MacLeod “Chalk Dust in the Law of 
Inhibition” (2009) 13 EdinLR 294 at 295–6. 
763 Court of Session Act 1868 s 18;  Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 s 156, Sch QQ; 
Marshall Analysis of the Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 195–9. The latter statute 
also provided for registration of notices of inhibition which could be registered prior to execution and 
from whose date the inhibition would be effective, provided execution and registration took place 
within 21 days: s 155, Sch RR. 
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was clear from the outset and was emphasised by the fact that personal execution 
was needed in addition to the general publication.764 Stair sees publicity as putting 
the lieges “in mala fide” to transact with the debtor.765 In his Commentaries, Bell 
describes an inhibition as a “double prohibition” i the body of the text but in the 
first footnote he says that “It is not by the force of the prohibition against the public 
that the inhibition operates, but by the prohibition against the debtor himself, and the 
public notice.”766 The 1868 form was itself superseded by thost introduced by the 
1994 Rules of Court,767 now themselves superseded in turn by section 146 of the 
Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007 which provides that decrees for 
payment, documents of debt or decrees ad factum praestandum for grant of real 
rights over heritable property warrant inhibition. It also removes the Court of 
Session’s power to grant letters of inhibition.  
However, the forms to be used under the new system768 conform to the basic 
model arising from the 1868 reforms, under which inibition is a prohibition on the 
debtor of which the general public have notice. 
 
(7) Inhibition and litigiosity 
In Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger, Lord Hope suggested that inhibition operates by 
rendering the debtor’s heritable property litigious.769 As with apprising, however, the 
rule was well-established before the term litigiosity was applied to it. Craig discusses 
inhibition alongside litigiosity as a distinct category.770 
 The first step towards recognition of inhibition as giving rise to litigiosity appears 
to have been taken by Kames in the composition of his Dictionary of Decisions, 
where he categorised Cruikshank v Watt (where the court held that a disposition 
made between publication at the market cross and regist ation could be reduced ex 
capite inhibitionis) under the heading “Litigious by inchoat [sic] inhbition”.771  Even 
                                                 
764 As the court held in cases like Syme v Laird of Coldingknows (1614) Mor 6943. 
765 Stair IV.l.7. 
766 Bell Comm II, 134. 
767 For which see GL Gretton The Law of Inhibition and Adjudication (2nd edn, 1996) 15–16. 
768 Provided for in the Diligence (Scotland) Regulations 2009. 
769 [2004] UKHL 8 at para 22. 
770 I.xv.24 and 25. 




here, it might be argued that litigiosity was only being applied to cover the gap 
between initiation and completion of the diligence. In the Principles of Equity, 
however, Kames gathers inhibition alongside a process in the Court of Session, 
citation in adjudication, and denunciation for apprising or horning as circumstances 
giving rise to litigiosity.772 
Kames’ analysis does not appear to have attracted general support. Erskine and 
Bell both say that service of the schedule and publication at the market cross render 
property litigious,773 but they regard this as limited to the period before inhibition is 
completed by registration. On this analysis, litigiosity plays the same role that it does 
for adjudication. Bell maintained this approach despit  noting the similar effect of 
litigiosity and inhibition:  
 
The effect of [litigiosity] is analogous to that ofinhibition. It tacitly supplies the 
place of that diligence in all real actions. And inhibition itself, when begun but not 
yet completed, requires the aid of litigiosity to give it effect during such 
reasonable time as the law deems sufficient for bringing the proceedings to 
completion.774 
 
Kames’ approach does not appear to have found favour until Stewart applied it in his 
Treatise on the Law of Diligence in 1898.775 The reason is definitional: if litigiosity is 
defined as an “implied prohibition on alienation”, inhibition is excluded because it is 
an express prohibition. Nonetheless, the rules on inhibition developed in a way 
which mirrored those applied to adjudications and apprisings between initial 
publication and acquisition of the real right and which were explained by reference to 
litigiosity. Kames’ suggestion contained an important insight. He gathered together a 
number of cases which all operated in the same way and which were motivated by 
the same basic concern: preservation of a debtor’s property in order to ensure that the 
creditor could enforce his decree. Whether the prohibition is express or implied is of 
little moment. Therefore, Kames’ approach, as endorsed by Stewart and Lord Hope 
gives an appropriate account of inhibition and its relationship with litigiosity. 
 
                                                 
772 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 184–5. 
773 Erskine II.xi.7; Bell Comm II, 144–5. 
774 Comm II, 144. See also his discussion at II, 132–3, where he treats inhibition and litigiosity as sub-
categories within the broader class of preferences by exclusion. 
775 Stewart Diligence 553.  
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(8) Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007  
In addition to the abovementioned changes to the procedure by which a warrant to 
inhibit is obtained, the 2007 Act includes provisions which concern the effect of 
inhibition. If they constitute an exhaustive statement of the law, they amount to a 
very substantial innovation which would cast doubt on the appropriateness of 
understanding inhibition as giving rise to litigiosity. The doubt concerns two rules 
which are central to the operation of litigiosity: inhibition only affects future 
voluntary acts, and reduction ex capite inhibitionis operates ad hunc effectum. 
Section 160 provides that inhibition is breached by conveying or otherwise 
granting a right in property which is subject to the inhibition. The Act makes 
provision for termination of the inhibition on satisfaction of the creditor’s right776 
and for protection of good faith purchasers of inhibited property.777 Alarmingly, 
however, there is no provision to protect grants made in satisfaction of prior personal 
rights. However, in Playfair Investments v McElvogue,778 Lord Hodge held that such 
grants continue to be safe, pointing to the Scottish Law Commission discussion paper 
and report which preceded the legislation.779 These make it clear that the 
Commission intended that grants in satisfaction of pre-inhibition obligations remain 
unaffected by the inhibition. 
The definition of breach of inhibition in section 160 gives rise to a further doubt 
since no mention is made of diligence done to enforce post-inhibition debts. This 
might be taken to suggest that post-inhibition creditors are now free to do diligence 
against the debtor’s heritable property without rega d to the inhibition. This also 
seems unlikely. As discussed below, section 154 of the Act makes express provision 
regarding the effect of inhibitions in ranking procedures. If inhibitions no longer 
affected diligence done to enforce future debts, such a provision would be 
unnecessary. Once again, despite initial appearances the better reading appears to be 
that the law remains the same and inhibitions may thus be used to challenge 
diligence done to enforce future debts outwith the context of ranking procedures. 
                                                 
776 Ss 157–8. 
777 S 159. 
778 [2012] CSOH 148; 2013 SLT 225. 
779 Ibid at paras 21–4. 
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In contrast to these two issues, Parliament’s intention to change the rules on the 
effect of inhibition in ranking procedures was very clear. The combination of the 
relative effect of reduction and the right of the inhibiting creditor to attack diligence 
done to enforce future debts did have the potential to render ranking in insolvency 
procedures somewhat complex, particularly when there was more than one 
inhibition.780 The Scottish Law Commission regarded the level of complexity as 
intolerable and recommended that inhibition should confer no preference over future 
debts.781 An attempt was made to give effect to this recommendation in section 154 
of the 2007 Act, which provides that inhibition confers no preference in insolvency 
proceedings or “any other proceedings in which there is ranking.”782 
The nature of the change effected by this provision is less than clear. In part, this 
is because the provision attacks the symptom rather than the cause. The causes of the 
complexities just mentioned are the ad hunc effectum nature of reduction ex capite 
inhibitionis and the fact that, in a competition such as a ranking procedure, account is 
taken of any objection one competitor has against aother’s right. The 2007 Act 
makes no provision regarding the effect of reduction ex capite inhibitionis in general 
and the Scottish Law Commission Report suggests tha “reduction on the ground of 
inhibition should continue to benefit the inhibitor nly.”783 
This approach gives rise to difficulties. First, the limited effect of reduction is 
retained in theory but is discounted in the most important instance of its application. 
Secondly, section 154 seems to generate some problematic results.  
  
Suppose Colin is David’s creditor and inhibits him. Some time thereafter, David 
borrows money from Celia and grants her a standard security over his farm to 
secure the debt. The grant of the standard security to Celia is clearly a breach of 
the inhibition and it would be open to Colin to reduce it and adjudge the farm free 
of the security.  
 
                                                 
780 See Gretton Inhibition and Adjudication 110–124 for examples. 
781 Scottish Law Commission Report on Diligence (SLC 183, May 2001) paras 6.45–7. 
782 s 154(1). 
783 Report on Diligence para 6.92. 
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Before Colin raises his action of reduction, David is sequestrated and the trustee 
in sequestration sells the farm. Under the old law,ccount would have been taken 
of Colin’s right to reduce Celia’s security when the proceeds of sale were 
distributed. To do so now would offend against section 154. It amounts to giving 
Colin a preference in the ranking by virtue of his inhibition. It is no answer to say 
that Colin’s preference flows from his right to reduce rather than from his 
inhibition because the inhibiting creditor’s preference in insolvency always 
flowed from his right to reduce. 
 
Now suppose that Colin had reduced Celia’s security and that David was then 
sequestrated. Assuming that the general rule on the effect of reduction ex capite 
inhibitionis remains, Celia’s security appears to remain valid in a question with 
the trustee in sequestration and any other creditors. How is the trustee to divide 
the proceeds of sale? Is Colin to have the benefit of his reduction? It might be 
argued that it should be denied because it is derived from his inhibition and so this 
is just another case of an inhibition conferring a preference in ranking. If that is 
the case, however, it gives rise to the rather bizarre situation whereby Celia can 
strip Colin’s reduction of its effect by petitioning for David’s sequestration. That 
might be avoided by taking the view that Colin’s reduction makes all the 
difference and that it means he is not affected by section 154. However, since 
Colin’s reduction was only ad hunc effectum, all of the difficult ranking problems 
which section 154 was intended to avoid arise once again.  
 
This analysis may be thought unfair. The Commission’  i tention appears to have 
been to permit diligence in execution of post-inhibition debts but to retain reduction 
of real rights granted in breach of inhibition even in the context of sequestration.784 
On that model, an inhibitor could reduce a standard security granted after the 
inhibition, and there would be no question of the challenge being barred by 
sequestration. On the other hand, if the holder of the same security were to adjudge 
in execution of the debt, the adjudication would be safe from reduction ex capite 
inhibitionis whether sequestration followed or not. Of course, th  canons of ranking 
                                                 
784 Report on Diligence para 6.45.  
164 
 
continue to be required in cases where there were two s andard securities to other 
creditors but only one was in breach of the inhibition.  
As George Gretton pointed out in his response to the Commission’s Discussion 
Paper, it would also mean that a posterior creditor with a judicial security would be 
in a better position than one with a voluntary security.785 It is difficult to see that the 
distinction would be of much comfort to the inhibitng creditor. The distinction also 
gives Celia and David an incentive to collude, since she is better off with an 
adjudication than with a standard security. 
Further, this is not what the statute has provided. Preferences over voluntary rights 
in security are not excluded by section 154 so it remains competent to challenge 
diligence on future debts outwith ranking procedures. That means, of course, that the 
abovementioned hypothesis would play out in roughly the same way if Celia 
adjudged rather than taking a standard security. Finally, because the scope of section 
154 is restricted to inhibitions while reductions on ther grounds may have similar 
effect, complex ranking remains part of Scots law. 
The reforms in the 2007 Act change certain aspects of the law of inhibition which 
were previously thought to be fundamental and they do so in ways which are not 
always helpful. The changes, however, are probably not as wide-ranging as they 
appear at first glance. In particular, inhibition continues to operate as a prohibition on 
dealings by the inhibited party; deeds in satisfaction of prior obligations probably 
continue to receive protection; and reduction ex capite inhibitionis continues to 
operate ad hunc effectum outwith the context of ranking procedures. Therefor , it 
remains appropriate to continue to regard inhibition as an instance of litigiosity and 
to see breach of inhibition as giving rise to a personal right to reduce the relevant 
grant. 






RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFER ARISING FROM COURT 





Reference has already been made to Lord Hope’s sugge tion, in Burnett’s Trustee v 
Grainger, that inhibition operated by rendering heritable property litigious.786 In that 
passage, he makes the same suggestion regarding arrestment, presenting it as the 
equivalent of inhibition for moveable property.  
Arrestment is more complicated than inhibition. First, it applies to two types of 
property: corporeal moveables and personal rights.  Secondly, it is directed against 
two parties: the debtor himself and the third party who possesses the debtor’s 
corporeal moveables or who owes an obligation to the debtor.787 With inhibition, 
there is no such third party. 
Despite these complications, however, it is conceivable that arrestment may be 
understood in terms of a prohibition which bars the t ird party who possesses the 
moveables or owes a debt to the debtor from giving up possession of the moveables 
or paying the debt. Any effect on the rest of the world (who might, in this case, be 
called fourth parties) would be explained by reference to litigiosity as was the case 
with inhibition. This approach, which is sometimes called the “prohibition theory”,788 
has a long history in Scots law. It is evident in Mackenzie’s willingness to draw on 
Continental materials on arrestment in his discussion of inhibition. He adopts it 
explicitly in his Institutions, describing arrestment as “the Command of a Judge, 
discharging any Person in whose Hands the Debtor’s Moveables are, to pay or 
                                                 
786 [2004] UKHL 8; 2004 SC (HL) 19 at para 22. 
787 Depending on whether goods or a right belonging to the debtor have been arrested. 
788 Gretton “Diligence” para 285. 
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deliver up the same, till the Creditor who has procu ed the Arrestment to be laid on, 
be satisfied.”789 Stair describes arrestment as “a personal prohibition”.790 
Certain rules supported this analysis. The most striking was that, where 
moveables were poinded between arrestment and furthcoming or warrant to sell, the 
poinder had priority. This follows naturally from the view that arrestment merely 
renders the property litigious.  
Arrestment means that the debtor is prohibited from dealing with the property, so 
that someone who accepts a transfer or grant from him is complicit in his breach of 
that obligation (at least where the transfer is not i  implement of a prior obligation). 
The same can be said of an arrestee who accepts a disch rge of the arrested debt.791  
The poinder was in a different position: he was enforcing an existing obligation 
and doing so without the consent of the debtor. Thedebtor could not be said to be 
taking steps to evade the arrester’s diligence. Therefore, the poinder was not 
complicit in any fraud. Further, since the poinder was pursuing implement of an 
obligation, he could not be required to stand aside in favour of the arrester. If 
poinding was considered as constituting a real right, w ere the arrester acquired no 
such right prior to furthcoming or warrant to sell, then it would be obvious that a 
poinder should prevail over the arrester.  
This reflects the rule for inhibitions, which cannot prevent adjudications in 
implement of prior obligations. Some have suggested a parallel between the 
relationship of inhibition to adjudication and that of arrestment to furthcoming.792 On 
this view, there is an initial stage where the relevant asset is frozen by a prohibitory 
diligence which renders it litigious, followed by a second “seize” stage where the 
creditor obtains a subordinate right in the asset. 
However, other aspects of arrestment are difficult to harmonise with the 
prohibition theory. The most obvious are that arresters compete among themselves 
by date of arrestment not date of furthcoming and that an arrestment executed 
between delivery of a deed of assignation and its intimation beats the assignation. If 
furthcoming were to arrestment as adjudication is to inhibition, then having the first 
                                                 
789 Mackenzie Institutions 321. 
790 Stair III.i.26 and III.i.39. See also III.i.24, describing arrestment in similar terms to Mackenzie.  
791 Campbell v Beaton (1665) Mor 8349; Home v Taylor (1679) Mor 8352. 
792 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 175. See, similarly, Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1219. 
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arrestment would do no good: the two arresters would have a race to furthcoming. 
Similarly, where the debtor had made the assignatio prior to the arrestment and thus 
the prohibition, he cannot be said to have breached t  prohibition and an assignee 
who intimates a lawfully acquired assignation does nothing wrong. The prohibitory 
theory struggles to account for these results. If, however, arrestment confers a real 
right, the arrester’s priority becomes a simple application of prior tempore potior 
iure.793 The idea that arrestment confers a real right has been referred to as the 
“attachment theory”.794 
The dilemma is an old one. It was one of Dirleton’s Doubts.795 It has implications 
for the relevance of litigiosity and voidability to the law of arrestment. If the 
prohibition theory is correct, then litigiosity is key to explaining arrestment’s effect 
on transferees: the transfer is voidable because the the property was litigious. 
However, the account of litigiosity may need to be modified in order to take account 
of the arrestment rules. If, on the other, hand the attachment theory is preferred, 
litigiosity and voidability are of less interest because the arrester’s access to the 
arrested property can be justified on the basis of his real right without the need to 
attack any post-arrestment transaction. 
Gretton has suggested that “there is no settled rational framework in which the 
law can be developed”.796 If the law of arrestment is to develop usefully, one account 
must prevail. 
 
(1) European background 
Arrestment (often referred to as “arrest”) was a widely recognised legal institution 
across northern Europe. Charles du Moulin gave an extensive and influential 
discussion in his Secunda pars commentariorum in consuetudines parisienses of 
1576.797 Discussion can also be found in works on the law of other parts of France, 
                                                 
793 See, for example, Inglis v Robertson and Baxter (1898) 25 R (HL) 70 at 73 per Lord Watson. If the 
Gaian approach is rejected, then arrestment would be said to generate a subordinate personal right but 
the consequences for competition with third parties are the same:  Gretton “Ownership and its 
Objects” at 837–40.  
794 Gretton “Diligence” para 285. 
795 Dirleton Some Doubts and Questions in the Law (1698) 7. 
796 Gretton “Diligence” para 285. 
797 (1576) 13ff. 
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the Low Countries and Germany.798 Complete treatises, such as those of David 
Mevius, Pierre Peck799 and Andreas Gaill,800 were devoted to it. Their focus, 
however, is not on the Roman or Canon law tradition but arrest as an institution of 
municipal (or, in the case of Gaill and Mevius, imperial German) law. 801  
The focus on municipal law reflects the consensus that the institution was 
“barbarian” in origin.802 Nonetheless, the search for a Roman law parallel was a 
common concern. The principal candidate appears to have been manus iniectio.803 
This might seem slightly surprising, since the modern view is that manus iniectio 
was directed at the debtor’s person rather than his property.804  
Manus iniectio was attractive to the ius commune writers for two reasons. First, 
they believed that it covered restraint of assets as well as of the person.805 Secondly, 
their view of arrest included restraint of a person as well as of assets.806 Indeed, the 
early-twentieth-century legal historian, Hans Planitz, suggested that arrest of the 
person was the older and more fundamental institution out of which arrest of assets 
                                                 
798 P van Christynen In leges municipales civium Mechliniensum notae seu commentationes (1625) 
291ff (on van Christynen, see Académie royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de belgique 
Biographie nationale (Vol IV, 1873) col 11); B d’Argentré Commentarii in consuetudenines ducatus 
Britanniae (1628) Tit xv (on D’Argentré, see Stolleis Juristen 155); Pothier Traité de la procedure 
civile 238–40; S van Leeuwen Commentaries on Roman-Dutch Law (trans JG Kotzé, 1881–6) Vol II, 
ch VII; P Vromans Tractaet de foro competenti (New edn ed by H van Middellant, 1722) 121 fn 34 
(brief details on Vromans can be found in A J van der Aa (et al) Biographisch Woordenboek der 
Nederlanden (vol 19, 1876) 476); B Carpzov Jurisprudentia Forensis Romano-Saxocanonica (1703) 
Pt 1 const 28 and 29. 
799 P Peck Tractatus de iure sistendi et manuum iniectione, quam vulgo arrestationem vocant (1665). 
Like van Christyen, Peck was a member of the civic council of the city of Mechelen, in Flanders. On 
Peck see Biographie nationale (Vol 16, 1901) col 782. 
800 A Gaill Tractatus de manuum iniectionibus impedimentis, sive arrestis imperii (1586) 8ff. On Gaill 
generally, see Stolleis Juristen 228. 
801 Given that many of the laws under discussion were of cities or provinces rather than nation states, 
the term municipal rather than national is used in opposition to ius commune. 
802 Du Moulin In consuetudines parisienses 14; Gaill Tractatus 8; Peck Tractatus 1–2; Mevius 
Tractatus ch 1 para 9. See also A Wach Der italienische Arrestprocess (1868) and H Planitz “Studien 
zur Geschichte des deutschen Arrestprozesses” (1913) 34 ZSS (GA) 49, (1918) 39 ZSS (GA) 223 and 
(1919) 40 ZSS (GA) 87. 
803 Eg Van Christynen In leges mechliniensum 291; Gaill Tractatus 8; Mevius Tractatus Ch 1 para 6; 
B d’Argentré Commentarii Tit V “ de manus inietione et obsidibus/Des Arrests & Ostages”; P Peck 
Tractatus; J van den Sande Decisiones Frisicae (2nd edn, 1639) Lib I Tit xvii: De manus injectione 
sive arresto. On Van den Sande in general, see PC Molhuysen and PJ Block (eds) Nieuw 
Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek (Vol 4, 1918) col 1199–1200. 
804 G Mousourakis Fundamentals of Roman Private Law (2012) 315–6, contrasting it with the l gis 
actio per pignoris capionem. 
805 Gaill Tractatus 9, with reference to the French humanist Guillaume Budé.  
806 Gaill Tractatus 8; Mevius Tractatus ch 1 para 11; Van Christynen I  leges mechliniensum 291; 
D’Argentré Commentarii 21; Peck Tractatus ch 1 para 4. 
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had developed.807 The references to manus iniectio reveal something about the scope 
of arrestment in the eyes of Continental European lawyers but they seem to be an 
example of application of Roman material to an institution which had already 
developed rather than evidence of a Roman law basis. 
Despite the fact that arrestment’s roots lie neither in Roman nor Canon law, it can 
be seen as part of the ius commune. There is extensive cross-reference between 
works which are concerned with different systems of municipal law and the 
widespread use of the single non-Roman term is remarkable. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the approach taken varied in significa t aspects between 
particular systems and the various writers do not speak with one voice. 
There was even disagreement about the way in which t e word was used. “Arrest” 
had two senses. On the one hand it denoted the mechanism for restraining a person or 
his assets in the prosecution of a legal dispute; on the other, it could mean the 
decision of a court or tribunal. The latter use of the term is reflected in the modern 
French arrêt. Du Moulin suggested that it was derived from the Gr ek term ἄρεςον, 
which he considered to be equivalent to the Latin placitum.808 He offered no 
etymological suggestions about the other use. Du Molin’s approach was followed 
by Peck.809 Peck also suggested a connection with another Greek word, ἄῤῥαιςον, 
which he equated with incorruptum and inviolatum.810 Both Du Moulin and Peck 
believed that the use of the word arrest for prohibitions on movement was distinctive 
to France.  
Gaill and Mevius saw things differently. They suggested that the distinctive 
French usage was in relation to court decisions.811 This is perhaps unsurprising since 
the term was being used in Germany to denote restraint of person or his assets. 
Mevius did, however, repeat Peck’s views on the etymology of arrest in the sense of 
a court decision. 
                                                 
807 Planitz “Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Arrestp ozesses” with further references. The most 
important statement of the contrary view is Wach Der italienische Arrestprocess. 
808 Du Moulin In consuetudines parisienses 14. From placeo, to satisfy or please. 
809 Peck Tractatus 1–2. 
810 From incorruptus, unspoiled and inviolatus, unhurt or inviolate. I have not been able to find the 
term ἄῤῥαιςον other than in Peck and Mevius. It may be related to ἀκέραιος, which means pure, 
unharmed or inviolate. 
811 Gaill Tractatus 9; Mevius Tractatus 3. 
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In addition to disputes where the word was used in a particular sense, there were 
different approaches to the effect of arrest in competition with other creditors. This is 
evident in the discussions of lawyers from the Low Countries. In his Commentaries 
on the Roman-Dutch Law, Simon van Leeuwen noted that while in Friesland a
“throughout Germany” an arrester obtained a preference, this was not the case in 
Holland.812 Pieter Vromans made the same point distinguishing the position in 
Holland from that of Utrecht.813 Both make reference to the maxim Arrest geeft geen 
praeferentie and Vromans explains the reason for the rule: no distinction was made 
between an arrest which was directed at preserving the subject of litigation (een 
litigieuse saak) until the dispute was decided and arrestment in execution. The 
purpose was to keep things as they were and no priority was obtained until 
possession was taken.  
According to Josias Bérault, the position in Utrecht, Friesland and Germany was 
also adopted in the majority of French outumes (although not in Normandy). Bérault 
suggested that the first arrester’s preference was justified by reference to the maxim 
vigilantibus iura subveniunt.814 Pothier gives the same rule for saisie-arrêt under the 
Coutume d’Orléans.815 
Peck also subscribed to this view of the effect of arrest816 but his account makes it 
easier to see how the contrary view could arise. He suggests that arrest gave rise to 
pignus praetorium.817 This was a post-classical procedure (also known as pignus in 
causam iudicati captum) allowing execution against particular assets belonging to 
the debtor.818 As understood in Holland, this did not imply a prefe nce for the 
creditor using arrest, since he was obliged to publicise the sale by execution to allow 
                                                 
812 Van Leeuwen Commentaries Vol II, 396. 
813 Vroman Tractaet de foro competenti 122–3. A translation of this passage can be found in Buller, 
QA v Racket (1843) Reports of Important Cases Heard and Determined in the Supreme Court of 
Ceylon during the Years 1843–’55 (1884): Supreme Court Minutes 1843, p 2.  
814 J Bérault La coustume reformée du pays et duché de normandie (4th edn, 1632) 739. 
815 Pother Traité de la procedure civile 237. Pothier distinguished saisie-arrêt, which was directed at 
payment from simple arrêt, which was merely directed at preserving the arrested asset: ibid 238–9. 
The former was only available where the creditor had a titre exécutoire (ie it was not available on the 
dependence or in security). It was, however, possible to convert a simple arrêt into a saisie-arrêt if 
sentence was obtained: ibid 240. Pothier offers no comment on the ranking of simple arrêt. 
816 Peck Tractatus 202–5. 
817 Ibid 189–90. 
818 D 42.1.15; C 8.21; Mousourakis Fundamentals of Roman Private Law 340–1; Schulz Classical 
Roman Law 411. 
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other creditors to claim their share of the price.819 However, the language of pignus 
inevitably suggested that arrestment conferred some kind of security right on the 
arrester. Indeed, Dirleton uses the term pignus praetorium to characterise the 
attachment theory.820 Mevius refers to this passage from Peck and goes on to discuss 
Saxon law. There, arrest gave the arrester a tacit hypothec to which the rule prior 
tempore potior iure applied.821 He suggests that the position varied across Germany 
but that the ius commune position (here the term is better understood as a precursor 
of gemeines Recht)822 tended away from conferring a real right on the arrester and 
therefore away from ranking by the date of arrestment.823 
At first sight, litigiosity does not appear to have played an important role in 
European analysis. Mevius considered whether arrest rendered property litigious but 
concluded that it did not. His reasons reflect the narrow German understanding of 
litigiosity, arguing that the requisite actio realis was absent and that, if arrestment did 
not confer a hypothec on the creditor, it could notbe said to render the property 
litigious.824 However, in a passage heavily dependent on Peck, Mevius suggests that 
arrestment means that the arrested property cannot be burdened, sold or alienated.825 
Mevius goes on to explain that the basis of this restriction is that the relevant act 
would be done in fraud of the litigation and of the pursuer.826 On this view, 
arrestment prohibits the voluntary grant of rights in the arrested property and gives 
effect to this prohibition in disputes with third parties on the basis of fraud but it does 
not confer a real right on the arrester. That analysis is very close to what Scots 
lawyers would understand as litigiosity. The European systems which followed this 
approach might be considered equivalent to the prohibition theory in Scotland while 
                                                 
819 Buller v Racket, quoting Peck “on Arrest”. The passage does not appear in the Tractatus. It is 
likely to be from the Dutch edition of the work: P Peck Verhandelinghe van handt-opleggen ende 
besetten: Dat is, arrest op persoon ende goederen (1659) which included notes by Simon van 
Leeuwen. This is not held by any Scottish library and so was not consulted. 
820 Doubts 7. 
821 Mevius Tractatus 177–8 and 219-20. The same approach is taken by Carpzov Jurisprudentia 
forensis Pt 1 const 28 defs 143–4.  
822 That is, the common law of Germany, largely based on received Roman law. Mevius was explicitly 
concerned with arrestment as it was understood in Germany. 
823 Mevius Tractatus 178, 182 and 220–3. 
824 Ibid 182. 
825 Ibid 182–3. Cf Peck Tractatus 190. 
826 Mevius Tractatus 183. Here he quotes Favre Codex Fabrianus VII.xxiv.5. See, similarly, Carpzov 
Jurisprudentia forensis Pt 1 const 29 def 4. 
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those which did accord a preference to arrestment might be considered equivalent to 
the attachment theory.  
Arrestment, therefore, was addressed in the ius commune literature but not in a 
way that made things easy for Scots lawyers. There were significant differences of 
analysis between the various municipal laws. It is striking, however, that the two 
major approaches to arrestment which are evident in the Scottish approach can also 
be seen in the ius commune literature. This is not the place to trace the development 
of arrestment in the various European systems. However, it may be noted that in 
modern German827 and French law,828 the equivalents of arrestment appear to confer 
a subordinate right on the arrester. 
 
(2) Scotland and Europe 
The relationship between Scotland and Continental thinking on arrestment was a 
complex one. In everyday usage (and indeed in criminal law) “arrest” refers to 
seizure of the person rather than restraint on the movement or transfer of assets. 
There is evidence of use of the term in both senses in the records of the old Scots 
Parliament. It was used most frequently to refer to seizure of a person829 but was 
being applied to seizure of assets in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.830 
However, seizure of the debtor’s person as a mechanism for enforcing obligations 
                                                 
827 §930 I ZPO. 
828 The position is less obvious in France because the Code de procedures civiles d’exécution presents 
rendering the asset untransferable as the primary effect of saisie conservatoire: art L521-1. However, 
in relation to créances, art L523-1 expressly invokes art 2350 C civ (and via that, art 2333 C civ) from 
which it is clear that the pursuer using the saisie conservatoire gets a security right in the créance. The 
position is less clear for corporeal moveables, but art L522-1 does provide that a pursuer who has used
saisie conservatoire in relation to a corporeal moveables and who then obtains an enforceable title (ie 
a court decree) can proceed to sell the assets which have been frozen. This right of sale seems 
inconsistent with a mere prohibition. 
829 Eg RPS 1357/11/5–7 and 19; 1424/5 and 7; 1426/23. 1357/11/6 and 7 are particularly interesting 
because assets are seized in those cases but they are said to escheat to the Crown rather than to be 
arrested. 
830 For instance, a letter from Robert the Bruce to various officials regarding a remission granted to 
Henry Cheyne, the bishop of Aberdeen refers arrears of  “revenues issuing from our justiciary, 
chamberlain and sheriff courts of Aberdeen and Banff”  which were “not raised by us or our people 
during the times in which they were under our arrest [sub arresta nostra].” RPS A1318/31. Similarly, 
a general letter of James II, giving notice of a decre t of the General Council in a dispute about 
privileges of sale between Irvine and Ayr, refers to “bonorum arrestationibus”. See also 1482/12/84 
and 85, using the term to describe official seizure of merchants’ goods. 
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was achieved by horning and caption rather than by arrestment831 Thus Scots law 
does not seem to have received the whole of the European institution.  
A similar independence is evident in the deployment of the concept of litigiosity. 
Despite suggestions in the ius commune literature that arrestment did not give rise to 
litigiosity, Stair used the latter term to describe th  effect of arrestment.832 Thus the 
word “litigious” was being applied to arrestment long before it was used to describe 
inhibition. Arrestment stands alongside apprising ad djudication in the first wave 
of instances of litigiosity in Scotland.  
Further, the variation between treatments of arrestm n  in the ius commune meant 
that there was no single European position to receiv . Scots lawyers do not appear to 
have chosen a particular European system to follow, nor is there any evidence of a 
particularly systematic approach to borrowing. This left Scots law vulnerable to 
incoherent development.  
In contrast to inhibition, Scottish sources did acknowledge a connection between 
arrestment in Scots law and equivalent procedures elsewhere in Europe. In his 
Observations on the Acts, Mackenzie suggests that arrestments in Europe “are used 
in the same Sense, and are execute in the same Way that we use them; and all this 
Subject is very well treated by Christin. Tit. 3. ad leges Mechlin. Argent. Tit. des 
Arrest. 8.”833 Mackenzie’s references are to Paul van Christynen’s I  leges 
municipales civium Mechliniensum notae seu commentatio es834 and Betrand 
d’Argentré’s Commentarii in consuetudenines ducatus Britainniae.835 Mackenzie 
somewhat overstates the similarity between these accounts and Scots law, since they 
consider arrestment to encompass arrest of the debtor’s person as well as his assets. 
 As noted above, Mackenzie also made reference to Mevius’ Tractatus iuridicus 
de arrestis in his discussion of inhibitions.836 He relies on Mevius for his account of 
the origin of the term arrestment but appears to have misread him. Mackenzie takes 
                                                 
831 Ross does begin his chapter on arrestment with a discussion of chapter one of Quoniam 
attachiamenta, which discusses attachment of either the person or go ds of the defender as part of the 
mechanism for initiating a plea of wrang or unlaw: Lectures Vol I, 449; Quoniam attachiamenta 116–
7. Ross suggests that this is the basis of arrestment on the dependence but even he concedes a different 
basis for arrestment in execution. 
832 III.i.32. 
833 Observations on the Acts 287. 
834 291ff.  
835 The title on“Des Arrests & Ostages is in fact the fifteenth and begins with fragment number 112.  
836 Observations on the Acts 287. 
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Mevius’ etymological argument to refer to arrestment in the Scottish sense rather 
than to court decisions and to have conflated the two Greek terms. As a result, 
Mackenzie derives arrestment from ἄρεςον, which he equates with placitum, 
incorruptum and inviolatum.837 
This reading does, however, give a hint at Mackenzie’s view of the functions of 
arrestment: placitum fits with a view of arrestment which is directed at the 
satisfaction of a claim, and incorruptum and inviolatum suggest that it is directed at 
preservation of the status quo so that a matter could be dealt with judicially and steps 
taken to enforce any decision. It may also suggest tha reference to European 
materials may not always have been particularly careful. 
In fact, explicit references to continental material are relatively rare. The work and 
system used seem to vary with the writer rather than with the issue at hand. As we 
have seen, Mackenzie referred to works from Brittany, Mechlen and Germany. 
Forbes mentions the works Mackenzie cited (with the ex ception of Mevius) but his 
most important foreign source concerned the law of Saxony.838 Kames quotes from 
Van den Sande’s Decisiones Frisicae (and suggests that arrestment was borrowed 
from Friesland, or at least the Netherlands, rather t an France).839 Walter Ross 
attributes the development of arrestment in execution on an attachment model to 
Scots law’s “imbibing the customs of France, and the principles of Roman 
jurisprudence”840 and quotes the passage from Bérault mentioned above.841 Bell 
makes a similar comment about arrestment being borrowed from France and cited 
Pothier’s Traité de la procedure civile.842  
Some of the difficulties in this area may be attributable to the way in which this 
European material was assimilated. It is tempting to think that two distinct 
approaches developed because Scots looked to one syst m in relation to some 
problems and another in relation to others but there is not enough detailed reference 
for a confident conclusion on this point. Also, Scots lawyers did not swallow what 
                                                 
837 Ibid. 
838 Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1212, 1225 and 1227 citing Carpzov Jurisprudentia Forensis Romano-
Saxocanonica and at 1216, citing Van Christynen In leges mechliniensum and D’Argentré 
Commentarii 
839 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 184. 
840 Ross Lectures Vol I, 450. See similarly, Stewart Diligence 14. 
841 Ross Lectures Vol I, 455. 
842 Bell Comm II, 62. 
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they read whole. For example, although Forbes drew h avily on Carpzov, he did not 
take the Saxon approach to characterising arrestment but followed Stair and 
Mackenzie in adopting the prohibition theory.843 
 
(3) Letters of arrestment 
As noted above, the style of inhibitions was the starting point for their analysis. Less 
attention was paid to letters of arrestment. Some writers make reference to them but 
no attention is paid to the particular wording.844 Dallas gives two styles for 
arrestment.845 
Their basic form bears strong similarities to letters of inhibition: the pursuer’s 
right is narrated, and the letters assert that the def nder will take various steps to 
dilapidate his estate “in manifest defraud, hurt and prejudice of the said complainer”. 
Once again, the basic concern is an attempt to defeat th  creditor’s satisfaction by 
diminution of the estate. Once again, this attempt is characterised as fraud.  
However, there are some important differences. Letters of inhibition were 
addressed to the debtor and to the lieges and they quite obviously contained a 
prohibition. Letters of arrestment, on the other hand, are addressed to messengers at 
arms, who are directed to “fence and arrest” all of the debtor’s moveable property 
“wherever, or in whose hands the same may or can be apprehended, to remain in 
their hands, under sure fence and arrestment” until caution is provided to the pursuer.  
At first sight, the words “fence and arrest” might be taken to suggest that the 
messenger at arms should do something to the property itself, perhaps even seizing it 
(given the common understanding of arrest of a person). However, the words “to 
remain in their hands” prevent such an inference. The best reading seems to be that 
the messenger was mandated by the court to order whoever was in possession of the 
property or whoever owed the debt not to give it up. 
As Kames notes, arrestment neither orders nor authorises payment or delivery to 
the arrester.846 That does not come until the summons for the action of furthcoming. 
He therefore infers that arrestment, like inhibition, is merely prohibitory and that it is 
                                                 
843 Forbes Institutes Vol I, 274–5; Great Body Vol I, 1202–3 and 1214–5. 
844 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 176–7; Ross Lectures Vol I, 457; Bell Comm II, 63. 
845 Dallas System of Stiles Vol II, 72 and 79. 
846 Principles of Equity Vol II, 177. 
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the action of furthcoming that establishes the arrester’s right to the property.847 This 
explains his contention that furthcoming is like adjudication and can be brought 
without a prior arrestment.848 However, the need for an action of furthcoming does 
not necessarily favour the prohibition theory. Not every right in security entitles to 
the security holder to immediate possession or sale of the encumbered property.849  
For the modern law, Kames’ view is further weakened by section 73J of the 
Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, which provides for theautomatic release of arrested 
funds to the arrester after 14 weeks without the ned for further procedure. Of 
course, automatic release is subject to exceptions but the principle that an arrester 
can get his hands on funds after nothing more that arrestment and the lapse of time is 
established. That makes it difficult to see arrestmnt as the inhibition which matches 
furthcoming’s adjudication. 
Although arrestment involves a prohibition, it is a different kind of prohibition 
from that which we see in letters of inhibition. The prohibition is not directed at the 
debtor but at the third party who either possesses th  goods or is the debtor’s debtor. 
That being the case, there is no explicit prohibition on the debtor dealing with the 
property (and thus no concomitant prohibition on the lieges participating in such 
dealings). That said, there is a clear implication that the debtor would be acting 
fraudulently by dealing with the property. This may explain why arrestment was 
considered an instance of litigiosity long before inhibition: the prohibition is implied 
rather than express. If arrestment operates by rende ing property litigious, it seems 
closer to an inchoate adjudication than to inhibition: the creditor has made his 
intention to seek satisfaction from this asset clear by the service of the arrestment, 
from which point the debtor is obliged to pay or submit. 
Since arrestment is served on the third party rathe than the debtor, there is a risk 
that the debtor might not be aware of the arrestmen. The court soon developed a rule 
that, until the arrestment was intimated to the owner of the arrested goods, it 
                                                 
847 Ibid 177–8. 
848 Ibid 175. 
849 For instance, the holder of a standard security over residential property has to go through an 
extensive procedure before selling or foreclosing in the event of non-payment: Conveyancing and 
Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970, ss 19–20, 28. 
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remained lawful for him to deal with them.850 The debtor was not the only person 
neglected by the arrestment procedure; there was no provision for notice to the 
lieges, potential fourth parties who might accept a transfer. The only public act was 
the raising of the letters of arrestment.  
As noted above, doubts arose in the context of adjudication about the efficacy of a 
court action as a means of publicity. These concerns apply a fortiori to arrestment, 
particularly because the level of care expected in the purchase of moveables is less 
than with heritable property. The position may have be n ameliorated by the fact that 
the arrestee would usually need to be involved if the debtor was to deal with the 
arrested property. At a minimum, intimation would require to be made to the arrestee 
or he would need to accept an instruction to hold crporeal moveables on behalf of a 
transferee. This would give the arrestee an opportunity to make the arrestment known 
to the fourth party and to refuse to accept the instruction. The arrestee had a strong 
incentive to do this: the penalty for breach of arrestment was single escheat.851 
Overall, the form of letters of arrestment suggests that the core idea behind 
arrestment was less clearly established than was the case for inhibition. This might 
be the result of mixed messages from the Continent.852 However, it is also possible 
that their lack of clarity made Scots lawyers more p n to outside influence in this 
area. 
 
(4) The 1581 Act 
The consequences of breach of arrestment were addresse  by legislation in 1581.853 
The statute dealt with three issues: deforcement of execution,854 breach of arrestment, 
and “alienationis maid in defraud of creditouris”. All three concern actions which 
frustrate a pursuer’s efforts to get satisfaction. The legislation is evidence of a dual 
response to such conduct. 
                                                 
850 The King v Lumisden (1533) Mor 685; Seytoun v Forbes (1566) Mor 685. Cf Brown v Gairns 
(1682) Mor 13986. 
851 The King v Dingwall (1524) Mor 785. 
852 Walter Ross’s account of arrestment suggests an initial, pure, prohibitory model which was 
polluted by the attachment theory under the pernicious nfluence of the French. 
853 1581 c 118, RPS 1581/10/42. 
854 That is, impeding the messenger in the execution of the diligence. 
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In relation to deforcement and breach of arrestment, the remedy was escheat of 
moveables855 with the modification that the pursuer in the action for deforcement or 
breach of arrestment was entitled to payment of his debt from the gift of escheat. 
Here we see both punishment for disobedience to an official command and 
recognition that the command was imposed for the benefit of a particular individual. 
Escheat goes beyond what is necessary to compensate the arresting creditor for loss 
of the opportunity to execute against the relevant ssets. The punitive aspect is 
emphasised by the fact that the Act uses the word “comtempnandlie”856 to describe 
breach of arrestment. By breaking the arrestment, the defender has acted in defiance 
of an order of the court. 
However, the response is not simply punitive. The operation of escheat was 
modified to ensure satisfaction of the arrester’s claim. Further, a fragment in Hope’s 
Major Practicks suggests that where an arrestment was put on when it should not 
have been, then breach does not give rise to any pealty, despite the Crown seeking 
to claim the escheat.857 This rule would make little sense if the sole purpose of the 
escheat was to impose a sanction for contempt but it does make sense if a prominent 
role is accorded to the reason for the order in the first place. By 1792, compensation 
had replaced punishment and the arrestee who breached the arrestment was only 
liable for the value of the arrested goods.858 
In 1581, an alienation in defraud of a creditor was understood as one aimed at 
defeating satisfaction of a particular decree rather an as a transfer by a debtor who 
knows himself to be absolutely insolvent. The provision in the 1581 Act for 
expedited procedure in such cases casts some light on arrestment. It is drafted on the 
assumption that a fraudulent alienation of either land or goods could be set aside. 
This in turn suggests that, prior to 1581, it had already become clear that a transfer 
made in breach of an arrestment was subject to challenge as a fraud on the creditor. 
One important consideration is missing from the 1581 Act. There is no suggestion 
that the arrester obtains any kind of right in security in the arrested asset. If that were 
the case, there would be no need to try to set the transfer aside and the arrester would 
                                                 
855 Ie confiscation of all moveable property by the Crown. 
856 Ie contemptuously. 
857 Hope Major Practicks VI.xxxvii.8. 
858 Grant v Hill (1792) Mor 786. On the penal consequences of breach of arrestment see further GL 
Gretton “Breach of Arrestment” 1991 JR 96 at 104–6. 
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not need any supplementary recourse against the arrestee’s escheat. The Act 
therefore sits slightly more easily with the prohibition theory than with the 
attachment theory. However, it is difficult to put too much emphasis on this. As 
noted above, in Ramsay v Wardlaw859 a transfer was reduced on the basis of fraud on 
a creditor despite the fact that the defrauded creditor had already completed a 
comprising (obtaining a real right in the property which was disponed).  
The early materials on arrestment in Scots law do not, therefore, tip the scales 
very far one way or the other. It is necessary to examine the detailed rules, most of 
which developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 
(5) Detailed rules on arrestment 
 
(a) Death of the arrestee or debtor 
The death of the arrestee or the debtor provides th first test for a theory of 
arrestment. If arrestment gives a right in security, neither death should pose a 
problem for the arrester: the arrested asset would remain burdened. On the 
prohibitory model, however, the obligation may require to be reconstituted as was 
the case with inhibition. 
Cases from the early seventeenth century established that furthcoming could be 
pursued where the debtor died, provided that the debtor’s executor or other 
representative was also called.860 
Mackenzie and Stair argued that, since arrestment was a personal prohibition on 
the arrestee, it required to be renewed if the arrestee died, just as an inhibition did.861 
The point appears to have been accepted by Steuart862 nd Forbes,863 although the 
former was very doubtful about the soundness of the rule. It did not give rise to any 
further ligation until 1738, when Stair’s position was challenged in Earl of Aberdeen 
                                                 
859 (1492) Balfour Practicks 184 c XX. 
860 Dempster v Dingwall (1610) Mor 778; Clark v Erle of Perth (1611) Mor 778. If litiscontestation 
had already occurred in the action for furthcoming, it was necessary to transfer the summons so that 
the representative could be included but this does not represent a serious departure: Stirling v Lady 
Auldbarr’s Tenants (1616) Mor 779. 
861 Mackenzie Institutions 321; Stair III.i.26. 
862 Steuart Dirleton’s Doubts 13–4. 
863 Institutes Vol I, 275; Great Body Vol I, 1214. 
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v Creditors of Scot.864 The arguments presented brought the two theories into sharp 
focus. The arrestee had died and the arrester sought furt coming from the heir. The 
latter objected that the arrestment did not extend to him on the basis of Stair’s 
“personal prohibition” theory, suggesting that arrestment was analogous to inhibition 
and furthcoming analogous to adjudication.  
The arrester argued that arrestment must be more than a mere prohibition since it 
formed the basis for the action of furthcoming. If it was merely a prohibition, then it 
was difficult to see why the arrestee should be obliged to deliver or pay out to the 
arrester without the latter obtaining some right. Secondly, in contrast to the rule for 
inhibitions, the date of arrestment established priority in questions with other 
arresters. Thirdly, an arrestment beat an assignation which was not intimated prior to 
the arrestment. Fourthly, an arrester competed withan executor-creditor by date of 
arrestment rather than furthcoming. 
The contrast between the two approaches might be presented in the following 
terms. The heir relied on the basic characterisation of arrestment which was found in 
Stair and on the analogy with inhibition, with little regard for the rules on the 
interaction of arresters with other creditors which developed in the seventeenth 
century (and which are considered in more detail below). The arrester relied on these 
rules. 
The latter approach prevailed and the action of furthcoming was successful, much 
to the surprise of Lord Kilkerran, who noted that “This was new, and till it shall be 
followed by another judgment, cannot be called a settled point.” Kilkerran’s reserve 
seems to be echoed by Bankton, who tries to take a middle way, beginning with 
Stair’s analysis, suggesting that the arrestee’s heir “might lawfully pay, without 
regard to the arrestment, before he is interpelled by reviving the action against him” 
but pointing out that the arrester can nonetheless bring an action of furthcoming, 
provided that the debt is proved by writ. From this, he concludes that “while the 
subject is in medio [ie prior to the heir paying or delivering up the arrested asset], an 
arrestment is understood to be a nexus realis, a real lien”[.]865 
                                                 
864 (1738) Mor 774; J Fergusson of Kilkerran Decisions of the Court of Session, from the year 1738 to 
the year 1752 (1775) 35–6. 
865 Bankton III.i.36. 
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Erskine makes a clearer break from Stair, endorsing the attachment theory866 and 
explaining the lawfulness of payment by the heir as protection of bona fide 
payment.867 Erskine’s approach was repeated by More in his notes n Stair868 and by 
Stewart.869 It appears to remain good law. The rule on the death of the arrestee 
appears to be a case of a move from the prohibition to the attachment theory; yet it is 
reconcilable with the prohibition theory, for most bligations survive the death of the 
obligee and thus bind the executor.  
 
(b) Arrestment and poinding 
The clearest application of the prohibition theory is the treatment of competition 
between arrestment and poinding. By the end of the sev nteenth century, it was clear 
that poinding of arrested goods released the arrestee from the obligation to make 
furthcoming870 and that the arrestment did not operate to prevent poinding.871 
Mackenzie summarises the position in the Institutions:  
 
Arrestment being but an inchoated Diligence, discharging the Party in whose 
Hand the Arrestment is made, to pay, the Right to the Goods arrested remains still 
in the Debitor, and may be poinded for his Debt; for Poinding is a complete 
Diligence, giving an absolute Right to the Goods poinded.872 
 
The arrester has merely taken a step towards acquiring a right in the arrested asset. 
This is enough to prohibit a voluntary grant but, if the poinder acts before 
forthcoming, he is preferred. Poinding gives a real right. If the arrester had a real 
right, the poinder would have taken subject to thatre l right.873  
Steuart took a more radical approach. The rule on poi ding led him to draw a 
parallel with the inhibition-adjudication relationship from which he inferred 
(contrary to the established rule) that a second arrester who got furthcoming first 
                                                 
866 Although he does suggest, rather surprisingly, that the nexus is caused by litigiosity. 
867 III.vi.11. 
868 Stair Institutions of the Law of Scotland (5th edn, ed with notes by J S More, 1832) Vol II, cclxxxi . 
869 Diligence 134 despite his general preference for the prohibition theory: 126–6. 
870 Wright v Thomson and Archibald (1611) Mor 2757; Lesly v Nune (1636) Mor 2759. 
871 Hunter v Dick (1634) Mor 2757; Dick v Spence and Thomson (1635) Mor 2758; Lesly v Nune 
(1636) Mor 2759; Forrester v Tacksman of Excise of Edinburgh (1679) Mor 2760; Competition, 
James Corrie, Provost of Dumfries, with Robert Muirhead (1736) Mor 2760 
872 Institutions 322. See also Stair III.i.37. 




would beat the prior arrester.874 This does not seem to have garnered much support 
elsewhere.  
Kames uses vulnerability to poinding as part of his argument for the prohibition 
theory. He suggests that arresters would rank by date of furthcoming under “the 
common law” but that equity intervenes to bring about the established rule in relation 
to competing arrestments.875 
The rule on interaction with poinding clearly presented problems for those who 
tended towards the attachment theory. Given his chara terisation of arrestment as a 
nexus realis, Bankton might fairly be placed in this category. Initially, he presents 
the rule as a simple exception.876 Later, however, he seems to hint that the arrester’s 
vulnerability to later poinding is a consequence of the fact that arrestment is a 
“preparatory diligence”.877 Erskine is similarly ambivalent, observing that “an 
arrestment is only an inchoated or begun diligence, which of itself gives no 
preference” and that it must therefore be completed by furthcoming,878 despite 
favouring the attachment theory elsewhere. Erskine acknowledges that arrestment 
secures a preference against assignees and subsequent arrestments.879  
Bell follows Erskine in explaining that post-arrestment poinding prevails because 
arrestment is “incomplete”.880 Furthcoming is necessary, “the transference of the real 
right not being completed till decree of forthcoming be pronounced.”881  He does not 
address the difficulties which the prohibition theory faces in relation to other rules, 
being content merely to list the rules for competition with authority in the footnotes 
but no analysis.882 
Hume had more enthusiasm for the attachment theory, suggesting that it had 
replaced the prohibition theory “[i]n our later practice”, although he concedes that 
the change was not uniform.883 Hume deals with the rule on poinding by suggesting 
                                                 
874 Dirleton’s Doubts 13–4. See also Forbes Great Body Vol I, 1215. 





880 Comm II, 61. 
881 Ibid 63. 
882 Ibid 69 
883 Hume Lectures Vol VI,  107.  Lord Deas endorsed Hume’s view of a transition fr m the prohibition 
to the attachment theory in an obiter dictum in another significant 19th century case on arrestment ad
fundam jurisdictionem: Lindsay v London and Northwestern Railway Co (1860) 22 D 571 at 598. 
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that arrestment of corporeal moveables does not attach he items themselves but 
rather the debtor’s right to have them returned. On Hume’s analysis, completed 
poinding takes away the debtor’s ownership of the goods and thus destroys his 
personal right to have them returned. That in turn means that the arrester has no right 
in security because its object no longer exists.884 
This analysis deals with one of the principal obstacles to acceptance of the 
attachment theory and also provides an explanation for the apparent overlap between 
diligences against moveable property. A similar approach was taken in very different 
circumstances in Heron v Winfields, Ltd.885 There the purported arrester had 
deposited goods belonging to the debtor and then sought to arrest them ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem. Among the grounds for finding that the arrestment was 
not good was the absence of a personal obligation to deliver the goods to the debtor. 
Gretton criticises the analysis in Heron on four grounds: goods are arrestable even 
where there is no contractual relationship between the arrestee and the debtor;886 
goods which are exempt from poinding (now attachment) are also exempt from 
arrestment; documents cannot usually be arrested; and arrestments are subject to 
prior real rights.887 
It is possible to defend Hume’s thesis from at least some of these challenges. It 
proposes an obligation to return the property but this is not necessarily a contractual 
one. Hume seems to refer to the general, non-contractual obligation to return 
property which belongs to another.888 
On the overlap between the property exempt from poinding or attachment and that 
exempt from arrestment, it should be noted that arrestment is only worthwhile insofar 
as it can lead to furthcoming. While, on Hume’s approach, arrestment does not affect 
the arrested corporeal moveable, furthcoming certainly does. If it did not, the 
property could not be sold. Property is excluded from poinding or attachment 
because there are policy reasons for refusing to deprive the debtor of it.  These 
                                                 
884 Ibid 108–9. 
885 (1894) 22 R 182. 
886 Moore and Weinberg v Ernsthausen 1917 SC (HL) 25. 
887 Gretton “Diligence” para 281. 
888 Stair I.vii.2. See similarly, Lord Kinnear’s suggestion that the obligation might arise “x contractu 
or quasi contractu”: (1894) 22 R 182 at 185. This general obligation t  make restitution of the 
property did not apply in Heron because the “arrestee” held the property on behalf of the debtor who 
had a lien over the property. The lien meant that nei her he, nor anyone holding on his behalf was 
obliged to return the property to the owner. 
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reasons would apply to furthcoming as much as to poinding or attachment. If 
furthcoming of an item would be barred, there seems to be little point in permitting it 
to be arrested. 
The fact that the arrester takes subject to prior real rights might be explained on an 
analogous basis. The point of arresting the right to recover the property is to get 
access to that property by means of furthcoming. If the property is acquired by 
furthcoming, it will be encumbered by the real rights in it which exist at the time of 
acquisition. If it is sold free of these burdens, the holders of the prior real rights must 
be compensated, just as prior security holders must be paid off if a subordinate 
security holder sells property which is subject to a right in security. 
These defences against Gretton’s challenges point t a deeper problem. The 
debtor’s personal right is merely a right to have th property delivered to him, not a 
right to conveyance. He already owns the property, he cannot be granted any greater 
right in it. All that the third party possessor can do for him is put him back in 
possession. 
The arrester does not want mere possession of the property. He wants ownership 
(or to be able to confer ownership on a buyer pursuant to a warrant to sell). 
Acquiring the debtor’s right to delivery will not give him that since it is merely 
concerned with giving possession. If the arrester is to get ownership or the power to 
sell, furthcoming has to be conceived as some kind of adjudication. There is 
authority for this view of furthcoming889 but it creates problems for the rules on 
competitions between arrestments. 
 
Suppose David owes money to Andrew and Alexa. His cla sic car is possessed by 
Terence, who borrowed it for a month. On day one, Andrew arrests the car. On 
day two, Alexa does the same. A month later, Alexa gets a decree of furthcoming. 
The day after Alexa’s decree, Andrew gets his. 
 
As discussed below, it is well established that Andrew should prevail in this case 
on the basis of his prior arrestment. However, on Hume’s analysis, it looks as if 
Alexa is in a stronger position. Andrew might have  better right to delivery of the 
                                                 
889 Eg Stair III.i.42 and IV.l.26. 
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car by Terence because he attached that first. However, Alexa has the first 
furthcoming and thus, by the time it was “adjudged” to Andrew, Alexa has 
already obtained a prior real right. In that situation, the right that Terence delivers 
the car will be of little comfort. 
 
Hume gets round this by suggesting that “the decreet of forthcoming, when given, 
relates back to the execution––[so] that it lays a nexus or line on the fund 
arrested”.890 For Hume, Alexa does acquire a right to the car but this is later 
retrospectively undermined by Andrew’s decree of furthcoming since, when both 
rights are backdated to their respective arrestments, Andrew’s ends up being the first. 
Such retrospectivity is unattractive and liable to give rise to uncertainty: how long 
must Alexa wait for Andrew to get his decree? Further, it undermines the strength of 
Hume’s argument in relation to poinding. If backdating can defeat Alexa’s prior 
furthcoming, why would it not have stopped Peter who poinded the car between 
Andrew’s arrestment and his furthcoming? Hume’s approach does not provide a 
satisfactory way to read the rule on poinding in a m nner consistent with the 
attachment theory. 
In his discussion of arrestment and poinding, Stewart is firm in his adoption of the 
prohibition theory: it gives “no right of real security in, and operates no transference 
of, the subject arrested”.891 For him, therefore, the rule on poinding was easy to 
reconcile with his approach although he does not lean heavily on it when stating the 
prohibition theory. Neither does he allow it to push him to conclusions in the teeth of 
the authorities in the way that Steuart did. 
The picture was somewhat muddied by discussions in the nineteenth century 
about whether poinding was completed by mere execution or whether the poinder 
required to secure either sale or possession of the poinded goods.892 However, these 
considerations do not bear too heavily on the present question because it has always 
been accepted that once a poinder acquires his real right (whatever may be necessary 
to do that) he beats an arrester who has not obtained furthcoming. If arrestment gave 
the arrester a real right in the goods, even a completed poinding should rank behind 
                                                 
890 Hume Lectures Vol VI, 107–8. 
891 Stewart Diligence 125 
892 For a summary see Stewart Diligence 159–60 and 364–6. 
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(c) Arrestment and buyers of corporeal moveables 
While the 1581 Act suggests a clear approach to bad faith transferees of arrested 
property, the position of those who were not complicit was less clear. Jornaw v 
Drumond894 seems to suggest that a buyer is not affected by an arrestment unless it is 
intimated to him. Aitken v Anderson is similar: the court held that “an arrestment 
made upon goods could not hinder the lieges to buy in the public market”.895 Given 
the lack of proper publicity for the arrestment, this approach is understandable.  
Different priorities motivated the court in Wardlaw v Gray896 and Innerweek v 
Wilkie.897 In both cases, a prior arrester beat a bona fide purchaser. In Innerweek, the 
basis of the decision was that the arrestment “did so affect the wool really at the 
instance, and to the behoof of the arrester” that nothi g done thereafter could 
prejudice him. The result might have been explained on the basis of litigiosity by 
arguing that the raising of the letters of arrestment was a matter of public notice and 
that the buyer was therefore in constructive bad faith.898 Instead, the language of the 
attachment theory was deployed. 
Innerweek was somewhat unusual since the arrestment was done in th  debtor’s 
own hands.899 Again, the language tends to support the attachment theory: 
“Arrestment of goods in the debtor’s own possession found to affect, and to be a 
nexus realis, as well as if it had been in the hands of a third party.”900  
Allowing arrestment in the debtor’s hands raises the problem of lack of publicity 
particularly sharply because there is no third party possessor to sound the alarm. For 
this reason, and because it could operate to freeze all of the debtor’s liquid assets, 
                                                 
893 Bell Comm II, 60. 
894 (1615) Hope Major Practicks VI.xxxvii.20. 
895 (1620) Mor 786. 
896 (1611) Mor 786. 
897 (1624) Mor 733. 
898 As Stair argues at III.i.40 and 42. 
899 For other examples, see Schaws v M’Churoch (1685) Mor 733 (where the matter did not arise for 
decision because the arrestment had prescribed); Gairn v Toschoch (1688) Harcarse Decisions 18. 
900 Gairn v Toschoch. 
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arrestment in the debtor’s hands was rejected by Stair.901 His view persists in the 
modern law.902 But even if arrestment in the debtor’s hands is barred, potential 
purchasers have no reliable way of ascertaining whether goods are subject to 
arrestment. This concern led some eighteenth-century writers to suggest that a good 
faith purchaser would be protected from arrestment. For Kames, the result was a 
simple application of the principles of litigiosity. Since there was no mechanism for 
public notification as was the case with other insta ces of litigiosity, potential 
purchasers could not be in constructive bad faith.903 
Even those who tended to favour the attachment theory r cognised that good faith 
purchasers should be protected. For example, Bankton concedes that the purchaser 
was protected in the same paragraph as he states his general view that “arrestment 
imposes a kind of real burthen, and is not simply a prohibition”. His justification was 
the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam.904 
This rule persisted in the nineteenth century. Bell says that, while arrestment 
“confers a preference”, it “creates no further real right, so as to entitle the creditor to 
follow and vindicate it from third parties acquiring bona fide.”905 This is consonant 
with his general preference for the prohibition theory. Stewart agrees,906 subject to 
the rather surprising caveat that the purchaser must have obtained possession of the 
goods even if ownership has passed without delivery under the Sale of Goods Act.907 
He offers no argument to explain why this might be th case. It may be that he 
reasoned that the arrestment persisted for as long as the arrestee was able to comply 
with an action of furthcoming.908 
It seems likely that a good faith purchaser would continue to be protected in the 
modern law. No authority has been discovered which expressly disapproves such 
                                                 
901 III.i.25. 
902 Erskine III.vi.5 (Stair seems less enthusiastic about arrestment in the debtor’s hands than Erskine 
suggests); Hume Lectures Vol VI,  96; Bell Comm II, 70; Gretton “Diligence” para 261. Cf Forbes 
Great Body Vol I, 1208–9; Bankton III.i.32. 
903 Principles of Equity Vol II, 184–5. 
904 III.i.32. 
905 Prin §2278. Adherents of the attachment theory would not suggest that the arrester should be able 
to vindicate the property since no-one alleges that t e arrester owns it. Despite that, Bell’s intentio  s 
tolerably clear. 
906 Diligence 126–7. 
907 Ibid 127–8. 
908 See Gretton “Breach of Arrestment” 103. 
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protection.909 Gretton endorses Stewart’s position.910 Of course, an arrester will 
prevail over a gratuitous or bad faith acquirer911 but that result can be explained 
under the prohibition theory by the normal principles of litigiosity. The rules 
governing the relationship between the arrester andsubsequent purchasers are 
consistent with the prohibition theory but Bankton does provide a possible 
mechanism for reconciling them the with the attachment theory. 
 
(d) Competition between arrestments 
Evidence of early adoption of the attachment theory is found in Wallace v Scot.912 A 
prior arrester without a decree competed with a subsequent arrester who had obtained 
one. The question divided the Lords but the first arrester prevailed. The majority 
were persuaded by the analogy of pledge. This set the tone for the rule which would 
eventually prevail.913 However, note should be taken of a number of cases wh re the 
first arrester ranked behind or alongside a subsequent arrester. In some, the Lords felt 
that two creditors who had the same diligence and ha pursued their remedy 
assiduously should rank equally provided that one arr stment followed the other 
closely.914 This might been seen as motivated by concerns analogous to those which 
led to the Diligence Act 1661. Thus it is not necessarily inconsistent with the 
attachment theory. Whatever its rationale, it did not persist. 
By Stair’s day, priority by date and time of arrestment appears to have been 
settled.915 In Wightman v Seton,916 the result was justified in terms of the attachment 
theory. The first arrester was preferred although both had obtained decrees of 
furthcoming on the same day and the second arrester had possession of the arrested 
goods. The Lords found that arrestment gave “an onus reale on the goods”.917 The 
                                                 
909 Although it is somewhat perplexing that a good faith purchaser of corporeal moveables should be 
protected where a good faith assignee is not. 
910 “Breach of Arrestment” 102–3. 
911 See, eg Stewart Diligence 128. 
912 (1583) Mor 807. 
913 Robertson v M’Ewan (1680) Mor 814 
914 Speir v Mure and Mureson (1611) Mor 808. 
915 Stair III.i.46; Cunningham & Lyle v Wallace (1666) Mor 809; Lauder v Watson (1685) Mor 814, 
although a prior arrester could lose his priority on grounds of mora and Stair does appear to suggest 
that the basic rule is priority by date of decree at IV.xxxv.6. 
916 (1697) Mor 815. 
917 See further, Laird of Dundas v Murray (1738) Mor 821; Lister v Ramsay (1787) Mor 824; Erskine 
III.vi.18; Hume Lectures Vol VI, 108. 
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equivalent rule whereby assignations intimated on the same day ranked pari passu 
was reconceived as a response to uncertainty about the iming of the competing 
acts.918  Where there was no uncertainty, the prior tempore rule could be applied. 
These authorities and reasoning were applied to competing arrestments in the 
eighteenth century.919  
A posterior arrester with a decree was preferred to a prior arrester without one in 
Scott v Keith.920 The first arrester lost out because of a concern that one creditor 
should not have to wait for a less diligent creditor to get his act together.921 However, 
this case did not establish that arrestments were ranked by date of decree.922 Where 
both creditors had obtained decrees, the first to arrest prevailed even if he was second 
to obtain decree.923 Further, from the eighteenth century, arrestments on the 
dependence began to be permitted to compete by date of rrestment even when there 
was no decree, providing that the prior arrester was not dilatory in the pursuit of his 
decree.924 This shift removes any doubt that this class of cases might be thought to 
cast on the attachment theory. 
Posterior arresters were also able to obtain a preference in cases where the first 
arrestment had been done on a bond which was not yet due, even if both had become 
due by the date of the competition.925 The challenge that this result poses to the 
attachment theory may be illustrated by considering analogous application to 
standard securities. Craig lends £50,000 to Danni to be repaid in one lump sum 10 
years from the date of the advance. The loan is secured by a standard security which 
is duly registered. During the 10-year period, Danni borrows another £50,000 from 
Colin. That is to be repaid in 2 years. Danni having defaulted on the second loan, 
                                                 
918 Stair IV.xxxv.7; Erskine III.vi.18; Hume Lectures Vol VI,  109–10; Wright v Anderson (1774) Mor 
823. 
919 Steuart Dirleton’s Doubts 16 (although Steuart preferred an equalisation rule); Forbes Great Body 
Vol I, 1225–6; Bankton III.i.42 and Erskine III.vi.18; Cameron v Boswell (1772) Mor 821. The pari 
passu rule continued to be applied in cases of uncertainty: Wright v Anderson (1774) Mor 823. 
920 (1626) Mor 808. 
921 Stair III.i.46; Erskine III.vi.18. 
922 Although Stair appears to suggest as much on the basis of the prohibition theory: IV.xxxv.6. 
923 Seatoun v Jack (1665) Mor 809; Cunningham & Lyle v Wallace (1666) Mor 809; Montgomery v 
Rankin (1667) Mor 809; Sutie v Ross (1705) Mor 816; Brodie v M’Lellan (1710) Mor 816; Roystown 
v Brymer (1716) Mor 819. 
924 Watkins v Wilkie (1728) Mor 820; Bayne v Graham (1796) Mor 2904; Hume Lectures Vol VI, 110. 
925 Charters v Neilson (1670) Mor 811; Mader v Smith (1673) Mor 812; Pitmedden v Patersons 
(1678) Mor 813. 
190 
 
Colin seeks to enforce. We would be very surprised to find Craig ranking behind 
Colin because his loan was not yet due. 
However, that approach did not persist. Erskine modified it, treating competitions 
where the arresters’ debts were due on different dates on the same terms as 
competition between an arrestment in execution and  arrestment on the 
dependence: the arrester whose debt is not due must stand aside because he is not in 
a position to demand furthcoming.926 That meant that, where both debts had fallen 
due, the first arrester would prevail. 
Bell took a more robust attitude, arguing that a fundamental difference between 
English and Scots law was that the latter followed the Civil law tradition in allowing 
diligence to be done in security of future and contingent obligations.927 He suggested 
that, while Erskine’s argument might be “unobjectionable” where the debtor is 
solvent, it is “unsound” in cases of insolvency.928  Bell pointed out that Erskine’s 
approach would deprive a creditor who had used arrestm nt in security of the benefit 
of his diligence in the very circumstance when he was likely to need it.929 He did not, 
however, consider the implications of this approach for the theory of arrestment. 
Bell’s approach established the rule which persists to he present day, that even those 
who arrest on the dependence or whose debts are not yet due rank by their date of 
arrestment.930 
The rule that arresters competed by date of arrestment rather than of furthcoming 
posed an obvious challenge for the prohibition theory. As noted above, Steuart and 
Forbes went as far as to deny prior by date of arrestm nt but such a position is 
impossible to sustain in the face of the authorities o the contrary. 
Stair tried to explain ranking by date of arrestment as an effect of litigiosity. He 
suggested that it meant that neither a voluntary deed nor posterior diligence could 
affect litigious property, unless the party who rend red the property litigious was 
negligent.931 This understanding of litigiosity differs from that found elsewhere in 
Scots law and it is not even consistent with Stair’s own view on the relationship 
                                                 
926 III.vi.18. 
927 Comm I, 332–3. 
928 Ibid 333–4. 
929 Ibid 334. 
930 Hume Lectures Vol VI, 111; Stewart Diligence 138–40; Gretton “Diligence” para 287; Mitchell v 
Scott (1881) 8 R 875. 
931 III.i.42. Kames makes a similar argument in his note n Stevenson v Grant (1767) Mor 2762. 
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between poinding and arrestment.932 If arrestment did prohibit posterior diligence by 
rendering the property litigious, it should exclude poinding as much as arrestment. 
Kames’ argument was similar. As already mentioned, he suggested that the 
common law rule was ranking by furthcoming but that arresters ranked by date of 
arrestment because equity intervened by rendering the property litigious.933 A 
creditor who knows about an arrestment should stand asi e and let the person who 
had started first complete his right.934 The problem with this argument is that it 
proves too much, just as Stair’s did. It would also mean that a poinder should stand 
aside,935 and it would mean that no-one could adjudge property which the debtor had 
contracted to sell. Also, like Stair, Kames seems to stretch litigiosity beyond the 
normal understanding of the concept. The result is not consistent with the “race to 
completion” principle which Scots law generally applies to competing personal 
rights to real rights.936 
Recognising that a mere prohibition was not sufficient to explain why competing 
arresters ranked by date of arrestment, Stewart, argued that arrestment was not 
simply a prohibition but also “an inchoate attachment”.937 That meant that the 
arrester had staked some sort of a claim to the asst (making it more like citation in 
adjudication than an inhibition) and Stewart believed this explained the result of 
competitions between two inchoate diligences (eg where a multiplepoinding was 
raised by the arrestee before either arrester could seek furthcoming or where an 
arrester competed with an incomplete poinding).938  
Stewart goes on to say that an arrestment depends “for its preference over a 
completed diligence on decree of furthcoming having been obtained prior to the 
completion of the competing diligence.”939 This might seem to suggest that, where a 
second arrester completes his diligence by furthcoming first, he will prevail. 
However, Stewart appears to have had other diligences in mind such as poinding  
                                                 
932 As Hume points out: Lectures Vol VI,  108. 
933 Kames Principles of Equity 179–80. 
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because he later recognises that “In competition inter se, arrestments are preferred 
according to priority in date, and it is immaterial who gets the first decree of 





(e) Arrestment and confirmation as an executor-creditor 
Arresters also found themselves in competition with executor-creditors whose real 
right was acquired by confirmation. The early authorities on this topic are mixed. In 
Riddell v Maxwell941 and Hume v Hay,942 an arrester was preferred to an executor-
creditor who obtained confirmation between arrestment and forthcoming. In the 
latter, Harcarse records that the Lords came to this view on the grounds that 
arrestment was “nexus realis, which could not be prejudged by the debtor’s death, 
more than real rights of poinding the ground, &c.” 
These cases support the attachment theory: the arrester prevails because his real 
right predates the executor-creditor’s. Other authorities, however, point in the 
opposite direction. Reporting Russell v Lady Balincrieff,943 Harcarse suggests that, 
“if the confirmation of the rents had been anterior t  the decreet [of furthcoming] 
they would probably have decerned in favour of the [executor-creditor].” The most 
likely basis for such a decision would be an application of the prohibition theory, 
since it would mean that the arrester did not acquire the right until furthcoming. 
The prohibition theory appears to have been applied in Carmichael v Mossman,944 
where the executor-creditor was preferred because of confirmation prior to 
furthcoming. Kilkerran suggests that counsel must have failed to cite Riddell but that 
the arrester did not reclaim because “the Lords, in a full Bench, were so unanimous”. 
The approach in Carmichael was followed by two nineteenth century cases.945 No 
consideration was given to the earlier authorities which support the attachment 
                                                 
940 Ibid 137. 
941 Riddell v Maxwell (1681) Mor 2790. 
942 (1688) Mor 2790. See also Crawford v Simson (1732) Mor 2791. 
943 (1688) Mor 2791. 
944 (1742) Mor 2791. 
945 Wilson and M’Lellan v Fleming (1823) 2 S 430; Anderson v Stewart (1831) 10 S 49. 
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theory. These cases have been taken by subsequent writers to establish the law.946 
Alongside the rule on poinding, the rule regarding executor-creditors is one of the 
major obstacles to acceptance of the attachment theory.  
  
(f) Arrestment and heritable property 
Where rents were arrested, arresters could find themselves in conflict with holders of 
rights in heritable property. The authorities here a  mixed. In Warnock v Anderson a 
creditor had arrested rents and sought furthcoming.947 The buyer of the relevant land 
compeared and pled that he had a contractual right to the land which predated the 
arrestment, pointing to the parallel with inhibition. He suggested that the same rule 
should apply to arrestment. This argument was rejected on the ground that arrestment 
was different to inhibition because it “behoved to w rk upon an existing body.” 
In Stewart v Stewart, an adjudger of a heritable bond was preferred to an 
arrestment between citation and decree of adjudication. The successful argument 
relied on the fact that an arrester was vulnerable to poinding until furthcoming.948 
 
(g) Arrestment and assignation 
The clearest application of the attachment theory can be found in the relationship 
between assignation and arrestment. As Hume notes,949 if arrestment were truly 
analogous to inhibition, an assignee to whom the deed of assignation was delivered 
prior to the arrestment should be safe. The act of assignation was not prohibited 
when the assignor acted.950 In fact, an assignee must have intimated before the 
arrestment in order to prevail. That suggests a race to intimate or serve between the 
assignee and the arrester and thus gives strong support to the attachment theory. The 
arrester’s preference is not based on the assignee’s wrongful conduct, since the 
assignee has done nothing wrong. Rather it is based on the principle prior tempore 
potior iure est. He completed his real right first. 
                                                 
946 Bell Comm II, 69 fn 2; Hume Lectures Vol VI, 109; Stewart Diligence 134–5; Gretton “Diligence” 
para 299. 
947 (1633) Mor 2787. 
948 (1705) Mor 703. 
949 Hume Lectures Vol VI, 108. 
950 Fairholm v Hamilton (1755) Mor 2778 does appear to have been decided according to this logic. 
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Competition by date of arrestment and intimation was applied in the early 
seventeenth century.951 In a case from 1630, the assignee and arrester were ranked 
equally because both intimation and arrestment weredon  on the same day.952 This is 
best understood as an instance of the reasoning which (for a while) led to arresters 
being ranked equally: both had pursued satisfaction with all diligence. Similarly, 
Adie v Scrimzeor eflects the later rule on competing arrestments. Arrestment and 
intimation were on the same day and the Lords felt tha they could not determine 
which had been earlier because the schedule of arrestment did not give the particular 
hour it was made so the two arrestments ranked pari passu.953 
Another parallel with the rules on competing arrestments can be seen in Douglas v 
Mitchell.954 An arrestment was followed by an assignation to a creditor who 
intimated by serving an arrestment. The first arrester was not in a position to object 
to payment because he had not yet obtained a decree. This was an application of the 
rule that a creditor who is not ready to seek furthcoming cannot expect another who 
is ready to wait for him. 
As these special rules fell away, the rule on competition by date of arrestment 
became clear. The approach to arrestments and assign tions presented challenges for 
proponents of the prohibition theory which were similar to those posed by the rule on 
competition between arrestments.  
As noted above, Stair invoked litigiosity to explain the arrester’s success. Kames 
took the same approach but his account was more subtle.955 Noting that both the 
debtor and the assignee may be ignorant of the arrestment, Kames argues that both 
must be in bad faith before they will be affected by the prior arrestment.956 He 
concedes that there are “many decisions” which prefer an arrester where the deed of 
assignation was delivered prior to the arrestment but not intimated until afterwards 
but simply says that he “cannot comprehend” the basis for these decisions and points 
out that the authorities are not uniform.957 
                                                 
951 A v B (1618) Mor 2771; Davidson v Balcanqual (1629) Mor 2773. 
952 Inglis v Edward (1630) Mor 2773. 
953 (1687) Mor 2775. 
954 (1638) Mor 2774. 
955 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 182. 
956 Ibid 183–9. 
957 Ibid 189. He argues on the same basis that an assignee who has not intimated prior to the 
competition should be preferred to an arrester who arrests after the assignation. 
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The first example which Kames gives of contrary authori y concerns a 
competition between assignees of rent and adjudication.958 He points out that an 
assignee to whom the deed of assignation was deliver d prior to citation prevails 
over the adjudger provided that he intimates before the decree. From this he argues 
that “An arrestment surely makes not a stronger nexus upon the subject than is made 
by the summons of adjudication.”959 This seems very close to begging the question, 
since the essence of the attachment theory is that arrestment does indeed make a 
stronger nexus than citation in an adjudication. The other authori y is Fairholm v 
Hamilton,960 which concerned a competition between a Scottish arrestment and an 
English assignment. Kames relies heavily on the fact that at that time English law 
considered an assignment as a procuratory in rem suam, but he rather neglects the 
fact that it operated to transfer title in Equity without the need for intimation. Neither 
of Kames’ arguments seems to have enough force to rbut the weight of authority 
which suggests that the relationship between arrestments and assignations is best 
understood in terms of the attachment theory.  
Despite having endorsed the attachment theory elsewhere, Erskine attempted to 
explain the interaction between assignation and arrestment without recourse to it. He 
suggested that, where delivery of a deed of assignation was followed by arrestment 
by another creditor and finally by an intimation, the assignee’s intimation was 
“accounted part of the voluntary deed” with the result that the voluntary deed is 
completed after the prohibition is laid on and so i struck at by litigiosity.961 Once 
again, this is a version of litigiosity which is much stronger than that which applies in 
the case of inhibition or inchoate adjudication. Further, the intimation is the act of the 
assignee, who is surely as entitled to look to his own interests as any other 
creditor.962As with competition between arresters, Bell and Stewart state the rule but 
do not attempt to integrate it with their broader theory.963 
It seems clear that the prohibition theory cannot account for the settled rules on 
competition between arrestment and assignation. 
                                                 
958 Smith v Hepburn and Barclay (1637) Mor 2804. 
959 Ibid 189–90. 
960 (1755) Mor 2778, referred to in Kames Principles of Equity Vol II,  191. 
961 III.vi.19. 
962 See further Scottish Law Commission Report on Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty 
Arrestments (SLC 164, March 1998) para 9.18–9. 




(h) Arrestment and sequestration 
As noted in chapter 4, collective insolvency procedur s did not develop until 
relatively late in Scots law. The first collective s questration procedure covering 
moveable property was introduced in 1772.964 That statute provided for equalisation 
of diligence done in the window from thirty (later xtended to sixty) days before 
notour bankruptcy and four months after it.965 The rule is preserved in the modern 
legislation with apparent insolvency taking the place of notour bankruptcy.966 
Further, arrestments done during the sixty days prior to the date of sequestration are 
struck down as ineffective to create a preference (as are post-sequestration 
arrestments)967 
These equalisation rules meant that the cases in whch an arrestment without 
furthcoming competed with a trustee in sequestration were limited. The effect of 
sequestration on the right of an arrester, therefore, did not come to be settled until the 
nineteenth century. 
Aside from the equalisation provision,968 the 1772 Act made no direct provision 
regarding the effect of sequestration on an arrestmnt. Nor did it raise the issue quite 
as sharply as later legislation would. Under section 1, the debtor was ordered by the 
court to grant a disposition of his moveable estate o the factor for creditors. This 
meant that the rules restricting what the debtor could validly grant could be applied. 
Further, section 14 provided that “all Debts claimed upon, which are intitled to a 
preference by the Law of Scotland not altered by this Act, shall be preferred 
accordingly.” 
Under the 1783 Act, the factor had been replaced by a trustee who could apply to 
the court for a “Decree, finding the Property of the whole sequestrated Estate and 
Effects, real and personal, to be in the said Trustee” for the behoof of creditors.969 
                                                 
964 12 Geo 3 c 72. The progress of Scots bankruptcy legislation is traced in Bell Commentaries II, 
281–3; Goudy Bankruptcy 1–11 and in Scottish Law Commission I solvency, Bankruptcy and 
Liquidation in Scotland (SLC Consultative Memorandum No 16, November 1971) paras 9–13. 
965 Stewart Diligence 179.  
966 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 Sch 7 para 24(1). 
967 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 37(4). 
968 12 Geo 3 c 72, s 17. 
969 23 Geo 3 c 18, s 19 
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The vesting was, however, limited to “that Right and I terest in the Estate which the 
Bankrupt himself has, and which his Creditors can vlidly attach”. 
The 1793 Act did away with the need to apply for a specific order vesting the 
property,970 and included a qualification to the trustee’s duty to pay out to creditors: 
“Regard being had to Preferences obtained by Securities or by Diligence, before the 
said Deliverance [ie the date of sequestration], and not expressly set aside by this 
Act.”971 This was replicated in the 1814 Act972 but does not seem to add much to the 
qualification on the vesting provision.  
The 1814 Act was the legislation which Bell discussed in the fifth edition of the 
Commentaries (the last which he would produce himself).973 Under this legislation, 
the only possible grounds for giving the arrester a p eference were that the arrestment 
was considered to have limited the debtor’s right in the relevant property that 
arrestment was considered a diligence which secured a preference. Bell goes as far as 
to say that the trustee’s right “cannot be obstructed by any diligence used, or security 
held, by an individual creditor, if not completed as real right till after [vesting in the 
trustee].”974 Inhibition confers no such preference and so, neither would arrestment if 
the prohibition theory is followed. That being the case, it is slightly surprising that 
Bell included arrestment in his list of diligences which secure a preference in 
sequestration.975 It is difficult to argue that he had in mind an arrestment which had 
been followed by a forthcoming, since furthcoming would operate to remove the 
asset from the bankrupt’s estate and there would therefore be no question of ranking. 
Bell says little about the basis for this view, but it is striking that he covers 
arrestment under the heading “Of the ranking of creditors holding securities over the 
moveable fund” rather than alongside inhibition under “Of the ranking of creditors 
                                                 
970 33 Geo 3 c 74, s 23 and 24.  
971 33 Geo 3 c 74, s 29. Cf 23 Geo 3 c 18, s 22. 
972 54 Geo 3 c 137, ss 29, 30 and 38. 
973 (1826). While M’Laren restored most of Bell’s text in the 7th edition of the Commentaries, the 
legislative changes between 1826 and 1870 were so great that he used Shaw’s edition for the chapter 
on sequestration: Bell Comm (7th edn, 1870) II, 281 fn 1. Bell did discuss the 1838 Act in his 
Commentaries on the Recent Statute relative to Diligence or Execution against the Moveable Estate; 
Imprisonment; Cessio Bonorum and Sequestration in Mercantile Bankruptcy (1840). He does not say 
anything further about the ranking of arresters or the nature of their right. Further references to Bell’s 
Commentaries in this section are to the 5th edition, unless otherwise specified. 
974 Bell Comm II, 405. 
975 Bell Comm II, 512. 
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entitled to preferences by exclusion”. That suggests that, in this context at least, he 
tended towards the attachment theory. 
Sequestration was put on a permanent footing and extended to all types of debtor 
in 1838.976 The 1838 Act also leaves arrestments to be covered by the general 
provisions which protect creditors with “securities” or “preferences”. Vesting of the 
debtor’s moveable property in the trustee was provided for in section 78, but was 
“subject always to such preferable securities as existed at the date of the 
sequestration, and are not null or reducible.”977 
Section 83 provided that sequestration operated as an arrestment and furthcoming 
and as a completed poinding on behalf of all creditors as at the date of 
sequestration.978 Given that a completed poinding defeated an arrestm nt without 
furthcoming, this might be thought to imply that arrestment should confer no 
preference in sequestration. In fact, courts have consistently recognised the arrester’s 
preference on the basis of the protection for securities in section 78.979 
This was challenged in Brown v Blaikie.980 Lord Fullerton suggested that, because 
the trustee becomes entitled to payment of debts owed to the bankrupt, the arrester’s 
“security no longer exists as a substantive nexus on any part of the moveable 
estate.”981 However, he still accepted that the arrestee was entitled to a preference on 
the proceeds of the claim.982 Lord Fullerton’s qualms about the nature of the 
arrester’s right were rejected in Gibson v Greig and the arrester’s preference can now 
be considered well-established.983 
This characterisation of arresters as having rights in ecurity, and the preference 
accorded to them in sequestration procedures on that basis, provide strong support 
for the attachment theory.  
 
                                                 
976 2 & 3 Vict c 41. 
977 The same words are found in the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 s 97. The modern equivalents 
are Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 33(3) and Insolvency (Scotland) Rules 1986 r 4.66(6)(a). 
978 The equivalent modern provision is Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 37(1)(b). Of course, 
poinding has been replaced by attachment. 
979 Stewart Diligence 186; Goudy Bankruptcy 254; Gretton “Diligence” para 292. 
980 (1849) 11 D 474. 
981 Ibid at 479. 
982 Ibid at 479. 
983 (1853) 16 D 233 at 237 per Lord Ivory and at 240 per Lord Rutherfurd. See further, Mitchell v 
Scott (1881) 8 R 875, Stewart v Jarvie 1938 SC 309 and  James Gilmour (Crossford) Ltd v John 
Williams (Wishaw) Ltd 1970 SLT (Sh Ct) 6. 
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(i) Lucas’s Trustees v Campbell & Scott984 
Most of the rules which are relevant to the characterisation of arrestment were settled 
by the end of the nineteenth century but the introduction of the floating charge 
opened a new front. Before that is discussed, some attention should be given to 
Lucas’s Trustees v Campbell & Scott because of the influence it had on the floating 
charge cases. It concerned an attempt to arrest industrial plant which was located in a 
quarry in the hands of the tenant of the quarry. Under the lease, the plant was owned 
in common by the landlord (who was the arrester’s debtor) and tenant. At the ish, the 
tenant was obliged to vacate the quarry leaving the plant behind but entitled to 
payment for his share of the plant.985 The Inner House held that the arrestment was 
invalid because it could not lead to a decree of furthcoming. For Lord Kinnear, the 
heart of the problem was that an arrestment, like an assignation, could not make the 
arrestee’s position worse.986 That meant that the arrestment could not operate to 
compel him to take or retain possession of the plant after the ish in order to be able to 
make furthcoming to the arrester.987 
The decision is understandable: the arrestee was not entitled to retain possession 
of the quarry, and asking him to keep the plant elsewhere may well have involved 
undue difficulty and expense. Even on the attachment theory, arrestment involves a 
direction to the arrester that he should retain posses ion.  
Lord Kinnear justified the decision with a thorough endorsement of the 
prohibition theory, describing arrestment as “a diligence in personam” 988 and 
characterising furthcoming as an adjudication, which is “the essential part of the 
diligence”.989 This is also understandable: the case concerned corporeal moveables so 
to follow the approach taken to arrestment and poinding may have seemed obvious.  
While the Scottish sources were divided in their approach to arrestment, most of 
the support for the attachment theory has come fromthe courts. Until the twentieth 
century, writers tended towards the prohibition theory, perhaps because they relied 
on each other more heavily than on case law. In Bankton, Erskine and Hume, 
                                                 
984 (1894) 21 R 1096. 
985 Ibid at 1106. 
986 Ibid at 1105. 
987 Ibid at 1107. 
988 Ibid at 1106. 
989 Ibid at 1103. 
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however, there are the beginnings of a move to the a tachment theory. Hume, in 
particular, seems to have thought the law had shifted n that direction. But even these 
moves were tentative. Despite the odd ambiguous expression later writers, notably 
Bell and Stewart,990 tended towards the prohibition theory. When a new problem 
arises in any area of law, it has to be solved by recourse to the principles of the field. 
General statements about the principles of arrestment are more easily found in the 
work of legal writers than in the cases. Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
prohibition theory should be favoured in novel situations. 
 
(j) Twentieth-century debate: arrestment and the floating charge 
Another novel situation was created by the introduction of the floating charge: 
competition between an arrester and a floating chargeholder. It is well recognised 
that a floating charge does not affect particular assets until attachment. This takes 
effect “as if the charge were a fixed security over the property to which it has 
attached”,991 but subject inter alia to the rights of other creditors with “effectually 
executed diligence on the property” affected by the c arge.992 Whether an arrester 
prevails in a competition with a floating charge depends on whether the arrester has 
an “effectually executed diligence”.  
This issue arose in Lord Advocate v Royal Bank of Scotland.993 The majority in 
the First Division affirmed the decision of the Lord Ordinary that an arrester who had 
yet to obtain furthcoming did not have effectually executed diligence and, therefore, 
that the chargeholder’s right was not subject to the arrestment. The basis for this 
decision was a straightforward adoption of the prohibition theory, relying on 
quotations from Stair, Erskine, Stewart, and Lord Kinnear’s opinion in Lucas’s 
Trustees.994  
For the arrester it was argued that arrestment gavea s curity over the arrested 
property: hence the priority over voluntary acts of the debtor (eg assignations) and 
                                                 
990 Of course, Stewart’s work was not published until af er Lucas’s Trustees was decided. 
991 Companies Act 1985 s 463(2); Insolvency Act 1986 s 53(7) and 54(6); (when it comes into force) s 
45(5) of the Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007. 
992 Companies Act 1985 s 463(1)(a); Insolvency Act 1986 s 55(3)(a) and 60(1)(b); (when it comes into 
force) s 45(3)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007. 
993 1977 SC 155. The legislation in force at the time was the Companies (Floating Charges and 
Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972 s 15(2)(a) but the rel vant wording was the same. 




subsequent arrestments.995 The majority suggested that these results could be 
accommodated within the prohibition theory by refernce to litigiosity, relying on 
Erskine’s analysis.996 The problems with this have already been discussed and they 
were acknowledged by the judges although that does n t appear to have led them to 
reconsider their approach.997 
It is no surprise that the court looked for statements of general principle to deal 
with this novel situation and that this led them towards the prohibition theory. 
However, while the court’s approach reflected the historical preferences of writers on 
Scots law, it was not welcomed by modern scholars.998 Not all of the criticisms of the 
decision depended on favouring the attachment theory over the prohibition theory but 
many did.999 In particular, there was forceful rejection of the idea that litigiosity 
could explain the rules on competitions between arrestments and assignations.1000 
Further, it was shown that the mismatch between the approach to a competition 
between an arrestment and assignation and that to arrestments and floating charges 
created a circle of priorities.1001 Where an assignation is intimated after an arrestmn  
but before the attachment of a floating charge and there has been no furthcoming, the 
arrestment beats the assignation, the assignation beats the floating charge because the 
right to payment left the debtor’s patrimony prior t  attachment but, according to 
Lord Advocate v Royal Bank, the floating charge beats the arrestment. 
The decision is widely regarded as problematic, but the Inner House did not take 
the opportunity to change tack when floating charges and arrestments came back 
before it in Iona Hotels Ltd v Craig.1002 In that case, the floating charge had been 
granted after the arrestment and therefore the grant of the charge could be attacked 
on the basis of litigiosity. Lord Hope made his support for the prohibition theory 
clear. Indeed, he seems to have had fewer doubts about the capacity of litigiosity to 
                                                 
995 Ibid at 164. 
996 Ibid at 170 and 176–7. 
997 Ibid at 170. 
998 See S Wortley “Squaring the Circle: Revisiting thereceiver and ‘effectually executed diligence’” 
2000 JR 325. 
999 Wortley “Squaring the Circle” at 333–4. 
1000 Eg Scottish Law Commission Report on Diligence on the Dependence and Admiralty Arrestments 
paras 9.17–20. 
1001 Which forms the primary focus of Wortley’s article. 
1002 1990 SC 330. 
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explain the ranking of arrestments and inhibitions than Lord Emslie in Royal Bank, 
observing that “for my part I am content to accept it as sound in law.”1003  
Iona Hotels did little to assuage academic concerns and the judgment does not 
give any answer to the objections which were made to Lord Advocate v Royal Bank. 
Indeed St Clair and Drummond Young go so far as to suggest that the decisions were 
so unsatisfactory that later courts would simply declin  to follow them.1004 
The cases on floating charges and arrestment provide evidence of the continuing 
tenacity of the prohibition theory but they also illustrate the deep practical problems 
which it can generate and the difficulties which result from combinations of rules 
with differing theoretical foundations. 
 
(k) Conclusions 
The material surveyed supports Gretton’s contention that no consistent approach to 
the characterisation of arrestment can be discerned. Whatever view one adopts, it is 
impossible to avoid doing some violence to well-established rules. 
While there is clear support for the prohibition theory, its proponents’ attempts to 
account for the way arrestments rank among themselve  and with assignees suffer 
from serious problems. They prove too much (suggesting that poinders ought to have 
been subject to challenge as well), and they stretch litigiosity beyond the 
understanding which applies in other situations. This approach would change 
litigiosity from an effect which is justifiable in terms of Scots law’s understanding of 
fraud to something approaching equitable title. It is difficult to see why arrestment 
(for which there is no real public notice) should be accompanied by a stronger 
litigiosity than occurs elsewhere. 
In the modern law, incorporeal property is often signif cantly more valuable than 
corporeal moveables. Confirmation as an executor-creditor is not a commonly used 
diligence. Therefore the most important task for any theory of arrestment is to 
account for its interaction with other arrestments, with assignation, and with 
insolvency processes. These are the very situations for which the prohibition theory 
struggles to provide a convincing account. Only the attachment theory can provide a 
consistent explanation of the most important rules surrounding arrestment.  
                                                 
1003 Ibid at 335. 
1004 Corporate Insolvency para 9.15.  
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It might even be possible to argue that, since poinding has been abolished and 
replaced by attachment,1005 one of the major obstacles to the attachment theory has 
been removed. Attachment bears a strong resemblance to poinding but it is a fresh 
institution. Nothing in the Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 
demands that the rules on the relationship between poi ding and arrestment be 
applied to competitions between arrestments and attachments. Furthermore, 
arrestment of corporeal moveable property is now restricted to making up any 
shortfall between the value of rights which are arrested and the debt in execution of 
which the arrestment has been done.1006 
The floating charge presents a more serious obstacle o wholesale acceptance of 
the attachment theory. Its importance as a means of granting security over 
companies’ moveable property (whether corporeal or incorporeal) means that its 
interaction with arrestment is of real practical importance in a way that confirmation 
as an executor creditor is not. The established law in this area is based on a clear and 
deliberate adoption of the prohibition theory. However, it rests on an unloved 
decision of the Inner House, which gives rise to serious practical difficulties. For 
these reasons, even the floating charge does not provide a good reason to favour the 
prohibition theory over the attachment theory. 
The attachment theory also provides a much clearer basis for automatic release of 
attached funds to an arresting creditor under section 73J of the Debtors (Scotland) 
Act. 
The best that can be done for the development of the law of arrestment is a 
wholesale adoption of the attachment theory. It is some comfort that this approach 
has also been adopted elsewhere in Europe against the background of conflicting 
approaches to the ranking of arresting creditors. If the attachment theory is adopted 
there is less room for litigiosity: someone with a re l right in an asset has little need 
to call in aid a prohibition on dealings with that asset. Adoption of the attachment 
theory would also prevent any suggestion that the sronger effects of arrestment can 
be applied by analogy in other cases of litigiosity since those stronger effects are 
attributable to the arrester’s subordinate real right. 
 
                                                 
1005 Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002 Parts 2–4. 




B. LITIGIOSITY BEYOND DILIGENCE 
Scots law was slow to develop a general theory of litigiosity. In the course of his 
discussion of arrestment, Kames put forward a theory which anchored the concept 
within a broader framework and linked it to specific nstances. However, aspects of 
his treatment made it unlikely to garner widespread acceptance. Applied to its fullest 
extent, it would have meant something akin to equitable title in Scots law. 
 
(1) “Real actions” 
Although Bell did not regard inhibition as a species of litigiosity, and his approach 
was not as wideranging as Kames’, he too presented an account of litigiosity which 
went beyond the traditionally recognised instances of apprising, adjudication and 
arrestment. Bell located the concept in a broader comparative and conceptual 
framework: 
 
It is a general rule, which seems to have been recognised in all regular systems of 
jurisprudence, that during the dependence of an action, of which the object is to 
vest the property, or to attain the possession of a real estate, a purchaser shall be 
held to take that estate as it stands in the person of the seller, and to be bound by 
the decree which shall ultimately be pronounced.1007 
 
He suggests that the basis of the rule is the maxim pendente lite nihil innovandum 
and that the doctrine is accepted both in England and on the Continent, where it is 
known as “vitium litigiosum”.1008 Unfortunately, he gives no specific references for 
the Civilian position.  
When Bell moves from general comparative comments to discussion of Scots law, 
he suggests two broad categories of litigiosity: that which arises from diligence and 
that which arises from “real actions”. This might be taken to indicate that, outside 
diligence, its effect was limited to actions which nvolve the assertion of a real right. 
However, Bell’s observation that “There is litigiosity in all real actions for 
                                                 




recovering the property or possession of lands”1009 suggests otherwise. A pursuer 
who seeks to recover “property of lands” does not own them.  
The sense that Bell considered real actions to extend o cases when the pursuer 
asserted a personal right to a real right is reinforced by his use of Menzies v 
MacHarg as an example of a real action.1010  There, Mary Renton, having been 
fraudulently induced to sell land to James Gillespi, raised an action for reduction of 
the sale and disposition which followed. In the interim, she assigned claim to 
Menzies, while Gillespie contracted a number of debts and granted a trust deed for 
creditors. MacHarg purchased the land from Gillespi’  trustee. Menzies wakened 
the action and sought to recover the land from MacHarg on the basis of Gillespie’s 
fraud. MacHarg pointed to the maxim dolus auctoris non nocet successori but this 
was rejected. No hint is given as to the Lords’ reasoning but the argument before the 
court was that the raising of the initial action had rendered the land litigious. Bell’s 
account of litigiosity has echoes of a phrase from submissions on behalf of Menzies:  
 
By the laws of all countries, a real action which con ludes that the defender’s 
right be reduced and the pursuer’s declared, interpels the defender from making 
an alienation judicii mutandi causa and third parties from dealing with him.1011 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, reduction on grounds of fraud is a remedy 
which gives return of property in satisfaction of a personal right to reparation of a 
wrong done. Therefore, the action which rendered the property litigious was one 
where a personal right to property was being asserted. 
One question remains in relation to litigiosity and personal rights. The focus 
seems to be on personal rights to recover property or on personal rights to property 
which arise from diligence. There is, however, a third source from which a personal 
right to property may arise: a voluntary obligation u dertaken by the owner. Can 
litigation to enforce such rights render property litigious? 
It is not easy to see why a personal right to get something back should be 
privileged over a right to acquire the thing in the first place. Bell speaks with a 
wavering voice. His initial comment about the general rule, recognised in all systems 
                                                 
1009 Comm II, 145. 
1010 (1760) Mor 14165, cited at Bell Comm II, 145. 
1011 Ibid at 14168. 
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refers, to actions whose object “is to vest the prope ty … of a real estate.”1012 That is 
the aim of an action for implement of missives as much as it is the aim of a 
reduction. However, when he comes to discuss Scots law pecifically, he restricts the 
rule to “real actions for recovering” ownership or possession.1013 In the third edition 
of the Principles, Bell has a section on litigiosity which says it arises in “real actions, 
declarators, reductions, adjudications, [and] ranking and sale”.1014 Whether this 
covers litigation asserting a personal right to property depends on how broadly the 
term “real actions” is understood to be. 
Of course, a transfer made in frustration of a personal right to acquire property 
calls to mind the offside goals rule. A possible explanation for the omission of 
actions to enforce personal rights to acquire property from Bell’s catalogue of actions 
triggering litigiosity can be found in Kames’ attitude to the relationship between the 
offside goals rule and litigiosity.1015  
The parallels between the instances of litigiosity and offside goals cases are clear. 
In the classic offside goals case, a transfer to a bad faith second buyer is set aside 
because it frustrates the first buyer’s personal right to the property. When the first 
contract of sale was concluded, the seller came undr an obligation not to transfer the 
property to anyone else. Where a creditor was in the process of doing diligence, there 
was an obligation not to transfer the property and defeat the diligence. Where 
property has been fraudulently acquired, there is an implied obligation not to transfer 
it on which is a corollary of the obligation to give the property back.  
For Kames, both cases are explained by reference to the accessory liability of the 
grantee where the granter breaches an obligation not to transfer. However, there was 
a major difference between the two. The offside goals rule was concerned with 
accessory liability for stellionate: fraudulently granting the same right twice.1016 
Cases characterised as giving rise to litigiosity could not be brought under stellionate 
because there was no double grant. There was some other reason why the transfer 
was prohibited. Thus, litigiosity is once again playing a suppletive role, filling in to 
                                                 
1012 Bell Comm II, 144. 
1013 Ibid 145. 
1014 Bell Principles (3rd edn, 1833) § 2345. The section forms part of a discus ion of civil procedure 
which was omitted from the fourth edition. 
1015 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 43. 
1016 For further discussion of stellionate, see section C(1) below. 
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catch those cases which could not be accounted for by accessory liability for 
stellionate. Offside goals cases are excluded from litigiosity because they are already 
covered by stellionate.  
The net result of all this was that the broadest account of the scope of litigiosity 
which would have been available to Bell stopped short of protecting personal rights 
to acquire real rights for the first time. This may explain why they do not make it into 
his class of actions which give rise to litigiosity in the Principles. 
 
(2) Public notice and bad faith 
A major difference between litigiosity and the offside goals rule is the absence of 
attention to bad faith or gratuitousness in the former. This is explicable on the basis 
that litigiosity only affects third parties after an event of which they were deemed to 
have notice. If everyone is in bad faith, there is no need to worry about particular 
knowledge or whether a transfer is gratuitous. 
Notice could arise from something as slight as calling of a case in court. While 
calling a case is a public event, it is unrealistic to expect the general public to take 
notice of this. This difficulty was addressed by section 159 of the Titles to Land 
Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 which, as discussed above, provided that 
adjudication should only render property litigious once a notice of litigiosity was 
registered. It also provided that no summons of reduction should render the relevant 
lands litigious until a notice of litigiosity was registered. This provision suggests 
parliamentary endorsement of the view that litigiosity extended beyond diligence to 
actions of reduction, but it follows Bell in stopping short of recognising actions 
asserting personal rights to acquire property for the first time.  
It might be argued that raising an action for implement of missives creates 
constructive notice of that right, putting the general public in bad faith for the 
purposes of the offside goals rule, since calling of an action of reduction was taken to 
put the general public in bad faith in the past andsection 159 makes no mention of 
actions for implement of missives. However, it is unlikely that such an argument 




While the principle underlying the offside goals rule may be substantially the 
same as that which underlies challenges to transfers on the basis of litigiosity, it 
seems unlikely that litigiosity can be invoked to circumvent the need to show bad 
faith on the part of the grantee. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
As with the actio Pauliana, the core principle in litigiosity is an obligation not to 
participate knowingly in transactions which would defraud the pursuer. Fraud in this 
context means an act which is undertaken to frustrate the pursuer’s attempts at 
satisfaction by transferring or burdening the relevant assets. 
This principle accounts for the effect of inchoate djudication, inhibition, and 
actions of reduction in rendering property litigious. In each case, there is public 
notice of the affected asset or assets. Someone who accepts a transfers of this 
property is thus knowingly facilitating the defender’s attempt to frustrate the 
pursuer’s satisfaction and is thus an accessory to the fraud. He is therefore liable to 
make reparation by having the grant set aside, putting the pursuer in the position he 
would have been in had the wrongful grant not been made. As with 
misrepresentation, the reduction is natural restitution for the wrong which has been 
done. 
The prohibition on transfer is imposed to protect the pursuer’s interest. Therefore, 
it is a personal obligation owed to the pursuer. That in turn implies that the protected 
party has discretion whether or not to set the transfer aside and that the effect of the 
reduction is limited to what is necessary to protect he pursuer’s interest meaning that 
third parties cannot rely upon it. 
Basing the restriction on transfer on fraud on creditors also explains the protection 
of grants made or diligence done in satisfaction of prior obligations, because the 
grantee of such rights has a legitimate interest to pursue and therefore cannot be said 
to be a wilful party to the frustration of the purser’s rights. 
Arrestment is something of an outlier. Aspects of the institution were developed 
using a litigiosity analysis, while other rules drew on the view that arrestment did 
more than merely prohibit certain acts. Litigiosity cannot provide a satisfying 
account of these rules. That means that arrestment can do little to inform an account 
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of litigiosity because, where it deviates from the rules applicable to inhibition or 
inchoate adjudication, the likely explanation is that this is an aspect of the attachment 
theory. Furthermore, examination of the materials suggests that the attachment 









OFFSIDE GOALS AND SUCCESSOR VOIDABILITY 
 
Few areas of Scots property law have attracted as much odern scholarly interest as 
the offside goals rule.1017 It addresses actions by an owner which render him 
incapable of fulfilling a prior obligation to transfer his property or grant a real right 
in it. The core case is double sale: Alfred concludes a contract for the sale of his field 
to Betty; before Betty has obtained her real right, Alfred sells a second time to Cecil, 
who registers first. The offside goals rule says that, if Cecil was in bad faith, the 
transfer to him is voidable at Betty’s instance. Betty can also set aside a gratuitous 
transfer to Cecil even if he is in good faith.  
There is broad consensus on the basic elements. A grant is voidable on the basis 
of the offside goals rule if: 
 
1) the granter was under a prior obligation to grant a real right to the avoiding 
party, which obligation gave rise to a concomitant obligation not to alienate or 
burden the property; 
2) the grant was made in breach of the prior obligation; 
3) the grantee knew of the obligation or the grant wasnot for value.1018 
 
The rule appears to run contrary to the general principle that personal obligations1019 
bind debtors personally rather than affecting their assets, and to undermine the 
                                                 
1017 D Carey Miller “A Centenary Offering: The double sale dilemma – time to be laid to rest” in  M 
Kidd and S Hoctor (eds) Stella Iuris: Celebrating 100 years of the Teaching of Law in 
Pietermaritzburg (2010) 96; RG Anderson Assignation (2008) paras 11-04–30; Carey Miller 
Corporeal Moveables paras 8.28–32; DA Brand, AJM Steven and S Wortley Professor McDonald’s 
Conveyancing Manual (7th edn, 2004) paras 32.52–62; S Wortley “Double Sales nd the Offside Trap: 
Some thoughts on the rule penalising private knowledge of a prior right” 2002 JR 291; Reid Property 
paras 695–700.  
1018 Reid Property para 695, approved in Advice Centre for Mortgages v McNicoll [2006] CSOH 58, 
2006 SLT 591 at para 46. 
1019 Ie duties correlative to personal rights. 
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application of the maxim prior tempore potior iure to real rights.1020 It presents a 
broader challenge than either inhibition or the rules on grants by insolvent debtors 
because controlling factors such as the need for the authority of the court or the 
specific context of insolvency are absent. 
The problem of double sales has attracted considerable attention in continental 
European scholarship1021 and in South Africa, where the equivalent to the offside 
goals rule is known as the doctrine of notice.1022 The modern South African debate 
may be considered to begin with an article by R G McKerron in 19351023 and picked 
up pace with an exchange of articles in the South African Law Journal in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.1024 South African law in this area deserves special attention 
because it has had a particular influence on academic debate in Scotland.1025 
The mid-twentieth century also marks a turning point for Scots law in this area. 
Although the topic was addressed during the foundation l period in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the rule received of a fresh impetus from the decision in 
Rodger (Builders) Ltd v Fawdry.1026  Indeed, its very name derives from a dictum of 
Lord Justice Clerk Thomson in this case.1027  With the exception of Anderson, 
modern treatments have not sought to make extensive use of historical sources, 
although some reference is made to nineteenth-century cases. Because Anderson 
provides a recent and extensive discussion of the history of the rule,1028 and because 
of the extensive modern analysis, a slightly different approach to that found in other 
chapters is needed in this here. Historical comments are made only where necessary 
                                                 
1020 For a very forceful statement of this view, see Anderson Assignation paras 11-05 and 11-30. 
1021 For modern surveys with further references, see W Ernst “Der zweifache Verkauf derselben Sache 
– Bertrachtungen zu einem Rechtsproblem in seiner europäischen Überlieferung” in E Jakob and W 
Ernst (eds) Kaufen nach römischem Recht (2008) 83; R Michaels Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag 
(2002); S Sella-Geusen Doppelverkauf (1999). 
1022 For modern surveys see FDJ Brand “Knowledge and Wrongfulness as Elements of the Doctrine of 
Notice” in H Mostert and MJ de Waal (eds) Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe (2011) 21. Carey 
Miller “A Centenary Offering”; G Lubbe “A Doctrine in Search of a Theory: Reflections on the so-
called doctrine of notice in South African Law” 1997 Acta Juridica 246; Meridian Bay Restaurant v 
Mitchell [2011] ZASCA 30, 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA).  
1023 RG McKerron “Purchaser with Notice” (1935) 4 South African Law Times 178. 
1024 GA Mulligan “Double Sales and Frustrated Options” (1948) 65 SALJ 564; JE Scholtens “Double 
Sales” (1953) 70 SALJ 22; GA Mulligan “Double Sales: A rejoinder” (1953) 70 SALJ 299; JE 
Scholtens “Difficiles Nugae – Once again double sales” (1954) 71 SALJ 71; GA Mulligan “Double, 
Double Toil and Trouble” (1954) 71 SALJ 169. 
1025 Carey Miller “A Centenary Offering” and Wortley “Double Sales and the Offside Trap”. 
1026 1950 SC 483. 
1027 Ibid at 501. 
1028 Anderson Assignation paras 11-06–23. 
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to show the links between Scots and ius commune material and between the offside 
goals rule and the broader law of fraud on creditors. 
 
A. MALA FIDES , PERSONAL BAR AND THE PUBLICITY PRINCIPLE 
Rodger (Builders) itself offers little in the way of serious consideration of the basis 
of the rule. Lord Jamieson, who gave the leading judgment, was content to rely on 
three nineteenth-century cases where the rule had been applied and to observe that 
the purchaser was in bad faith.1029  
In the first of these, Marshall v Hynd,1030 the judges’ primary concern was the 
level of knowledge of the prior contract needed to put the second purchaser in bad 
faith. For knowledge to constitute bad faith, however, there must be some rule which 
explains the relevance of that knowledge to the action in question. 
This issue was addressed in the second case, Stodart v Dalzell, where both Lord 
Ormidale and Lord Gifford suggested that the second purchaser’s knowledge of the 
prior right meant that he was not entitled to rely on the faith of the records regarding 
his seller’s right.1031 The analysis echoes that of Lord Kinloch in another nineteenth-
century case, Morrison v Somerville: “No one can allege that he trusted the records, 
when he knew of his own knowledge how the case actually stood. The records imply 
constructive information. The case here is that of actual knowledge”.1032 This 
approach was picked up in Rodger (Builders) where Lord Jamieson observed that 
“[t]he right to rely on the register does not extend to one in knowledge of prior 
obligations or deeds affecting the subjects.”1033  
This approach makes Lord Gifford’s characterisation of the rule as a species of 
personal bar in another nineteenth-century case, Petrie v Forsyth, understandable.1034 
On this model the first buyer has acquired a right, albeit not one which has been 
published. Under normal circumstances, that right would be non-opposable to the 
second buyer who had registered because the latter could invoke the faith of the 
                                                 
1029 1950 SC 483 at 500, citing Marshall v Hynd (1828) 6 S 384, Petrie v Forsyth (1874) 2 R 214 and 
Stodart v Dalzell (1876) 4 R 236. 
1030 (1828) 6 S 384. 
1031 (1876) 4 R 236 both at 242. 
1032 (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1089. 
1033 1950 SC 483 at 500. 
1034 (1874) 2 R 214 at 223.  
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records. However, the second buyer’s knowledge of the right means that he is barred 
from making this argument since he knew better. As Reid and Blackie point out, 
however, personal bar is difficult to maintain in this context because of the absence 
of inconsistent conduct by the second buyer.1035  
Even if the language of personal bar is eschewed, a rule which restricts reliance 
on the register to those who are in good faith is conceivable. Indeed such rules exist 
in the Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012.1036 Wortley makes tentative moves 
towards such an analysis with his suggestion that the basis of the offside goals rule 
might lie in an aspect of the publicity principle: “the publicity principle is not merely 
there to protect third parties: in certain circumstances, it can also be used to penalise 
them.”1037 
The difficulty with this approach is that the act of publicity (be it registration, 
intimation or delivery) is not merely a mechanism for making a transfer known. It is 
constitutive of the transfer. Until the relevant public act, ownership remains with the 
seller and the first buyer’s right is merely personal. The first buyer has no proprietary 
interest of which third parties could have notice. This stands in contrast to the good 
faith requirements in the 2012 Act,1038 which cover cases where the Land Register 
misstates the relevant real rights.  
In that context, an argument based on the faith of the records or the publicity 
principle might have difficulty answering Lord Low’s objection: “Assuming that 
they knew of the obligation, they knew also that it did not affect the lands.”1039  Like 
its correlative right, the seller's duty is personal. The second buyer might argue that 
his knowledge of it was irrelevant because the obligation of which he knew did not 
bind him. 
Further, arguments about publicity or personal bar offer little in the way of an 
explanation for why a gratuitous transferee who wasignorant of the earlier transfer 
should be vulnerable. 
 
                                                 
1035 EC Reid and JWG Blackie Personal Bar (2006) para 2-08. See further JWG Blackie “Good Faith 
and the Doctrine of Personal Bar” in ADM Forte (ed) Good Faith in Contract and Property Law 
(1999) 129 at 147–60. 
1036 Eg Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012 s 86, particularly paragraph (3)(c). 
1037 Wortley “Double Sales and the Offside Trap” at 314. 
1038 Land Registration (Scotland) Act 2012 ss 86–93. 





B. MALA FIDES  AND THE TRANSFER AGREEMENT 
Carey Miller suggests that the import of the second buyer's bad faith can be 
explained, not by reference to the publicity principle but by invoking the principle of 
separation of contract and conveyance.1040 This principle recognises transfer as a 
distinct juridical act requiring intention on the part of transferor and transferee. Carey 
Miller argues that the second buyer’s bad faith means he has a defective intention to 
acquire, which renders his right voidable.1041  
This involves an unusual understanding of intention. Both seller and second buyer 
wish the transfer to take place. At the time of the transfer their wills are directed to 
that end. The fact that one or both parties knows it to be wrong does not affect their 
intention. A poacher has a sufficient animus acquirendi, although he knows that he is 
committing a crime.1042 Further, the vices of consent, such as fraud and force and 
fear, operate for the protection of one of the parties to a transaction where his consent 
has been improperly obtained. What is being suggested here is something completely 
different: both parties give free and informed consent and it is a third party who 
needs the protection. 
A second problem with Carey Miller’s analysis is a variant of the problem with 
the publicity principle argument. Even if it is conceded that bad faith affects 
intention to acquire, some explanation is needed of why the knowledge amounts to 
bad faith. That means an explanation of why the second buyer should have acted 
differently. 
As for the gratuity case, Carey Miller addresses thi in straightforward policy 
terms, suggesting that the reason is simply that “a party who fails to give value 
should not trump a competing party with an earlier r ght”.1043 This approach has 
                                                 
1040 Wortley describes Carey Miller's analysis as an “abstract system approach” (“Double Sales and 
the Offside Trap” at 312), a characterisation which Carey Miller accepts (“A Centenary Offering” at 
96). However, the analysis turns on the need for a real or transfer agreement. A transfer agreement 
might be necessary even in a system which also required a valid causa for the transfer. Therefore, it 
seems marginally preferable to see the analysis as resting on the principle of separation. 
1041 Corporeal Moveables para 8.28. See also para 8.30 and “A Centenary Offering” at 114. 
1042 Erskine II.i.10.  
1043 Carey Miller Corporeal Moveables para 8.32. 
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intuitive appeal. The law of transfer is primarily geared towards the needs of 
commerce and thus of onerous transferees. Donees ar not worthy of this protection. 
Once again, however, a little more seems to be needed. Suppose Donna makes a 
written promise to David that she will convey a field to him. The next day, she 
concludes a contract with Betty for the sale of the same field. Foolishly, Betty pays 
up front. On the third day, Donna delivers the disposition to David who duly 
registers it. Betty clearly has a right against Donna for breach of contract but David 
is safe. The story would be different if Betty’s missives had been concluded on Day 
1 and the promise to David made on Day 2. If the basic idea behind the vulnerability 
of donees under the offside goals rule is that theyar  less worthy of protection than 
onerous transferees, it is difficult to see why Betty should be worse off because the 
promise happened to come first. To say that David has t e earlier right is to fall into 
the error which underlies the personal bar analysis: the idea that some kind of proto-
property right is acquired before completion of the transfer of which the act of 
transfer merely gives notice. All David has on Day 1 is a personal right against 
Donna. 
Similarly, if the gratuity case is explained by lack of sympathy for donees, why 
can a donee invoke the rule against later donee?1044  
 
C. MALA FIDES  AND FRAUD: SCOTLAND AND THE IUS COMMUNE 
The difficulties with the publicity principle and the transfer agreement as bases for 
the offside goals rule drive analysis back to an earlier approach. The nineteenth-
century cases cited in Rodger (Builders) marked a shift in the analysis of the rule. Up 
to that point, it was thought to rest on fraud. This analysis was not unique to 
Scotland. The idea that the double seller behaved fraudulently has a long history in 
Europe. 
A constitution of the Emperor Hadrian which appears to provide for the 
punishment of a double seller is recorded in the Digest.1045 However, discussion of 
the private law aspects of double sales was not helped by the fact that the main 
                                                 
1044 Eg Alexander v Lundies (1675) Mor 940. 
1045 D.48.10.21. 20th century scholarship suggests that the text did not originally refer to double sales: 
E Levy “Gesetz und Richter im Kaiserlichen Strafrecht” (1938) 4 BIDR (NS) 57 at 67–8 (fn 32). Of 
course, the scholars who influenced Scots law took he text at face value.  
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Digest text on the topic1046 deals with a very complex situation but makes no mention 
of Hadrian’s penalty. Neither is there any mention of a penalty in C.3.32.15.pr, the 
major text setting out the principle that the first of two competing buyers to obtain 
traditio prevailed. 
Much ink has been spilt trying to analyse and reconcile the texts and, although 
none of them mention fraus or dolus, the concept of fraud would play a key role in 
the endeavour. The story is too lengthy to be recounted in detail but some elements 
of significance to later discussion in Scotland andSouth Africa can be highlighted. 
 
(1) Stellionatus  
The Glossators were particularly concerned the application of the word “iure” (from 
ius, meaning right or law) to the second sale in C.3.32.15pr. How could a contract 
which was declared criminal by another text be so characterised? Azo reconciled the 
two by drawing a sharp distinction between civil and criminal law.1047 The second 
sale was valid (thus iure) but it rendered the seller criminally liable.  
Azo drew a parallel between double sale and double pignus which was punishable 
as stellionatus.1048 The earliest text on stellionatus concerns pignus.1049 However, the 
term appears to have had wider import. A text from Ulpian suggests that it did in 
criminal law what the actio de dolo did in private law.1050 Thus stellionatus was a 
residual category, catching criminal conduct not otherwise provided for. Both the 
reference to the actio de dolo and the well-established cases of stellionatus make the 
                                                 
1046 D.18.4.21. 
1047 Sella-Geusen Doppelverkauf 69–71. 
1048 Azo Ad singulas leges XII liberorum codicis iustinianei commentarius (1577, repr sub nom 
Azonis, Lectura super codicem, 1966) 224–5. On non-possessory pignus, see HLE Verhagen “The 
Evolution of Pignus in Classical Roman Law, Ius honorarium and ‘Ius novum’” (2013) Tjidschrift 
voor Rechtgeschiedenis 51 at 57–60 
1049 D.13.7.16.1. For discussion see P Stein “The Origins of Stellionatus” (1990) 41 IURA 79 at 81–2. 
The word derives from stellio, a term applied to geckos who, according to Pliny, could shed their skin 
when threatened by a predator: “The situation of the predator who is left holding the rejected skin 
(tunicula) of his intended victim resembles that of the pledgee who has received by way of pledge a 
thing not belonging to the debtor or already pledged to another.” Stein “The Origins of Stellionatus” at 
82–3. Discussion of the origin of the term was a favourite topic of humanist scholars (F Schaffstein 
“Das Delikt des Stellionatus in der gemeinrechtlichen Strafrechtsdoktrin” in O Behrends et al (eds) 
Festschrift für Franz Wieacker zum 70. Geburtstag (1978) 281 at 283–4) and was picked up by 
Erskine: IV.iv.79. 
1050 D.47.20.3. See generally Stein “The Origins of Stellionatus” 83–9, expecially at 87 where he 




link with fraud clear.1051 Most of the instances of stellionatus mentioned in the 
Digest involve some kind of trickery but two are of particular significance for the 
offside goals rule. Destruction of property which is subject to a contract of sale does 
not involve deception but it does involve deliberat frustration of the buyer’s 
contractual right. Secondly, collusion to the detriment of another was regarded as 
stellionatus. Of course, a bad faith instance of the offside goals rule involves a 
collusive action which is directed at the frustration of a personal right. 
The term “stellionatus” persisted in the Civilian tradition. A wide-ranging 
interpretation appears to have been maintained in the Netherlands  Germany.1052 
In France lawyers were aware of the broad Roman defi ition, and Pothier used the 
word in his Traité de la procédure civile.1053 However, the term was most commonly 
applied to purported sales of property which did not belong to the seller or purported 
grants of first-ranking hypothecs over property which was already burdened.1054 
Whether the view taken was broad or narrow, however, it was clear that the term 
referred to fraud in its criminal aspect. But while the fact that an act was punishable 
as stellionate undoubtedly points to fraud for civil purposes, the latter classification 
does not depend on the former.  
In Scotland, the word “stellionate” was used particularly in relation to double 
grants1055 and so assumed a central role in some discussions of the offside goals rule. 
In some sources, a broader significance was attached to the term.1056 Mackenzie, 
following the Civilian tradition, stresses its residual role.1057 He suggests that the 
                                                 
1051 As well as double pledge, a number of other cases r  mentioned in the the Digest: sale of a 
statuliber (ie a slave to whom liberty had been granted subject to a certain condition) without 
disclosure of his status as such (D.40.7.9.1); accepting payment in satisfaction of debt you know to 
have been satisfied (D.17.1.29.5); swapping or destroying the goods which are to be pledged or sold 
for others or imposture or collusion to the detriment of another (both D.47.20.3). 
1052 HP Glöckner “Stellionatus” in A Erler and E Kaufmann (eds) Handwörterbuch zur deutschen 
Rechtsgeschichte Vol 4 (1990); Schaffstein “Das Delikt des Stellionatus in der gemeinrechtlichen 
Strafrechtsdoktrin”; Van Leeuwen Commentaries Vol II, 268. 
1053 Pothier Traité de la procédure civile 314. 
1054 Code Napoléon (1810, repr 2001) art 2059. 
1055 1592 c 142, RPS 1592/4/82; Balfour Practicks 166 c I; Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 40; Bell 
Comm I, 308. 
1056 G Mackenzie The Laws and Customs of Scotland in Matters Criminal (ed O F Robinson, St Soc 
59, 2012) 210–2, Erskine IV.iv.79 and Bell’s Dictionary “stellionate”. 
1057 Mackenzie Matters Criminal 210.  Hume takes the idea of stellionate as a residual category even 
further, suggesting that it might be applied to a nondescript offence against the person: Commentaries 
on the Law of Scotland (4th edn, 1844) Vol I, 328. For other 19th century writers who followed this see 
MGA Christie “Assault and Related Offences” in “Criminal Law (Reissue)”, The Laws of Scotland: 
Stair Memorial Encyclopedia Vol 7 (1995) para 204. 
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statutes of 1540 and 1592, which make provision for the consequences of double 
grants, operate on the presupposition that Scots law in relation to stellionate is the 
same as “the civil law”.1058 However, the broader view does not seem to have had 
any impact on the discussion of double grants. 
The term is most closely associated with legislation of 1540, which is often 
referred to as the Stellionate Act.1059 Curiously, it does not use the word “stellionate” 
but simply characterises the relevant conduct as fraudulent. It deals primarily with a 
fraudulent scheme which was made possible by the then absence of a register for 
heritable transactions. This created the possibility of “private” transfer, usually by 
base infeftment. The fraudster would sell and grant infeftment to his son or close 
confidante but remain in possession. He would then sell the land to an unsuspecting 
third party. Later, the first grantee would emerge and produce his prior title. The 
statute offered limited protection to the second buyer: if he had possessed peaceably 
for a year and a day, he would prevail over the first buyer. The seller was declared 
infamous and “to be punist in his persoune and guidis at the kingis grace will and 
plesour.” The final words of the Act, almost as an fterthought, extend the 
punishment to superiors who knowingly receive double resignations for the purpose 
of such a scheme and extend the Act to those who grant double assedations1060 or 
assignations.1061 
The Act was pressed into service to support the offside goals rule by Bankton and 
Kames. The former explains the vulnerability of a gr tuitous second assignee on the 
basis that “the objection that lay against the cedent, of granting double rights [for 
which Bankton cites the 1540 Act], is good against the second gratuitous 
alienee”,1062 such actions being “manifestly fraudulent”. Curiously, he does not 
invoke the rule in his equivalent discussion of double dispositions, where instead he 
                                                 
1058 Mackenzie Matters Criminal 210. 
1059 1540 c 105, RPS 1540/12/77. 
1060 Defined in Bell’s Dictionary as “an old law term, used indiscriminately to signify a lease or feu-
right.” 
1061 The act is remarkably similar to a law of Lothair I: Lotharii I. lex XXX in F Walter (ed) Corpus 
Iuris Germanici Antiqui Vol III (1824) 642. On this law, see W von Brünneck Über den Ursprung des 
sognennanten jus ad rem: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte dieses Dogma (1869) 20–1. 
1062 Bankton III.i.8. 
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relies on fraud at common law, although he does cite Alexander v Lundies, the 
assignation case which he explained by reference to the 1540 Act.1063  
Kames defines stellionate as double grant and notes that it is punishable under the 
1540 Act. He then sets out a classic offside goals scenario and suggests that “it was a 
tortious act in [the second purchaser] to receive from me what I could not lawfully 
give; and he is punished for this act by the voiding of his purchase.”1064  
Yet it is difficult to see how the 1540 Act can provide a basis for the offside goals 
rule. The situations envisaged by this statute differs quite significantly from an 
offside goals case. Under the Act, the second purchaser is protected from the fraud of 
the first purchaser. The offside goals rule is about protecting an innocent first 
purchaser from a fraudulent second purchaser. Conversely, if the rule was not based 
on the 1540 Act, the latter’s repeal in 19641065 cannot be considered to undermine it. 
The broader view of stellionate espoused by Mackenzie might be taken to provide 
some basis for the offside goals rule. However, this view depends on being able to 
characterise the relevant conduct as fraudulent. 
One important insight can be derived from Bankton and Kames, however. Both 
recognised that the primary wrong was done by the sell r, and that the transferee was 
vulnerable as an accessory to the granter’s wrong. This idea of accessory liability 
was prefigured in Mackenzie’s discussion of the superior’s liability under the 1540 
Act. He observes that “if the superior was conscious to the design of making these 
double resignations he cannot but be art and part of the cheat”.1066 
 
(2) Double grants and fraud on creditors 
Like Azo, Accursius addresses the use of the word iure in C.3.32.15.pr. However, he 
accounted for it in a different way, arguing that iure signified bona fides and the 
absences of dolus.1067 This raised the possibility that the priority of the second 
purchaser who obtained traditio first was restricted to cases where he or she was in 
                                                 
1063 Bankton I.x.90.  
1064 Kames Principles of Equity Vol II, 40–1.  
1065 Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 s 1, Sch 1. 
1066 Mackenzie Matters Criminal 211. 
1067 Sella-Geusen Doppelverkauf 71–3. 
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good faith.1068 The connection between double sale and fraud would be eveloped by 
later scholars. 
Baldus took the next step in his commentary on C.7.75: De revocandis his quae 
per fraudem alienata sunt. Drawing on Canon law,1069 he suggested that a distinction 
had to be made between creditors with a right to a qu ntity of fungibles and those 
with a right to a specific asset. In the latter case, the creditor did not need to sue the 
debtor in order to establish his insolvency before pursuing the transferee for the 
asset.1070 This approach, described by modern Dutch scholars as the ruime 
Pauliana1071 (broad Pauliana) was followed by a number of Commentators and some 
humanist scholars but it was vigorously resisted by many humanists.1072 However, it 
was picked up with enthusiasm by usus modernus writers in Spain and Germany.1073  
Ankum found little evidence of application of the rule by Dutch and French 
lawyers.1074 Voet does record that some jurists thought that a personal actio in factum 
should lie against a second buyer who knew of a prior sale. The rationale was that the 
second buyer would thereby be prevented from benefiti g from his fraud.1075 Ankum 
notes that there is more evidence of recognition in Belgium. The rise of consensual 
transfer in late scholastic and Natural law accounts rendered the analysis irrelevant in 
some systems because it tended to eliminate the gap between contract and 
conveyance, although even these can be seen as reflecting a policy concern to protect 
the first buyer.1076 
The logic of Baldus’ analysis is attractive: the actio Pauliana dealt with acts by a 
debtor which rendered him incapable of fulfilling his obligations. Where the 
                                                 
1068 Sella-Geusen points out that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Accursius would have 
endorsed this view.  
1069 Ernst “Der zweifache Verkauf derselben Sache” 95–6 and Ankum Geschiedenis 183–4. 
1070 Baldus de Ubaldis In vii, viii, ix, x et xi Codicis libros Commentari (1599, repr in Commentaria 
Omnia von Baldus de Ubaldis, Vol VIII, 2004) 127: see Ernst “Der zweifache Verkauf derselben 
Sache” 96; Sella-Geusen Doppelverkauf 185–8; Ankum Geschiedenis 167, 182–6 and 402. 
1071 Ankum Geschiedenis 66. 
1072 Ibid 402 and 411.  
1073 Ibid 411–2 and Michaels Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag 139 although Ernst suggests that the 
usus modernus writers also deployed the concept of the ius ad rem, suggesting that the first buyer had 
a right which, while not real was more than merely personal: “Der zweifache Verkauf derselben 
Sache” 96–7. 
1074 Geschiedenis 411–2, 417, 420 taking the view that the advys of Schomaker cited by McKerron 
(“Purchaser with notice” at 181) was an isolated insta ce. There was more evidence in Belgium: ibid 
420. 
1075 Voet Commentary on the Pandects D.6.1.20. 
1076 Ernst “Der zweifache Verkauf derselben Sache” at 94. 
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obligation is to transfer some quantity of money or wheat, a solvent debtor remains 
capable of meeting it even if he makes other transfers. Where, on the other hand, the 
debtor is bound to transfer a particular item, giving that asset away renders him 
incapable of fulfilling the obligation even if he is otherwise solvent. The other 
elements of the actio Pauliana would help to account for the need for either bad faith 
or gratuity on the part of the post-sale acquirer. 
 
(3) Initial recognition of fraud as the rationale i n Scots law 
Fraud on a creditor seems to have been central to analysis of the offside goals rule in 
Scotland since its inception. Seatoun v Copburnes,1077 decided in 1549, is probably 
the first recorded case which can be understood in terms of the offside goals rule. 
Lady Seatoun sought to reduce an infeftment given to James Copburne by his father. 
She argued that, prior to that sasine, she and the priests and college of the Kirk of 
Seatoun had bought an annualrent of the lands from him. Lady Seatoun alleged that 
infeftment on the annualrent had been completed, so she might have been able to rely 
on her prior real right but for some reason she chose not to rely on that. Instead she 
suggested that “the said laird in manifest defraud of the said lady and preistis dolose 
infeodavit suum filium in suis terris, and sua, said scho [ie she], that that alienatioun 
in dolo et fraude (ut predicitur) facta de iure erat etractanda.” 
Fraud on creditors had been recognised even earlier in Ramsay v Wardlaw,1078 but 
Seatoun is nonetheless remarkable because the actio Pauliana was not firmly 
established in Scots law until the seventeenth century. It cannot be said to have 
opened the floodgates, however. 
The first major scholarly discussion of the offside goals rule comes in Stair’s 
treatment of resolutive conditions in contracts of sale. A resolutive condition is a 
term which purports to make the property revert to the transferor in given 
circumstances. Stair’s view was that such conditions had no proprietary effect. The 
transferee merely had an obligation to reconvey if the condition occurred. This raised 
the question of the effect of the obligation on third parties who obtained the property 
from the transferee. Although the origin of the obligation to convey differs from 
                                                 
1077 (1549) Sinclair Practicks No 459. 
1078 (1492) Balfour Practicks 184 c XX. 
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double sale, the end result is the same: an alienation in breach of an obligation to 
grant a real right to someone else.  
As with Seatoun v Copburnes, Stair analyses the situation in terms of fraud but 
makes no direct reference to fraud by an insolvent d b or:  
 
…though there may be fraud in the acquirer, which raiseth an obligation of 
reparation to the party damnified by that delinquence, yet that is but personal; and 
another party acquiring bona fide or necessarily, and not partaking of that fraud, is 
in tuto. But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the like, inducing malam 
fidem, whereby any prior disposition or assignation made to another party is 
certainly known, or at least interruption made in acquiring by arrestment or 
citation of the acquirer, such rights acquired, not being of necessity to satisfy prior 
engagements, are reducible ex capite fraudis, and the acquirer is partaker of the 
fraud of his author, who thereby becomes a granter of double rights; but this will 
not hinder legal diligence to proceed and be completed and become effectual, 
though the user thereof did certainly know of any ichoate or incomplete right of 
another.1079 
 
In this passage, we see the key elements of the offside goals rule are already present: 
the idea that the primary wrong is done by the granter; that the successor is only 
vulnerable if the prior right is known of and that the basis of this is participation in 
the granter’s fraud. 
It is also worthy of note that, as with his analysis of fraudulent misrepresentation 
and of fraud on creditors, Stair characterises the vulnerability in terms of a personal 
right to reparation from the wrongdoer. Further, as with fraud on creditors, the 
second purchaser’s liability is accessory. It takes two to transfer and so the second 
purchaser is an essential accomplice in the seller’s fraud.  
The pattern of development in Scotland is slightly different from that in the wider 
ius commune tradition. There is no sense of the actio Pauliana expanding to cover 
cases other than insolvency. Rather, the Scottish analysis seems to jump straight to 
the idea that an offside goal is a fraud on the first buyer.  
 
 
                                                 
1079 Stair I.xiv.5. He does go on to consider whether t 1621 Act might apply to gratuitous alienations 
of property subject to a resolutive condition but con ludes that the law is not clear. It would later 





D. FRAUD AS THE RATIONALE IN THE MODERN LAW 
 
(1) Is fraud a broad enough concept to account for the offside goals 
rule?  
As Anderson and Reid show,1080 the fraud analysis persisted until the nineteenth 
century. Indeed references to it can also be found in the cases from that era, 
alongside arguments based on the publicity principle. Thus, in Morrison v 
Sommerville, Lord Kinloch gives a classic fraud-based analysis: 
 
In granting a second right, the seller is guilty of fraud on the first purchaser. 
Against the seller himself the transactions would be clearly reducible. But, in 
taking the second right in the knowledge of the first, the second disponee becomes 
an accomplice in the fraud, and the transactions is reducible against both alike.1081 
 
Even in Petrie v Forsyth, Lord Neaves proceeded on the basis that the second 
purchaser’s conduct was fraudulent.1082 However, Lord Gifford took a different 
approach, distinguishing between fraud, mala fides and “mere knowledge”.1083 He 
concluded that what was needed was knowledge sufficient to put the second 
purchaser under a duty to contact the first. Lord Gifford clearly considered this to fall 
short of fraud. On such a model it is difficult to see how fraud can form the basis for 
the doctrine.  
A similar line of reasoning is articulated by Lord Drummond Young in Advice 
Centre for Mortgages: 
 
The theoretical basis for the foregoing principle is not discussed in any detail in 
the decided cases, perhaps because its practical application is very obvious, at 
least in simpler cases. The origins of the principle seem to lie in the concept of 
                                                 
1080 Reid Property para 695; Anderson Assignation 11-06–23. 
1081 (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1089. This analysis is reflected in the issue which the Inner House appointed 
to be put to the jury: “whether, in violation of a previous minute of agreement, dated 7th October 1850, 
No 8 of the process, the said disposition was granted fraudulently by the said George Somerville, and 
was taken fraudulently by the said John Craig Waddell, in the knowledge of the said previous 
agreement, and in defraud of the pursuer’s rights under the same.” (1860) 22 D 1082 at 1090. 
1082 (1874) 2 R 214 at 221. 
1083 Ibid at 223. 
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fraud in its older sense. This is not the modern sese, involving a false 
representation made knowingly, but rather consists of actings designed to defeat 
another person's legal right. Nevertheless, the law h s moved away from the 
concept of fraud. In Rodger Lord Jamieson said: “[F]raud in the sense of moral 
delinquency does not enter into the matter. It is sufficient if the intending 
purchaser fails to make the inquiry which he is bound to do. If he fails he is no 
longer in bona fide but in mala fide ”. Thus implied or constructive knowledge, 
just as much as actual knowledge, will bring the principle into operation and 
render the second purchaser in mala fide.1084 
 
The discomfort with fraud as a rationale is also evid nt in academic analysis: 
Kenneth Reid is careful to specify that “the original analysis based on ‘fraud’ 
remains correct, provided that ‘fraud’ is not confined to its narrow modern 
meaning.”1085 Wortley goes further, seeming to regard the second purchaser’s 
liability in cases of mere knowledge of the prior right as being more than a fraud-
based justification can support.1086 Dot Reid regards offside goals as part of the law 
of fraud, specifically of secondary fraud, but suggests that this is a survival of the 
older, broader view which was heavily dependent on the concept of inequality 
derived ultimately from scholastic thinking. This leaves the offside goals rule in the 
law of obligations but outside the established categori s of enrichment or delict.1087 
A similar train of development occurred in South African law: initial recognition 
of the doctrine based on fraud, recognition that mere knowledge of the prior 
transaction was sufficient to render the transfer voidable, followed by uncertainty as 
to the doctrinal basis of the rule.1088 
In Scotland, the doubt stems from the interaction of two distinct developments. 
First, there is the sense that, while Scots law took a broad view of fraud in the early-
modern period, later developments saw it narrow considerably so as to be limited to 
deliberate deceit, particularly under the influence of Derry v Peek.1089 Secondly, 
there appears to be a relaxation in the level of knwledge required in some of the 
                                                 
1084 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 44. 
1085 Property para 695. 
1086 Wortley “Double Sales and the Offside Trap” at 301. 
1087 “Fraud in Scots Law” ch 7, esp pp 243–4 and 250–1. 
1088 See Brand “Knowledge and Wrongfulness as Element of the Doctrine of Notice” at 22–25 and 
Lubbe “Doctrine in Search of a Theory”. 
1089 (1889) 14 App Cas 337. This development is discussed in detail in Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” ch 
4 and 5. 
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dicta in the nineteenth-century cases. This broadene  the scope of the rule and can 
appear to move it away from a category of intentional wrongdoing.  
However, it seems possible to address these concerns and thus to continue to rely 
on fraud as a basis which can guide future development. 
 
(a) Fraud on creditors rather than fraud as deceit 
In response to the objection that the meaning of fraud has narrowed, reference may 
be made to a species of fraud which is recognised by the modern law but which does 
not involve deception: fraud on creditors as discused in chapters 4 and 5. 
Furthermore, mere knowledge of what is going on is sufficient to render the debtor’s 
counterparty a participant in the fraud in that context. 
Anderson notes the parallel between the offside goals rule and the actio Pauliana, 
but points to two differences in respect of the latter: having given good consideration 
will be a defence and the relevant mala fides is knowledge of insolvency rather than 
knowledge of a prior right.1090 The analysis in chapter 4 suggests, however, that these 
differences reflect a different context rather than a fundamental conceptual division. 
The reason that payment is usually a good defence to the actio Pauliana is that such 
payment renders the transaction neutral in its effect on the patrimony. There is no 
prejudice to ordinary creditors. It makes no difference to them whether the debtor has 
a piece of machinery worth £5000 or £5000 in his bank ccount. Both are assets 
which are available to them for the satisfaction of their rights. Things are different in 
the offside goals situation because what matters for the creditor is not the value of the 
patrimony as a whole but the presence in it of the particular asset to which he is 
entitled. 
This line of thought leads to an explanation of why t e relevant mala fides is 
knowledge of the insolvency in an actio Pauliana situation and knowledge of the 
competing right in an offside goals situation. Knowledge that someone is insolvent 
implies knowledge of personal rights against his patrimony: if you know someone is 
insolvent you know that he has creditors whom he cannot pay. Specific knowledge of 
the rights is not necessary because the counterparty knows enough to understand that 
the transaction will frustrate the creditors’ hopes of recovery. Conversely, if the 
                                                 
1090 Anderson Assignation para 11-17. 
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counterparty knows that someone else has a personal right to a particular asset, the 
general solvency of the seller is not relevant. Even if the seller is generally solvent, 
the competitor will still be frustrated. 
This point is illustrated by the rules on another dvice aimed at preventing fraud 
on creditors: inhibition. A general creditor’s inhibit on covers the heritable property 
of the debtor because any of it could be subject to an adjudication for enforcement of 
the debt. Where, however, the creditor has a personal right to a particular plot, the 
effect of the inhibition is restricted to that asset.1091 The general state of the 
patrimony is irrelevant to the creditor, provided that his access to that plot is secured. 
The fraud in the offside goals situation consists of an attempt to frustrate a 
creditor’s hopes of satisfaction from the debtor’s patrimony. That fraud in this sense 
is not restricted to situations where the debtor is insolvent is evidenced by the fact 
that this type of fraud also underlies the rules on litigiosity where no insolvency need 
be shown. 
 
(b) Mala fides without knowledge 
The second problem identified by the modern accounts relates to the knowledge 
requirement. Mala fides can be fixed even in cases where the second purchaser is 
unaware of the prior right, provided that he knows enough to put him on his inquiry 
and then fails to make the relevant inquiries. Thus the rule can apply where a naïve 
second purchaser honestly thought that there was no problem. That is the basis for 
Lord Jamieson’s observation that “fraud in the sense of moral delinquency does not 
enter into the matter.”1092 
The courts have been somewhat evasive about the precise circumstances which 
will raise the duty of inquiry and what the content of the duty is.1093 This is 
regrettable because it makes life difficult for potential purchasers, but the basic 
rationale is clear enough: where there is a duty of inquiry on a purchaser and he fails 
to make that inquiry, he cannot rely on his ignorance of a fact of which he would 
                                                 
1091 Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) etc Act 2007 ss 150(1) and 153. 
1092 1950 SC 483 at 499. 
1093 See further J MacLeod and R Anderson “Offside Goals and Interfering with Play” 2009 SLT 
(News) 93 at 94–5. 
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have known had he fulfilled the duty. You are treated as knowing what you should 
have known. 
Lord Drummond Young was therefore correct to characterise circumstances 
where the duty of inquiry is neglected as cases of “implied or constructive 
knowledge.”1094 Again, this reflects analysis found in other instaces of fraud on 
creditors: the result of publication of an inhibition or a notice of litigiosity is that 
everyone is deemed to know of it. Where there is constructive knowledge of a prior 
right, the grantee is deemed to have that knowledge and the analysis may therefore 
proceed on the basis that he does know. 
Where Lord Drummond Young went astray was to conclude that this amounted to 
a move away from the concept of fraud. The fraud is still there: the seller knows of 
the prior right and sells anyway. Mala fides is not watered-down fraud; mala fides is 
knowing that the fraud is happening. Such a view is consistent with the standard 
understanding of bona fides in property transactions: ignorance of another’s right. 
It is worth bearing in mind that the offside goals rule is not the only circumstance 
where failure to come up to an objective standard of reasonable inquiry can leave a 
naïve counterparty liable on the basis of complicity in fraud. As suggested in chapter 
4, that is the basis of the analysis of the voidability of some unfair preferences. 
Further, a solicitor’s naïve trust in his client was held sufficient to render him liable 
as an accessory to (conventional) fraud by deception in Frank Houlgate Investment 
Co Ltd v Biggart Baillie.1095  
 
(c) Why is the faith bad? 
If fraud is to provide a convincing rationale for the offside goals rule some 
explanation is needed of why the third party must take account of a personal duty 
owed by someone else. 
It is not quite sufficient to point to the accessory nature of the liability. In criminal 
law, such an assertion suffices because criminal law duties typically bind everyone 
and therefore the conduct in question is wrong for both principal and accessory. The 
                                                 
1094 [2006] CSOH 58 at para 44. 
1095  [2013] CSOH 80; 2013 SLT 993, esp at paras 37–46 (where the parallel with the offside goals 
rule is drawn). As with the offside goals rule, there is an argument that the requisite mental element 
here should be drawn relatively narrowly: EC Reid “‘Accession to Delinquence’: Frank Houlgate 
Investment Co Ltd (FHI) v Biggart Baillie LLP”  (2013) 17 EdinLR 388 at 394. 
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same can be said of inducing a payment by deception.1096 Everyone owes everyone 
else a duty not to commit such fraud. So, where Alfred induces Brenda to pay him by 
deception using forged documents and Cecil helps to prepare the documents, 
knowing what they are for, both are liable. Cecil was obliged not to deceive Brenda 
just as much as Alfred.  
In offside goals, however, the position is different. The seller’s conduct is only 
wrong because of a particular duty that he and onlyhe owes to the first purchaser. 
Until the first contract was concluded, a sale to the second purchaser was perfectly 
lawful. The duty not to sell flows from that contract to which the second purchaser 
was not a party. The second purchaser might argue that, although he knew that the 
seller was behaving wrongfully, this fraud arose from the personal relationship 
between the seller and the first buyer and was therefore none of his business.  
This problem is not unique to the offside goals rule. It is also raised by fraud by 
insolvent debtors and was discussed briefly in chapter 4 but it is felt more sharply in 
relation to offside goals, perhaps because the actio Pauliana is so ubiquitous and 
perhaps because the requirement of insolvency is thought to keep the problem within 
reasonable bounds. 
Dot Reid explains the accessory’s liability by refence to the moral sense of Stair 
and Aquinas and the latter’s broad notion of inequality.1097 That, however, raises the 
question of how this moral sense might be conceptualised as a duty with legal 
consequences. 
The rules on fraud on creditors, whether they arise in the context of offside goals, 
insolvency or litigiosity, presuppose a limited duty of non-interference with other 
people’s personal rights. While a personal right is only enforceable against the 
debtor, it is not a matter of complete indifference to third parties. They have a duty 
not to facilitate breaches of the relevant obligation. However, since personal rights 
are invisible, facilitation only renders the facilitator liable in circumstances when he 
knew or ought to have known of the relevant right and that the relevant conduct 
would breach it. 
                                                 
1096 As in Frank Houlgate. 
1097 “Fraud in Scots Law” 242. 
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Further evidence of such a duty can be found in the delict of inducing breach of 
contract. The five characteristics or essential elem nts of that delict were set out by 
Lord Hodge in Global Resources Group Ltd v Mackay:1098 
 
1)  breach of contract; 
2)  knowledge on the part of the inducing party that is will occur; 
3)  breach which is either a means to an end sought by the inducing party or an 
end in itself; 
4)  inducement in the form of persuasion, encouragement or assistance; 
5)  absence of lawful justification. 
 
The parallels with the requirements for the offside goals rule are close but not 
exact.1099 Some differences are not surprising given the differing origins. 
Nonetheless, the parallels between the two rules ar triking: in the core offside goals 
case, the second purchaser persuades the seller to s ll when the latter was already 
contracted to transfer the property to another; in the foundational authority on 
inducing breach of contract a theatre owner persuaded a singer to appear in his 
theatre when she was contractually bound to sing in another.1100 
 Both rules are part of modern Scots law and both pint towards recognition of an 
obligation to take account of other people’s personal rights. Both do so on the basis 
of accessory liability.1101 Absent an obligation not to participate in breach of a 
personal right, it is difficult to see how inducing breach of contract or participating in 
a fraud on creditors could be considered wrongful. 
 Of course, that answer raises its own question: if third parties owe the holder of a 
personal right a duty not knowingly to participate in or encourage the breach of that 
right, why is the third party’s liability accessory? The answer lies in the trigger for 
the liability. Liability depends on breach by the dbtor. Until the debtor defaults on 
                                                 
1098 [2008] CSOH 148; 2009 SLT 104 paras 11–4. Lord Hodge rew heavily on the restatement of the 
law in this area in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1. 
1099 See further J MacLeod “Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” (2009) 13 EdinLR 278. 
1100 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B 216; 118 ER 749. 
1101 The basis for the distinction between inducing breach of contract and causing loss by unlawful 
means in OBG v Allan was that the former, but not the latter was concerned with accessory liability: 
[2007] UKHL 21 at paras 3–8 and 32 per Lord Hoffmann. 
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his obligation, the third party is not liable. So a third party who tried, unsuccessfully, 
to persuade a seller to sell to another incur no liability. 
A duty of non-interference sits well with the idea th t personal rights are property 
which is owned in essentially the same way as corporeal property.1102 It can then be 
seen as equivalent to the duties of non-interference which protect corporeal 
moveables or land. Of course, the content of the duty is not absolute but neither is the 
duty not to interfere with corporeal property: a landowner, for example, must tolerate 
access taken under Part 1 of the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, and the law of 
nuisance does not give a remedy against every use of n ighbouring property which 
has implications for the enjoyment of his own; likewise a bona fide possessor of a 
corporeal moveable belonging to another does no wrong. 
Admittedly, the duty of non-interference is not the same as the duty of non-
interference with corporeal property, but that is because the nature of the property 
being protected is different. And in any event, rules ike those in the Land Reform 
(Scotland) Act 2003 show that the level of protection against interference by third 
parties is not uniform between the different types of corporeal property. There is no 
right to roam over corporeal moveables. 
Thus, a duty of this kind sits particularly well within a Ginossarian or Gaian view 
of the relationship between creditors and their rights but it should be noted that there 
is some support for delictual protection against the second purchaser even in 
Germany, where the intellectual environment unsympathetic to such protection 







                                                 
1102 See eg Ginossar Droit réel, propriété et créance No 22–5. 
1103 Michaels Sachzuordnung durch Kaufvertrag 360–98 (surveying the arguments). It must be 
conceded that the analysis does not command the herrschende Meinung in Germany. 
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(2) The scope of the offside goals rule 
 
(a) Personal rights to real rights 
Traditionally, the offside goals rule was said to pr tect only “rights capable of being 
made real”1104 or, more precisely, “personal rights to real rights.” This limitation the 
rule has been doubted in light of Trade Development Bank v Warriner & Mason 
(Scotland) Ltd.1105 In that case, a condition against leasing in a standard security was 
given effect against a tenant on the basis of the tenant’s bad faith vis-à- vis the 
prohibition. This led Kenneth Reid to suggest that t e personal-right-to-a-real-right 
requirement had fallen away and that the scope of the rule was instead controlled by 
the requirement that the granter was in breach of an antecedent obligation in making 
the grant.1106  
As Webster has pointed out,1107 framing the rule’s application in these terms is 
difficult to reconcile with the earlier decision of the Inner House in Wallace v 
Simmers.1108 There the court declined to apply the rule to protect a licensee against 
an action for ejection by a third party purchaser on the basis that this was not a 
personal right to a real right. Sale by one who has gr nted an irrevocable licence is a 
breach of an antecedent obligation (since it renders the licensor unable to fulfil his 
obligation), but Wallace means that the rule will not apply even if the third party is in 
bad faith.  Webster suggests that the restriction is ecessary in order to maintain the 
distinction between lease and licence in particular and between real and personal 
rights in general.1109 
The view that not every grant in breach of a prior obligation is challengeable as an 
offside goal is also supported by recent authority.1110 In Gibson v Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc, Lord Emslie expressed some doubts about whether t test was 
                                                 
1104 Wallace v Simmers 1960 SC 255 at 260 per Lord Gurthrie. 
1105 1980 SC 74, approved in Trade Development Bank v Crittall Windows Ltd 1983 SLT 510. 
1106 Reid Property paras 695–6. 
1107 P Webster “The Relationship of Tenant and Successor Landlord in Scots Law” (PhD thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 2008) 211–3. 
1108 1960 SC 255. 
1109 Webster “The Relationship of Tenant and Successor Landlord in Scots Law” 211. 
1110 Optical Express (Gyle) Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc 2000 SLT 644 and Gibson v Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc [2009] CSOH 14, 2009 SLT 444. 
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appropriately expressed.1111 However, his alternative formulation: that the right be 
capable of “affecting the records” seems to come to much the same thing for 
heritable property. The records are only affected in any meaningful way by transfer, 
extinction or grant of a real right.  
Lord Emslie’s formulation has the disadvantage of nt being apposite to cover 
moveable property. On the other hand it usefully raises the question of the holder of 
a real right who is contractually bound to grant a discharge transferring that right 
before the discharge is granted. For instance, Dominic may own a plot which has the 
benefit of a right of way over Serena’s land. She pays him for a discharge because 
she wants to develop the land. Before the discharge is ranted, Dominic gifts the plot 
to Gary, who refuses to grant the discharge. Should Serena be able to invoke the 
offside goals rule? On Lord Emslie’s formulation, she can. On the traditional model, 
the picture is less clear but protecting her seems to be the correct result. Had 
Dominic contracted to grant a servitude to her, Serena would have been able to rely 
on it and there is no obvious reason why one type of transaction with a servitude 
should be favoured over another.  
Therefore, the requirement might be better rephrased as a personal right to the 
grant, transfer, variation or discharge of a real right.1112 This is a rather cumbersome 
formulation. The basic point expressed by the “personal-right-to-real-right” 
formulation appears to be widely accepted and the phrase remains a useful (if slightly 
imprecise) handle for the concept. The question remains, however, of how this idea 
sits with the rationale for the offside goals rule pr sented here. 
 
(b) Personal rights to subordinate real rights 
One implication of the suggestion that the offside goals rule protects personal rights 
to the grant, transfer or discharge of real rights is that the rule extends beyond double 
sale. In principle, someone with a personal right to the grant of a servitude or a lease 
should be able to invoke the rule too. 1113 So, if Bert contracts to grant a right of way 
                                                 
1111 [2009] CSOH 14 at paras 43–50, esp para 44. 
1112 If Gaian view of ownership of rights is rejected, further modifications are necessary to account 
for dealings with personal rights. 
1113 There is express authority to this effect in South Africa Grant v Stonestreet 1968 (4) SA 1 (A). A 
similar result was reached in  Greig v Brown and Nicholson(1829) 7 S 274, although the court’s 
reasoning is not clearly enough expressed to make it a clear instance of the offside goals rule. 
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to Sally but transfers the property to Ernie before Sally is able to register the grant, 
Sally can invoke the offside goals rule against Ernie if he was in bad faith or the 
transfer was gratuitous. 
Subordinate real rights present difficulties in terms of remedies. If, the holder of 
the prior personal right hears of the wrongful grant before it is completed, he may be 
able to obtain an interdict against completion.1114 What of the case, where the prior 
rightholder only discovers the grant after the fact? Where the first grantee was 
entitled to transfer of the asset, there is no difficulty in returning the property to the 
seller. That is only a short term step, after which it will pass to the first grantee. 
Where, on the other hand, the first grantee is merely entitled to a subordinate right, 
setting a transfer aside seems to go too far. If the first grantee is entitled to a 
servitude, all he needs is an opportunity to complete his real right. He has no interest 
in the seller being the owner instead of the second buyer. 
The South African solution is to allow the personal right to be enforced directly 
against the successor.1115 This result has been explained in terms of a broad, 
equitable approach.1116 It seems to come close to collapsing the distinctio  between 
real and personal rights and may explain the tendency in South Africa to suggest that 
the doctrine of notice affords “limited real effect” to personal rights.1117 Such an 
approach is not particularly attractive for Scots law. How then can the problem of the 
offside goal against a right to a servitude be solved?  
Categorisation of the rule as an instance of fraud on creditors is helpful. The 
discussion in chapters 4 and 5 suggested that reduction ad hunc effectum is not 
limited to cases of inhibition and that it could restrict the scope of a reduction as well 
as the people it affects.  
                                                 
1114 Spurway, Petr (10 December 1986, unreported), OH, available on LexisNexis. 
1115 1968 (4) SA 1 at 20 per Ogilvie JA. The reasoning of the court in Greig v Brown and Nicholson i
Shaw’s report is limited to the brief and rather surprising suggestion that since both rights were 
personal “the common owner is divested by the conveyance” without the need to complete the grant 
of servitude by taking possession. This analysis would be difficult to maintain light of the clarification 
of the relationship between real and personal rights and of the race to completion in Sharp v Thomson 
1995 SC 455 and Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger [2004] UKHL 8; 2004 SC(HL) 19. 
1116 Meridian Bay Restaurant (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell [2011] ZASCA 30; 2011 (4) SA 1 (SCA) at paras 
30–1 per Ponnan JA. 
1117 “Die juiste siening na my mening is dat vanweë die kennisleer aan ’n persoonlike reg beperkte 
saaklike werking verleen word”: Associate South African Bakeries (Pty) Ltd v Oryx & Vereinigte 
Bäckerien (Pty) Ltd 1982 (3) SA 893 (A) at 910 per van Heerden JA. 
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The classic instances of fraud on creditors are about putting assets back in a 
patrimony so that creditors can obtain rights in them. This is obviously the case with 
inhibition, or fraud by an insolvent debtor, but it is also the case in a classic double 
sale of land. Reduction is not an end in itself. Rather, it puts the fraudulent granter in 
a position to perform by granting a real right affecting the asset. Alternatively, it 
allows the creditors to get the court to make the grant for the debtor by means of 
diligence. This endgame is what justifies the reduction.  
Where reduction is ad hunc effectum, its effect is specified so it goes no further 
than necessary to secure the protected interest. Thus reduction ex capite inhibitionis 
merely operates to render an adjudication against the former owner competent. That 
being achieved, it has no further value.  
In some cases, the practical distinction between ad hunc effectum and catholic 
reduction is a minor one: if a transfer to Billy is reduced to allow Dan to register his 
disposition, Dan’s registration will deprive Billy of any right that he has. However, it 
makes a big difference where an offside goal has been scored and there is a personal 
right to a servitude. The reduction would be ad hunc effectum to enable a deed of 
servitude granted by the seller to be registered and constituted a real right, but it 
would go no further. For all other purposes Billy would remain owner. 
Of course, the net result of this approach is very similar to the South African rule. 
A transferee who was faced with a valid offside goals challenge in these 
circumstances could save everyone a lot of time and money simply by agreeing to 
grant the relevant subordinate real right. In doing so, he would be in no worse a 
position than if reduction ad hunc effectum had been obtained and the grant had been 
made from his author. The courts might even be justified in allowing the procedure 
to be short-circuited and compelling the transferee to make such a grant. 
Nonetheless, for the sake of a proper understanding of the relationship between real 
and personal rights, it is important to understand properly why such a short cut might 
be permitted. 
 
(c) Does the fraud-on-creditors analysis prove too much? 
Therefore, the fraud-on-creditors analysis can account for one implication of the 
view that the offside goals rule is a mechanism for pr tecting personal rights to real 
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rights. However, it appears to struggle with a more fundamental aspect. If the basis 
of the offside goals rule is fraud on creditors andsome general duty not to participate 
in the breach of personal rights owed to others, why is it restricted to creditors 
holding a particular class of personal rights? After all, any kind of creditor can 
challenge a fraudulent grant by an insolvent debtor, protect his right with an 
inhibition, or rely on the doctrine of inducing breach of contract. Why then, should 
the offside goals rule be restricted to a particular cl ss of personal right? 
The first point to note is that the doctrine of inducing breach of contract gives 
personal rights some external effect. The personal-right to-a-real-right restriction 
does not apply. The fact that a right is not a personal right to a real right does not 
necessarily mean that the third party is safe. Rather, it is likely to mean that he is 
liable in damages but safe from reduction of the transfer (as there is no offside goal). 
The consequences of the personal-right-to-a-real-right estriction are not as sharp as 
first appears. 
This argument depends on the mental element of induc g breach of contract 
being substantially the same as that for offside goals. This is broadly the case: the 
test for the mental element of inducing breach of contract is not unduly stringent and 
is likely to be met in most bad-faith offside goals cases. If the second purchaser 
knows of the prior right, then breach of its correlative obligation is a necessary 
means to the end sought by the second purchaser: obtaining the property for himself. 
The difficulty arises in those cases where the second purchaser is put on notice but 
has something which falls short of clear and certain knowledge of the prior right.  
This is a divergence between inducing breach of contract and offside goals. 
However, it is not as big a gap as may appear at firs . In OBG v Allan, Lord 
Hoffmann made it clear that wilful blindness, where someone decides not to inquire 
for fear of what they might find, was as good as knowledge.1118 That is sufficient to 
cover a lot of the offside goals cases and a reining in of the mental element to match 
that for inducing breach of contract would be desirable since the present approach 
creates too much uncertainty for potential purchasers.1119 
                                                 
1118 [2007] UKHL 21 at paras 40–41. 
1119 See further MacLeod and Anderson “Offside Goals and Interfering with Play” at 94–5 and 
MacLeod “Offside Goals and Induced Breaches of Contract” 278 at 281–2. 
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Even under the present law, there will be few cases where the mental element for 
the offside goals rule is fulfilled but that for inducing breach of contract is not. 
Where both are fulfilled, the restriction of the offside goals rule to personal rights to 
real rights affects which remedies are available rather than whether a remedy is 
available. 
This brings the analysis back to the nature of the remedy under the offside goals 
rule. As suggested above, avoidance for fraud on creditors is aimed at putting an 
asset back in a patrimony so that a creditor can obtain a real right in it. It operates ad 
hunc effectum and goes no further. It gives the fraudulent transferor no right to 
possess the property. 
That, in turn, provides a rationale for the result in Wallace v Simmers.1120 Miss 
Simmers had a licence (a personal right) against her brother which entitled her to 
occupy a house on his property. He sold the property in breach of that licence. 
Suppose that she had obtained a reduction of the transfer from her brother to the 
buyer. What would the effect of that reduction have been? Her brother had no 
obligation to grant her any real right and, since reduction would not have given him 
any right to possess the property, he would not be in a position to secure her 
possession and thus to fulfil his obligation under the licence. The hunc in ad hunc 
effectum in this case would have no content. Therefore the reduction would have 
been pointless. 
Restricting offside goals to personal rights to the grant is therefore consistent with 
the fraud rationale because it reflects the nature of avoidance for fraud on creditors.  
 
(3) Objections to “an interference with contract” a pproach in South 
Africa 
A similar analysis to the one proposed here has been advocated in South Africa by N 
J van der Merwe.1121 He suggested that the doctrine of notice be explained on the 
basis of Aquilian liability for interference with contract. Two major objections have 
                                                 
1120 1960 SC 255. 
1121 NJ van der Merwe and PJJ Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (2nd edn, 
1970) 229–48. Van der Merwe wrote in Afrikaans. The discussion here is based on the summaries of 
his views and the reaction to them in Brand “Knowledg  and Wrongfulness as Elements of the 
Doctrine of Notice” at 30, Wortley “Double Sales and the Offside Trap” at 308–9 and Lubbe “A 
Doctrine in Search of a Theory” 259. 
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been raised against this, and Wortley suggests that they would be equally significant 
in Scotland.1122 
The first group of criticisms refer to the respective mental elements of the doctrine 
of notice and of interference with contract.1123 In this respect Van der Merwe has 
been attacked from both sides. The standard view of interference with contract is that 
it is limited to intentional conduct and therefore incapable of accounting for the full 
scope of the doctrine of notice.1124 Van der Merwe’s answer to this criticism was to 
suggest that interference with contract extends to cover negligence as well as 
intentional wrongdoing.1125 On the other hand, Brand criticises Van der Merwe’s 
position as too broad, precisely because it covers cases of negligence where there is 
no actual knowledge of the right which is frustrated.1126 Brand does not consider the 
doctrine of notice to extend that far. 
Criticisms in the second group focus on the fact tha e remedy granted to the 
first purchaser is not compensation. Rather the doctrine “effectively affords” specific 
performance,1127 which is not considered to be the proper province of the law of 
delict. 
Whatever their merits in relation to South African l w, these arguments do not 
seem sufficient to displace the analysis in the Scottish context. On the view presented 
here, the remedies for both fraud on creditors and the delict of inducing breach of 
contract presuppose the same duty not knowingly to facilitate or encourage breach of 
someone else’s personal right. The fraud on creditors rules, however, are not part of 
the inducing breach of contract rules. Inducing breach of contract is its own delict 
covering the right to damages. The offside goals rue does not, in a strict sense, 
derive from inducing breach of contract. That being the case, some divergence 
                                                 
1122 “Double Sales and the Offside Trap” at 309. 
1123 This term is still used in South Africa. It had wide currency in Scotland and England until OBG v 
Allan, when the House of Lords rejected that category in favour of two distinct torts/delicts: causing 
loss by unlawful means and inducing breach of contract. 
1124 J Neethling, JM Potgieter and PJ Visser (trans JC Knobel) Law of Delict (5th edn, 2006) 282–4 and 
Wortley “Double Sales and the Offside Trap” at 309. 





between the conditions for availability of damages for inducing breach of contract 
and those for reduction may be tolerated.1128 
As far as remedies are concerned, there are two assumptions implicit in the 
argument: that reduction is not an appropriate remedy for a delict, and that damages 
would not be available for a bad faith offside goal. 
On the first point, compensation is not the only remedy afforded by the law of 
delict: where a wrong can be anticipated, interdict may also be available. Unlike in 
South Africa, there is no suggestion in Scotland that e effect of the offside goals 
rule should be to render the personal right positively enforceable against the 
successor. Reduction does exactly what damages in del ct try to approximate: it 
restores the status quo ante. This is rarely possible: a court decree will not turn the 
clock back and redirect the negligently driven car. That does not mean, however, that 
it should not be done in those cases where it is pos ible. 
On the second point, it is not clear that damages cannot be awarded for offside 
goals. If they have never been granted that is because they have not been sought 
rather than because they have been refused. It is no urprising that damages have not 
been sought: a first buyer who was content with money would be likely to sue the 
seller for breach of contract rather than pursuing reduction of the offside goal. 
Further, it might be argued that inducing breach of c ntract covers liability for 
damages in this situation. 
Finally, it is worthy of note that, while Brand shares the general South African 
scepticism about Van der Merwe’s approach, his own proposed approach draws 
heavily on principles which, at least to Scots lawyers, look delictual:  
 
[A]lthough the doctrine of notice is not founded in delict it shares a common 
element with delictual liability, namely wrongfulness (sometimes referred to as 
unlawfulness). Secondly, that in determining wrongfulness for the purposes of the 
doctrine we should be guided by the principles thathave become crystallised in 
delictual parlance.1129 
                                                 
1128 Cf Lord Hodge’s comments on the conditions for damages for fraud on the one hand and for 
setting a contract aside on account of fraud on the o r in Frank Houlgate: [2013] CSOH 80 at para 
44. 
1129 Brand “Knowledge and Wrongfulness as Elements of the Doctrine of Notice” at 31. Brand goes 
on to suggest that, because the loss in the doctrine of otice is purely economic, wrongfulness depends 
on public or legal policy considerations. The wrongful but not delictual approach is also proposed in P





An analysis based on the wrongful nature of conduct which is guided in its 
development by the principles of the law of delict seems to be best located in the law 
of delict. 
 
(4) Gratuitous acquirers 
An analysis based on the wrongful nature of the second purchaser’s conduct faces 
obvious challenges in dealing with the case of gratuitous acquisition.1130 Yet 
recognition that the seller’s conduct amounts to fraud means that the “no profit from 
fraud” rule and the law of unjustified enrichment can be invoked to explain the 
vulnerability.1131 As discussed in chapter 4, this rule presents its own challenges 
because of the indirect nature of the enrichment. However, this exception to the 
normal rule against recovering indirect enrichment can be explained as an extension 
of the fraud rule: had the donee known what was being done, he would have been 
bound to refuse the property. An attempt to retain he benefit once the full facts are 
known amounts to completion of the incomplete dolus and hence to wrongful 
conduct. The voidability of the grant enables the party who would be so-wronged to 
prevent this wrong from being done. Therefore, an obligation to reverse the 
enrichment is justified although the enrichment is indirect. 
Of course, an onerous transferee in good faith may also discover later that he was 
an unwitting accomplice in the seller’s wrong, but in such a case the balance of 
policy is a little different. Such a transferee is not seeking to retain a pure enrichment 
but rather the benefit of a lawful bargain. Were it to be forfeited, he would be left 
with a claim for money and so exposed to the risk of the seller’s insolvency. Given 
the personal rights do not rank according to the rul  prior tempore potior iure, there 
is no obvious reason why that burden should be shifted from the first buyer to the 
second when both were duped by the seller.  
This analysis draws on the point made by Carey Miller regarding the relative lack 
of favour which the law shows to donees, but it gives a reason for allowing a donee 
                                                 
1130 For examples of an offside goals challenge by a gratuitous acquirer, see Alexander v Lundies 
(1675) Mor 940 and Anderson v Lows (1863) 2 M 100. 
1131 Reid “Fraud in Scots Law” 243–9 and 256–8. 
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whose personal right predates a right under an onerous contract to keep the property 
if he got his real right first. In that case, the donee was not an unwitting accomplice 
in any fraud because his author was perfectly entitl d to make the promise at the time 
when he made it. 
 
E. IMPLICATIONS OF FRAUD ON CREDITORS AS A RATIONAL E 
On the analysis suggested above, avoidance of the transfer gives effect to the first 
creditor’s delictual right to reparation against a second purchaser who acquired in 
bad faith. It does that by putting the second purchaser in the position he would have 
been in had the wrongful act not taken place. The voidability of gratuitous grants is 
based on an analogous rule in the law of enrichment, which can be viewed as an 
extension of the fraud rule. One advantage of this view is that it allows the offside 
goals rule to be set alongside the other instances of fraud on creditors. Once that is 
established, they can offer guidance on some of the contested issues surrounding the 
offside goals rule.  
The implications for the relationship between offside goals and subordinate real 
rights have already been discussed but the fraud-on-creditors analysis also casts light 
on another point of contention in modern discussions f the offside goals rule: the 
time at which the grantee must be put in bad faith. It was suggested obiter in Rodger 
(Builders) that a buyer who was in good faith when missives wre concluded but 
who discovered the prior right before registration f the disposition would be 
vulnerable under the offside goals rule.1132 This view was followed by Lord Eassie in 
Alex Brewster & Sons v Caughey,1133 whose decision was, in turn, endorsed by Lord 
Rodger in Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger.1134 Lord Rodger took pains to explain why 
the position of the trustee in sequestration was distinguishable from that of a second 
buyer in an offside goals case. That was necessary because of his view that a second 
buyer who hears of a prior right must stand aside for the first purchaser whereas there 
is no such obligation on the trustee. 
                                                 
1132 1950 SC 483 at 500 per Lord Jamieson. 
1133 Unreported, 2 May 2002 (available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/EAS0904.html). 
1134 [2004] UKHL 8 at para 142. 
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Despite this high authority, however, this seems to be wrong in principle and has 
rightly been subject to academic criticism.1135 A clue as to why it is wrong can be 
found in the extract from Stair which Lord Rodger gave to distinguish between the 
position of the trustee or the creditor doing diligence and the second purchaser: 
 
But certain knowledge, by intimation, citation, or the like, inducing malam fidem, 
whereby any prior disposition or assignation made to another party is certainly 
known, or at least interruption made in acquiring by arrestment or citation of the 
acquirer, such rights acquired, not being of necessity to satisfy prior engagements, 
are reducible ex capite fraudis, and the acquirer is partaker of the fraud of his 
author, who thereby becomes a granter of double rights. 1136 
 
While the general rule is that a bad faith acquirer will be vulnerable as a partaker in 
his author’s fraud, the rule does not apply to those who acquire “of necessity to 
satisfy prior engagements”. As Lord Rodger rightly observed, the trustee in 
sequestration and creditors doing diligence may readily be considered to fall into this 
class.  
However, Lord Rodger neglects the fact that, once a purchaser has concluded his 
contract with the seller, he too is a creditor1137 and takes “of necessity” because, like 
other creditors, taking an asset is the only way that he can ensure that his right is 
fulfilled. Indeed, it might be argued that the necessity affecting a purchaser is more 
pressing than that affecting a creditor who is owed money. It makes no difference to 
the latter which of the debtor’s assets is sold provided that it raises sufficient funds to 
pay the debt. A purchaser’s right, on the other hand, can only be satisfied by transfer 
of the asset he contracted to buy. 
The point becomes clearer after reflection on other cases for fraud on creditors in 
the context of insolvency and of inhibition. It is no fraud to accept what you are 
owed and that is all that a buyer who registers with supervening knowledge of a prior 
contract does. There is an unavoidable conflict of rights and, in such a situation, each 
person is entitled to look to his own interests. The purchaser who knows of the prior 
                                                 
1135 Anderson Assignaton paras 11-24–31 
1136 Stair I.xiv.5, cited 2004 SC (HL) para 142. 
1137 RG Anderson “Fraud and Transfer on Insolvency: ta … ta… tantum et tale” (2004) 11 EdinLR 
187 at 202. 
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contract before he concludes his own contract is in a different position because he 
can avoid the conflict of rights by not agreeing to buy the property. 
 
 
F. OFFSIDE GOALS AND SUCCESSOR VOIDABILITY 
Throughout this thesis, it has been suggested that voidability is the result of a 
personal right against the recipient to have property r turned. If that is the case, then 
transfer by one who himself holds as a result of a voidable transfer is an offside goal 
if the acquirer is in bad faith or gratuitous. Of course, this maps directly onto the 
circumstances in which a successor to voidable titl will be affected by the 
voidability which affected his author. Thus Reid is correct to analyse this “successor 
voidability” as a special case of the offside goals ru e.1138 
This approach has been criticised by Whitty, who suggests that the right to 
recover voidably-transferred property is initially “a power or option to rescind the 
antecedent contract”1139 and that it is only when this is exercised that the right to 
return of the property arises. He further argues that t e “author’s fraud” rule provides 
a sufficient, free-standing, explanation for the vulnerability of bad faith and 
gratuitous successors with a distinct history. 
Whitty’s criticisms seem misplaced. It is not the case that, in order to avoid a 
transfer, one must first rescind the antecedent contract. This is evident in relation to 
both fraud on the transferee and fraud on creditors. 
Take fraudulent misrepresentation: in almost every circumstance, a 
misrepresentation which affects a contract will also affect the transfer agreement. If 
the transfer agreement is affected by the misrepresntation, then the transferor is 
entitled to avoid the transfer without bothering with the contract. This option 
becomes a necessity where the transfer but not the antecedent contract is affected by 
fraud. Such cases are rare but they are possible. The effect of fraud which supervenes 
between contract and transfer was discussed in chapter 3. In those cases only the 
                                                 
1138 Reid Property para 698. Dot Reid takes a similar approach, casting both as instances of secondary 
fraud: “Fraud in Scots Law” 231–5. 
1139 N Whitty “The ‘No Profit from Another's Fraud’ Rule and the ‘Knowing Receipt’ Muddle” (2013) 
17 EdinLR 37 at 56. 
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transfer is voidable so Whitty’s model would deprive the defrauded party of any 
protection. 
The fact that voidability can affect the transfer alone is also evident when fraud on 
creditors is considered. A gratuitous alienation might be a bare transfer, with no 
antecedent obligation. Nonetheless, it would be challengeable if made by an 
insolvent debtor. Similarly, the prior rightholder is not prejudiced by the seller’s 
contract with the second buyer but by the transfer to him. Therefore, it is the transfer 
that is voidable.  
The author’s fraud rule which Whitty invokes is typically stated as the maxim 
dolus auctoris non nocet successori nisi in causa lcrativa. This tells us who is safe 
from the author’s fraud but it is only possible to w rk out who is vulnerable by 
looking to the gaps in the statement. Neither does th  bare maxim provide any 
explanation for the result in question. 
The fraud of the author does not affect onerous successors because the right to 
avoid the transfer for fraud is a personal one which does not affect singular 
successors. What is needed is an explanation of why bad faith and gratuitous 
successors are vulnerable despite the fact that the right to challenge is personal. It 
does not seem enough to say that they are vulnerable because they do not fall within 
the scope of the maxim (not least because the maxim says nothing about bad faith). 
Categorising bad faith and gratuitous transferees’ vulnerability in terms of the offside 
goals rule provides such an explanation. Therefore, R id seems correct to place 
successor voidability in the context of the offside goals rule. 
 
G. SUMMARY 
The analysis in this chapter has suggested that the offside goals rules is best 
understood as an instance of the law’s response to fraud on creditors. Avoidance is 
natural restitution, giving the defrauded creditor reparation for the wrong. Like the 
other instances of fraud on creditors, grantees maybe liable as participants in the 
fraud (where they are in bad faith) or on the basis of an enrichment rule which 
prevents the completion of an incomplete dolus (where the grant is gratuitous). 
Categorisation of the rule as an instance of fraud on creditors suggests that 
avoidance on the basis of the offside goals rule is ad hunc effectum, with the scope of 
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the reversal being defined by what is necessary to allow the defrauded creditor 
satisfaction by obtaining a real right in the relevant property. This factor explains 
both how the offside goals rule can protect a personal right to a subordinate real right 
and why the rule is limited to personal rights to real rights. 
The fraud-on-creditors rationale also implies that a creditor who was in good faith 
when he acquired his personal right is entitled to pursue satisfaction of that right 
even if he discovers a conflicting personal right before he gets his real right. Further, 
since the basis of voidability is the personal right to have a transfer reversed, this 





TANTUM ET TALE  
 
One challenge to the account of the effect of fraud presented in previous chapters 
arises from the treatment of defrauded parties in insolvency. Chapter 2 included 
discussion of a line of cases where sellers sought to establish that buyers had 
defrauded them by failing to disclose insolvency. This might be thought a pointless 
exercise. Fraud gives rise to a personal right to reparation but a personal right against 
an insolvent debtor is worth little. Further, the sellers in these cases already had a 
personal right, a right to the price.  
However, these sellers had a strong reason to act as they did. Fraud received 
special treatment in insolvency. This meant that they could recover the items sold 
rather than merely being content with a dividend in insolvency. The basis for this 
preference was said to be the fact that creditors ding diligence (and thus insolvency 
officials) took the debtor’s assets tantum et tale as the debtor had them. 
The expression tantum et tale is scattered widely throughout Scottish authorities. 
Its influence has not always been positive. As Bell puts it, “Out of this phrase of 
‘ tantum et tale’ a new host of difficulties arose”.1140 Not least of these is determining 
what it actually means. Trayner glosses it thus: “So much and of such a kind; both as 
regards quality and extent.”1141 
The terseness of the phrase has led to flexibility in application. Discussing the 
decision of the Inner House in Heritable Reversionary Co v Millar,1142 Goudy 
observed that the decision gave effect 
 
to a supposed principle that in heritable property the title of a trustee in 
bankruptcy, as well as all other singular successors, must be determined by the 
state of the public registers. … The supposed princi le has been sometimes 
                                                 
1140 Bell Comm I, 298. 
1141 Trayner Latin Maxims and Phrases. 
1142 (1891) 18 R 1166. 
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expressed by the maxim––a trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to property vested in 
the bankrupt, tantum et tale, as it stands upon the record.1143 
 
However, Goudy also uses the phrase later on in his note, describing a decision 
contrary to that of the Inner House in Heritable Reversionary: “The simple and 
equitable rule applied was, that creditors can take no higher right than their 
constituent, that they stand in his shoes and must take tantum et tale as he held [ie 
subject to latent trusts].”1144 
As a matter of language, there is no problem with this. However, the fact that the 
phrase fits so easily into two contrasting propositi ns shows how dangerous it is to 
talk about a “doctrine of tantum et tale”.1145 The danger is particularly acute because 
of Scots lawyers’ lack of familiarity with Latin. Bell complained that some were led 
astray by “taking the sound instead of the sense of the phrase”.1146 
Tantum et tale might therefore seem a poor title for a chapter. It is, however, the 
best available name for the rule that certain claims against the debtor in respect of 
assets, which could not be raised against the debtor’s onerous good faith successor to 
those assets, may none the less be raised against creditors doing diligence or the 
debtor’s trustee in sequestration. The origins and extent of this rule are murky and it 
is problematic in light the sharp division between r al and personal rights re-affirmed 
in Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger.1147 Perhaps it is appropriate that even the name 
presents difficulties. 
At the heart of the tantum et tale debate was a policy argument which might be 
regarded as the converse of the dynamic security argument advanced in support of 
protection for good faith purchasers of fraudulently acquired property. Unsecured 
creditors, it was argued, had trusted the personal creditworthiness of the debtor and 
thus relied neither on the registers nor on the presumption that the possessor of 
moveables owned them. They could make no claim on the publicity principle. 
Therefore, even when they did diligence or had the debtor’s estate sequestrated, they 
did not deserve the protections afforded to singular successors and those who took 
real security.  
                                                 
1143 H Goudy “Note on Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar” (1891) 3 JR 365 at 366. 
1144 Goudy “Note on Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v M’Kay’s Trustee” at 366. 
1145 Eg Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1891) 18 R 1166 at 1170 per Lord Adam. 
1146 Bell Comm I, 298. 
1147 [2004] UKHL 8; 2004 SC (HL) 19. 
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This debate around tantum et tale took place in three main arenas: attaching 
creditors’ general invulnerability to personal rights against their debtor;1148 the 
trust;1149 and the clarification of the effect of fraud on transfer.  
 
A. ATTACHING CREDITORS’ INVULNERABILITY TO PERSONAL  
RIGHTS AGAINST THE DEBTOR 
The strict division between real and personal rights and the resulting invulnerability 
of attaching creditors to prior personal rights against their debtor are seen as 
fundamental in modern Scots law. The essence of a personal right is that it exists 
against a particular person or group of persons and, s Lord Rodger put it, “since the 
debtor and the trustee in sequestration are different p rsons, the trustee is not affected 
by any personal obligations that may have affected th  debtor.”1150 As Lord Rodger 
goes on to acknowledge, the trustee takes the bankrupt’s estate subject to personal 
rights but they do not affect particular assets andrank pari passu. Therefore, they 
cannot be used to lift particular assets out of the sequestrated estate. Further, the 
trustee’s liability for the debts of the estate is a result of his office. The same cannot 
be said of creditors doing diligence. They are absolutely free of their debtor’s 
personal obligations. The same principle can be used to explain why good faith 
purchasers take free of their author’s personal obligations. 
A line of eighteenth and nineteenth century cases concerning the effect of 
adjudication, and most recently surveyed by Lord Rodger in Burnett’s Trustee,1151 
shows that the principle has sometimes been challenged, generally by purchasers of 
assets which were then subject to diligence. It is unnecessary to repeat Lord Rodger’s 
extensive analysis but note may be taken of the elements relevant for the present 
discussion. 
The challenges were made on the basis of the argument ntioned above that 
adjudgers must take the right of their debtor tantum et tale as it stood in him. Since 
the debtor was bound to respect these personal rights, it was argued, so were 
                                                 
1148 Discussed, in relation to heritable property by Lord Rodger in Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger [2004] 
UKHL 8 at paras 112–38. 
1149 For which see GL Gretton “Trusts” in Reid and Zimmer ann History of Private Law in Scotland 
Vol I, 480. 
1150 Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger [2004] UKHL 8 para 137.  
1151 Paras 112–31. See also Bell Comm I, 301. 
248 
 
adjudging creditors. This approach, which might be styled the “broad” tantum et tale 
rule, was eventually rejected. 
The line of authorities which prevailed “seems to have proceeded on the basis … 
that feudal rights were not affected by personal rights”1152 and involved a rejection of 
a policy-based distinction between purchasers and adjudgers.1153 The reasoning 
which prevailed was not based on policy considerations. Rather the key factor was 
the technical conclusion that the requirements for constitution of the right in the 
property had not been fulfilled by the holder of the personal right but had been 
fulfilled by the adjudger.1154 
The resulting principle was considered to be a general one, applicable to 
moveable as well as heritable property.1155 The reasoning applied even to the 
personal rights of so-called “uninfeft proprietors”.1156 As the court pointed out in 
Earl of Fife v Duff, the disposition “vests in him most of the essential attributes of 
ownership” including the right to take possession of and fruits from the property.1157 
If any personal right was going to qualify as a ius ad rem, a right to a thing which 
might stand between the status of a real and a personal right, defeating attaching 
creditors but not purchasers, it would be the right of the uninfeft proprietor. 
However, even that right had no effect against adjudgers. This point once again 
became a matter of some doubt in the late twentieth c ntury.1158 However, the 
uninfeft proprietor’s argument was decisively rejected by the House of Lords in 
Burnett’s Trustee v Grainger.1159 
The adjudgers’ success might have been expected to prevent any further recourse 
to the tantum et tale argument. In fact, it was merely recast in a narrower form. To 
understand why, it is necessary to examine two areas which needed the tantum et tale 
rule to explain their effect. 
 
                                                 
1152 [2004] UKHL 8 para 125. 
1153 Ibid para 122. 
1154 Ibid para 125. 
1155 Wylie v Duncan (1803) 3 Ross LC 134 at 137 per Lord President Campbell; Bell Comm I, 308. In 
Wylie, Lord Presdient Campbell does suggest that a different rule applies to assignations but that is 
readily explicable because the decision pre-dates Redfearn v Sommervails (1813) 5 Pat App 707. 
1156 Earl of Fife v Duff (1862) 24 D 936 (affd (1863) 1 M (HL) 19) at 942. 
1157 (1862) 24 D 936 at 941. 
1158 Sharp v Thomson 1997 SC (HL) 66. 
1159 Esp per Lord Hope at para 19. See also Lord Hope’s judgment as Lord President in the Inner 




B. TWO RULES IN NEED OF A RATIONALE 
The defeat of the broad tantum et tale rule in the adjudication cases removed the 
obvious rationale for two rules that were well-established by 1800: the immunity of 
trust assets to general creditors1160 and the right of a defrauded seller to recover the 
object of sale from the fraudulent buyer’s general c editors.1161 Both involved rights 
to specific assets owned by the debtor. If, however, the asset was owned by the 
debtor, and no mid-right between a real right and a personal right was recognised, the 
rights of beneficiaries and defrauded sellers must have been personal. Why then did 
they prevail over the general creditors of the trustee or the fraudster? 
Some accounts of these rules did not encounter this problem because they denied 
that the debtor owned the relevant assets, arguing that the beneficiary was the true 
owner of the trust assets and that fraud rendered th  transfer null. However, such 
analyses faced substantial difficulties in explaining the protection of good faith 
purchasers against the beneficiary or defrauded seller and did not represent the 
consensus in respect of either situation. Stair, Bankton, Erskine and Hume all made it 
clear that the trustee was the owner of the trust property.1162 In Redfearn v 
Sommervails, Lord Meadowbank confirmed that the right of beneficiaries was 
personal.1163 The view that fraudulently-induced transfers are valid until set aside has 
already been discussed.1164  
 
(1) Surviving by distinguishing 
The rules concerning trusts and fraudulent acquirers were too well established to be 
dropped as a result of a conceptual challenge, particularly since the adjudication 
cases did not concern trusts and only two of them concerned fraudulent 
acquisition.1165 
                                                 
1160 See Gretton “Trusts” at 494 and 499–500. 
1161 See chapter 3, part D(4) above. 
1162 Stair I.xiii.7; Bankton I.xviii.12 (marginal heading); Erskine III.i.32 and Hume Lectures Vol II, 
145–6. 
1163 (1813) 5 Pat App 707 at 710. 
1164 Chapter 3 part D. 
1165 Ireland v Neilson (1755) 5 BS 828 and Gibb v Livingston (1763) 5 BS 897. 
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To modern eyes, at least, the adjudication cases undermine the rule protecting 
defrauded sellers.1166 If their right to avoid is delictual and therefore p rsonal, the 
rejection of the idea that personal rights bind adjudgers seems to leave little scope for 
protection. Further, the cases seem to reject any policy distinction between 
purchasers and creditors in relation to personal rights. At the time the law was 
developing, however, this may have been less evident. Opponents of the broad 
tantum et tale rule may not have understood their views as having any implications 
for fraud. The precise effect of fraud on transfers was not settled and they may have 
thought fraud rendered transfers void.1167 Those who accepted that fraud was a 
ground of avoidance rather than of nullity took comf rt from the fact that the 
decisions concerned adjudication, while the bulk of the decisions about defrauded 
sellers concerned poinding or arrestment of moveables.1168 The adjudication cases 
could therefore be quite easily distinguished without addressing the points of 
principle which they raised.  
Such considerations cannot, however, provide an adequat  justification in the 
modern law. While the language of Lord Rodger’s line of cases is that of feudal 
conveyancing, the principles are applicable to all types of property because they flow 
from the personal nature of personal rights. Personal rights do not become less 
personal because they relate to moveable property. Furthermore, unless a particular 
class of personal rights can be set apart, the idea that a personal right could give a 
preference over other creditors in relation to a specific asset is incoherent.  
All creditors have a personal right, and no personal right links the right-holder to a 
specific asset. Therefore, saying that attaching creditors take subject to the debtor’s 
personal obligations amounts to saying that each creditor has a preference over all 
the other creditors in respect of each asset. A preference conferred on every creditor 
is no preference at all because preferences work by making some people better off 
than others. 
 
                                                 
1166 The dual patrimony theory means that trusts are not similarly undermined, although that 
development was still almost 200 years in the future. 
1167 Lord Braxfield, the major opponent of the broad t ntum et tale rule appears to have taken this 
view: Allan Stewart & Co v Creditors of Stein (1788) Hailes 1059. 
1168 Compare Hume Lecutres Vol II, 16 (on the defrauded seller) with Vol I, 47 (discussing the 
tantum et tale rules in adjudications). See Mansfield v Walker’s Trustees (1833) 11 S 813 at 822–3 per 
Lords Gillies, Mackenzie, Medwyn and Corehouse. 
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(2) Tantum et tale  reborn – taking advantage of the debtor’s fraud 
Perhaps as a result of these problems, lawyers did not content themselves with 
seeking to confine the rule to adjudication of heritable property. Even as the 
distinction between heritable and moveable property in this area was being asserted, 
its weaknesses were being felt. While Lords Gillies, Mackenzie, Medwyn and 
Corehouse scolded the defenders in Mansfield v Walker’s Trustees for referring to 
cases concerning moveables which are “nowise connected” with the cases on 
personal rights and adjudication, they none the less f lt obliged to concede that 
“Even in the case of moveables … the creditor using dili ence does not take them 
tantum et tale, as they stand in the debtor, that is, he is not responsible for the 
personal obligation of the debtor concerning them.”1169 
Although the adjudication cases did not put an end to the distinction between 
purchasers and general creditors, they do seem to have caused, or at least been 
accompanied by, a significant narrowing of its scope. From now on, general creditors 
were only to be affected by a small class of personal rights. 
The key to the new approach can be found in Hume’s tr atment of the defrauded 
seller’s right to recover from the fraudster’s general creditors. He seems to begin 
with the broad tantum et tale rule, that the general creditors “are held to attach their 
debtor’s interest such as it is in his own person and no better; they occupy his place, 
and are liable to the same exceptions as he.” He does n t stop there, however. He 
goes on: “As their debtor himself, if the question were with him, could not avail 
himself of his fraudulent acquisition, so neither can they take benefit by it who plead 
his right.”1170 
In context, the latter passage looks like a mere specific instance of the general 
principle enunciated in the former, but it would become the essence of the new, 
narrow tantum et tale rule. It is easy to see how a special rule, prohibiting creditors 
from taking advantage of their debtor’s fraud, could explain the protection of 
defrauded sellers. First, it seems intuitively wrong to allow other creditors to “take 
the benefit of” or “adopt” the debtor’s fraud. On a technical level, their special status 
as victims of fraud rather common or garden creditors allows them to be 
                                                 
1169 (1833) 11 S 813 at 822. 
1170 Hume Lectures Vol II, 16. 
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distinguished from the wider body of creditors and thus given a meaningful 
preference. Adoption of the debtor’s fraud could also include doing something which 
would be fraud were the debtor to do it.1171 
Some appear to have been concerned, however, that simple reference to fraud was 
insufficient to establish a connection with a particular asset, leading to the additional 
requirement that the fraud be one of the “conditions which affect the constitution of 
the real right in the debtor”.1172 On this view, a defrauded party is a mere personal 
creditor unless the fraud had induced the transfer of the asset in question. Others, 
however, focussed directly on the prohibition on taking the benefit of the debtor’s 
fraud. This meant they were willing to grant prefernces to compensate defrauded 
parties even in cases where the fraud did not cause the acquisition of property.1173 
The distinction was most significant in trust cases, due to the courts’ willingness 
to characterise breach of trust as fraud.1174 This is readily understandable if the broad 
understanding of fraud as dolus, and thus as breach of bona fides, is borne in mind. 
Appropriation of the trust assets to satisfy his personal debtors would be breach of 
trust were the bankrupt to do it himself. Breach of trust is a betrayal of the good faith 
(fides) with the truster and thus a species of fraud. Of course, breaches of trust can 
occur which are not related to the acquisition of pr perty. 
The point is illustrated by Graeme’s Trustee v Giersberg.1175 In her marriage 
contract, Mrs Giersberg had assigned all her property and acquirenda to a trust for 
the rather dubious purposes of avoiding her husband’s jus mariti and the diligence of 
her creditors. As beneficiary, she was entitled to alimentary payments from the trust. 
In order to incorporate incorporeal acquirenda into the trust it was necessary to make 
intimation to the relevant debtors. For some time, th  trustees neglected to do so, in 
                                                 
1171 Eg Graeme’s Tr v Giersberg (1888) 15 R 691 at 694 per Lord President Inglis. 
1172 Mansfield v Walker’s Trs at 822–3 per Lords Gilles, Mackenzie, Medwyn and Corehouse   (affd 
(1835) Sh & MacL 203 at 338–9 per Lord Brougham). See also Bell Comm I, 299 and Lord Shand’s 
dissent in Graeme’s Tr v Giersberg (1888) 15 R 691 at 697. 
1173 Mansfield v Walker’s Trs at 842–3 per Lord President Hope and Lord Moncrieff (dissenting – 
their position was essentially supported by Lord Justice Clerk Boyle and Lord Glenlee at 843–51) 
when the Second Division was called to advise on the matter; Molleson v Challis (1873) 11 M 510; 
Colquhouns’ Tr v Campbell’s Trs (1902) 4 F 739. 
1174 Lord President Hope’s note on Dingwall v M’Combie printed in Gordon v Cheyne (1824) 2 S 566 
at 567–8; Bell Comm I, 310 suggesting the application of this analysis to Thomson v Douglas, Heron 
& Co; Mansfield v Walker’s Trs at 847 per Lord Justice Clerk Boyle explaining Gordon v Cheyne in 
terms of fraud and Heritable Reversionary Co v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43 at 45 per Lord Herschell 
and at 50–1 per Lord Watson; Colquhouns’ Trustee v Campbell’s Trustee  at 744 per Lord Kinnear. 
1175 (1888) 15 R 691. 
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breach of their duties. Thereafter, one of the trustees became insolvent. As well as 
being a trustee, he was owed money by Mrs Giersberg, and his trustee in 
sequestration sought to arrest the acquirenda rights to payment. This was, of course, 
only possible because of his breach of trust. Mrs Giersberg opposed the arrestment.  
Lord Shand reasoned that the right which the trustee in sequestration sought to 
enforce had not been acquired through fraud: Mrs Giersberg’s debt to the marriage 
trustee was not the result of fraud, and never had anything directly to do with the 
trust; the right to do diligence to enforce a debt was an automatic incident of the debt, 
so its existence could not be attributed to fraud either.1176 Therefore, he argued, the 
trustee was quite free to arrest the debts. 
The majority, however, took the opposite view. Lord President Inglis and Lord 
Adam justified their position by reference to a broad reading of the assignatus utitur  
rule.1177 Lord Kinnear, however, based his decision on the tantum et tale rule. He 
argued that the trustee in sequestration was seeking to take advantage of the marriage 
trustee’s breach of trust because, had the marriage trustee performed his duties 
properly, arrestment would have been impossible.1178 Lord Kinnear’s approach was 
adopted by Lord President Kinross in Colquhouns’ Trustee v Campbell’s 
Trustees.1179 In the absence of a requirement that the fraud be involved in the 
constitution of the right,1180 the rule came to be stated in fairly wide terms. For
instance: 
 
[T]he creditors cannot enlarge the estate for distribution by adopting a fraud on 
the part of the bankrupt, or doing something which would have been a fraud if 
done by him while solvent.1181 
 
Given the broad nature of fraud in Scots law,1182 this comes very close to opening the 
door to the old view of tantum et tale.1183 The early twentieth-century authorities thus 
                                                 
1176 At 697. 
1177 At 694 and 698. 
1178 At 692. 
1179 (1902) 4 F 739 at 742. 
1180 Cf Stewart Diligence 620 and the Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Adjudication 
for Debt and Related Matters (SLC DP 78, November 1988) para 5.36 and Report on Diligence para 
3.70 suggesting that the fraud requires to affect the grant of the right to the debtor. 
1181 (1902) 4 F 739 at 744 per Lord Kinnear. 
1182 Particularly since, grant of a second disposition by the bankrupt would be fraud. 
1183 See Anderson “Fraud on Transfer and on Insolvency: ta … ta... tantum et tale?” at 189–91. 
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left the law rather unclear. This represents an endpoint for the rule’s development as 
the case law dried up. 
 
C. THE WITHERING OF TANTUM ET TALE  
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the tantum et tale rule is its disappearance 
in the twentieth and early twenty first centuries. The rule, it seems, has been left 
largely without a role.1184 
Trust assets’ invulnerability to the trustee’s attaching creditors can now be 
explained by reference to the dual-patrimony theory1185 and to section 33 (1)(b) of 
the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985.  Although the rule is mentioned in a major 
modern textbook on the law of diligence1186 it is only used in relation to arrestments 
and the situations discussed seem explicable on the basis of either the nemo plus rule, 
separate trust patrimony, or the assignatus utitur rule.1187 Similarly, when Lord 
Cameron used the term in relation to adjudications in Gibson v Hunter Home 
Designs Ltd, he seemed to regard it as merely meaning that adjudgers take property 
subject to prior real rights.1188 These modern uses of tantum et tale add nothing to 
other, better established rules in these cases. 
Most curiously of all, there has been no successful claim for restoration of goods 
by a defrauded seller for a hundred years.1189 And in contrast to trusts, no fresh 
construction has emerged to explain the rule. The constructive trust might have been 
employed to allow reliance on the separate patrimony rationale. There is, however, 
no support for such a construction in the authorities. Therefore, the fraudulently 
acquired assets must be considered to pass into the fraudster’s personal patrimony, 
meaning that the defrauded party continues to requi to assert his right to recovery 
                                                 
1184 The term continues to be mentioned in a number of cases but it does not signify any result which 
could not be explained by reference to other rules of property law.  
1185 This process was started, albeit rather imperfectly, by the House of Lords in Heritable 
Reversionary when they shifted their attention from trying to characterise breach of trust as fraud to 
examining the nature of the trustee’s title: see Lord Watson at 49. The separate patrimony theory 
provides Scots lawyers with a non-fraud analysis which does not require recourse to divided title: GL 
Gretton “Trusts without Equity” (2000) 49 ICLQ 599; Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on 
the Nature and Constitution of Trusts (SLC DP 133, October 2006) paras 2.1–2.28. 
1186 G Maher and DJ Cusine The Law and Practice of Diligence (1990) para 5.37.  
1187 See also Gretton “Diligence” para 262. 
1188 1976 SC 23 at 29–30. 
1189 Muir v Rankin (1905) 13 SLT 60 appears to be the last instance. 
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against the trustee as he would have done against the fraudster, rather than bringing a 
declarator of trust. In doing so, explicit reliance on the tantum et tale doctrine is still 
necessary. It is difficult to believe that there have been no insolvent fraudulent 
acquirers since the beginning of the twentieth century. Apparently counsel have not 
seen fit to rely on the doctrine for many years. 
The question was addressed, albeit obiter, in AW Gamage v Charlesworth’s 
Trustee.1190 There Lord Johnston expressed serious doubts about whether the seller 
would have been able to recover the goods from the trustee in sequestration: 
 
I doubt whether the doctrine of tantum et tale can be carried so far. A subject held 
on a title with a latent trust seems to me to be a very different thing from one 
acquired on a contract tainted with fraud, and to apply the doctrine to the latter, as 
to the former, appears to me to come very near to teating fraud in contract as a 
vitium reale.1191 
 
Lord Johnston was right. The tantum et tale rule does come very close to treating 
fraud as a vitium reale. None the less, it is remarkable that what was once a ore case 
for the rule had become, in Lord Johnston’s mind, a m rginal one. It must be 
conceded, however, that Lord Salvesen had no such doubts. Since AW Gamage, very 
little has been heard of the rule.1192 Perhaps the increasingly stringent approach to 
establishing fraud in these cases made the rule practically unworkable. 
 
D. BURNETT’S TRUSTEE v GRAINGER  
In Burnett’s Trustee Lord Rodger took great care to distinguish the position of the 
trustee from that of a purchaser.1193 He did so because he was concerned to show 
why the trustee in sequestration was not prevented from completing his title by the 
offside goals rule. Lord Rodger took the view that the offside goals rule applied even 
to cases where the second buyer found out about the first sale after his contract had 
been concluded. Doubts about the soundness of this analysis have been expressed in 
chapter 7. Nonetheless, Lord Rodger’s line of reasoning is interesting. He suggests 
                                                 
1190 1910 SC 257. 
1191 Ibid at 270. 
1192 It is noted in Reid Property para 694 on the basis of the earlier case law. 
1193 [2004] UKHL 8 at paras 67 and 141–2. 
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that attaching creditors are to be accorded greater licence than purchasers (even when 
the purchaser was in good faith when the contract ws concluded). This is a complete 
reversal of the policy which underlies the tantum et tale rule, ie the view that the 
purchasers are more worthy of protection than attaching creditors. 
 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The tantum et tale rule could be regarded as presenting a serious challenge to the 
approach to fraud taken in this thesis. In its later form, it involved a sharp distinction 
between fraudulent misrepresentation and innocent misrepresentation or 
concealment1194 and elevated the right to recover fraudulently acquired property 
above the status of a mere delictual right to reparation. 
The Scottish Law Commission has consistently recommended the retention of the 
tantum et tale rule because of its equitable flexibility.1195 However, they suggest that 
“it would be unwise to put the adaptability of the tantum et tale principle at risk by 
attempting to make it the subject of express statutory statement” and so the 
legislature “should not attempt to define the content of that principle.”1196 The value 
of a principle so flexible that its content cannot be stated in legislation is perhaps 
open to question, particularly in an area of law where certainty is valued so highly. A 
rule which is best expressed in three Latin words which mean very little even when 
translated must surely come under suspicion. 
The rule seems better considered as an anomaly and something of an 
anachronism. In so far as a clear effect can be identified, its primary function in the 
modern law is to accord a preference to one class of unsecured creditors which is 
difficult to justify. If it sits uncomfortablly with the approach taken to 
misrepresentation, it also sits uncomfortably with the principle of paritas creditorum. 
Allowing creditors to take advantage or adopt the bankrupt’s fraud sounds unfair but 
it must be borne in mind that the bankrupt is likely to have harmed all creditors, and 
giving effect to the tantum et tale rule will worsen their lot. Further, it disrupts the 
                                                 
1194 Inglis v Mansfield (1833) 11 S 813; Muir v Rankin at 61 per Lord Dundas. 
1195 Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation para 11.22; Discussion 
Paper on Adjudication for Debt para 5.37 and Report on Diligence paras 3.70–2 and 3.206–7. 
1196 Discussion Paper on Adjudication for Debt para 5.37. See also Report on Bankruptcy para 11.22 
and Report on Diligence para 3.71. 
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strict division between real and personal rights which is central to Scots law and was 







This thesis has examined several key grounds of voidable transfer in Scots law: 
misrepresentation, insolvency of the granter, litigiosity, and the offside goals rule. It 
began with an examination of the emergence of voidability as a category of invalidity 
distinct from voidness or nullity with the following characteristics: 
 
• The act is valid for the time being. 
• Whether the act is set aside depends on the decision of the person or persons 
whose interests are protected by the rule which rendered the act voidable. 
• Good faith purchasers of voidably acquire property a e protected. 
 
It is suggested that, in the instances which are examined, these phenomena can be 
explained by characterising voidability as a mechanism for giving effect to a 
personal right to the reversal of the relevant transaction. This personal right arises 
either from the law of delict, as a right to reparation for fraud, or in a case where the 
grant is gratuitous, from the law of unjustified enrichment. The enrichment analysis 
is supported by the fact that the acquirer would have been liable for fraud had he 
known what was going on, so that in one sense the enrichment rules can be 
considered as extensions of the relevant fraud rule. W re the acquirer to retain the 
property with full knowledge of the circumstances of the acquisition, he would 
effectively complete the fraud. This is permitted where a transfer is onerous, in order 
to maintain security of transactions, but a gratuitous transferee has no relevant 
reliance interest and so is not entitled to the same degree of protection.  
They type of fraud is not the same in all of the cases examined. In the case of 
misrepresentation, it is straightforward deceit. This is a wrong against the autonomy 
and free decision-making of the transferor in disposing of his assets. Reversing this 
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wrong necessitates the unwinding of the transaction and returning the assets, which is 
achieved by avoidance of the transfer. 
The other cases examined concern fraud on a credito. In those cases, the fraud 
consists in attempting to frustrate an existing creditor’s attempts to get satisfaction 
from the debtor’s patrimony.  
In the case of the transferor’s insolvency, the attempt to defraud creditors is 
general in nature. The debtor is aware that his assets are insufficient to satisfy his 
creditors and he deepens his inability to pay by making the grants which are 
challenged. 
In the case of litigiosity, a prohibition on dealing is imposed as a result of court 
action. As in insolvency, its purpose is preservation of the estate or relevant asset in 
order to ensure satisfaction of the creditor’s right. Consideration of litigiosity also 
included extensive examination of the effect of arrestment, which is sometimes 
attributed to litigiosity. 
Arrestment is a challenge to the present account because its effects go beyond that 
which are explicable by a personal right to have dealings with the arrested property 
set aside. Examination of the sources suggests that these effects are attributable to the 
view that arrestment gives the arrester a subordinate real right in the arrested 
property and that this view is a preferable basis for explaining arrestment. It is 
therefore unnecessary to be account for the stronge eff cts of arrestment by 
reference to fraud on creditors. 
In the case of the offside goals rule, the restriction on dealings with an asset is 
implied by the transferor’s pre-existing obligation to grant a real right in the property 
to someone else. By transferring the property, the debtor renders himself incapable of 
fulfilling this obligation. Characterising the right to avoid as a personal right to the 
reversal of a transaction explains in turn why bad faith or gratuitous successors to 
voidably acquired property can be brought within the offside goals rule. 
The transferee is liable as an accessory to the fraud and therefore subject to the 
right to reduce. The interest protected is in avoiding frustration of the creditor’s 
efforts to obtain satisfaction. In some cases, adequately protecting this interest does 
not require the transfer to be set aside to its full extent or against all parties. The 
extent of the reduction may then be specified and the act remains valid for all other 
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purposes. This modification of the effect of reduction is particularly associated with 
reduction ex capite inhibitionis but examination of the early-modern materials and 
the principles surrounding the law in this area shows that it is applicable beyond the 
case of inhibitions. 
Understanding the offside goals rule in this way gives a clearer view of certain 
problematic aspects of the rule. The parallel with in ibition and with grants by 
insolvent debtors suggests that a purchaser who is in good faith when his contract is 
concluded is entitled to protect his own interests by pursuing satisfaction, despite 
later acquiring knowledge of a competing personal right which predates his own.  
The limited effect of avoidance for fraud on creditors helps to explain how the 
offside goals rule would apply to cases where the first creditor’s right was to the 
grant of a subordinate real right rather than to transfer the property. It further 
explains why the offside goals rule only protects personal rights to real rights. 
Avoidance of a transfer on the basis of the rule is ad hunc effectum, the hunc being 
so as to enable the debtor to make the relevant juridical act. For all other purposes, 
the transfer remains effective. If, therefore, the debtor has no obligation to make a 
juridical act affecting an asset, setting its transfer aside would serve no purpose. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that the creditor s not necessarily without a 
remedy as he may often be able to pursue a damages claim for inducing breach of 
contract. 
The so-called tantum et tale rule presents a further challenge to the account of 
voidability presented in this thesis. This rule gives a defrauded party a preference 
over attaching creditors, which appears to run contrary to the idea that the defrauded 
party has a mere personal right. The wider difficult es with the tantum et tale rule, 
the tensions with recent case law and the absence of successful reliance on the rule in 
the modern era are explored. Taken together, these ca t doubt on the continuing 
relevance and utility of the rule and suggest that failure to account for the tantum et 
tale rule should not be considered fatal in an analysis of voidability.  
In summary, this thesis maintains that avoidance of transfers on grounds of 
misrepresentation, insolvency of the debtor, litigiosity or the offside goals rule is best 
understood as a mechanism for giving effect to a personal right to the reversal of the 
transaction. That right arises from an obligation bi ding on the transferee which is 
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imposed for the protection of the avoiding party. The extent to which the transfer is 
reversed is determined by what is necessary for the int rest protected by the 
obligation. This account provides a plausible explaination of the position of good 
faith purchasers, of the choice which the avoiding party has about whether to set the 





APPENDIX: THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 1621 (c 18) 
 
A ratificatioun of the act of the lordis of counsell and sessioun made in Julii 
1620 aganis unlauchfull dispositiones and alienationis made be dyvoures 
and banckruptis 
 
[a] Oure soverane lord, with advyse and consent off he estaittis convenit in 
this present parliament, ratiefies and apprevis and for his hienes and his 
successoures perpetuallie confermes the act of the lordis of counsell and 
sessioun made aganis dyvoures and bankruptis at Edinburgh, the tuelff day 
of Julii 1620, and ordanis the same to have and tak full effect and 
executioun as ane necessarie and proffitable law for the weill of all his 
hieghnes subjectis, off the quhilk act the tennoure followes: 
 
[b] The lordis off counsall and sessione, understanding by the grevous and 
just complayntis of many of his majesties gude subjectis that the fraude, 
malice and falshoode of a number of dyvoures and bankruptis is becum so 
frequent and awowed and hathe alreddy taikin sick progres to the 
overthairow of many honest menis fortounes and estaitti  that it is liklie to 
dissolve trust, commerse and faythfull dealing amang subjectis, 
quhairupoun must ensew the ruine off the whole estat  gif the godles 
deceatis of those be not preventit and remeidit, who, by there apparent welth 
in landis and guidis and by thair schow of consciene, credite and honestie 
drawing into thair handis upoun trust the money, merchandice and guidis of 
weilmeaning and credoulous persounes, do no wayes int nd to repaye the 
same, bot ather to leiff ryioutouslie by wasting of uther menis substance, or 
to enriche thame selffis by that subtile stealthe of trew menis guidis, and to 
withdraw thame selffis and thair guidis furth of this realme to elude all 
executioun of justice; and to that effect, and in manifest defraud of thair 
creditouris, do mak simulate and fraudfull alienationes, dispositiounes and 
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utheris securities of thair landis, reversiounes, tyndis, guidis, actiounes, 
dettis and utheris belanging unto thame to thair wyiffes, childrene, 
kynnismen, alleyis and uther confident and interposed persounes without 
anye trew, lauchfull or necessarie caus and without anye just or trew pryce 
intervening in thair saidis barganis, wherby thair just creditoures and 
cautioneris ar falslie and godleslie defraudit off all payment off thair just 
dettis and manye honest famelies liklie to cum to ut er ruine.  
 
[c1] For remeid quhairoff, the saidis lordis, according to the powar gevin 
unto thame by his majestie and his most noble progenitoures to sett doun 
ordouris for administratioun of justice, meaning to follow and practize the 
guid and commendable lawis, civill and cannone, maid aganis fraudfull 
alienatiounes in prejudice of creditouris and aganis the authoures and 
partakeris of suche fraude, statutes, ordanis and declairis that in all actiounes 
and causes depending or to be intentit by any trew cr ditour for recoverie of 
his just debt or satisfactioun of his lauchfull actioun and right, they will 
decreit and decerne all alienatiounes, dispositiounes, assignatiounes and 
translatiounes whatsoevir made by the dettour of ony of his landis, teyndis, 
reversounes, actiounes, dettis or guidis quhatsoevir to anye conjunct or 
confident persoun without trew, just and necessarie causes and without a 
just pryce realie payit, the same being done efter th  contracting of lauchfull 
dettis frome trew creditoures, to have bene frome the beginning and to be in 
all tymes cuming null and off nane availl, force nor effect at the instance of 
the trew and just creditour be way off actioun, exceptioun or replye, without 
farder declaratour.  
 
[c2] And incace anye of his majesties gude subjectis (no wayis pertakeris of 
the saidis fraudis) have lauchfullie purchesit anye of the saidis bankeruptis 
landis or guidis by trew barganis frome just and competent pryces or in 
satisfactioun of thair lauchfull dettis frome the interposed persounes trusted 
by the saidis dyvoures, in that cace the right lauchfullie acquyrit be him 
quha is nawayes partaker of the fraude sall not be annulled in maner 
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foirsaid, bot the ressaver off the pryce of the saidi  landis, guidis and utheris 
frome the buyer salbe haldin and obleisit to mak the same furth cuming to 
the behuiff of the bankruptis trew creditouris in payment of thair lauchfull 
dettis;  
 
[c3] and it salbe sufficient probatioune of the fraude intended aganis the 
creditoures if they or onie of thame salbe hable to verefie by wreate or by 
oathe of the pairtie receaver of anye securitie frome the dyvoure or bankrupt 
that the samen wer made without anye trew, just and necessarie caus or 
without anye trew or competent pryce, or that the landis and guidis of the 
dyvoure and bankrupt being sold by him who bocht thame frome the said 
dyvoure, the whole or the maist pairt of the pryce thairoff wes converted or 
to be converted to the bankruptes proffite and use,prowyding alwayes that 
so muche of the saidis landis and guidis or pryces thairof so trusted by 
bankruptis to interposed persounes as hathe bene realli  payit or assignet by 
thame to anye of the bankruptis lauchfull creditoures salbe allowed unto 
thame, they making the rest forthcuming to the remanent creditoures who 
want thair dew paymentis.  
 
[d] And if in tyme cuming anye of the saidis dyvoures or thair interposed 
partakeris of thair fraude sall mak anye voluntarie payment or right to ony 
persoun in defraude of the lauchfull and more tymelie diligence of ane uther 
creditoure haveing servit inhibitioun or useit horning, arreistment, 
comprysing or uther lauchfull meane dewlie to affect the dyvoures landis or 
guidis or pryce thairoff to his behuiff, in that cace the said dyvoure or 
interposed persone salbe holdin to mak the same furthcumand to the 
creditour haveing used his first lauchfull diligens, who sall lyikwayis be 
preferrit to the concreditour, who being posteriour unto him in diligence 
hathe obtenit payment by partiall favoure of the dettour or of his interposit 
confident, and sal have gude actione to recover frome the said creditour that 




[e] Finallie, the lordis declairis all suche bankruptis and dyvoures and all 
interposed personis for covering or executing thair fraudis and all utheris 
who sall gif counsell and wilfull assistance unto the saidis bankruptis in the 
dewysing and praktiezing of thair saidis fraudis and godles deceittis to the 
prejudice of thair trew creditoures salbe reputed an holden dishonest, fals 
and infamous persones, uncapable of all honoures, dignities, benefices and 
offices or to pas upoun inquestis or assysses or tobeir witnes in judgement 
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